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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores a particular experiment in political accommodation 
between the Muslim majority and Coptic minority in Egypt between 1918 and 
1952. The Egyptians then seized the opportunity presented by a changing 
political system to restructure the governing arrangements between Muslims 
and Copts and involve the latter more fully in the political process. Many 
hoped to see the collaboration of the 1919 revolution spur the creation of 
both a new collective Egyptian identity and a state without religious bias. 
Traditional ways of governing, however, were not so easily cast aside, and 
Islam continued to have a political role.
Some Egyptians held tenaciously to the traditional arrangements which 
had both guaranteed Muslim primacy and served relatively well to protect the 
Copts and afford them some autonomy. Differences within the Coptic 
community over the wisdom of trusting the genuineness and durability of 
Muslim support for equality were accented by a protracted struggle between 
reforming laymen and conservative clergy for control of the community.
The unwillingness of all parties to compromise hampered the ability of the 
community both to determine and defend its interests.
The Copts met with modest success in their attempt to become full 
Egyptian citizens. As one example, their influence in the Wafd, the pre­
eminent political party, was very strong prior to and in the early years of 
the Constitutional Monarchy. As a second, their formal representation was 
generally adequate and, in some Parliaments, better than adequate. However, 
this very success produced a backlash which caused many Copts to believe, 
by the 19L0s, that the experiment had failed: political activity had
become fraught with risk for them. Coptic complaints about Muslim 
intolerance abounded and reflected the broad criticisms levelled at minority 
behaviour by Muslims. At the close of the monarchy, equality and shared 
power seemed notions as distant as in the disheartening years before the 
revolution.
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND ABBREVIATIONS
Arabic words have been transliterated largely according to the 
Cambridge University system. Two exceptions should be noted. A few 
Coptic names , which are not of Arabic origin and which appear obscure 
in proper transliteration, have been rendered, for the ease of the 
reader, in a more recognizable form. The main examples here are the 
names of three great churchmen: Sergius, Makarios and Cyril (or
Kirillos). In addition, some Egyptian place names, which have long 
been familiar to the English-speaking world, have been left in their 
standard form. These names include Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Damietta 
and Luxor.
Various source abbreviations have been used in the footnotes, and 
these are explained below:
Egyptian Archives 
CAS 
CCEH
Chamber Debates
DM
DW
PPF
Senate Debates
Foreign Archives 
CMS 
LD
Coptic Archaeological Society, Cairo
Centre for Contemporary Egyptian History 
and Documentation (Markaz Watha1iq wa 
Ta'rikh Misr al-Mucasir), Dar al-kutub, Cairo 
F = File Cabinet 
D = Drawer
Madabit
Majlis al-Nuwwab, Parliament Library, Cairo. 
Dar al-Mahfu?at, Citadel, Cairo.
Dar al-Watha'iq, Citadel, Cairo.
Palace Press Files, CCEH, Dar al-kutub, Cairo 
Madabit
Majlis al-Shuyukh, Parliament Library, Cairo.
Church Missionary Society, London.
Lampson/Killearn Diaries, Middle East Centre, 
St. Antony's College, Oxford University.
PHS Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia
7INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem
In a polity whose raison d ’etre was the perfection of a 
society in which Muslims could fulfil their religious obligations, 
the place of indigenous non-Muslims posed both theoretical and 
practical problems. How should such a polity deal with those 
who had been exposed to Islam and yet declined to accept its 
manifest truth? There were too many non-Muslims and they performed 
functions, particularly in Egypt, that were too critical to the 
well-being of the state to be either forcibly converted en masse 
or exterminated. Religion was therefore made a political, social 
and economic determinant; it set an individual’s status, friend­
ships, tax, entitlement to government benefits, code of law and 
sometimes even profession and living quarters. Non-Muslims were 
not citizens in the full sense because loyalty to the State and to 
the State's religion were inextricable.^ They were not trust­
worthy, and therefore Muslims required some protection from them.
Although with time an extensive body of literature pertaining 
to religious minorities in the Islamic lands developed, the 
position of minorities was firmly fixed neither in theory nor in 
fact; it was time and place specific. Of course, there were 
similarities; the public did have an idea about the appropriate 
place for minorities, and this idea helped set regulations and 
perpetuate attitudes. Still, there was some flexibility in this
1, See Albert Hourani, A Vision of History: Near Eastern and
Other Essays, Beirut, 1961, p.T^.
8system, A government could use Qur'anic verses and extracts from 
the Iiadith, the two basic sources of Islam, to justify either 
a lenient and beneficent attitude toward a minority or a harsh and 
suppressive one. Sometimes it just followed the mob. Much depended 
on other factors: general economic conditions, political turmoil, and
the particular occupations and amount of wealth held by a minority among 
them.
The influx of Western ideas into Egypt in the 19th century began 
to change both the theory and practice of government and communal 
organization. These ideas opened up new opportunities to the Copts to 
improve their community’s status and to make an active contribution to 
politics and the political culture. The Copts had long been excluded 
from politics and from certain goods which the State existed partly to 
provide; for the first time, new ways of thinking gave them a chance 
to play a serious role in determining their own destiny. Muslims, of 
course, as the majority, had the largest say in determining this 
destiny; some helped the Copts seize these new opportunities and others 
advocated the retention of more traditional ways. This thesis, then, 
is concerned with the basic policy questions of how the Egyptians 
restructured the governing arrangements between the majority and minority 
in this changing system and what factors influenced that restructuring.
Related concerns are the effect of Islam on this process and the
ways in which its precepts were applied to policy matters involving
minorities; the influence of the British, as the slowly retiring
colonial power; and the ways in which the Copts struggled to overcome
an ethnic identity the display of which had involved considerable risk
in the past and which had given them no right to act in the political
?sphere. How did various discriminatory practices alter. Finally, how 
useful are ethnic and religious loyalties in accounting for political 
conduct in this period?
9The development of new arrangements was not fixed and sudden, as 
might be inferred from the establishment of a constitution and 
parliament in 1923, but was a process with both victories and setbacks.
The question of whether a satisfactory accommodation was reached by 
the end of this period was one that would have drawn different answers 
from different people.
It is not intended in this thesis to use the Egyptian situation as a 
basis from which to derive generalizations about the perplexing problem 
of ethnic conflict in other parts of the world or even in the Middle 
East, nor is it intended to make any categorical statements about Islam 
and its role in the politics of other Islamic countries. It is the 
purpose of this thesis only to address a particular experiment in 
accommodation between Egypt’s majority and largest minority in the first 
half of this century. The results of this experiment can perhaps also 
be used to help measure the confluence between religious dictates and 
political behaviour in Egyptian society. The Copts were, in some ways, 
peripheral to a debate which centred on determining the proper role for 
religion in this society.
B. The getting
1. The Traditional Position of the Copts and Other non-Muslims 
Prior to the 19th century, the particular place of non-Muslims in 
Muslim polities was determined largely by the fact that Islam granted 
the validity of and incorporated elements of Judaeo-Christian doctrine. 
Muslims were therefore willing, in a general sense, to let Christians 
and Jews practise their religion and be ruled by their own laws and 
religious leaders. This system, based on separation, minimized 
contacts between ethnic groups and was relatively successful in containing
i o
communal conflict; this does not, however, suggest that there was not 
pressure of various kinds on non-Muslims. Although semi-autonomous, 
these religious communities, or millets as they were called by the 
Ottomans who perfected the system, lived in close interdependence with 
the government. The ecclesiastical authorities were the government- 
sanctioned and supported heads of a community, and they dealt with the 
government on its behalf. For example, the Egyptian state relied on 
the Copts for taxes, the performance of certain kinds of jobs and 
sometimes the deflection of a mob's anger that might otherwise have 
been aimed toward the government. The Copts, in return, looked to
2
the State for protection of their lives, property and right to worship;
a protection that was reflected in their designation as Dhimmfs or
Protected Peoples and that was far more easily withheld by the State than
were taxes by the Copts. The Copts also relied on the State to settle
3
numerous intra-communal squabbles. Despite the fact that the Copts 
disliked the Egyptian government’s right to intervene in certain Coptic 
communal and religious matters, they often forfeited the independence 
and autonomy they had in other areas by inviting government mediation 
or partisan interference.
The Qur'an andHadith are not entirely consistent in the behaviour 
toward non-Muslims that they enjoin upon Muslims. Some verses in the 
Qur'an react strongly to the hostility displayed toward Islam and the 
Prophet's divinely ordained mission by Christians and Jews.^4 Others,
2. One interesting Upper Egyptian manifestation of this Muslim obligation 
to protect Copts was that Beduin, at least until the 1930s, formed 
special relationships with Copts, offering protection in return for 
financial assistance. Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and 
Revolution, trans. Jean Stewart (London 1972), p.67.
3. Otto Meinardus, Christian Egypt; Faith and Life (Cairo 1970), p.356. 
There are several such verses in Suras II and V. For example, one
verse in Sura V instructs Believers not to take Jews and Christians as 
friends because they were the friends only of each other: "Whoso of 
you makes them his friends is one of them. God guides not the people of 
the evil doers". See The Koran Interpreted, trans. by A.J. Arberry, 
part Z (New York 1973)» p.136.
1 1
notably in Suras II and V, advise that any man who believes in God and
does good, be he Christian or Jew, will reap his just reward from the
Lord and will have no cause for fear or sorrow. The Copts were in a
particularly fortunate position for the Prophet, who had a Coptic wife,
preached especial kindness to them: "When you conquer Egypt, be kind to
the Copts for they are your proteges and kith and kin",^ Other sayings,
however, abuse non-Muslims, emphasize their inferiority and warn
Believers to be on their guard; for example, "deference to the unbeliever 
r
is unbelief".
Non-Muslims suffered from specific disabilities, some of which were
serious and interfered with their freedom of worship. For example, there
7
were restrictions on repairing old churches and building new ones, non- 
Muslims could not testify In court or bear arms, and regulations governed 
their appearance and behaviour in order that they be clearly distinguishable 
from Muslims and not affront the sensibilities of the latter.
The disparate legacy allowed some governments, as noted, to show 
considerable generosity toward the Copts. The regulations were not 
always rigidly and routinely enforced, and the problems Copts suffered 
were sporadic; the two things which they may have felt most keenly, 
arbitrary government and an onerous tax system, weighed just as heavily,
5. Quoted in Shaykh Damanhuri on the Churches of Cairo, ed. and trans.
Moshe Perlman (Berkeley 1975)> p.^. Another Hadith reads that
"Whoso revileth a dhimmi will be flogged on judgment day with lashes 
of fire". When cAmr !ibn al-'Ass was Viceroy in Egypt, the Caliph 
cUmar reminded him that the Prophet had said, "Whoso unfairly treateth 
a convenantor or imposeth too heavy a burden.on him, will I be his 
adversary on judgment day..." Al-Sayyid Muhammad a]-SChidr Husain, 
"Tolerance of Islam", Nur al-'Islam 3 (part 6 ) (1932), p.l6 .
6. From al-fAshbah wa-l-Nazalir; quoted in Shaykh Damanhuri, p.56.
7. Two sayings on this subject are attributed to the Prophet. The first
insists that no church be erected in Islamic territory, and once a 
church has been destroyed it should not be rebuilt. The second is that 
there should be "no celibacy in Islam,h&F church construction".
Shaykh Damanhuri, p.52.
8. See those listed in M. Belin, "Fetoua Relatif a la condition des Zimmis", 
Journal Asiatique, 1+eme serie, tom.19 (1852), pp.97-110. One list of 
apparel . specified that dhimmis could not wear shoelaces and, if they 
wore shoes without laces, the shoes were to be coarse material and
nnril noocirrf n n l  miT »  QVicaTrlrVi T’l a m Q n V n i r ,,i t \ R n
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in most cases on the True Believers. It can he said, however, that
their social and civil inferiority made their Muslim neighbours as
9
much inclined to take advantage of them as was the government.
One perennial subject of controversy was the employment of non- 
Muslims in the state apparatus. There were two basic objections to 
this employment: (l) it was distasteful to see non-Muslims occupying
positions which gave them power over Muslims, and (2) non-Muslims could 
not be trusted to fill one of the goals of the state - the promotion of 
Islam.^ Of necessity, these objections were generally overlooked, 
particularly in Egypt where the Copts dominated certain sectors of the 
civil service.
Necessity, however, was not of great concern to some jurists; many 
argued that it was unlawful to appoint non-Muslims to positions of trust
of
and influence, and others were willing to tolerate the employment'non- 
Muslims in an executive rather than legislative or ruling capacity. The 
weight of Informed Muslim opinion, however, seems to have come down on 
the side of those opposed to hiring non-Muslims. Of course, non-Muslims 
were not only employed but sometimes reached positions of influence.
These theories did have an effect, however, in that they left a lingering 
sense in Muslims of the impropriety of employing ^himmis. This meant 
that the position of such employees was precarious; they were subject 
to periodic and summary dismissal as well as to routine discrimination 
in promotions. In order to placate subjects grown restive, a ruler might 
dismiss all his non-Muslim officials and rehire them after the soothing 
lapse of a few months.
9. Avedis Sanjian, The Armenian Communities in Syria Under Ottoman 
Dominion (Cambridge 1965), pp.27^-5*
10. Richard Gottheil, "An Answer to the Dhimmis: Translation of a 
Manuscript by Ghazi Ibn al-Wasiti", Journal of the American Oriental 
Society XLI (1921), p.Hl8. E.I.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in 
Medieval Islam (Cambridge 1958), p.83- I. Belin, Fetoua Relatif
a la Condition des Zimmis", Journal Asiatique 18 (l85l)» pp.U17-516•
13
The position of non-Muslims was probably most precarious in times 
of financial stress or when Christian governments threatened the state. 
In a place where religion determined political loyalty, Copts were 
bound to be suspected of collaborating with foreign Christian enemies. 
Problems also arose from the indiscreet display of wealth and power; 
Muslims sometimes reacted sharply to any evidence that non-Muslims had 
forgotten their place.
2. Population, Culture and Religious Divisions
Census statistics for this period exist but are less than accurate.
Problems were compounded by inept techniques for collecting information
and a popular fear that correct answers would increase one's
vulnerability to government exactions. The figures relating to Egypt's
minorities may be the most suspect of all. Egypt would not have been
the first government to have undercounted its minorities in order to
undercut the grounds on which communal desires rest. The Copts have
long complained about the inaccuracy of the censuses, which usually
11number them at around 7 per cent of the population, and have claimed
to comprise 15 to 20 per cent of the population. The Church has never
been permitted to do a formal counting of its flock, and its informal
estimates, like those of some foreign Christians, err on the side of
generosity. It is therefore impossible to determine exactly how many
Copts there were in this period; even British estimates of the time
ranged between 7 and 20 per cent. The correct figures lie somewhere
12between the two extremes.
11. CENAM staff, "The Coptic-Muslim Conflict in Egypt: Modernization of 
Society and Religion Renovation", CENAM Reports, 1972-3, pp.31-5U.
See also Edward Akin for more recent complaints, A Lonely Minority: 
the Modern Story of Egypt's Copts (New York 1963}, pp.23-U.
12. Meinardus, Christian Egypt, p.367. He suggests a figure of 
10 per cent.
*A.St Tritton, The Caliphs and their non-Muslim Subjects (London 1930). P.37.
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Copts lived in every province of Egypt and in no one were they
in the majority. There were more Copts in Upper than in Lower Egypt,
13
and a large number lived in Cairo and Alexandria. The 1917 census 
recorded that 76 per cent of the Orthodox, 91 per cent of the Protestant 
and 62 per cent of the Catholic Copts lived in Upper Egypt. Slightly 
more than half resided in four Upper Egyptian provinces: al-Minya,
lU’Asyut, al-Suhaj and Qina. The 1937 census estimated the Copts at
15approximately 5 per cent of the rural population; this suggests that
they were marginally more urban than their Muslim compatriots. This
lack of a geographic centre made it difficult for them to protect
themselves from the occasional hostility of individuals or the state.
It was also next to impossible to mount a separatist movement; they
could not even hope to take their most populous province, 'Asyut, with
1 ^
a Coptic population of 22. h per cent in 1917-
One important element in preserving generally peaceful inter-
communal relations was the high degree of cultural similarity.
Egyptians were still fond of quoting Cromer's saying that a Copt was an
Egyptian who worshipped in a church and a Muslim was one who prayed 
17
in a mosque. The perceptions and values of Copts and Muslims were 
similar and both communities were at least partly aware of this. A 
Coptic peasant had more in common with a Muslim peasant than with
13. In 1917j 75 per cent of all Copts lived in Upper Egypt, 15 per cent 
in Lower Egypt, and 10 per cent in the Governates of Cairo, 
Alexandria, the Canal, Damietta and Suez. All the 1917 data are 
from The Census of Egypt (1917)5 vol.2 (Cairo 1921).
lH. Betts, Christians in the Arab East, p.6l. This is from the 19^0 
census.
15. Baer, Population and Society (London 196*0, p. 97*
16. In 1917) the Coptic population of Jirja was 15.6 per cent; of al- 
Minya, 17.*+ per cent, and of Qina, 7*8 per cent. The other 
provinces had smaller percentages of Copts.
17. Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol.2 (London 1908), p.206.
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wealthy co-religionists, although this did not imply that he had a firm 
consciousness of class and that class interests routinely prevailed over 
ethnic ones, Copts and Muslims probably did not generally share much 
of a feeling of community; they had fewer and more superficial contacts 
with one another than with members of their own group. These contacts, 
however, became more frequent and less superficial over the course of 
this century.
Even in the realm of religion, the division between Copts and Muslims
was not as clear as Cromer’s statement suggested. Both groups shared
18a number of superstitions. For example, they visited the shrines of
19
one another's saints, and in some places in Upper Egypt it was not
20unusual for Muslims to attend the Good Friday church service.
Coptic priests were believed by many Muslims and Copts to possess
21the power of healing.
There were three significant Coptic sects in Egypt; the only- one 
that was both statistically and politically important was the Orthodox 
sect, and its communal organization will be dealt with in detail in 
Chapter One. The Protestant and Catholic communities were small, with 
a combined total of less than 10 per cent of the entire Coptic population; 
and the Protestants were split into different groups. Neither 
Protestants nor Catholics were without influence, in part because of
18. Sir John Bowring observed that Christian "females are equally secluded 
and have their harems like other Orientals. In the remote parts of 
Egypt, [the Copts] practise polygamy and circumcise their children... 
In the rural districts, the habits of the Copts are scarcely 
distinguishable from those of the Arabs...They adopt with the Musulman 
all the superstitutions of the country, whether superstitutions be of 
Mahometan or Christian origin...The Musulmans are less prompt to 
credit Christian superstitions than are the Copts to adopt those of 
the Musulmans..." Report on Egypt and Candia (London I8U0), p .8.
19. Winifred Blackman.' Th'g-Fgliahin of Upper Egvut (London 1927) pp.2^8-58.
20. FO.U07/187 No.237 (Enclosure): Memorandum on the Coptic Church,
11 September 1920.
21. Blackman, The Fellahin of Upper Egypt, pp.213-1^ -.
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their contacts with and dependency on foreigners. They were conduits
for the transmission of Western ideas; and their missionary-run schools,
which also educated Muslim children, were very influential. Protestants
were more vocal and seemingly less traditional than Catholics and they
played a significant role in promoting Anglo-American political ideas.
They also advocated the reform of the Orthodox church and provided an
example Orthodox reformers could envy. They, therefore, were more
disliked by the Orthodox clerical establishment than were the quieter
22and less aggressive Catholics. The latter were also brought closer 
to the Orthodox by their retention of the old liturgy and ritual. With 
rare exceptions, Coptic Catholics avoided politics. Protestants were 
far more active in this arena as is indicated by the careers of 1Akhnukh 
and Louis Fanus, Fahml Wisa, George Khayyat, Makram ^Ubaid and Tawflq 
Dus, although the latter two chose to advance their careers by returning 
to Orthodoxy.
23Relations between these three communities were usually strained.
The Orthodox were understandably unhappy with attempts to lead astray 
the faithful, and they worried that the fragmentation of the community 
would hamper its ability to protect itself. The Orthodox were also 
troubled by the provocative acts of Christian missionaries, and they 
were fearful of being thought too close to sects whose connection to 
foreign interlopers could easily be damning in Muslim eyes. Despite 
the fact that the sects viewed one another with hostility, Muslims could
22. Pere Anawati noted that in Alexandria the Coptic Catholics were 
viewed by the Syrian Catholics as a backward and uninfluential lot. 
Interview, 23 April 1979*
23. Interview Mirrit Ghali, U December 1978, and Pere Anawati,
23 April 1979*
17
not be expected to make such fine distinctions. To them, Copts were
2t ,Copts. By the mid-lpnOs, the pressure of increased Muslim hostility
forced a certain amount of formal collaboration. A Liaison Committee,
representing the three Coptic sects and other non-Muslim communities
in Egypt, was established. It met regularly and discussed co-ordination
on matters of mutual concern. One particular interest was in government
attempts to reform non-Muslim personal status jurisdiction, and another
more general one was the worsening situation for non-Muslims.
a) Coptic Catholics - The first Copts were converted to Catholicism
25in Upper Egypt by Franciscan missionaries in the 18th century.
Their numbers grew slowly but steadily, and many may have converted 
during the brief period when Mu^allim Ghali was chief secretary to 
the ruler, Muhammad ^Ali. Ghali, a Catholic, tried to promote 
the fortunes of his sect, and there is some suspicion that his 
downfall was due to the machinations of the Orthodox establishment.
The community was protected by Austria-Hungary which claimed the
right as an extension of its privilege, gained in 1699 s to protect
the Franciscan Mission. This right was not universally recognized
and problems resulted when Austro-Hungarian consulates intervened
26
m  communal affairs. An accord between the Egyptian and Austro- 
Hungarian governments finally granted the right of the latter to 
extend religious protection but with the understanding that this 
did not make Coptic Catholics foreign persons.
2k. However, Misr did report in 19^7 the case of a Catholic Copt who tried 
and failed to get an Egyptian passport. When Egyptian officials 
asked him to whom he owed religious allegiance and he replied, ’'the 
Pope", they insisted that he obtain an Italian passport. Misr,
25 December 19^7, p.l.
25. See the lists of converts in P. Gabriele Giameradini, I Prinri 
Copti Cattolici (Cairo 1958).
26. There was no Capitulations agreement recognizing Austro-Hungarian 
protection of Coptic catholics. F0.371/320t, J209031/209031/16.
DW Majlis al-Wuzara*. Raqm Muhafaza k. Al-Majmu a 155. Tawa’if 
Qibtiyya. File 16 which is inside File 10.
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This right, of course, disappeared with the First World War.
Coptic Catholics were also under the general and somewhat vague 
protection of France; although at least one agreement, no doubt 
signed at Austro-Hungarian insistence, specifically exempted 
Coptic Catholics from French protection. This protection, in any 
case, seems never to have amounted to very much; again Coptic 
Catholics remained under Egyptian jurisdiction.
Orthodox hostility was able to prevent the establishment of a Coptic
27Catholic clerical hierarchy until the 19th century. The Vatican
appointed the first Coptic Catholic Patriarch in 1895* Eventually,
however, the community obtained independence from Rome; Patriarchs
were thereafter appointed by the local synod of bishops, with the
concurrence of both the Egyptian government and the Pope, In 1908
the community drew up an organic law and established personal status
courts; both were formally recognized by the Egyptian government 
28in 1910. Despite links with Rome, Coptic Catholics turned out
to be no more immune to the problems of factionalism and clerical
corruption than the Orthodox.
b) Coptic Protestants - American Presbyterians were the largest and
most active group of missionaries working in Egypt. They began
the arduous task of spreading the Gospel in the mid-19th century
and, by 1878, had opened more than 35 schools. They soon found
that it was easier to convert Copts than Muslims, and so they
29concentrated their efforts on 'Asyut. Some wealthy 'Asyuti
Copts became Protestant because they were disgusted with the
27. H.A.R. Gibbs and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, vol.l 
(London 1957)s p.2^8.
28. DW Majlis al-Wuzara1, Raqm Muhafaza k, al-Majmuca 155s Tawa'if 
Qibtiyya, File 16 which is inside File lU.
29. The missionaries still wanted to convert Muslims but they thought that 
this task would be facilitated if they could train enough Copts to 
work as evangelists.
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backwardness and corruption of their 0™  church. They may also 
have been attracted by a religion that seemed more modern, and that 
also gave them close and perhaps useful links with Westerners.
The Protestants were recognized as a separate community in the middle
of the last century, and they were accordingly granted limited
jurisdiction in matters of personal status. Their leader was
appointed, with the approval of the Egyptian government, by the
community itself. In 1899 a communal council was established, and
it included both lay and clerical notables.^ There were different
Protestant groups, but the Council was dominated by the United
31Presbyterian Church of Egypt. In 1926 this latter group became
self-governing and independent from the American Presbyterian
Church. Three years later, it had 20,200 communicants with an
32
average Sunday church attendance of 27,000. The total number of
Egyptian Protestants was around 60,000, and the head of the Council
was *Alixan 1Abskharun Pasha, one of the wealthiest landowners in 
33the country.
3. The Historical Background
The Coptic community clearly occupied an inferior position and 
lived in some expectation of Muslim hostility, which periodically flared 
into violence. Nevertheless, the Copts could and did take pride in 
portraying themselves as the original inhabitants of Egypt, with the 
oldest title to the country. This was not a title which Muslims
30. DW Majlis al-Wuzara*. Raqm al-Muhafaza h. Al-Majmuca lUl.
Tawa'if Qibtiyya. Files 18, 21 (inside file lU).
31. In the 1960s lU members of the 20-man council were Presbyterian.
Otto Meinardus, Christian Egypt: Ancient and Modern (Cairo 1977),p.57^.
32. In 30 years’ time, the number of communicants had increased by
322.75 per cent. Rev. J.R. Alexander, A Sketch of the Story of 
the Evangelical Church (Alexandria 1930), pp.ij-3-7*
33. FO.lUl/752, 353/80A/33.
accepted, but it was difficult for them to dispute Coptic ties to 
Egypt and the community's right to residence when Egypt had been a 
Christian and mainly Coptic country at the time of the Arab conquest in 
the seventh century. It was not until the tenth century that Egypt was 
mainly Muslim in population rather than simply Muslim in ruling elite.
The position of the Copts began to improve early in the 19th 
century with the stability and tolerance of the Muhammad '"'All dynasty. 
Political assimilation dates from the middle of that century, when the 
Coptic community ceased to be regarded by the state as an administrative 
unit. In 1855 their main badge of inferiority, the poll tax, was 
lifted. Shortly thereafter, the Copts lost their exemption from 
military service. They served on Egypt's appointed and elected 
representative bodies from the time the first Consultative Council was 
established in 1866, and they frequently reached high office.
Taking heart from this progress, the Copts became increasingly bold
in voicing demands for equalityj their audacity was either intentionally
or unintentionally encouraged by the British presence. Accordingly,
the first two decades of this century witnessed one of the not infrequent
nadirs in inter-communal relations. There was much general unrest in
this period, and tensions between Muslims and Copts were only one aspect 
3I4
of the problem. Good will between the two communities foundered on
the rock of Coptic employment in the civil service, but there were other 
points of dissension as well. Both Coptic notables and the communal 
press were active in demanding equality in civil service appointments 
and promotions, the provision of Christian religious instruction in
3^. Peter Mellini , Sir Eldon Gorst: The Overshadowed ProConsul
(Stanford 1977), p.ll8.
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government schools, the institution of Sunday as a holiday for 
Christian schoolchildren and government employees, and the appointment 
of more Copts to Egypt's representative "bodies. In 1908 the wealthy 
Coptic landowner * Akhnukh Fanus, organized a Coptic Reform Society to 
promote these demands; and he tried briefly to establish a political 
party of similar ilk. Neither the British nor the Egyptian
governments were receptive to Fanus* demands; he and his supporters 
were particularly disappointed by the reaction of the former.
The Copts had an uneasy relationship with the British: on the one
hand, resentful of what they saw as inadequate support and, on the other, 
aware that the foreign presence guaranteed their safety. Some Copts 
believed that their community should not rely on the British for either 
the one or the other but should put their efforts into achieving
35harmonious relations with their Muslim compatriots. Dinshawai, the 
loss of civil service jobs to British officials and the 1907 financial 
crisis probably outraged almost as many Copts as Muslims. Both branches 
of the early nationalist movement, therefore, had Coptic adherents, 
although neither had large numbers of Christian supporters. Mustafa 
Kamil, the pre-eminent nationalist leader in this period, advocated 
equality between Copts and Muslims and spoke of their centuries-long 
harmonious relationship. His party, al-Hizb al-Watani (the National 
Party), called on Copts to join their Muslim brothers in promoting the 
nationalist cause and in working for unity and harmony. Kamil's
35* In 1906 a party of British sportsmen became involved in a fracas with 
villagers who objected to having their pigeons slaughtered. One 
Englishman was killed and several peasants, with only the most 
summary justice, were hanged.
36. Pierre Rondot, "Linvolution Historique des Coptes d'Egypte", Cahiers 
de 1'Orient Contemporaine 22 (1950), p.138. Albert Hourani,
Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (London 1962), p.207.
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approach recommended him to some Copts; hut toward the end of his short 
life, he moved, to the alarm of the Copts, in an increasingly pro- 
Ottoman and pan-Islamic direction. These biases received additional 
emphasis after his death in 1908 by his followers, and those Copts like 
Murqus Hanna, Sinut Hanna and Wisa Wasif who had supported the movement 
drifted away. The latter resigned from the party Executive Committee 
because of the anti-Coptic tone of the party press. With these 
resignations, pressure within the party to maintain a conciliatory attitude
37toward the Copts was removed.
The second branch of the nationalist movement, that which grew up
around the newspaper al-Jarida, was more appealing to the Copts although
generally less popular because it had no leader who could compare with
3 BMustafa Kamil and lacked a common touch. It was, however, free of
pan-Islamic and pro-Ottoman leanings. Its political thinking and its 
nationalist goals centred on Egypt as a unique cultural and political 
entity. Among its Coptic supports were Sinut Hanna and Fakhri ‘TVbd al- 
Nur, but this was a bad time for even modern nationalists to gain the 
general support of the Coptic community. In addition, the 'Urama group, 
abandoned by Gorst, grew increasingly anti-British and this perhaps 
made it less attractive to the Copts.
37* Both Wisa Wasif and Murqus Hanna continued to work for an improvement in
communal relations. Before and after his resignation from the party,
Wa§if opposed the Coptic demands then being made, perhaps from a fear 
that Coptic activists would provoke Muslims and eventually divide the 
communities. Wasif had opposed Fanus* reform society and his political 
party as well; accordingly, the Coptic press referred to him as a 
traitor to his people. See Muhammad Sayyid KailanI, al-*Adab al- 
Qibti: Qadiman wa Hadithan (Cairo 1962), p.86. Samira Bahr, "A1- 
'Aqbat fi al-Hayat al-Siyasiyya fi Misr", unpublished Phd thesis, 
University of Cairo 1977, pp.397-8.
38. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid; Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian
Relations (London 1968), p.201. Salama Musa remarked on the fact
that the Copts were attracted by the group's idea of Egypt for the 
Egyptians in The Education of Salama Musa, trans. L.O. Schuman
(Leiden 1961), p.U3.
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When Fanus1 Coptic Reform Society decided in 1908 to push its 
claim for equality of employment, it sparked what has been labelled 
a press "war". At first, the press reaction was mild; al-Jarida, 
al-Liwa' and al-Mu' ayyid all agreed that religion should not influence
39influence employment. Then, al-Liwa' and al-Mu'ayyid abandoned their
1+0moderate approach and, along with al-Dustur, attacked Coptic demands. 
Misr and al-Watan, the two Coptic papers, responded in kind and 'Var",
which continued until 1911, was declared.
The one side characterized Islam and Muslim rule as oppressive, and
the other criticized the temerity of the first and upheld the beneficence 
1+1of Islam. The Copts complained that they were inadequately
represented in the bureaucracy, and the Muslims that the Copts monopolized 
1+2 _ _
the civil service. Salama Musa and others believed that Shaikh al-
Jawish, the editor of al-Liwa', was responsible for the poisonous
exchange; but at least two contemporary scholars charge the Copts with 
h3
responsibility. It is true that the Coptic press was more vigorous
in expressing Coptic demands at this time than in previous decades, 
and no doubt this was seen by many Muslims as provocative. In June 
1908 a concerned group of Copts met in Cairo to protest al-Liwa''s hostile
39- Egyptian Gazette, 12 June 1908, p.5-
1+0. Al-Liwa * was the newspaper of the National Party and al-Mu1ayyid of
the Constitutional Reform party. The latter party had one Copt on 
its executive committee, 'Ilyas cAwad. Al-Mu'ayyid, which was edited 
by Shaikh cAli Yusuf, was the old paper of Riyad Pasha. Some of the 
anti-Coptic articles appearing in al-Dustur were written by ^Abbas 
Al- cAqqad.
Hi. For a translation of one of these articles, see Alfred Cunningham, 
Today in Egypt (London 1912), pp. 31+5-9*
1+2. Kailani, al-'Adab al-Qibti , p.89.
1+3- Salama Musa, The Education of Salama Musa, p. 1+9; Kailani, al-'Adab
al-Qibti, p.TO; ^Abd al-Latif Hamza, Qissat al-Sihafa al-^Arabiyya fi 
Misr (Baghdad 1967), p.101.
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tone , and many letters of complaint were sent to Gorst. A delegation 
was sent to the National Party, which was responsible for al-Liwa!; 
and, while many members were reportedly unhappy with al~Jawishrs
kk
articles, little was done to moderate them.
The situation was not improved when Butrus Ghali, a Coptic Cabinet
Minister, was made Prime Minister in November 1908. He was not the
first Christian to be appointed Prime Minister but he was both the
first Copt and the first Christian to serve at such a singularly awkward
time. He does not seem to have been imposed on the Khedive by the
Britishj Gorst at first thought that Ghali's religion was an
 ^5 C-  insurmountable obstacle. Khedive Abbas persuaded Gorst that religion
was not at issue, and that it was desirable to have an Egyptian, even a
Christian Egyptian, rather than a Muslim Turk. Ghali was competent
and his relations with the Khedive were excellent.
Muslims were disturbed by the appointment. Sa d Zaghlul wrote
in his diary that he feared the press would make an issue of it and
1+8would thereby kindle accusations of religious fanaticism. Curiously,
al-Liwa1 was fairly restrained in its comments but other newspapers,
1+9
such as al-Dustur, more than made up for its moderation.
Egyptian Gazette, 19 June 1908, p.3, 22nd June 1908, p-5*
U5. Samir Seikaly, "Prime Minister and Assassin: Butrus Ghali and
Wardani", Middle Eastern Studies 13 (1977), pp.115-7*
H6. Seikaly thinks that Ghali was chosen because both the Khedive and 
the British thought he was submissive and would be easy to 
manipulate. Ibid., pp.115-7- 
H7. Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London 19U5), p.83.
U8. Bahr, al-} Aqbaj; f 1 al-Hayat, p.^18.
U9 . Samir Seikaly, "The Copts under British Rule, 1882-191V ,  
unpublished PhD thesis, University of London 19&7, p.1^7*
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Two years after the appointment, a Muslim nationalist with close 
connections to the National P a r t y , o n e  Wardani by name, assassinated 
the Prime Minister. His reasons were mainly political. Butrus 
Ghali had by 1910 a number of black marks against him: he had sat on
the bench at the Dinshawi trial, he had signed the Sudan condominium
agreement, he had revived press censorship, and he was then known to
51
favour an extension of the Suez Canal concession. Still, Copt-
Muslim tensions, as developed and exploited by the press, created an
atmosphere conducive to murder. The Muslim and nationalist press
naturally described the crime as a political act; the Copts, just as
52 - „naturally, saw it as a religious one. Wardani was, in fact,
celebrated publicly not only as a nationalist but as a Muslim who had
53rid his people of an intolerably arrogant Christian. Storrs, the
Oriental Secretary, reported that groups of Muslims roamed the street
singing about "Wardani who killed the Nazarene", and he noted that the
5U
assassin had become a national hero. While the nationalists were
stressing Wardani ’ s political reasons to Europeans, they were, as 
K. Graham, the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, noted, using 
the religious aspects of the case to work up Muslim feeling in native 
circles. He added that sympathy for Wardani in the middle and lower 
classes had taken an anti-Christian and anti-Coptic turn. Graham
50. FO.lUl/802, 8l/pol./1910.
51. F0.371/890, 20791/59^6/16.
52. Including al-Wajan. Seikaly, The Copts Under British Rule, p.1^7.
53. FO.371/890, 20791/59^6/16. The British, however, thought that
Ghali had been able to keep some of the more troublesome spirits in 
the Coptic community in check, and that Wardani had done a 
disservice in removing this restraint. FO.371/111> 10869/5672/16.
5^. Storrs, Orientations, p.8i*; FO. 1^1/802, 8l/pol./l0.
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clearly was concerned by the threat of Muslim-Copt violence, and he
noted that there had been a few trivial attacks on Copts in Upper
55 - -Egypt. Gorst immediately added another Christian, Yusuf Saba, to
the Cabinet to prove to Muslims, as he wrote in a letter to Cromer,
that they had not gained a victory. ^  However, he chose a Christian
of Syrian rather than Coptic extraction.
Coptic activists were appalled by the murder and were also upset
by Gorst's contention that they had little support for their demands
within the community, and so they called for a conference to discuss
Coptic demands. The British reluctantly gave permission, and the
conference convened in 'Asyut in March 1911. Qallnl Fahml Pasha, a
Coptic notable with close ties to the Palace, thought that the Khedive
57had encouraged the conference out of a desire to embarrass Gorst.
Many Copts who later entered the political arena were in attendance: 
Murqus Hanna, Tawfiq Dus, 'Ilyas ^Awad, Fakhrl ^Abd al-Nur, Sinut Hanna,
r O
Bushra Hanna and George Khayyat. The conference, with strong backing
from the Coptic press, presented a petition with its demands to the
Khedive and the British. These demands were not new. The petition
asked for better representation, equal access to civil service positions,
the designation of Sunday as a holiday, equal access to state education
59and the provision of Christian religious instruction in state schools.
55. He felt that these attacks were greatly exaggerated by the Coptic 
press. FO.1^1/802, 8l/pol./10.
56. Quoted by Mellini, Gorst, p.20U.
57* Seikaly, "The Copts under British Rule", p.232.
58. Bushra IJanna -was Chairman, Tawflq Dus Secretary, and Sinut Hanna
Treasurer. Ramzi Tadrus, al-'Aqbat fi al-Qarn al-^Ighrin, vol.3,
(Cairo 1911), p.88.
59- The Coptic Conference Held at Assiout on March 6 , 7 and 8, 1911: 
the Speeches (no place, n.d.), American missionaries in 'Asyut 
were generally supportive of Coptic demands. They were invited to 
attend the conference, but to the great relief of the Residency were 
told by the American Agent in Cairo not to attend. FO.371/113, 
19118/19118/16.
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Almost all the demands made centred around a desire that the state he
a civil rather than a religious institution.
Not all Copts favoured the idea of a conference although their
numbers -were not the majority that al-Mu'ayyid claimed for them.^°
The Patriarch, who was 93 and senile, was persuaded by the government
to issue a statement disapproving of the conference before it convened.
However, his Bishop in 'Asyut, Makarios, a proponent of church reform
and a less than obedient servant, opened the conference. No leading
62Cairene family seems to have taken part in the conference; mainly
Upper Egyptians were in attendance. Both Wisa Wasif and Wasif Ghali
63
opposed the conference, and the latter made his objections public.
Wisa felt that the British were the ones who had determined hiring 
practices in the civil service; they, and not the Muslims, were the
6kreal enemy.
Most elements of the press resented the conference and the demands 
that came out of it.^ Al-fAhali, the organ of the Prime Minister, 
referred to the congress as a religious c o n s p i r a c y a n d  other newspapers 
accused the Copts of being the willing instruments of British policy.^
One unpleasant repercussion was a riot in 'Asyut in April; there may 
have been other incidents of violence as well.^
60. Tariq al-Bishri, "Misr al-Haditha Bain 'Ahmad w-al-Masih", al- 
Katib 109 (1970), p.115.
61. FO.371/1111, 18689/5672/16.
62. Seikaly, "The Copts under British Rule", p.232.
6 3. Bishri, al-Katib 109, p.115*
6h. Bishri, al-Katib 111 (1970), pp.127-8, quoting an article by Wisa 
Wasif in La Bourse Egyptienne, 12 May 1922.
65. Alfred Cunningham, Egypt Today, pp.92-7, translates and prints 
articles from the press.
66. See al-*Ahali , 7 and 8 March 1911: quoted in F0.371/HH, 10869/
5672/1 6.
6 7. FO.371/1111,13807/5672/1 6.
6 8. FO. 371/mi, 10869/5672/1 6.
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6 9With discreet government sponsorship, a counter-congress was
held to refute the sectarian hias of the ’Asyut conference. Moderate
nationalists of the ’Umma group were involved in the conference, which
was held in Heliopolis. The more extreme nationalists of al-Hizb
al-Watanx remained aloof; their leader, Muhammad Farid, saw the congress
as an attempt by the British, who were hiding behind the Egyptian
TOgovernment,to divide the Egyptian people. The congress was billed
as an Egyptian and not a Muslim conference and, while some Copts did 
71attend, Coptic demands were rejected out of hand.
Muslim delegates seem to have been very fearful of Coptic designs.
The congress’ Organizing Committee reported their conclusion that the
Copts were planning to form "a separate nation for themselves", and
that they were relying on manufactured grievances to enable them, with
72British help, to gain precedence over the Muslim majority. The body
of this report, read by Lutfi al-Sayyid, deserves quotation:
....the principle is found that every country 
should have an established church and that such 
a religion will be that of the government or the 
majority....that a state should have more than 
one religion is perfectly unthinkable and it 
would be absurd to admit that religious 
minorities can exist animated by political 
ambitions toward the exercising of public rights 
other than those of an essentially religious 
nature that are guaranteed by freedom of 
worship. The religion of the Egyptian people 
is Islam. For Islam is both the religion of
69. Riyad Pasha, the president of the conference, kept in close touch 
with the Minister of the Interior. Almost the entire conference 
consisted of set speeches which were approved beforehand.
FO.371/1113, l8097/l602U/l6.
70. cAbd al-Rahman al-Rafici, Muhammad Farid (Cairo 19^8), p.2UU.
71. The only Copt to give a speech was Gabriel Khalil, and he spoke on the 
protection and encouragement of Egyptian industry. FO/371/H13, 
18097/1602^/16.
72. Minutes of the Proceedings of the First Egyptian Conference
Assembled at Heliopolis, 29 April to~V May I9II (Alexandria 1911),
pp.5-6.
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the government and that of the majority.
This fact.... dominates the discussions 
relative to civil interests that might arise 
hetween the majority and minority in politics.
In short5 there is no doubt that political 
strife between individuals and parties should 
be based on their respective interests and not 
upon their religious b e l i e f s . ^3
Delegates agreed that Islam must continue to be the official
religion of Egypt. As Seikaly commented, "If the common theme of the
Coptic congress was a plea for justice, that of the Egyptian congress
7h
was an insistence upon the inviolable Islamic nature of the state .
Delegates conceded that religion should not be a factor in public
employment, but at the same time insisted that certain administrative
posts, like that of the governorship of a province, were not appropriate
75for a Coptic occupant. One motion put before the congress called
for an investigation into the reasons for the excessive numbers of
Copts in the civil service. Another insisted that the Copts enjoyed
too large a share of government educational facilities; and a third
condemned Treasury grants to Coptic institutions. The conference
also objected to the Coptic plea for proportional representation
because it would make the Copts a political minority whose interests
77differed from those of the majority. To the Copts, it was already
clear that their interests had diverged. Despite these conclusions, 
the conference was relatively restrained, if only due to the co-
rj O
operation of Gorst and the Egyptian government. On a concluding
note, the conference asked the Copts to return to their former
73- Ibid., p.6.
7*+. Seikaly, "The Copts under British Rule", p.317*
75* The Proceedings of the First Egyptian Conference, pp.10-13. 
76. FO.371/1113, 18097/1602^/16.
77* The Proceedings of the First Egyptian Conference p.6.
78. Mellini, Gorst, p.227.
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attitude and also begged the Muslims to forget everything that had
79transpired. Both were asked to look to their common interests.
In 1911 Gorst, who was hated by many Copts, was replaced as High 
Commissioner by Kitchener. The latter had an awe-inspiring reputation; 
the Copts were ready to respect him, and they certainly hoped that he 
would prove more amenable to their demands. They were far more 
welcoming of this appointment than the Muslim press. Kitchener was 
not able to meet Coptic requests, but for some reason community 
activists did not construe this as a bias in favour of Muslims.
Kitchener was able to calm the troubled sea of intercommunal relations,
8 0
and the polemics diminished. The declaration of a British
Protectorate and the start of World War I put a final clamp on both 
sectarian and nationalist political activity until the end of the decade.
7 9. po.371/1113, 1602U/1602U/1 6.
80. Severianus, ”Les Coptes de l’Egypte Musulmane", Etudes 
Mediterraneenes 6 (1959), P*80.
CHAPTER ONE
COMMUNAL ORGANIZATION
A. The Church
By this century, the church was a crumbling fortress, less and less 
ahle to protect those who sheltered within its walls. It had lost many 
of its administrative functions and both corruption and incompetence had 
left it open to the depredations of laymen and outside predators. The 
church, however, remained an important element in the lives of many 
Copts; for centuries it had been the one institution which represented 
the community and served as its refuge. Many still gave it their 
unquestioning support, while others saw it as capable of renewal. Even 
those who had lost some or all of their faith were slow to cut their 
communal bonds. This lingering sense of communal identity, as much 
imposed by Muslims as deliberately retained by Copts, meant that the 
church was able to preserve some independence of action, a remarkable 
feat given how little agreement there was as to who should hold the 
balance of power within the community.
The unity of the church was broken first by missionaries. Some 
Copts left the Orthodox fold for these new Christian sects, while 
others were stirred, from the mid-nineteenth century, to demand reform 
in their own church. The latter had two goals: the correction of
abuses such as simony,and the acquisition of a voice in church affairs. 
They saw the church as backward, corrupt and lazy; an ancient and 
malfunctioning organization in need of a push into the twentieth century. 
They wanted to limit clerical responsibility in those affairs of the 
community which were not strictly religious or theological, and they 
wished to build schools, hospitals and seminaries. They hoped to better
32
educate the clergy and improve the organization of charity. Both had
an important bearing on the community's well-being and future.
Most of those supporting reform were drawn from the educated middle
class and the landed gentry. They had been exposed, in some degree,
to Western thinking, some had even abandoned Egyptian culture in favour
of European. Their aim, therefore, was to make the church operate like
some kind of Western parliamentary system with all decisions and offices
subject to the will of the people. This is an odd model to choose for
a church whose very survival says something about the aptness of its
ways, and it may show the influence of American Presbyterian missionaries
whose own church functioned along reasonably democratic lines.
The clergy, of course, had once controlled practically all areas
of life in the community: religion, justice, charity, education, etc.
Their expertise was increasingly being questioned and their jurisdiction
eroded. They understandably felt threatened by the considerable respect
1
granted to this new breed of layman. Whatever the reformers liked to
think, the clergy were not all corrupt, unthinking and reactionary.
Of course, they were interested in protecting their personal power, but
many also hoped, by maintaining the church's ancient arrangements, to
preserve the community's cohesion and religious character, for therein
2
lay safety. They had powerful friends both in the Palace, and among 
the lay elite. The latter, drawn in past times from high officialdom,
1. The rivalry was fuelled partly by the fact that the clergy came from 
poorer families than did the reformers and resented the opportunities 
and advantages of the latter. Samir Seikaly, 'The Copts under 
British Rule, 1882-191^', unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
London 1967, pp.T3-H.
2. Patriarch Cyril, who died in 1927 s may have feared that progressive 
opinions would earn him the enmity of the Palace, rumoured to be 
responsible for the suspicious death of his reforming predecessor. 
Ibid., 71.
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probably had traditionally allied itself with the higher clergy to the
benefit of both, and sometimes, no doubt almost incidentally, to that
of the community as well. Both were helped by the fact that the great
mass of Copts, although often the victims of clerical waste and
corruption, had a tendency, born of long habit, to follow the lead of
their clergy rather than the latter’s new rival. Not all the clergy,
however, opposed the reform movement. Those who supported it were
admittedly few, but their influence was disproportionately great because
3
they fragmented the clerical monolith.
The rigidity of both the clergy and the reformers embittered the
conflict and made a solution all but impossible! ultimately it harmed
a system which both were trying to preserve, however different their
means. Various outsiders were sometimes drawn into the conflict to
help settle it. The government the Palace and the British all had
important roles to play, only the last were consistently in favour of
It
reform. They were also the most reluctant to intervene.
1. The Majlis Milli's Struggle for Power
In I87U, the government bowed to popular pressure and established 
a Coptic Lay Council (Majlis Mill!) with the right to participate in 
church affairs. Clerical opposition, however, was constant, and the 
Council functioned only sporadically. A new Majlis was elected in 
in 1883, and a new law gave it significant power, the exercise of which 
was successfully blocked by the clergy. Two later laws, dated 1908
3- Among its ecclesiastical supporters, whose reform activities sometimes 
won them excommunication or banishment, were Metropolitan Makarios of 
’Asyut, the Bishop of Manfalut and 'Abu Tlj, and the priests Murqus 
Sergius and 'Ibrahim Luqa.
U. The enthusiasm particularly of British churchmen and missionaries for 
Coptic church reform led the Coptic clergy to suspect that all 
British interference was ultimately designed to win converts to 
Anglicanism.
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and 19123 weakened the Council, but also enabled it meet regularly
since they assured the Patriarch of a majority in all its deliberations.
Reformers always played an important role in the Council but only
came to dominate it from the late 1920s, It was the chief mechanism
by which they sought to gain control of the community. Because Council
elections were held only in Cairo and the Council sat in that city,
Cairenes played a disproportionate role in the Council’s life. That
body would probably have been more conservative and more genuinely
representative had voting been by diocese. Some Council members were
in fact bound by the horizon of the community, but many had wider
interests and were involved, for example, in national politics as
well. An advantage was seen in electing politicians and high officials
to the Majlis; they could then represent the Council to their party
6and the government. The additional public exposure brought by Council
membership was probably useful to many Coptic politicians, particularly
those representing Cairene Coptic constituencies.
At the heart of the dispute between the clergy and key members of
the Council was the control of monastic endowment (waqf) revenues. Over
5,000 feddans had been endowed for the particular use of the seven
surviving monasteries, which were charged with the responsibility for
7
only about one hundred monks and an income in 1926 of £E300,000. The
5- The 1883 law gave the Council control of monastic endowments. The
Council was never able to gain de facto control from the Patriarch and 
in 1908 lost de jure control as well. The 1912 law gave Patriarchal 
appointees a majority on the Council and reduced the number of elected 
members. It also gave the Council control of those non-monastic 
endowments in Cairo.
6. The Wafdist politician, 'Ibrahim Faraj, recalls that he was asked to 
run for election to the Council in 1939 l>y the organization's Vice- 
President al-Minyawi and other Coptic notables. Interview,
13 June 1979-
7* Suryal Jirjis Suryal, in a petition to the Senate, noted that there were 
less than 200 monks in 1906, a figure which decreased to about a 
hundred by 1926. Misr, 18 March 19^, P*3i 20 March 19UU» P-3>
21 March 19^, P» 3*
Abbots disposed of huge sums as they saw fit, while rumours of waste 
and wrong-doing abounded. For example, in 1919-20 Dair al-Muharraq 
earned EE.1.5 million in cotton sales, a sum which seemingly disappeared
Q
into the void. Monastic incomes were not even spent on the welfare
of their intended beneficiaries, the monks, let alone on the entire
Coptic community. The monks lived in dire poverty and received little,
if any, education; only the poorest of the poor and those avoiding
conscription saw monastic life as a refuge of any sort. Many laymen
were interested ln helping the monks, but they could do nothing without
money. These large revenues, then, were the key to the success of lay
reform plans. The Council, with the backing of many Copts, wished to
establish a system of accountability by supervising incomes and
expenditures. Some Copts despaired of this solution and advocated
more extreme solutions like the dissolution of all monasteries or
supervision of monastic endowments by the Ministry of (Muslim)
9
Endowment s.
By 1926, the reform movement had gathered such speed that its 
opponents could only interrupt and not break its momentum. The two 
Coptic newspapers, various Coptic societies, the national and local 
diocesan lay councils, the latter of which functioned primarily as 
personal status courts, were all demending reform. Understandably, 
they focused on changing the Majlis charter to give it control of the 
endowment s.
8. Misr, 23 March 19^+U, p. 3- The Abbot of Dair al-Muharraq. was noted 
for his investments in land. His lack of concern for the welfare 
of his monks caused repeated revolts in the monastery from the 1920s
9. Among those who proposed this were Murqu? Fahmi, a speaker at the 
1911 Assiout conference; Hashid Hanna, a member of the Assiout Lay 
Council; and the newspaper al-Siyasa. See The Coptic Conference 
Held at Assiout on March 6 , 7 and 8, 1911, no place, n.d., p.57; 
Misr, 10 July 1926, pp.l, 3*
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Suryal Jirjis Suryal opened the campaign in the Senate in June 1926, 
by pointing to the many petitions of complaint against clerical 
mismanagement that the Senate had received. He then moved for a 
return to the Majlis law of 1883 and the abolution of the 1908 and 1912 
laws.^ He asked for a Council membership of 2U, all of whom would 
be chosen by an electorate of all adult male Copts. Bishop Lukas, a 
Senator appointed to represent the church, argued that the Council 
already had enough authority; the ecclesiastics, by virtue of their 
vaunted position, were entitled to exercise the greater share of power.
His argument was not persuasive, and the draft law was passed to the 
Judiciary Committee in July.
Only two members of the higher clergy supported the reform, the
_ , 11 Metropolitan of 'Asyut, and the Bishop of Manafalut and 'Abu Tij.
The rest opposed any reduction in clerical privileges., and none more so
than Yu'annis, the Metropolitan of Alexandria. In August the Patriarch
submitted a petition, apparently written by Yu'annis, to the Senate
objecting to Suryal1s plans and presenting the case for ecclesiastical
supervision of monastic endowments.
The Coptic press printed pages and pages of letters and telegrams
supporting Suryal and was unrestrained in its criticism of the clergy.
One article in Misr, a daily Coptic paper, accused the clergy of being
12so busy selling feddans that they served Mammon and not God. Other
newspapers, including al-Muq attain, Wadi al-Nil and the Liberal 
Constitutionalist al-Siyasa, praised Suryal's plan.
10. Curiously, Suryal was a member of the royalist al-'Ittihad party and 
yet here, as well as in the election of Yu'annis as Patriarch two years 
later, opposed the wishes of the King. FO 1^1/819, 17612/6/25-
11. Misr, 3 July 1926, p.2.
12. Misr, ik August 1926, p.l. Another article accused the Bishops of 
killing the Copts as the Jews had killed Christ. Misr, 16 November
1926, p.i.
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The Judiciary Committee, apparently accepting Lukas' advice that
the need to end a quarrel -which had heen going on since 1883 was not
critical, did not approve the draft law until 1927- The Bishop had
tried to postpone consideration of the Committee's report until yet
the following session^ while Suryal, in some trepidation lest the
government fall, had been urging speed for months.
The merits and demerits of the draft law, which gave the Majlis
the right to supervise endowments, schools, churches, societies,
monasteries, personal status and the Coptic press, were not debated in
either Chamber. Some Senators tried to send the bill back to committee
on a technical point, but failed. The coalition government forced the
bill through Parliament and a large majority in each house voted in its
13
favour before the end of the session. It became law in July 1927-
All Copts, except the absent Bishop Lukas, voted for the law; curiously,
Wafdist Copts played only a small part in the debate. If Patriarch
lhCyril had not been senile and ill, the reformers might not have been
so successful. Wo one was firmly in control of the community, and this
gave both free rein to clerical abuse and an opportunity to remedy the
problem. The British, although they approved of this project, did not
15
intervene in its behalf.
Unfortunately, the new law was ignored by the clergy and therefore 
did not settle the problem of monastic endowments. In 1928, the Coptic
13. For the relevant debates, see Senate Debates, 28 June 1926 and
30 May 1927s Chamber Debates, 25 June 1927* 
lU. He was said to have fallen under the influence of a relative who
was embezzling church funds. FO 1^1/686, 8609/7/26.
15. Curiously, the clergy were claiming that they had British support.
FO iia/686, 8609/7/26/
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Minister of Agriculture, Nakhla al-MutifE, suggested to the bemused
Prime Minister the creation of a joint lay-clerical committee responsible
for the endowments and to the Lay Council as one possible solution.^
The Prime Minister, so despairing that he overlooked his fear that
the Wafd would choose to profit from the expected opposition of both
reformers and clergy, approved the plan- Palace pressure may have been
17
behind his decision. The joint committee, designed to have a pro­
clerical majority, was announced by Royal Decree in December 1928, 
but was still not functioning by the following spring due to the seeming 
inability of the two sides to co-operate at any level.
Other problems, which had nothing to do with the major one of 
endowments, presented themselves with monotonous regularity. The
1Q
imposition of a Bishop of unsavoury reputation on al-Minya without
first taking the customary poll of local opinion, brought 2,000 Minyans
19to a protest meeting in May 1930 and a flood of telegrams opposing
20the Bishops’s investiture to the Palace. The Lay Council threw its
weight behind the protestors and declared the investiture null and void.
A second problem arose in the staffing of the Patriarchate; both 
the Patriarch and the Council wished to dismiss an individual of the 
others's appointing. One was accused by the Council of encroaching on 
its prerogatives, and the other by the Patriarch of financial incompetence.
l6. F0 lUl/685, 8U2U/59/28; 8U2U/78/28.
17* In a Cabinet meeting on 27 October, the King announced he would not
leave the room until the Cabinet agreed to changes in the administration
of Coptic endowments. The King had pressed for this for some time,
but the Prime Minister had insisted that they would only reap 
criticism by doing so. After the meeting Mahmud threatened to resign 
partly over the endowment issue and partly over the matter of 
appointing Sidqi Auditor-General. F0.1+07/207 N0 .U5, Mr. Hoare to 
Lord Cushendun, 28 October 1928.
18. FO.ll+1/758, 92/32/31.
19. Misr, 16 May 1930, p. 5-
20. D.W., cAbdin Palace Archives, Tawa’if Diniyya 1.
21. As the Residency pointed out, the latter’s only crime was acting in the
interests of the Council and "thus embarrassing the Patriarch in his
disposal of Coptic Church funds”. FO.lUl/758, 92/9/31.
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The Patriarch believed that the solution to his problems lay in a
return to the Council law of 1912. It is possible that, through his old
ally the Palace, he pressed the government to act because rumours
circulated that the Council would be reconstituted to make it more
22
amenable to the wishes of the Patriarch and the Prime Minister. The
Residency, asked to intervene by both the reformers and the Anglican
Bishop in Egypt, did not do so until 1931. Sir Percy Loraine, the
23High Commissioner, believed that his scope for action was limited, 
but he finally asked his Oriental Secretary, Walter Smart, to impress 
upon Prime Minister Sidqi the desirability of avoiding retrograde
measures. With British approval, Sidqi asked Nakhla al-Mutici to
2U
mediate. The latter accepted this thankless task and, after informing
25the Majlis that the government had no intention of altering its charter, 
worked out a compromise on some issues in June.
The Council of Ministers accepted the compromise solution which 
(l) left the Bishop of al-Minya in place and thereby confirmed the 
Patriarch's right to invest Bishops; (2) dismissed the official accused 
of incompetence by the Patriarch and suggested a Lay Council member to 
replace him; and (3) ordered the Patriarch's appointee to restrict his 
duties to those of a private secretary. Smart construed this as a 
significant victory for the Majlis Milll.2^ The Majlis apparently
22. FO.371/758, 92/9/31. As Sidql himself noted, the Coptic reform 
party was full of his political opponents. FO.^07/217. No.17. 
Sir Percy Loraine to Sir John Simon, 16 January 1933.
23. FO. 371/15^09, JU7A7/16.
2k. FO.lUl/758, 92/9/31.
25. Egyptian Gazette, 7 January 1931, p.5*
26. FO.lHl/758, 92/9/31.
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27disagreed for it suddenly withdrew its consent. In retaliation,
Patriarch Yu’annis first threatened to retire to a monastery, leaving
the community to wallow in its confusion, and then in February he changed
all the locks at the Patriarchate to prevent entry.
Loraine emphatically wished that the Patriarch would carry out his
threat. He was also tired of the reformers "trying to get their battles
28fought by someone else...," and he believed that it was undesirable to
espouse their cause too openly. The Foreign Office, however, wanted
29
him to intervene and even suggested that he press the King. Loraine
resisted this proposal, explaining that British representations had
30been frequent and adequate. The Prime Minister, he reported, had
dropped any idea of dissolving the present Majlis. British intervention
as well as communal resistance had another effect: the Egyptian
government finally instructed the Patriarch to withdraw the new Bishop
from al-Minya. This would have been a significant victory for the Lay
31Council had not the Patriarch refused to co-operate.
Twice in 1932, the Holy Synod petitioned Sidqi to weaken the
32 33Majlis, and once in 1933 the Patriarch, through Tawfiq Dus, presented
a similar plan. Sidqi liked the latter proposal but, upon consideration,
27. It was primarily upset over government confirmation of the troublesome 
Bishop. The Council claimed that it did not want to set a precedent 
for government intervention, despite the fact that some of its members 
had been eager for British intervention. FO.lHl/758, 92/1U/31.
28. FO.lUl/758, 92/9/31.
29. Murray in the Foreign Office minuted in March that the British could
intervene under the third Reserved Point but should do so only if 
they could be inconspicuous. Henderson was the one suggesting 
pressure on the Palace. FO. 371/15^+09 s J663/1+7/16.
30. For example, he persuaded Sidqi to prevent the excommunication of 
the Patriarch’s bete noire, ’Ibrahim Luqa. See also FO.371/15^+09, 
J1293/U7/16.
31. FO.11+1/758, 92/30/31.
32. Misr, 10 November 1932, p.3.
33. By*this time, Dus had replaced Qalinl Fahmi as the chief intermediary
between the Patriarch and the Palace, Qalinl was making his rounds
spitefully referring to the Patriarch as "that animal". FO.lUl/686,
8609/57/29.
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suggested a solution that was less drastic but would still leave the
3^Patriarch m  control. Loraine, maintaining his belief* that the
laity and not the clergy required protection, informed Sidqi that he
saw no justification for a change in the Council composition. The
Prime Minister replied that the chaos caused by the perennial quarrel
35about the spending of church income was reason enough. Sidqi’s scheme
was not to be gifted with success; the Foreign Office, like Loraine,
36found it unacceptable and had its disapproval voiced to the King.
In another attempt to solve the problem of endowments, yet another
joint lay-clerical committee was formed in 1937. It made as little
37progress as the old committee, and in June the Holy Synod gave up and
announced that it would retain control of the endowments. At the same
time, the Lay Council reaffirmed that it regarded the 1928 degree
38setting up the first joint committee as invalid.
The luck of the reformers changed when in 1 9 ^  they were able to
replace the late Patriarch Yu’annis with the reform-minded Makarios.
The latter suggested that the endowments be handed to a committee which
would be elected by the Majlis and approved by the Patriarch. The
income would be devoted first to improving monastic conditions and then
30
to whatever other projects the Patriarch thought worthwhile. The
reformers had no objection to this. They were more interested in over­
seeing the accounts and determining that the money was spent wisely than 
in choosing how the money would be spent.
3U. FO.1U1/7U9, 20/1/33.
35. Sidqi was particularly annoyed because the clergy were no longer 
being paid and the government had had to grant money for their 
support. F0.H07/217, No,7. Sir Percy Loraine to Sir John Simon,
16 January 1933.
36. FO.1^1/7^9, 20/8/33.
37* Misr, 9 August 1937> p.l. This committee has ceased meeting in 1930.
38. It did so on the grounds that the decree had not been submitted to a 
parliament and contradicted the 1927 law which had. al-.'Ahram,
18 June 1937, PPF *
39. FO.371A 1316, J906/IU/I6.
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Makarios * proposal aroused a storm of protest among the clergy who 
sent a delegation in May to the Minister of the Interior to enlist his 
support. The delegation failed, and the Wafd Government confirmed Lay 
Council control of monastic endowments, The Wafd had no reason to 
contradict the expressed wish of the head of the community and was perhaps 
concerned to placate, at least partially, those Copts inclined to follow 
the Coptic politician Makram %baid out of the party.
Meeting in the wake of this division, the Holy Synod determined that
Hothe Patriarch had violated church law. A delegation was sent to the
British Embassy to plead their cause and to express the fear that the
government might attempt to overcome their resistance by force. They
apparently overcame this fear; a Lay Council committee, sent to take a
preliminary look at the Waqf accounts, found the Abbots very unco-operative.
The clergy only needed patience for by July the honeymoon was over.
The Majlis thought it could dictate and, once the Patriarch tired of this, 
in
quarrelling began. Makarios soon came under the influence of his fellow
k2ecclesiastics. Annoyed with the Lay Council, he withdrew to a monastery
in August and did not return for two months. Away from lay influence, he
lost any remaining reformist tendencies. Inevitably, his return did not
improve the situation; the Council, with much of the community behind it,
I4.3
clung tenaciously to its right to control monastic endowments.
Makarios asked the government for a decree proclaiming his jurisdiction
HO. By Fitna. Misr, 30 May 19HH, p.2.
Hi. Interview, Iris Habib al-Masri, church historian and daughter of 
an influence Coptic official of the time, 2H August 1979.
H2. F0.371/H5931, J2266/10/16.
H3. A meeting of 1,000 people held by the Tawflq Society, a Coptic 
benevolent association, in June voted to back the Lay Council.
The latter also had the support of the local Lay Councils. Misr, 
16 March 19^6, p.l.
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over secular and financial church affairs, "but he died before it 
1+1+
could he issued.
His successor, Patriarch Yusab, who was elected with the support
of reform elements, also agreed to Majlis supervision of endowments and
then changed his mind after his election. As always, the problem was
partly due to the Council’s persistent lack of tact in trying to dictate 
I4.5
to the Patriarch. In 19^7s community split over the appointment
of a foreign Anglican as instructor at the seminary. Half the Lay
1+6Council opposed the appointment and resigned. This, in turn,
generated a new problem: the Patriarch wanted elections for an
entirely new Majlis scheduled while the Vice-President and effective 
head of the Council, al-Minyawi, held that the law only allowed for by-
1*7elections to fill the vacant seats. Several months later, the issue
had still not been decided; the Council could not function and there
was a backlog of personal status appellate cases. In disgust, the
Patriarch left Cairo and refused to return. It was rumoured that he
1+8had left it up to the Council of Ministers to settle the affair.
Patriarch Yusab appears to have been a weak individual who was
prey to the arguments of anyone more forceful than he. Al-Minyawi
and his supporters merely compounded the problem by splitting the
Council over a matter as unimportant as an instructor at the seminary.
Even loyal backers like Misr began to suggest the need for a change in
1+9
the Council's ways, and some even proposed a more drastic reallocation 
of duties.^
41*. Sergius, in the name of the Acting Patriarch, was still trying to
obtain this decree in March 19^6. Misr, 18 June 19^5» p.2.
1+5. Interview, Iris al-Masri, 2l+ August 1979.
1+6, Including Habib al-Masri, Raghib ’Iskander, Tawfiq Dus and Murad Wahbah
1+7. By law, the Patriarch was President of the Council. Misr,
5 June 19^7j p.l.
1+8, Misr, 28 November 191+7 s p.l.
1+9. Misr, 2 July 19^8s p.l.
50. I.e., the Coptic Unity Society. Misr, 5 November 19^7, p.3.
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Again in 19^ -9» Council elections were delayed due to an attempt
by the Patriarch to restrict the electorate. Hoping to force the
issue, he first declared in November that the Council was no longer
legally constituted and its decisions therefore void, and then in
February that he would retire to a monastery if the government did
not act on his request. The government, hoping to solve at least
this kind of problem permanently, had Parliament amend the Council
charter to give the Minister of the Interior the power to appoint
a commission to replace the Council until elections could be held.
In addition, all Council decisions from the end of its term in
October were validated.^ The Commission appointed by the Ministry
had a clerical bias, and this drove al-Minyawi and some other Copts
52on the Commission to withhold their participation. However, the
Commission held elections that summer (1950) and the reformers won 
a majority.
Yusab's pontificate was perhaps even more troubled than that of 
his predecessors. Accusations of clerical corruption and 
incompetence grew more and more frequent as the Patriarch came under 
the influence of his valet who was reportedly selling bishoprics for
£E5,000, and was perhaps collecting this fee at some later date from
53endowment revenues. As many as 16 of the 19 episcopal appointments
5U
made by Yusab may have been sold in this fashion. Finally, in 1955,
the clergy and the government agreed to the Patriarch’s deposition.
51. Chamber Debates, ninth session, 6 March 1950.
52. Misr was also unhappy with the Committee's composition. Misr.
2 and 10 May 1950, p.l.
53. French Embassy Archives, Box lUU, File 31/2, the Ambassador to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 7 March 1953.
5 .^ Otto Meinardus, Christian Egypt: Faith and Life (Cairo 1970), p.U2.
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2* Patriarchal Elections
Another sign of weakness was that there was no accepted method
of choosing a Patriarch. This was not a new problem; in past
centuries, a preference was voiced hut not always followed for
monastic candidates who were usually, hut not always, elected hy an
55electorate whose composition varied. There were three Partiarchal
elections in the first half of this century; all were controversial, 
and each time the problem was different. The variety in custom gave 
each side in an election dispute a number of precedents on which to 
draw. Essentially, these three elections provided additional 
opportunities for the reformers to attempt to take control of the 
community.
In 1926, the age and senility of Patriarch Cyril drove the
reformers to argue with the Synod over whose right it was to appoint
a deputy to act for the Patriarch. By tradition, it was the right
of the latter two; the reformers, fearing the appointment of the tough
56and reactionary Metropolitan Yu’annis, argued for the people.
Nothing happened due to the fact that the government, whose
responsibility it was to confirm such an appointment refused to take
sides. In August 1927, the quarrel became acute when Cyril died.
The Synod asked Yu’annis to serve as Acting Patriarch while the
reform party, hoping to prevent him from using the office to his
57advantage, pushed for an immediate election. However, the
reformers first wanted to change the election regulations, set in 
1908, which gave the government the right to choose the electors.
55. Ibid., pp.90-1.
56. Knowing that they were in the wrong, they asked Parliament to 
grant the Lay Council the right to appoint the Deputy. 
Parliament declined.
57. FO.141/685, 8424/51/27.
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After long argument, the reformers failed, and in 1928 the government
did exactly as they feared, packing the assembly with electors who
5 8
were not necessarily even Orthodox Copts.
The reformers’ candidate for Partiarch was Yuhanna Salama, 
deputy (wakil) of the Khartoum diocese, who had not only quarrelled
59with the Bishop, hut had been married in his youth. Although,
therefore not a favourite with the Synod, he was popular with Copts 
in the Sudan and the British, who supported his progressive ideas. 
British approval may have led the reformers to expect British help; 
it may equally have harmed Yuhanna in the King’s eyes, and may help
60to explain the latter’s preference for Yu’annis. King Fu'ad was
eager to settle the election so that a new Metropolitan could be
named to Ethiopia,^"1" and so he called on two Coptic politicians,
Quallni Fahml and Tawfiq Dus, to help secure the speedy election of
Yu'annis, In fact, almost all Coptic politicians became involved in
various ad hoc attempts to resolve differences.
Many Copts detested Yu'annis, and the Coptic press was full of
articles attacking him. In December 1927, an illegally constituted
assembly of 260 people representing Lay Councils and notables, elected
Yuhanna Salama Partiarch, and asked the government to confirm their 
62choice. The legitimate Nominations Committee condemned the meeting
58. FO.lUl/758, 92/5/31.
59- FO.371/20129, J166/166/16.
60. Interview, Iris al-Masri, 2h August 1979.
61. Only the Partiarch could consecrate a Metropolitan, but the King
feared that the Ethiopians would take advantage of the stalemate 
and name an Ethiopian Metropolitan. Qalinl Fahml, Muj^akkirat, 
vol.2 (Cairo 19^), p.111.
62. There is some confusion as to whether this was an election or a
nomination. The Residency described it as the former. Misr,
however, used both ’’tarshih" (nomination) and " ’intikhab"
(election) to describe the same act. Judging from the fuss the 
meeting created, the British interpretation was correct. FO.lUl/685, 
8^2^/59/28; 8^2^/78/28; Misr, 16, 17, 19 and 20 December 1927, p.l.
The government, due to countervailing pressures, delayed confirmation 
of Yu’annis' appointment as Acting Partiarch until just after this 
meeting.
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while the Majlis Mill! applauded it and requested the British to biLock
63
any government decision against Salama. The British were aware of
the strong clerical opposition to Salama and, while sympathetic,
decided against intervention. They did act to secure the reform
61+
party a royal audience, hut this did not hear fruit.
The lack of agreement on a draft election law continued to 
delay the election. The government was reluctant to decide the 
matter and so continued to prolong Yu'annis1 appointment as Acting 
Patriarch, thereby inevitably strengthening his hand. Finally, the 
government set up an assembly of 96 clerics and laymen, who were 
individually informed of the King's wishes by the energetic Tawfiq 
Dus. Acting in deference to those wishes, the assembly elected 
Yu'annis Partiarch in December 1928 by a vote of ninety-one to five. 
Both the manner of his election and his subsequent behaviour 
created doubts about his willingness and ability to protect the 
community.
The course of the second Partiarchical election ran no more 
smoothly, although the initial developments were encouraging. When 
Yu'annis died in 19^ +2, Yusab, Metropolitan of Jirja, was elected 
Acting Patriarch with little opposition. Even more surprising was 
the rapidity with which the Majlis and Synod agreed on new election 
regulations. These latter established an electorate of the clergy, 
the educated and the well-to-do. If not widely representative of
65
the community, it at least was not a body that could be packed.
Misr happily described the new regulations as giving the community the
. 61right to elect its highest religious official, vox populi vox Dei.
63. FO.li+l/685, 8U2t/51/27.
6k. FO.1^1/685, 8U2^/70/27.
65. Ultimately 31580 electors qualified.. Egyptian Gazette, 
1+ February 19^, p. 3.
66. Misr, 17 August 19^ -2, p.l.
4The problem this time occurred over the question of electing 
a monk. The new law required it; however, an explanatory 
memorandum issued with the law seemed to allow exceptions. Since 
rival sides could quote the article or the memorandum, the debate 
grew lively. Both the reformers and the clergy favoured monastic 
candidates initially; each group later split internally on the 
issue.
Unfortunately, the only monastic candidate put forward was a 
former government official named Wadi^ Sa^Id. Having taken orders 
only recently, his timing scandalized many; but he did have the
67support of certain reform elements, including members of the Majlis. 
Metropolitan Yusab was the main contender on the other side, and he 
had the support of several important Coptic politicians. Misr 
published articles on all the candidates and at least simulated 
neutrality; the British felt that the paper actually favoured the 
election of a Bishop.^ Yusab also had the support of al-Muqattam.
Letters advocating the election of Makarios, dredged up from the 
last election, began to appear in Misr. His great age was a 
discouraging factor, but some apparently saw him as a good man who 
could pave the way for a genuine monastic candidate at some not too 
distant date.^ The Wafdist al-Misribacked Makarios.^
The election was delayed because the Synod refused to recognize 
-tC 71Wadi as a monk. In deference to this, the Nominations Committee
withdrew him from the list of candidates in July 19^3. Throughout
67. He had led an exemplary and celibate life before becoming a monk. 
Interview, Iris al-Masri, 2k August 1979.
68. FO.371/35530, J1217/2/16.
69. Interview, Iris al-Masri, 2k August 1979-
70. The Wafd may have supported Makarios because its opponents were 
backing Yusab. See FO.371/35530, J1217/2/16.
71. Misr, 1 November 19^3, p.3.
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the autumn, the Lay Council insisted that Wadi*'' was a legitimate
nominee, whereas Bishops were not. Eventually, the Council was
forced to give way on hoth points; without Wadi^, it was silly
to insist on a monk.
The disappointed Council swung its weight behind Makarios.
One clear sign of the times was that all the nominees promised reform
and, in the final weeks before the election, contention rested on
which candidate was the most progressive. Makarios' commitment
to reform went back to at least the early 1920s, and he, perhaps
accordingly, was elected in January 19^.
Less than two years later, Makarios died. The community,
arguing for some months over the advantage of monastic candidates,
finally agreed in March 19^6 to strike the clause demanding the
election of a monk from the regulations. Another problem, raised
by the last election, occurred over the question of whose right it
72was to validate a nominee.
Yusab Wadl^ , and one other candidate were approved by the
Nominations Committee in April; and the election was set for May.
The influential Coptic writer, Salama Musa, came out in support of
Yusab in Misr. As Musa pointed out, a Bishop might be expected to
73have more administrative and worldly knowledge than a monk, given 
prevailing monastic educational standards. Of course, Wadic was 
exceptional for a monk, but he may have lost supporters due to a 
suspicion that he would encounter problems with the Synod if elected. 
Yusab also had the support of over half the Lay Council, and he 
finally was elected Patriarch in the least controversial of the 
three elections. He was helped by a strike which kept many
72. The Lay Council was claiming this right. Misr, 5 March 19^6, p.l.
73. Misr, 16 April 19^6, p.l.
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electors housebound 'because his supporter, General Basili Sidql,
7U
arranged for army lorries to take other supporters to the polls.
3. Conclusion
Events in the Coptic community mirrored a similar ferment in
the Muslim community, and periodic attempts 'were made to reform
75various Islamic institutions.  ^ The government had always had 
more control over the Muslim religious establishment than it had 
over the Copt, but its power over the latter grew. Partly this was 
due to the fact that the government was increasingly treating the 
Copts as individual citizens rather than members of a corporate body
iSiIwith rights and duties of its own. In addition, the government 
benefited, albeit sometimes reluctantly, from the stalemate between 
laymen and clergy.
It was, of course, not unusual for the government to intervene 
in the internal affairs of the community, nor for the various
T ^factions in a communal dispute to ask for government support.
What was new was the number of both Copts involved and outsiders whose 
help could be sought; the British, the Cabinet and the Palace were at 
times the object of appeal.
The Patriarch was a public official, subject at a minimum to 
government confirmation. The state had the authority to determine how 
power would be divided in the community and which group would
7*+. Interview, Iris al-Masrl, 2b August 1979.
75. The passage of the 1927 Majlis Milll law coincided with Parliament’s 
assumption of control over the affairs of al-’Azhar and its 
satellite schools. In addition, the Qadi school was reorganized 
and suggestions to reform Islamic personal status law and abolish 
private endowments were put forward. F0.1^1/566, 17008/108/27.
75a.fE. Kedamrie, "Parallel Comments about Iraq”, in The 
Chatham House Version, op.cit., p .306.
76. See Meinardus, Christian-Egypt, pp.355-9, for examples.
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supervise endowments. It was not only slow to make such decisions, 
hut it was often unwilling or unable to enforce them once made.
At different times, the government scolded or cajoled both the Majlis 
Mill! and the Patriarch, but it seemed unable to take stronger action. 
It never tried to force the monasteries to deliver waqf accounts to 
the Majlis, and the clergy obviously felt relatively free to ignore 
the government.
The government was, to an extent, caught between Palace support 
of the Patriarch and British sympathy for the reformers. Palace- 
tied governments like that of Sidql in the 1930s, especially were 
pushed to strengthen clerical power, but were usually prevented from 
doing so by the British. One notable success was the imposition of 
Patriarch Yu’annis on the community.
Of course, it was easier to contemplate Interfering with the 
Majlis Mi111 than dictating to the Holy Synod. With the whole of 
the Western world as an audience, the government was understandably 
cautious about openly opposing the Patriarch who was the symbolic, 
if not always accepted, leader of the Copts.
The British played an important role in encouraging reform, 
but intervened only when some action of the Egyptian government 
threatened the reform party or the Majlis. They avoided squabbles 
in which the Egyptian government was not involved. They were 
interested only in protecting the community from the government and 
not from itself; after the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was signed, 
intervention In this area ceased.
The community no longer had an accepted hierarchy of authority. 
Its fragmentation could have incidentally served the purpose of the 
state because it prevented the Copts from presenting a united front.
Some Copts even invited the government to take power over from the
community. Government power did, in fact grow in certain areas;
witness the 1950 law amending the Lay Council charter "because the
community could not agree on election regulations. The rivalry
between clergy and laymen did then hamper whatever protection the
millet system was able to offer the Copts, and perhaps hastened its
ultimate ruin. However, the main government reaction when faced
with Coptic affairs was not one of delight at an opportunity, but
of sheer annoyance due to the intractability of the problem. As
one Foreign Office official noted in 1935, the government no sooner
tried to remedy Coptic grievances than the various factions began
quarrelling violently over what form the remedies would take; and,
before the government secured agreement, it would fall and a new one
TTwould come into office.
Although many members of the Majlis thought the traditional 
ordering of the community was archaic, they fought hard against 
government encroachments in areas such as education and personal 
status jurisdiction. They were interested in weakening the clergy 
only to their own advantage and not that of the government. They 
were, however, proponents of equality, and they complained about 
government and private discrimination against Copts.
The institution of parliamentary government broadened the arena 
of struggle. Traditionally the government sought the advice of its 
own Coptic officials or the clergy on communal affairs. Now Coptic 
politicians also sought to persuade the government of the validity 
of their views in the dispute; and the government used them to help
TT. F0.3T1/19082, J515/153/16.
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mediate whenever endemic quarrels reached epidemic proportions.
The Majlis was anxious to see advocates of communal reform elected 
to Parliament so that its views could be represented. The clergy 
also recognized the usefulness of this, and in 1925 the monastery 
Dair al-Muharraq spent £E2,000 on an election party for Tawflq
iy O
Dus. There is some question, however, as to the extent to which
politicians and even high officials used these channels. In 
practice, such men may have feared to represent the community because 
of the harm it could do their careers. They had what amounted to a 
conflict of interest, which perhaps worked to the community’s 
detriment. Men without such ties potentially were less influential, 
but perhaps were less reluctant to make their voices heard. Many 
politicians may have been more interested in communal affairs before 
19191 after that date the chance to participate in national politics 
gave them an alternative. To the extent that the Wafd and its 
Coptic politicians were interested in the problem, they generally 
sympathized with reform. It was the coalition government of 1927 
and the Wafd government of 19^ +H which made changes favourable to the 
Majlis. Other parties proved more lukewarm toward reform, although 
the movement had important supporters among non-Wafdists.
The lay reformers, although bitterly deploring government 
intervention when it benefited the clergy, were happy to countenance 
it when it was in their favour. They were able to weaken the tie 
between the state and the Patriarch, and this in turn weakened the 
Patriarch’s ability to represent his flock to the government. Now 
that the government was relying less on the church for other things, 
it may have looked less to the church to present communal views.
78. Senate Debates, session 28, 28 June 1926.
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The church, in any case, was cautious about publicly appealing to
the government and Palace on behalf of the Copts. It had to take
care that its actions, so visible, did not jeopardize the group.
Weak Patriarchs, like Maqarius and Yusab, were ill-equipped to
act to protect Coptic interests, and even strong ones like Yu'annis
were wary of crossing the Palace.
The Majlis* success in gaining control of the community was
limited. It spent most of its energy trying to gain what it saw
as its rights, rather than exercising them, and foolishly made almost
every issue a point of contention. It was not always a responsible
body and absenteeism was chronic. Murqus Simaika, founder of the
Coptic Museum, argued that the Council was financially incompetent;
those estates it did manage showed an annual deficit, which was met
79by selling property. Iris al-Masri thinks that from the early
19l0s the Majlis was of limited value and lost much prestige in the 
80eyes of Copts. This may be true. At a time when the Copts were
at increasing risk in the larger society, the Majlis, along with the 
clergy, was expending its energies on inti-*q.-communal problems.
Given that endowments were such a hotly contested prize, and 
that there probably was some truth to allegations of clerical 
ineptitude and corruption, it would be surprising if they were not 
mismanaged. Unfortunately, the church was secretive about the 
amount of property it owned; there are no statistics reliable enough 
to permit firm conclusions about the fate of the endowments and their 
revenue over time,
79- FO.111/755, 121/6/33.
80. Interview, Iris al-Masri, 2l August 1979.
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Clerical and lay estimates of monastic holdings ranged between
8l5,000 and 9,000 feddans. Expenses were low and profits from land
and property were, at least in some years, quite high. Dair al-
82
Muharraq had 35 monks and an annual income of £E100,000 in 1927. 
Twenty-one years earlier, when the monastery’s income had totalled 
only £E9,633, its expenses had reached £E1,233, leaving an 87 per
O
cent profit. No doubt some of this profit was invested to produce
still larger incomes; certainly, little of it was spent on improving 
monastic conditions.
B. The Coptic Press
The number of periodicals published in Egypt in the past century
and the range of views they expressed are surprising given the small
size of the literate public. Few could support themselves from
subscription rates; as one Copt in the business said, there was no
81*quicker way to financial r u m  than to start a newspaper. Most
periodicals relied on special subsidies from those whose opinions 
they expressed. The uncertainty in funding, however, meant that 
periodicals frequently changed hands and, on occasion, showed startling 
reversals in political allegiance. The relative freedom accorded 
the press made it a useful political and social tool, and sometimes 
newspapers were suspended because of the violence of their attacks 
on the government.
81. See the following for various estimates: Misr, 7 August 1926, p.l; 
16 March ±9hh, p. 3; 20 March 19^, p. 3. Ramzi Tadrus, al-’Aqbat 
fi al-Qarn al-^Ishrin, vol.l (Cairo 1911), pp.136-7. Gabriel Baer, 
A History of Land Ownership in Modern Egypt, 1800-1950 (London 
1962) p.179.
82. Misr, 16 March 19^, p. 3., quoting Suryal’s memorandum to the 
Senate, ih April 1927.
83. Misr , 20 March 19^^, p.3.
81*. Misr, 27 April 1935, P*7.
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Coptic periodicals follow this general pattern and provide 
evidence of a lively, if disunited, communal life. Copts published 
religious, intellectual and political periodicals, some of which were 
meant to appeal to Muslims as well as Christians. Internal communal 
matters were a natural concern; articles covered such assorted 
topics as Coptic history, Coptic cultural and religious mores and, 
of course, the various quarrels over church organization.
Although Coptic periodicals did not speak with one voice, they 
did unite on some issues. They helped to promote, some more 
consciously than others, communal solidarity; and they sometimes 
defended Coptic interests. Their freedom in voicing complaints 
about discrimination suggests considerable Muslim tolerance. From 
the mid-19^0s especially, Coptic periodicals encouraged the idea 
that there was a Coptic political perspective rather than as many 
political views as there were Copts. They even encouraged co­
operation between the normally hostile Coptic Christian sects. Three
of the most important Coptic periodicals will be reviewed here.
Two, Misr (Egypt) and al-Watanf(.The Homeland), were daily papers, and 
one, al-Manara al-Misriyya (The Egyptian Lighthouse) was sometimes 
published weekly, and sometimes monthly.
1. Misr
Misr was the chief Coptic organ in the period under study. It 
sometimes served as a regular party paper with a Muslim as well as 
Coptic readership; and, at other times, it addressed itself mainly 
to communal concerns. It was founded in 1895 by a wealthy 'AsyutI 
who wished to counteract the relatively pro-clerical views of 
al-Watan. The paper consistently advocated an increase in lay 
participation in church affairs. Its self-conscious role was as a
5 7
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watchdog of the Copts, and after 1930, it was the only daily organ 
reporting on clerical activities. It was a leader in the communal 
reform movement, and its support for the Coptic Lay Council offered 
that body some protection from government, if not clerical, 
interference.
Misr probably had a largely middle-class and educated audience.
It received financial support from printing the announcements of the 
Lay Council, the Patriarchate, Coptic societies and the government. 
Particularly after 1930, It had a virtual monopoly on the announcements 
of communal organizations. It may have received covert subsidies
from reformers. There Is some evidence that it at times received a
8(5 8*7direct subsidy from the Patriarchate and at times from the Wafd.
Misr purported to guide the Copts in national as well as communal
affairs. The paper supported the British Occupation and defended
the Copts from the attacks of the Muslim press in the troubled first
decade of this century. It was then a stronger champion of Coptic
rights than at any other time until the mid-19^0s.
In 1918, Misr experienced a change of heart and became both
vehemently anti-British and pro-Wafdist, Financial difficulties were
Q
partly responsible for the conversion, after which circulation soared. 
Misr became a major Zaghlulist organ with both Copts and Muslims on 
staff. For example, one series of articles written by the Coptic
85. Misr, 5 August 1931, p.5.
86. This'is curious given Migr1s views. However, in 19^6 the Patriarchate
gave Misr £E1,U00, a subvention it then threatened to cancel if 
Salama Musa continued as Editor. Yusab may have arranged the 
subsidy because Musa supported him in his campaign to become 
Patriarch. He now wanted Musa fired because the latter had upset 
the government. DW. ^Abdln Palace Archives, Tawa'if Diniyya, 
Memorandum 15, 8 December 19^6.
87. Interview, 'Ibrahim Faraj Masiha, 13 June 1979.
88. 'Anwar al-Jundi thinks that circulation was around U,000 early in the 
century. Another source claims that it climbed to 100,00 in 1919,
but this sounds wildly inflated. 'Anwar al-Jundl, al~Siliafa al-
Siyasiyya (Cairo 1962), p.150; Severianus, "Les Coptes de l'Egypte 
Musulmane", Etudes Mediterraneennes 6 (.1959): 80.
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nationalist Siniit Hanna pn 1919 played an influential role in
s 8 9
"bringing down the Muhammad Sa id Ministry.
When ^Adli became Prime Minister in 1921, and quarrelled with
Zaghlul, Misr moved into the moderate ^Adlist camp and Mahmud Azmi, a
noted secularist, was named editor. During the Tharwat Ministry,
which followed that of ^Adli, the paper vacillated between ^dli 
90and Zaghlul, but eventually chose to support the latter. By
November 1922 Misr was attacking the new Liberal Constitutionalist
party with which ^Adli had ties. The paper remained Wafdist, albeit
with varying degrees of enthusiasm for most of the next three decades.
Until 1925 Misr was an important Wafdist organ publishing mainly
articles of national concern. Then again during the 1928 Mahmud
Cabinet, when many Wafdist periodicals were suspended, the party
leaned heavily on Misr. Staff from the suspended Kawkab al-Sharp
joined Misr, and Abbas al- Aqqad continued to write for the paper
even after Kawkab resumed publication. The depredations of the
Sidql regime increased the Wafd’s reliance on Misr; by May 1931,
it was the only Wafdist paper in circulation, and al-^Aqqad was again
editor. Its attacks on Sidqi persuaded the latter to have the paper
c.suspended; it soon reappeared with al- Aqqad at the helm again.
Misr’s ties with the Wafd would never again be so close.
After the owner’s death in 1932, his sons kept some distance from 
politics until the Wafd returned to power in 1936. The paper was 
enthusiastically Wafdist until the shock of the disastrous 1938 
election defeat inspired caution. There was little criticism of
89. Migr was suspended because of these articles. Tariq al-Bishri, 
"Misr al-Haditha Bain ’Ahmad w-al-Masih", al-Katib 119 (19T0): 130.
90. One Palace observer recorded that it lacked a precise political 
colour. C.C.E.H. cAbdin Palace Archives, Note on the Political 
Press in Egypt, undated but probably written between June and 
November of 1922.
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the Mahmud government. Misr, pleased with the Wafd’s return to 
power in 19^2, avoided comment on the argument between al-Nahhas and 
his Coptic ally, Makram ^ TTbaid. It neither rushed to support ^Ubaid 
after his split from the party, nor continued to hack the Wafd.
Misr was soon complaining that the Wafd refused to allocate it 
enough newsprint; it had to suspend publication twice in 19^. The 
paper was relieved to see ^ Ahmad Mahir made Prime Minister in 19^, 
but none the less newsprint remained scarce.
From 19U6, Misr assumed a markedly communal character and largely
withdrew from the national political arena. Under Salama Musa, who
became Editor in 19^2, Misr was so zealous in its defence of Coptic
rights that the Sidqi government accused the paper of fanaticism and
91refused to publish any more announcements in its pages. In the 
increasingly charged atmosphere of communal tension, Misr sought to 
protect the minority by attacking the majority. It assailed the 
bigotry of the Muslim Brethren, doubted the wisdom of British 
withdrawal and criticized the 1950 Wafd Cabinet.
For much of this period then, Misr was attached in some measure 
to the Wafd. To an extent, it was responsible for creating and 
maintaining Coptic support for that party; it later both mirrored 
and encouraged Coptic dissatisfaction with the party. If at times 
Misr overlooked parochial interests in its enthusiasm for national 
ones, its links with the Wafd were an advantage and afforded more 
protection to the community than a strongly sectarian stand. Its 
disaffection from the political system dates from the 1938 election 
and with the Wafd from 19^2-3. The Wafd did not need Misr’s
91. This entailed considerable loss for the paper. Misr, 
13 May 19^6, p.l.
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support after 1938 because it had several periodicals expressing 
party views. Misr’s hacking may even have entailed some risk given 
the accusation made during the 1938 campaign that the Wafd was a 
Coptic clique.
2. Al-Watan
The first of the Coptic dailies was founded in 1878, and it
hacked the ecclesiastics in their struggle to limit the say of laymen
in church affairs. Although willing in time to countenance moderate
92reform, its pro-clerical stance guaranteed it a Patriarchal subsidy.
With its sale in 1923 to a lawyer, the paper became an advocate of 
communal reform, although of a slightly more conservative complexion 
than Misr.
Al-Watan opposed the British occupation until the 1090s, when it
became a staunch defender of both the British presence in Egypt and 
93Coptic rights. Lacking its rival’s talent for prediction,
al-Watan continued to favour the British well into the 1920s. It
_ 97
condemned both the revolution and Zaghlul; in time, however, it
came to recognize how little support there was for the retention of 
British control, and it modified its tone.
It continued, however, to urge co-operation with the British 
and called upon the Egyptians to present their views to the Milner 
Mission. Unlike the nationalists, it celebrated the 1922 grant 
of independence.
Al-Watan was, at this time, primarily concerned with national
and not communal affairs. Like Misr, it had Muslims on staff and
92. FO.U07/I86, Wo.237 (enclosure), Memorandum on the Coptic Church, 1920.
93. Seikaly, The Copts, p.122; al-Jundi, al-Sihafa,p .150; F0.371/895, 
1*7992/1*7092/16.
9I*. One Residency official applauded its ’’sensible articles",
F0.1*07/181*, Wo.182, Sir M. Ceetham to Earl Curzon, 25 March 1919*
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■backed ^Adli when he became Prime Minister. The fact that Muslims 
could even temporarily write for Coptic papers meant that Copt- 
Muslim differences had blurred, their place taken by a more 
critical issue. Muslim writers probably helped attract Muslim 
readers without losing any of the paper’s traditional Coptic audience. 
Al-Watan’s natural inclination was to support whatever Ministry was in 
power, and it also made frequent protestations of loyalty to the 
throne. Even if it was not always enthusiastic about a given 
government, it generally refrained from the sort of criticism to which 
Misr was given.
With al-Watan1s sale in late 1923, the paper began to support 
the Wafd Ministry. Unfortunately, it was too late. The Wafd did 
not need two Coptic papers. Misr had both a stronger claim on the 
party’s affection and a larger circulation. In fact, al-Watan’s 
mistake may have been to look too much like its rival, with similar 
views on church and national affairs. It began to appear 
sporadically in 1927, and finally disappeared in 1930.
Al-Watan was most influential in the period before the First 
World War. It appealed, until 192k, to older, more traditional 
Copts who were comfortable with the status quo and who exhibited
95some degree of Anglophilia. The radical change m  viewpoint in
192^ 4 occurred not only because of a change in ownership, but because 
there were fewer readers who opposed communal reform and supported 
the British. Al-Watan1s defection left the Partiarch without a 
mouthpiece, and it left the British with only al-Muqattam of the 
Arabic press to express their views.
95. F0.H07/186, No.203 (enclosure), Note on the Egyptian Press, 1920.
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3. Al-Manara al-Misriyya
This journal in 1928 succeeded one published by its owner,
Murqus Sergius, in the Sudan. Sergius, a radical priest with a
parish in Cairo, was a popular if notorious figure. Known for his
advocacy of church reform, he also acquired reputation as a fiery
orator during the 1919 revolution. For all but a brief period in
the 19^0s, he and his journals were the bane of the Patriarchate
9 6because of their strong advocacy of reform.
Although al-Manara was primarily interested in religious
97affairs, it also dealt with Copt-Muslim relations. Its owner
broke with the Wafd in the 1920s; consequently, his journal had 
no party affiliation and tended to evaluate issues in terms of their 
affect on the Coptic community. It defended Coptic rights even when 
other Coptic journals were slow to do so, and it routinely reported 
incidents of communal violence. Al-Manara frequently protested 
against discrimination and government interference in communal
98affairs; it also attacked the Muslim Brethren, called for the 
dissolution of all Islamic societies and deplored Muslim oppression 
of Copts.
C. Voluntary Associations
1. Non-Political
In the past century, many Coptic societies were founded and 
flourished. They had different aims but most combined religious
96. He supported the Patriarchate of his friend Makarios,and also 
for a time, that of Yusab.
97. The radical priest 'Ibrahim Luqa published a similar journal, 
(al-Yaqza), but it, unlike its owner, seems to have restricted 
its scope to church affairs.
98. See March and April 19^ +8. The journal did assume a somewhat 
more temperate tone during Sergius' two terms as Patriarchal 
Deputy (wakll) under Makarios and Yusab.
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sentiments with social objectives. Their ultimate purpose was to 
serve the community and, while some chose to do this by circulating 
devotional pamphlets, others helped by building schools and hospitals. 
At least one society was formed for the sole purpose of encouraging 
church reform, but many became involved in lay-clerical quarrels 
and most seemed to back the reform party. These societies tried 
to compensate for the weakness of the community; one task they 
assumed was the church's traditional responsibility for charity. At 
the same time, they reinforced communal bonds by encouraging 
religious faith and communal schooling. They helped keep the Coptic 
poor from looking elsewhere for help, and they provided a social outlet 
for their members. They limited the attraction of Islam by 
providing for the same needs and satisfactions as did parallel Muslim 
organizations.
Coptic voluntary associations provided services that the state 
either was unable to provide due to limited resources, or was 
unwilling to provide for non-Muslims. In trying to lighten the 
burden of being Copt in a Muslim society, these organizations were 
doing as much of a service for the government as they were for 
individual Copts. Copts generally felt that the government should 
help any society acting for the public good, regardless of religious
99affiliation. This was something the government was reluctant
to do because grants to Coptic societies or the church often drew 
fire from the opposition p r e s s , G r a n t s  generally were made to
99. See M. Fahmi's speech, the Coptic Congress held at Asyut, p.H8.
100. For example, al-T&aghr objected in 1937 to the Ministry of 
Finance's modest contribution of £E1,000 to Coptic schools in 
Qina, pointing out that the secondary school of a Muslim 
charitable institution in 'Aswan had had to close because of a 
lack of funds. Al-Tl^aghr, 1 April 1937, p.l.
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Coptic institutions on special occasions, like Christian holidays,
and gifts sometimes came from the Palace, hut money was not
budgeted routinely. These societies could not plan on the basis
of an annual allocation in the government budget. Coptic charities
that helped Muslims and Copts ’were more likely to benefit from
government largesse. For instance, the Coptic Hospital, which
provided free treatment for more Muslims than Copts in 1922-3,
received aid from the Ministry of the Interior
Most members of the Lay Council, which nominally supervised
these societies, were active in association life. The societies had
considerable independence and there was little formal co-ordination
102of their activities or views. From time to time, appeals were
103made for unity and talks were held, but they were unproductive.
In 19^7, Salama Musa unsuccessfully called upon Coptic societies to
form an agency to find employment for young Copts and investigate
10^charges of discrimination. Coptic societies generally were not
outspoken in their defence of Coptic rights, at least not until the 
late 19^0s.
Most association members were at least middle class; they came 
from the landed gentry, the civil service and the professions.
Coptic politicians often joined communal societies; no doubt some 
were active with the hope of strengthening their electoral support in 
the community. Since many members had some role in government, they
101. D.W. ^Abdln Palace Archives. Tawa’if wa Jam^Iyat Diniyya 2, 
Letter from President Jirjis Antun to Hassan Hash’at Pasha,
31 March 1925*
102. One association, the Union of Coptic Societies, was able to 
bring some societies together, but it still spoke as one voice 
among many.
103. A number of societies met in March 1936 to discuss unity, but 
their talks bore no fruit.
lOH. Misr, 25 June 19^7, p.l.
1 '
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may have used their influence on behalf of the community, and
particularly in encouraging government support for church reform.
The government had always, of course, given more money to Muslim
societies and had had correspondingly more control over them than over
Coptic societies. From the 19^-Os, the government showed an
inclination to increase its control over both kinds of societies,
but without a concomitant desire to increase its funding for Coptic
associations. Partly the government had a legitimate interest in
protecting both the contributors to and beneficiaries of private
charity, but it may also have been suspicious of voluntary activities
that duplicated, at least in theory, those social services the
government now was trying to provide to both Copts and Muslims.
Perhaps the government feared that some of these associations could
come to challenge its authority and undermine its legitimacy.
The Copts naturally saw government interference as an infringement
on their autonomy and objected bitterly. A 19^5 law regulating
donations gave the Ministry of So.cial Affairs considerable power over
Coptic societies, including the implicit right to inspect church 
105accounts. Three years later the Ministry ruled that churches must
obtain its permission to collect donations and put out poor boxes.
In addition, the Ministry ordered certain Christian associations to
keep a register of speakers with summaries of their sermons. As the
French Embassy noted, this allowed the government to take steps
against those associations showing too great a concern with the
107inequities of Egyptian society. What was more disturbing was
105. Law U0 .U9 (19^5) 'was designed to protect the public by supervising
the collection and use of donations. See Misr, 2k December 19^ -6, p.l.
106. French Embassy Archives, Box ll+H, File 31/2, M. Gilbert Arvengas 
to Mi/. Georges Bidault, 15 March 19^8; Misr, 20 April 19^8, p.3.
107. French Embassy Archives, ibid., 29 April 19^8.
16 6
the annnouncement that the Ministry hoped to keep a proportion of
Coptic to Muslim societies similar to the Coptic percentage of the
population. Misr argued that this was "blatantly discriminatory and
noted glumly that Coptic societies were so busy fighting the
government for the right to exist that they had little time for good 
10 8works. By the early 1950s, the Ministry was refusing to give
109funds to Coptic organizations serving only Copts. In 1951» "when
the government actually planned to supervise collections in churches, 
the Patriarch was moved to protest; the government at least in this 
one instance, retreated
2. Political
There were few attempts to form Coptic political organizations
and only one example of a group with political goals growing out of
a religious association. In 1908 the wealthy Copt, ’Akhnukh Fanus,
formed the Independent Egyptian Party as a reaction to both inter-
communal tensions and the Islamic colouring of the nationalist movement.
First called 'Ahrar al-’Aqbat (Coptic Liberals), the party changed its
112name under fire from other Copts. Although seen by some as an
113attempt to create a religious party, the party had little in its 
platform that was of interest only to Copts. The party appears to
11^have attracted the support of some conservative and wealthy Muslims 
and did not intend, after its initial blunder, to be a Coptic party. 
However, Fanus’ reputation as an advocate of Coptic rights, probably
111
108. Misr, 20 April 19^ +8, p.3.
109. Zag'hib Mikha’Il, Farriq...Tasud’ al-Wahda al-Wataniyya? (Cairo 
n.d.) p.171.
110. Misr, 17 February 1951 > trans. in The Cry of Egypt's Copts 
(New York 195l)> pp.10-11.
111. L.Y. Yunan, al-Hayat al-Bizbiyya fi Mig.r, 1881-191*+ (Cairo 1970), p.U6.
112. Samira Bahr, "al-’Aqbat fi al-Hayat al-Siyasiyya fi Misr",
113. Ibid., p.U09. 
llU. Ibid., p.236.
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frightened off both Muslim and Coptic support. Orthodox Copts
would have been suspicious of his Protestantism and the ’Umma group,
with its moderate political views, probably provided serious
competition. Whatever the reason, the party was a failure.
In 19^9» Ramsis Jibrawi, a lawyer, labour leader and Misr 
115correspondent, founded a Coptic party, the National Democratic
Party, in reaction to troubled communal relations. The party
criticized restrictions on the freedom of worship and demanded that 
-L.3- 6they be lifted. It also complained about discrimination and
inadequate parliamentary representation; one call was for the
establishment of proportional representation. Despite Misr's support,
the party soon floundered. Copts perhaps failed to join it from a
fear that it would aggravate an already bad situation.
The most important Coptic political organisation was the Coptic
Nation (al-'Umma al-Qibtiyya). Active between September 1952 and
195 -^» the group’s roots lay in the violence and discrimination of
the 19^0s and 1950s, Sometimes called the Coptic Brethren, it
modelled itself on the Muslim Brethren in its mix of politics and
religion and its desire to purify the Coptic religion. Both societies
manipulated traditional religious symbols in their quest for power.
The Coptic Nation was the only organization that Copts determined
11Tto alleviate the community's grievances could join.
Founded by a young lawyer, ’Ibrahim Fahml Hilal, the group had 
many young professional members, including Ramsis Jibrawi. Hilal
115. He was adviser to several unions in the early 1930s and was the 
second Vice-President of ^Abbas Halim’s Egyptian Labour Party.
R. Graves, acting Director of the European Department, commented 
that Jibrawi was foolish, insignificant and lacking "even the 
virtue of enthusiasm", FO.lUl/763, 506/33/31; 506/2A/31; 506/1/31.
116, Migr_, 11 June 19^9, p.l.
11J. Interview, Dr. Zahir Riyad, Director of the African Department, 
Coptic Higher Research Institute, 1 June 1979.
68
and his friends had talked about the need for a Coptic political 
organization since secondary school, but the catlyst -was added
ll8
only with the burning of a Coptic church in Suez in January 1952.
The party claimed to be a social or religious organization and not
a political one, but its activist bent ensured its rapid growth
119among the disenchanted young.
Al-'Umma identified the Muslim Brethren as the chief threat to
the Copts and, like the Brethren, illegally collected arms and
120trained members in their use. Because the Brethren asked for
an Islamic state, al-'Umma demanded a Coptic one. Hilal now claims
that this was only propaganda and that the group's real goal was
121the separation of religion and state. Nevertheless, the demand
may have been a serious one at the time. The party had a flag and
a motto that declared that God was their king, Egypt their country,
122the Gospels their law and the Cross their badge. They published
pamphlets and a newspaper and asked the government to give the Copts 
their own radio station. They complained that the census under­
counted Copts, and they demanded a constitutional amendment naming 
the Copts a "nation" ('umma).
Members worked to strengthen religious feeling. Cultural 
differences in Egypt were no longer so acute so the society took old,
devalued symbols, like the Coptic language, and tried to reinvest them 
12^with meaning. Members assumed a puritanical outlook, studied and
118. Interview, 'Ibrahim Eahmi Hilal, 22 May 1979.
119. Hilal claimed that the society, within one year, had established 
branches outside Cairo, and had membership of 92,000. Ibid.
120. The 195*+ government order banning the party claimed that it had 
created a paramilitary organization. Bahr, al-!A.qbafr, p.359.
121. Interview, 'Ibrahim Fahmi Hilal, 22 May 1979.
122. Bahr, al-'Aqbat, p.35*+.
123. See Abner Cohen on this subject in Two-Dimensional Man 
(London 197*0, p. 103.
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and spoke Coptic, wore special clothes and adhered strictly to 
Biblical injunctions.
The group also supported church reform and opposed the Orthodox 
religious establishment; it saw the church's internal corruption 
and disunity as responsible for the community's external weakness.
12i+
One solution they advocated was the deposition of Patriarch Yusab.
The latter understandably asked for and received a government order
125
dissolving the society in 195*+. The society went underground and
made an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap the Patriarch and later to 
assassinate him. Leading members of the society, including Hilal 
and Jibrawi, were tried, convicted and sentenced to several years in 
prison.
12*1. French Embassy Archives, Box lUU, File 31/2, letter to the
Ambassador from S. Fishawl, a member of the society, August 195*+. 
125. Bahr, al-'Aqbat, p.359*
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CHAPTER TWO
THE BRITISH, THE COPTS 
AND THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
A. British-Copt Relations "before the 1919 Revolution
The British attitude toward the Egyptians was marked by a belief
in the superiority of Western culture so strong that not even the fact
that some Egyptians shared that culture’s religion inclined the
British to make exceptions. In their eyes, Coptic Orthodoxy lacked
q
"the true and spiritual part of Christianity", and therefore bore no
resemblance to European Christianity. Missionaries, frustrated in
their attempts to convert Muslims, were particular proponents of this
view and were anxious to persuade Copts to adopt their brand of
Christianity. One Anglican association working in nineteenth-century
Egypt declared its refusal to tolerate "the soul-destroying heresy 
2
of the Copts". As a religion replete with bizarre ritual and
superstition, it had failed, as Cromer so nicely put it, to provide
3
its adherents with any moral benefit. Copts were seen as
k 5compulsive liars who were servile and addicted to alcohol.
Perhaps their chief fault was that they had failed to distinguish
themselves from their Muslim compatriots and thereby succeeded in
questioning Western notions about Christianity's superiority to Islam.
The British in Egypt, unlike those in India, did not have an
ethnic preference, perhaps because Egyptian communal differences were
less distinctive. There were, in any case, few benefits to be
1. M.L. Whately, Among the Huts in Egypt (London 1873), pp.1^9-50.
2. S.H. Leeder, Modern Sons of the Pharaohs (London 1918), p.310.
3. Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt, II (London 1908), p.205*
k. Leeder, Modern Sons, op.cit. , p.328.
5. Ibid., p.327; quoting Blackwood’s Magazine, August 1911.
6. Cromer wrote that bigotry, ignorance and vice were traits shared by
both Muslims and Copts. Cromer, Modern Egypt, II, op.cit. , p.207.
derived from favouring Copts in this overwhelmingly Muslim society; 
and the British were usually careful lest their actions he inter­
preted by Muslims in this light. In this instance, however, Coptic 
and Muslim perceptions of British preferences matter more than the 
preferences themselves. Each community was convinced that the 
British favoured the other. Muslims believed that the British had
set aside their fellow Christians for special treatment. Copts,
7
who expected this treatment, were disappointed and viewed the 
neglect of their complaints as indicative of a preference for MuslimsJ
However, the Coptic attitude toward the Occupation did depend 
partly on the state of inter-communal relations which were in turn 
influenced by Muslim perceptions of the two between the British and 
the Copts. It was easier for the Copts, as Christians and an already 
subject people, to adjust to foreign non-Muslim rule. Whatever 
their differences with the British, and they had many, the Copts were 
grateful for British protection whenever communal relations were 
strained. When relations with Muslims were good, the British 
presence naturally seemed less vital and desirable.
The Copts felt British injustice most keenly in the matter of 
the Egyptian civil service. From the time of Khedive 'Isma^il’s 
deposition, they saw Coptic positions lost first to a policy of 
retrenchment and then to Syrians and Armenians and finally to the 
British.^ One missionary reported in 188U that a majority of Copts
7* Copts seeking jobs from British employers sometimes made their
appeal in the name of the Saviour. Leeder, Modern Sons, op.cit.,
p.326.
8. See Kiriakus Mikhail’s letter of complaint to The Times,
20 September 1910, puoted in FO.371/891*, 38033/38033/16.
9- Murqus Simaika listed the grievance about the civil service as one 
reason the Copts joined the nationalists in 1919* F0.37l/37115
J12835/ll80/l6. Hourani also thinks that fewer Coptic officials 
were employed in this period than previously. Albert Hourani, 
Minorities in the Arab World (London 19^ +7) » p.229*
72
opposed the British Occupation "because so many Coptic officials had
been dismissed.1*^ Gorst, responding to what he thought was a
legitimate Egyptian grievance, tried to increase Egyptian employment
in the civil service. However, the Copts believed that only Muslims
benefited from his scheme. Copts were particularly disturbed by what
they saw as the loss of senior jobs. It is unlikely that they held
such jobs in great numbers before the Occupation, but it is possible
that the British were reluctant to award too many top posts to
Copts for fear of seeming biased. They certainly did believe that
the Copts, as non-Muslims, were ill-fitted to hold positions like
11
those in the upper echelons of the provincial administration. The
Copts became increasingly dissatisfied with the British attitude 
toward them; and the hardships that they, along with Muslims, suffered 
during World War I reinforced their discontent and helped set the 
stage for Coptic participation in the nationalist movement.
B. Zaghlul, the Formation of the Wafd and the 1919 Revolution
Egyptian notables began meeting informally to discuss Egypt’s
future at the end of 1917- Other than one such visit paid by
12’Akhnukh Fanus to Zaghlul in the spring of 1918, no Copt seems to 
have participated in the discussions. This is due partly to 
Zaghlul1s eagerness to include elected members, among whom there were 
no Copts, of the old Legislative Assembly. In addition, there was a 
certain amount of social segregation, and both Muslims and Copts had 
yet to reconsider the Coptic attitude toward independence.
10. CMS Archives, Klein to the Secretary of CMS, 7 July 188U, E/133.
11. F0.1U1/7U2, 1*902/2/17.
12. Lashin ^Abd al-Khaliq Lashin, Sacd Zaghlul wa Dawrah fi al-Siyasa 
al-Misriyya, II, (Cairo 1975), p.121.
? 3
By the time of the Wafd’s visit to Wingate in November 1918,
two groups had coalesced; one around Zaghlul and the other around
Prince cUmar Tusun. One Copt, Sinut Hanna, had joined the Prince’s
13circle, hut he was soon lured into the Wafdist camp. In Sinut’s
favour were his influential and wealthy Bani Suwaif family and his 
membership, although only appointed, in the Legislative Assembly.
A second Copt, George Khayyat, was recommended for membership by his
, _ _ lU
fellow Asyuti, Muhammad Mahmud, and was accepted after Sinut.
Khayyat, a wealthy Protestant, was the American Consul in lAsyut,
15and the Wafd probably hoped to use him to influence American opinion. 
The Wafd now consisted of twelve Muslims and two Copts. Wasif Ghali, 
son of the assassinated Prime Minister, was the next Copt to join the 
Wafd. He was an obvious choice given the importance of his
family and the fame that he had gained by publishing nationalist 
articles in the French press . The readiness of the Zaghlulists to 
accept Coptic supporters and allow them a productive role owed much 
to the political ideas of the pre-war ’Umina party. These post-war 
nationalists had no interest in pan-Islam and believed that the 
interests of their own country superseded all other considerations.
13* Perhaps Sinut felt that the Prince, in the long rim, would be less 
hospitable to the Copts than the Zaghlulists. Al-^Aqqad suggests 
that he was offered Wafd membership only when it was learnt that he 
was about to Join a delegation that Muhammad Sacid was trying to form. 
cAbbas al-^Aqqad, SaLd Zaghlul; Sira wa Tahiya (Cairo 1936), p.256.
ik. Zaghlul mentioned this fact in his diary. It is quoted in Lashin, 
Sacd Zaghlul, II, p.163.
15. The Zaghlulists were aware of the influence that missionaries had on
their home governments. The British saw Khayyat as a non-entity and
it is true that his political career was undistinguished. He
perhaps was chosen to represent the well-educated and well-off 
Protestant community. F0.371/320U, JI953U7/186090/I6.
16. There are several versions of how the Copts joined the Wafd. Fakhri
^Abd al-Nur recalls that he took the initiative, talking first to 
^Ali Sha'rawi about the possibility of Coptic representation and 
then to Copts in the Ramsis Club. The latter appointed a
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
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Little public attention was paid to the Zaghlulists until the
17
arrest and exile of four senior members. Although Misr began
publishing articles lauding Copt-Muslim unity in January, neither it 
nor al-Watan followed the Wafd's activities until the March 1919 
uprising. Other newspapers also printed articles promoting fraternity, 
and this helped make Coptic participation in the nationalist 
movement possible. Al-Watan was cautious about this idea of unity
and warned of the difficulty of achieving it; without equality, noted
18
the paper, it was a house built on sand. Seeing itself as the
special representative of Coptic interests, a role it did not think 
Misr was fulfilling, al-Watan aimed a barrage of criticism at Coptic
leaders in the Wafd and claimed that they did not represent the
19community. Not all Copts, then, supported the nationalists.
Murqus Simaika insisted in January 1919 that he had no faith in
Muslim justice and believed that a British yoke was safer than a 
20Muslim one. Many, many Copts, however, supported Misr1s views
and were eager to play a role in the struggle for independence.
16. (continued from previous page) delegation of three, including 
Fakhri and Sinut to visit Zaghlul. When the four men met, Wasif 
Ghali was the first person they chose, then Sinut and Khayyat.
Ghali only joined later than these two because the cable inviting 
him went astray. ^Abbas al-cAqqad, on the other hand, suggests 
that the Copts sent Wisa Wasif to talk to Sa^d and that Wisa, himself 
declining to be the first Coptic member, suggested Ghali. There 
seems to be no confirmation of either tale in Zaghlul1s diary.
Fakhri cAbd al-Nur, "Mudhakkiratl" (unpublished typescript 19^2),
pp.21-3; Fakhri ^Abd al-Nur, "Mudhakkirati”, al-Musawwar, 21 March 
1969s P-3*+; cAbbas al-cAqqad, Sa^d Zaghlul, op.cit 1 , pp.255-6.
17. As Muhammad Mahmud pointed out to Grafftey-Smith. Lawrence 
Grafftey-Smith, Bright Levant (London 1970), P*65-
18. Al-Watan, 7 March 1919s P-l; 7 February 1919s P*l» l6 April 1919s p.2.
19. Tariq*al-Bishri, "Misr al-Haditha bain 'Ahmad w-al-Masih", 
al-Katib 115 (1970) i37-8.
20. F0.371/3711, J12835/1180/16.
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The British were incensed by this "opportunistic" betrayal. One
Englishman called it yet "another instance of the desertion of a
21
natural ally in our time of need". The British believed that they
had been fair to the Copts but, knowing that the Copts thought other­
wise, they should not have taken umbrage at the Coptic defection.
One popular British explanation was that the Copts had joined the
22nationalists from a fear of what would happen to them if they did not.
It was true, as one British official later noted, that Muslim
tolerance was more vital to the Copts than "remote and not always
23effective alien Christian support", but there was little sign of 
fear. The Copts had never been reluctant to voice their objections 
to nationalist ideas in the past. Not surprisingly, the British 
chose to ignore the positive reasons the Copts had for joining the 
movement; and some officials, despite strong evidence to the 
contrary, continued to believe that the Copts secretly wished the 
British to remain paramount in Egypt.
Salama Musa later recalled that some Muslims also suspected the 
new Coptic attitude; it took the 1919 revolution to remove any
2k
lingering doubts about Coptic loyalty. This two-month revolution 
was a heady lesson in the delights of Muslim-Copt collaboration. It 
established an ideal unity to which Egyptians often referred because 
fraternal feelings were stronger at this time than at any time since.
Two images of the 1919 revolution dominate the Egyptian mind and 
Egyptian historiography: one is of a demonstration bearing aloft a
21. Murray Harris, Egypt under the Egyptians (London 1925)* p.162.
22. Ibid., p.162; FO.371/3717* 8291/2^930/15.
23. FO.lHl/685, 8^2^/51/27•
2k. Salama Musa, The Education of Salama Musa, translated by 
L.O. Schuman (Leiden 1961), p.108.
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‘banner inscribed with a crescent and cross and the other is of
priests and shaikhs sharing the pulpit in mosques and churches.
Memory is always selective, but in this case it is not inaccurate.
Both images symbolize unity, and it is interesting that it is these
symbols that prevailed rather than some gesture indicating a more
active and violent resistance to the colonial regime. Perhaps the
explanation for this lies in the fact that unity was such an
unprecedented and therefore memorable phenomenon.
Muslim c~ulemat and Coptic clergy did have an important role in the
revolution, both in fomenting opposition to the British and in
cementing unity. Shortly after news of Zaghlul's deportation spread,
Murqus Sergius led a huge demonstration to al-'Azhar and was the
25
first Coptic priest to speak from its pulpit. It was an invitation
that was extended in following days to other priests. 'Ahmad 'Amin,
an 'Azhari calim, later recalled his fondness for demonstrations in
which he in his turban shared a carriage with a priest in a cassock,
the two of them a living symbol of Egyptian unity. He recollected
26too that he always carried with him the cross and crescent flag. 
Sometimes nationalist demonstrations even carried pictures of the 
Patriarch.
Priests and shaikhs visited one another and attended each other's
religious services; even the Mufti of Egypt called on the Patriarch
27
and the latter reciprocated. Until the mid“1920s, churches, like
25. Sergius was nick-named "the silver-tongued". He was arrested that 
spring after an incendiary four-hour speech at a mosque in Cairo.
'Ahmad 'Abukif, "Sergius Khatib Thawrat 1919"> al-Musawwar, 7 March 
19^9, p.3U. FO.371/3720, 152737/2U930/16.
26. '‘Ahmad 'Amin, My Life, translated by Issa Boullata (Leiden 1978)5 p*133.
27* Egyptian Mail, 21 March 1919s p.2. Azhari ^ulema and students also
visited the Patriarch. Fakhri ^Abd al-Nur, 1'MudhakkiratI"
(unpublished typescript 192^), p.2.
mosques, were the scene of many a meeting held in the nationalist 
interest; and this perhaps indicates in a small, circumstantial way 
a natural connection between religion and politics in Egyptian minds. 
Secular politicians realized that the involvement of religion in their 
cause worked to their advantage; the time would come, however, when 
they would realize the harm it could do. The participation of the 
clergy had a symbolic view in illustrating Muslim tolerance and a 
practical one in bringing Coptic support to the nationalists. It 
also defeated attempts to label the nationalist movement a religious 
one.
The Coptic role In the revolution was highly visible and
substantial, and Copts were involved in all its facets: demonstrations,
28 29 
strikes, propaganda, terrorism, organization and policy-making.
There were, for example, three Copts on a committee which organized an
important and effective strike of government officials. As a second
30example, the ’Asyut nationalist committee contained a majority of Copts.
There was much ostentatious fraternizing between Muslims and
Copts. Meetings celebrating unity were held all over Egypt, and
religious holidays became special times for exhibitingbrotherhood.
31Muslims, for example took part in the Easter festivities of 1919,
r- 32
and Copts helped Muslims celebrate the id al-Fitr at the end of June.
28. For example, Raghib ’Iskandar was a leading agitator among railway 
workers in 1919. FO.371/^983, Jll+95/93/l6.
29. Both Raghib and Najlb 'Iskandar belonged to secret societies.
The famous Vengeance Society had six Coptic members and yet 
another society, the Torch, was headed by Murqus Hanna and 
Najib Ghali.
30. FO.371/3715, 595^2/2U930/l6.
31. FO. 371/37175 875^0/21+930/16.
32. D.W. Mahfuzat Raqm 1. Makhtut Raqm 5* CAbd al-Rahman Fahmi’s
Memoirs (unpublished) 29 June 1919, p.l+2l+.
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More than a little had poetry was written on the theme of
unity, and Misr continued writing articles in praise of brotherhood.
After Zaghlul's release in April, Sinut, Khayyat and Wisa Wasif
travelled with the Wafd to Paris for the Peace Conference. Wisa
and Wasif Ghali, who was already in Paris, were put in charge of
propaganda, where their knowledge of French was useful. Khayyat
joined a committee charged with organizing meetings. The Wafdists,
with their live Copts and their written endorsements from Egyptian
Jews, made it clear to those they met that they had the support of
33Egypt’s minorities.
Back at home, the Wafdist Central Committee soon had several 
wealthy and mainly landowning Coptic members: Murqus Hanna, leader
of the Egyptian Bar since 191^5 Tawfiq Dus, a lawyer with a less
than pristine reputation; Kamil Butrus; Dr. Habib Khayyat, George’s
„ _ _ „ „ _ c 3U
brother; Fahmi Wisa, another Protestant; and Sarufim Mina Ubaid.
In September Sinut returned to help the Central Committee; for a
time, there was some thought of sending him to the United States,
35but his talents as a publicist were needed in Egypt. The British
were so concerned with the propaganda he was making against the 
Milner Mission that they soon ordered him to his country estate for 
some weeks.
33. Mahmud 'Abu al-Fatah, Maea al-Wafd al-Migri, no place, n.d.,
pp.68-9*
3 4^. D.W. Mahfuzat Raqm 1. Makhtut Raqm 3. cAbd al-Rahman Fahmi' s 
Memoirs, 11 April 1919, pp.272-U.
35. FO.371/3720, 1152737/2^930/l6. See his influential series 
of articles in Misr: 15 October 1919, p.2; 3 November 1919, 
p.l; 10 November’1919, p.l. Al-Watan attacked Sinut for 
his articles critical of the Ministry on 13 November 1919, 
p.3; 2H November 1919, p.2; and 25 November 1919, p.l.
7 9
Several Wafdists, recognizing the need for English speakers, 
wanted the able Oxford-educated Copt, Makram ^ Ubaid, to work with 
them. Like Sinut, cUbaid was considered for a US assignment, but
36
he appears to have wanted too much money. He also wanted to be
made a member of the Wafd. However bright he appeared on paper,
37no one in Paris knew him personally; Zaghlul wrote to one of 
cUbaidrs advocates, ^Abd al-Rahman Fahmi, that he preferred to see 
something of Ubaid's work before adding him to the Wafd. The 
Central Committee in Cairo was not happy with this answer and more 
letters were exchanged until CUbaid was invited to join the inner 
circle in the spring of 1920. The party then acquired a superb 
orator whose skills enriched the party for many years and beggared 
it when he left.
Disagreements among the nationalists were more common than co­
operation. There were arguments over tactics and there was much 
jockeying for position. Two of Zaghlul's strongest backers in this
36. Muhammad 'Anis, Darasat fl Watha'iq Thawrat 1919? Vol.I 
(Cairo n.d.) pp.5^-5*
37* Muhammad Mahmfld probably saw ^ Ubaid as a threat to his position. 
He had already quarrelled with Sidqi, and Zaghlul may have been 
reluctant to upset him further by admitting ^ Ubaid to membership. 
Thawrat 1919: Mu'assasat al-'Ahram, Markaz al-Watha'iq
(w'al-Buhuth al-Ta'arikhiyya li-Misr al-Mu^asird), pp• :
J
8 0
internal wrangling were 
the spring of 1921 over 
or the much more popular Zaghlul would lead negotiations with the 
British. A majority of Wafdists thought Zaghlul*s insistence on 
heading the delegation was unreasonable, and they went over to ^Adli's 
faction.
The only three members of the original Wafd who remained with
39Zaghlul were Sinut, Wasif Ghali and Wisa Wasif. A few months later
Uo
the Wafd was even more visibly Coptic. In this year and the next
the Wafd lost the support of many large landowners. It is curious
that Coptic landowners, by and large, did not desert the party.
Some Copts feared that this visibility would poison unity and
klexcite popular feeling against the community. Wafdists too may
have feared that the conspicuousness of their Coptic members would 
damage the party and so they paid great attention to promoting unity 
in the next months. In April a Wafd publication claimed that the 
Egyptians were a unique and homogeneous race, sharing physical and
38. When cAbd al-Rahman Fahmi was arrested that summer, Sinut Hanna
wanted to break*off negotiations with the British, and quarrelled 
bitterly with cAdli over the issue. Even Zaghlul thought that 
Sinut had been overly zealous in the matter. Sinut may have been 
one of the few in Paris to know about the secret terrorist 
organization run by Fahmi, See al-1Akhbar, 21 August 19&3,
Samira Bahr, al-'Aqbat, p.5^ -5; Dr. H. Mu'nis, "Dawr al-'Aqbat 
fT Thawrat 1919", 'Akhir Sa^a, 16 May, part 2, 1973, p.21.
39* George Khayyat did not leave at this point, but drifted away a 
few months later.
Uo. The Residency reported that the Wafd had six Coptic and two or 
three Muslim members. The Copts are Sinut, c'Ubaid, Wisa,
Wasif, Sadiq Hinain and Salama Mikhalil♦ * The last two were 
actually added in 1922 and not in 1921 as the report suggests. 
FO.U07/190, No.55j Report on the General Situation in Egypt,
U-10 August 1921.
Ul. Al-Watan, 25 June 1921, p.3.
Wisa Wasif and Sinut. The break came in
<£.whether Adli Pasha, as the Prime Minister,
8 1
H tZ . C. -mental characteristics. Ubaid, still backing Zaghlul, claimed in
another pamphlet that Egypt presented a striking example of religious 
toleration and unity. He praised Egyptian Muslims for rejoicing in 
the universal brotherhood that was the true spirit of Islam and 
added that the Egyptians did not make distinctions on the basis of
. . .  h3religion.
In November, Adli’s negotiations with the British collapsed and
he resigned from office. The following month, the British threatened
Zaghlul and several supporters with banishment unless they withdrew
to their villages. Zaghlul, Sinut, Ubaid and some others rejected
the ultimatum and were exiled. The rest moved to the countryside
but eventually returned to active political work. The exile, which
the British hoped would strengthen the moderates, seems to have had
the opposite effect. Eight of the schismatics, including George
Khayyat, returned to the Wafd at this time. They probably hoped to
take over the name and organization, because most again left when
they found that this would be impossible. Khayyat was one of two
who stayed. Other new members were admitted to the Wafd, including
1*1*Murqus Hanna, who was personally recommended by Zaghlul. Wisa
Wasif and Wasif Ghali published announcements stating the WafdTs
determination to continue the fight. Several Wafdists, including
c. —Fakhri Abd al~Nur, a wealthy Coptic landowner, published a manifesto
l*-2. D.W. Mahfuzat Majlis al-Wuzara*. Mawducat Majlis al-Nizar. 13J. 
Sacd Zaghlul w-al-Dustur. Mufawadat al-Wafd al-Misri,
22 April 1921.
1+3. W. Makram Ebeid, Complete Independence v. the Milner Scheme 
(London 1921) p. 9.
1*1*. FO.1*07/213, J395/395/16.
1*5. Al-Bishrl, al-Katib 115 (1970): 128.
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calling for a boycott of the British. Murqus Hanna was one of the 
more active members and was responsible for issuing several circulars
46and proclamations. Wafdist activities made it difficult for any
Ministry to function and, in July 1922, Murqus Hanna, George Khayyat,
Wasif Ghali and others were arrested and imprisoned. Arrests
continued and every time Wafdist ranks were decimated, a new
committee was formed. In late autumn, Raghib ’Iskandar, ex-member
47of the secularist Democratic Party, and the priest Butros Ghabryal 
were among those actively campaigning for the Wafd in the Delta.
FakhrT, who became a member of the Wafd’s inner circle in July 1922, 
was an active speaker. In December, another Copt, Sadiq Hinain, 
returned from a propaganda tour in Europe. Most of these activists 
were arrested at one time or another. In 1923 those under arrest and 
in exile were released. The Wafd then set about reorganizing itself 
and preparing for elections. Until the 1940s, when a new generation 
of politicians began to come forward, most important Wafdists had 
something to do with the party in this period.
On more than one occasion, Zaghlul himself spoke of the 
brotherhood of Copts and Muslims. His tolerance and lack of any 
connection with pre-war communal tensions inspired both Copts to 
trust him and Muslims to welcome Coptic participation. It is
46. He was doing this in conjunction with Salama Mikha'xl.
FO.407/193, E424l/6l/l6.
47. The Democratic party was founded in 1919 to advocate secularism 
and democratic government. The Copt, cAzTz Mlrhum, was 
Secretary-General of the party until its collapse in 1922. The 
party split over the issue of negotiations In 1921. A majority 
of the Executive sided with eAdli and, in a somewhat questionable 
manner, added several new members to thwart those members backing 
Zaghlul. Raghib 'Iskandar, then a member of the Executive, 
resigned and became a Wafdist. F0.407/l86, No.353 Field-Marshal 
Viscount Allenby to Lord Curzon, 12 January 1920; Charles Smith, 
Muhammad Husayn Haykal, pp.177-81.
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possible that he originally sought Goptic representation in the Wafd.
^8
to prove that his organization was not fanatical or even religious:
but Copts who joined the party later were added because of the skills
U9
they possessed and the devotion to the cause they displayed. Had
these men been seen as representatives of their community, the Wafd 
would quickly have foundered in the aftermath of Zaghlul’s break 
with ^Adli. Of course, talent was not the sole requirement for 
membership. The first Copts who joined the Wafd were members of 
prominent families which could be relied upon to contribute funds and 
rally support in their home province.
Some Copts chose their political allegiance on the basis of 
communal interests, and others looked first to Egyptian or personal 
interests.
Wo matter how much the Coptic press tried to manipulate Coptic 
opinion, the question of political commitment was, and would remain, 
an intensely personal one.
C. Divide and Rule
Contemporary Egyptian historiography generally attributes communal
problems in the period 1882-1952 to a British policy of divide and 
50rule. This is what many people of the time actually believed.
The Wafdist newspaper al-Balagfo wrote in one 1925 article that the
l|8. Al-Bishri, al-Katib 115 (1970): 126. Some nationalists were eager 
to prove that their movement was not a religious one. At one 
April 1919 strike meeting, ’Azhari students demanded public 
recognition of this fact. FO.371/3717, 75215/2U930/16. 
i+9* One exception to this was the appointment of Murqus Hanna as Vice- 
President of the Central Committee, a move meant to counter the 
appointment of Yusuf Wahbah as Prime Minister.
50. However, Egyptian historians vary in their willingness to 
recognize the existence of communal problems. Some cling
tenaciously to the myth of undisturbed unity.
84
British had successfully relied on a policy of encouraging inter-
51communal hatred until Zaghlul succeeded m  uniting the Egyptians.
Even before the -well-being engendered by the 1919 revolution, some
Muslims and Copts claimed that the Egyptians, despite religious
differences, had always lived in harmony; both dated discriminatory
policies from the time of the British Occupation. This trend
continued into the troubled 1950s; one compendium of Coptic
grievances, which was published around 1951 and immediately banned,
52
placed British policy at the root of the communal problem. This
testimony became a kind of article of faith. It is generally wise, 
if not fair, to blame internal problems on outsiders.
Although British rule eventually gave Muslims and Copts the 
pretext on which to unite, it was also an irritant to communal 
relations. The comments of Lord Cromer and Edward Lane on the 
degree of assimilation notwithstanding, the British regarded Copts 
and Muslims as two distinct communities. They did, after all, 
expect the Copts to understand that British rule was in their interest. 
There is little doubt that the British found the Copts useful. Both 
Cromer and those missionaries working in Egypt either believed or 
liked to pretend that the Occupation had saved the Copts from a 
massacre. While it is not untrue that 'Ahmad <1Urabi, in the closing 
days of the l88l revolt, tried to use religious feeling to rally 
supporters, it seems distinctly unlikely that the Copts were threatened 
with any kind of genocide. Cromer, anxious about the fate of the 
supposedly temporary Occupation, used alleged threats against the
52. 'Ahmad Shafiq, Hawliyat Misr al-Siyasiyya, vol2 (1925) 
(Cairo 1919), pp.^9-50.
53. ZaghTb Mikha'Il, Farriq TasudI Al-Wahda al-Wataniyya w-al- 
'Akhlaq al-Qawmiyya (Cairo n.d.) p.10.
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Copts to reinforce his superiors1 determination to stay in Egypt.
He never, for example, reported that some Copts opposed the 
53
Occupation; and -when he sent troops to Upper Egypt to extend
British hegemony, his ostensihle reason was to protect the Copts
57
from the fanaticism of the Mahdi. While the extent to which he
personally believed that Muslim fanaticism presented a danger is
unclear, it is certain that others believed it and that therefore it
was a convenient instrument. Particularly in his last years as Agent,
Cromer may have used religious tensions to advance both British
55interests and his own.
Gorst, who felt that minorities were too frail a reed upon which 
to lean, disapproved of Cromer's tactic. Upon succeeding the latter, 
he hoped to make British rule "more sympathetic to Egyptians in general
56
and to Muslims in particular". The appointment of Butrus Ghali
as Prime Minister seemed to many to be an odd way of fulfilling this
desire. Wilfred Blunt was one who saw the divide and rule principle
at work here. Peter Mellini, Gorst's biographer, concurs and sees
in the appointment an attempt to detach the Coptic community from the
57nationalist movement. This seems unlikely; there was little 
Coptic support for the nationalists at this time, and Gorst had already 
earned Coptic enmity by his opposition to communal demands. It is
53. Seikaly, The Copts, p.127.
57. Ibid., p.98.
55. Mellini, Sir Eldon Gorst, pp.125-8,
56. The London and Egyptian English-language press were unhappy with 
Gorst and wrote sympathetically about Coptic demands in the hope 
of embarrassing him. Ibid., pp.128, l77, 152, 208-13.
57. Ibid., pp.166-7• Ronald Storrs also thinks that Gorst 
advised the Khedive to appoint Ghali, but he does not expand
on his reasons for thinking this or on Gorst's possible motives. 
Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London 1975) p.71.
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possible, of course, that Gorst hoped to mute that opposition and 
secure, at the same time, the good will of the influential 
missionaries. Perhaps the most plausible explanation, given the 
Khedive's role in the appointment and Gorst's initial objection to 
Ghali, can be sought in the Khedive's desire to gain the support of 
those who were lost to the nationalists.
The most frequently given example of divide and rule between 
1918 and 1952 is the appointment of Yusuf Wahbah as Prime Minister
C" Q
in 1919- This is portrayed as a British attempt to drive a wedge 
between Copt and Muslim nationalists. It is not an implausible 
picture; the British resented Coptic adherence to the nationalist 
movement, and the appointment at least potentially, risked raising 
inter-communal suspicions with violence an all-too-likely consequence. 
However, Coptic opposition to the nationalists would not have been 
a substantial help to the British because Coptic support was not 
essential to the success of the nationalist movement. Their 
opposition would, of course, have provided a fillip to the British, 
who could once again use their concern for Coptic safety to justify 
the Occupation. If the British did have an ulterior motive in 
appointing a Coptic Prime Minister, there is no mention of it in the 
correspondence between the Agency and London. ^Abd al-Rahman Fahmi 
feared that the intention of the British was only to distract the 
nationalists from more pressing matters, and certainly the
59nationalists did feel called upon to react to the appointment.
58. 'Anis, Darasat Watha'iq, I, p.50* DW Mahfuzat Raqm 1, Makhtuf Raqm 5* 
Abd al-Rahman Fahmi's Memoirs, 3 December 1919> p.625* It was Fahmi 
who arranged for Murqus Hanna's appointment as Vice-President of the 
Central Committee.
59* 'Anis, Darasat Watha'iq, I, pp.50-1.
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However, most suspicions about British motives fall prey to 
the realization of how difficult it then was to fill the post of 
Prime Minister. The nationalists wanted to keep the office vacant, 
thereby depriving the Milner Mission of a government with which to 
talk. Volunteers for the post were few; Yusuf Wahbah was not even 
the first choice,^ but the Foreign Office feared that the Sultan 
would abdicate or be assassinated if they failed to name a Prime 
Minister, Wahbah was the best the British could do in a very
difficult situation, no doubt with their eagerness to win acceptance 
of the Milner Mission they would have preferred a Muslim Prime Minister 
with more political credibility. There was curiously little 
consultation within the British government before the appointment was 
made. Allenby does not seem to have discussed the matter with the 
Foreign Office, perhaps a sign of limited options. London was 
worried by Wahbah*s lack of influence and character, but feared mainly 
that his religion would draw more fire than a Prime Minister co­
operating with the British could then expect to draw. Although 
Wahbah had served in many Cabinets, including his predecessor's,
he was a colourless political figure and not one around whom even the 
62
Copts would rally. He answered well the instructions of one wit
to those forming Cabinets: "Parmi les Coptes, cherchez la
nullite".63
60. SirrI Pasha declined the post.
61. FO.371/3720, li+5201/2i+930/l6.
62. In the opinion of Murqus Simaika, Wahbah had shown no interest 
in the concerns of his community since the early 1890s and was 
of no use to the Copts as a Cabinet Minister. FO.371/3711, 
12835/1180/16.
63. FO.371/3717, 75210/2U930/16.
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It is likely that Muhammad SaC id, Wahbah's predecessor, bears
part of the responsibility for the appointment. The two men were
6h rclose and this was one way Sa Id could maintain his influence.
Sa^id did not want to be blamed for talking with the Milner Mission,
and the British had known that in sending the Mission they courted
65 £ ■**his resignation. It was much safer for Sa id to resign and let
Wahbah suffer the opprobrium attached to collaborating with the
British.
The Coptic response to the appointment was swift and sharp;
perhaps the Copts feared, as ^Abd al-Rahman Fahmi suggested, that
their new-found unity with Muslims would founder on the rock of Yusuf 
66Wahbah. Misr roundly condemned Wahbah, and Sinut, m  particular,
attacked him in the paper's pages.^ Wisa Wasif and other Copts
insisted that Wahbah did not represent the community. At one
November meeting, called and chaired by a representative of the
68
Patriarchate, 2,000 Copts came to protest. The speakers, including 
Murqus Sergius, praised national unity and swore to disavow anyone 
who accepted Cabinet office. The meeting telegraphed to Wahbah a
69demand for his resignation. Similar meetings were held in churches
all over Egypt, and fraternization between Copts and Muslims was 
particularly marked at this time.
6H. Qallni Fahmi, whose comments on colleagues must be viewed with
caution, suggested in January 1919 that Yusuf Wahbah had risen to 
high office by bribing Muhammad Sacid. FO.371/3711, 12835/II80/I6.
65. FO.371/3720, J153U90/2U930/16.
66. 'Anis, Darasat Watha'iq, vol.l, p.51*
67. See Misr, 22 November 1919, p.l*
68. Egyptian Mail, 25 November 1919, P*l*
69. ^Abd al-Rahman al-RafIcI, Thawrat Sannat 1919, Vol.2 
(Cairo 19^6) p.82.
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Copts sent several delegations to remonstrate with Wahbah, and
TOmany Egyptians wrote him threatening letters. Several hundred
Copts signed a document repudiating him and any man who co-operated
with the Protectorate. They also condemned the British for trying
to make it appear that the Copts approved of the Cabinet and its 
71policy. At no point did those Muslims who disapproved of Wahbah
attack him on sectarian grounds. Many newspapers insisted that the
Cabinet was not a Coptic Cabinet, and they recalled their strong
7P
attacks on the Muhammad Sa^id Ministry.
There was some support for Wahbah. The conservative al-Watan
commented that unity was perhaps not as strong as the Copts liked to
think if they felt compelled to go to such great lengths to repudiate
73a Coptic Prime Minister. The paper wondered why Wahbah should
bear the brunt of the attack when his Muslim colleagues were just as 
responsible, but clearly there could be no government without a Prime 
Minister. Al-Watan had supported the SacId Ministry, so its 
attitude toward Wahbah was not a departure occasioned by his religion. 
At no point did the paper suggest that the Copts should support the 
Cabinet because Wahbah was a Copt. Whatever the ulterior motive of 
the British, if there was one, Wahbah’s appointment may actually have 
strengthened Coptic-Muslim unity. In later years, no British action 
would be needed to make the beast of sectarian conflict rear its ugly 
head.
In December 1919> an unsuccessful attempt was made on Wahbah’s 
life by Iryan Yusuf Sacd, a Coptic student. Iryan had joined a
70. The Times (London), 2 December 1919s Times Clippings on Egypt, p.20.
71. Egyptian Mail, 25 November 1919s p.l.
72. See al-’Ahali, quoted in the Egyptian Mail, 28 November 19195 p.2.
73. Al-Watan, 2h November 1919s p.2.
9secret society called the Black Hand, but his immediate superiors
appear to have been working at the behest of 'Abd al-Rahman Fahmi1s 
Iksecret apparatus. He volunteered for the assassination knowing
that if a Muslim killed the Prime Minister, intercommunal problems
could result. Wahbah was a target solely because he formed a
government at a time when the nationalists wanted to prevent any
government from being formed. However, his would-be assassin may
have feared that Wahbah endangered the standing of the Copts.
After doing his best to avoid taking any stand on Egypt's
future, Wahbah resigned in May 1920. It is not clear why he chose
to accept an obviously dangerous position. Perhaps he felt that
British gratitude would secure his political future; instead, it
effectively ruined it. Hot even the British were happy when they
learned that Wahbah would be a member of a negotiating delegation
the Sultan was trying to form in 1921. They knew he was a British
75creature and could not even represent the Copts.
The British may have practised divide and rule without having a 
conscious and malicious policy to that effect. 'Akhnukh Fanus 
complained in a letter to the Agency in 1906 that the British were 
making a "religious consideration the basis of a civil distinction
f7 ^
in Egypt". There is evidence that the British perpetuated and
extended divisions which already existed in some form better to 
administer India; did they also do this in Egypt? India is a
7^. When Zaghlul formed a Cabinet, Iryan was pardoned and put on
salary. Al-Bishri, al-Katib 115 (1970): 135; Mustafa 'Amin,
al-Kitab al-Mamnu :^ 1Asrar Thawrat 19193 vol.l (Cairo 1976),
pp.133-1*.
75- FO.371/6293, E2839/260/16.
76. Coptic Archaeological Society. ox Cl: Coptic Question 1.
Letter from A. Fanus to Harry Boyle, November 1906.
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useful point of comparison "because the Egyptians themselves often
compared their country to India. In the latter case, the British
saw ethnic and religious divisions as natural ones and made use of
them to govern a large and politically fragmented area; as Kenneth
Jones has pointed out, sometimes the British in India were most
influential when they only hoped to administer and not influence.
He noted one example, that of the census, which listed people "by
ethnic category and therefore helped institutionalize social
divisions and created a mentality in which numbers were equated with 
77
strength. For a time, the British m  India organized army units
by ethnic group. They also instituted communal electorates which 
gave rise to communal organizations making communal demands. Not 
all such measures were taken for administrative ease. Some clearly
rjQ
were designed to check Indian nationalism. The Indians no doubt
were conscious of religious differences, but whether these would 
become as politically viable as they did without British encouragement 
is not clear.
The Indian and Egyptian situations were not identical. The 
Muslims were 30 per cent of India's population; their numbers gave 
them a greater claim on British attention than the Copts had. In 
addition, there were areas in which Muslims were in a majority.
The Asian subcontinent was less easy to rule than Egypt with a 
strong central government and accessible geography. Despite Fanus' 
claim, religion had been used to make civil and administrative
77• Kenneth Jones, Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in the Nineteenth-
century Punjab (Berkeley 19?6), p.317* The Egyptian Census also 
broke the population down into religious groups.
78. One example is Lord Curzon's 190U creation, over the objections of 
many Muslims and all Hindus, of Muslim and Hindu provinces in the 
previously united Bengal. Some scholars see this as an attempt 
to foster Muslim at the expense of Hindu Power. Asoka Mehta and 
Achyut Patwardhard, The Communal Triangle in India (Allahabad 19^2), 
PP-51*, 75.
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distinctions in Egypt. The British cannot wholly be blamed if they
accepted the fact that religious divisions had political importancei
some Egyptians, in fact, continued to argue that religious divisions
79should be used as political determinants. The Copts were a
conscious community, feeling more in common with one another than a 
Bengali Muslim may have felt with a Punjabi Muslim. Because of 
the nature of their history and that of their country, they may also 
have felt more loyalty to an entity called Egypt than a Bengali 
Muslim to an entity called India.
The British occupied Egypt to end chaos, improve an inefficient 
and debt-ridden administration, forestall foreign intervention and 
protect communications with India. It was in their interest therefore 
to maintain a stable and peaceful government. A policy of encouraging 
ethnic conflict, with its potential for escalation into violence which 
could spark outside intervention could well have been counter­
productive to British aims. Any Muslim backlash against Coptic 
Christians could eventually have included foreign Christians whose 
home governments might have been keen to become involved. The 1919 
solidarity between Muslims and Copts may even be construed, as Wingate
pointed out, as a tribute to British even-handedness and the absence
00
of any attempt on their part to sow discord. Not even the
magnetism of Gandhi could bring Muslims and Hindus together after 
years of British encouragement of Muslims demands. The British, in 
fact, were not nearly as receptive to Coptic demands in Egypt as they 
were to Muslim ones in India. Nor, at 10 per cent of the population, 
were the Copts very useful as an administrative division.
79* See Kyriakus Mikhail’s letter to The Times, 20 September 1910, 
reprinted in FO. 371/89^-» 38033/38033/16. Another one who felt 
that Muslims and non-Muslims should be separated administratively 
was an interpreter in the Mixed Court of Appeals in Alexandria. 
FO.371/3717, 82216/2^930/15.
80. F0.371/37115 J1235/1180/16.
9 3
If the British government did not practise a deliberate policy 
of divide and rule, it sometimes let the Egyptian government or the latter’s 
opponents make unhindered use of the ethnic weapon. It seems only to 
have intervened when it feared that foreign Christian lives or 
orderly administration were threatened. Examples of ethnic appeals 
and the British reaction to them are discussed in Chapter Seven.
D. Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Negotiations
1, Independence and the Reserved Point for the 
Protection of Minorities
Britain's decision to extend formal protection to
Egypt’s minorities was, as nationalists argued, potentially the
most divisive action the British had taken. The latter, however,
saw it as a partial cure for the divisions Inherent in Egyptian
society. They were genuinely concerned, in the wake of the
Armenian massacres, for the safety of Middle Eastern minorities.
In addition, missionaries in Egypt pushed the British government
to protect their new converts and other Egyptian Christians.
The Curzon draft treaty, presented to Sultan Fu'ad in December
8l1921, detailed civil rights for Egypt's minorities. Although 
these negotiations were unsuccessful, the Egyptian negotiating 
team did accept the draft's list of civil liberties.
8l The rights in the Curzon draft, the relevant portions of which 
are included below, were modelled on those in the Treaty of 
Sevres and were more explicit than those included in the 
Egyptian Constitution:
2h. Egypt undertakes to assure full and complete
protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants 
of Egypt, without distinction of birth nationality, 
language, race or religion.
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
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In February 1922, when Britain unilaterally granted Egyptian
independence, it reserved certain prerogatives for itself. The
third Reserved Point gave Britain the right to intervene in
Egyptian affairs to protect minorities and foreigners. Although
the clause may have been deliberately vague to allow Britain
a wide latitude for interference, the government does not
appear to have defined clearly the protection it was offering.
One confused official in the Residency noted that the guarantees
in the Curzon draft had been included in haste and at the last
moment; that they had had "nothing definite in mind when they 
82inserted it". Eventually, agreement did emerge that the
protection provided in the draft treaty should guide British
8 3
intervention on behalf of minorities. At no time between 1922
81. (continued from previous page)
All inhabitants of Egypt shall be entitled to the 
free exercise, whether public or private, of any 
creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not 
inconsistent with public order or public morals.
25. All Egyptian nationals shall be equal before the law, 
and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights 
without distinction as to race, language or religion.
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall 
not prejudice any Egyptian national in matters 
relating to the enjoyment of civil or political 
rights, as, for instance, admission to public 
employments, functions and honours or the exercise 
of professions and industries.
26. Egyptian nationals who belong to racial, religious 
or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same 
treatment and security in law and in fact as the 
other Egyptian nationals. In particular, they 
shall have an equal right to establishment, manage 
and control, at their own expense, charitable, 
religious and social institutions, schools and 
other educational establishments, with the right to 
use their own language and to exercise their 
religion freely therein.
82. F0.lUlA52, lk5A/5/22.
83. F0.11+1A52, A 5A / 1/22.
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and the conclusion of the 1936 treaty did the British construe
the reservation as merely affording the Copts the protection of
life and limb. The Residency often interfered to protect the
community's autonomy and integrity.
Coptic opposition to the reserved point was vehement; even 
8U
al-Watan condemned it. The Copts insisted that they were not
a minority and that any division made between Copts and Muslims
Or
was artificial. They feared that this reservation would
destroy national unity and serve as a ready excuse for
86interference in Egyptian affairs. Salama Mikha’Il wrote a
pamphlet condemning this reservation, and Copts protested in 
many parts of Egypt. In one important meeting in St. Peter’s 
church in Cairo in May, leading Coptic and Muslim Wafdists 
attacked all the reserved points and demanded the return of 
their exiled leaders.
Given the frequent declarations of unity, the British could 
not have been surprised by the Coptic reaction. In 1921 British 
negotiators had heard the Coptic ex-Minister Yusuf Suliman Pasha
Orj
argue that there were no minorities and no majorities in Egypt.
In the 192U negotiations, the British showed some willingness
to drop their claim to protection. In April a memorandum
prepared for the Cabinet noted that the Copts had joined the
nationalists and had secured generous representation in both
Parliament and the Cabinet and had also obtained adequate
88
protection in the Constitution. Allenby, sharing this view,
8U. Al-Watan, 11 March 1922, p.l.
85. Misr, 5 March 1922, p.l.
86. Al-Watan, 6 March 1922, p.2.
87. Misr,"15 February 1939? PP*1» 10*
88. F0.371/1001+0, E32U2/368/16.
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suggested that the claim of protection was an embarrassment
rather than an advantage. He noted that it had acquired a
false importance in Egyptian minds and suggested the British 
89
drop it. A draft agreement drawn up by the Foreign Office
in September did not mention minorities. Zaghlul, however,
raised the subject. In the second of three conversations he
had with Ramsey MacDonald, he asked the British to abandon their
90protection of minorities. MacDonald did not reply; it was
the issue of the Sudan, however, that brought the negotiations 
to an end.
Neither Prime Minister Tharwat’s 1927 draft treaty nor the
Foreign Office’s amended version mentioned minorities. It would
seem that the British government felt that the Egyptian
Constitution adequately protected the civil rights of all
Egyptians. During the 1929 Mahmud-Henderson negotiations, the
British government submitted a draft Note recognizing that the
protection of minorities was the exclusive concern of the
91Egyptian government. The subject was revived within British
92
circles during the 1930 negotiations, but it was not formally
93discussed by the negotiators. Both Makram Ubaid and Wasif
_ 9U
Ghali opposed any mention of minorities in the treaty. However,
89. FO.371/100^2, E666I/368/I6.
90. This meeting was held on 29 September. FO.371/100^2, E8UU0/368/16.
91. For the text see FO.371/13850, J3287/5/16.
92. The Egypt Inter-Mission Council suggested that the Egyptian 
government send a Note saying that the Egyptians would respect 
the liberties guaranteed by their constitution. Booth, the 
Judicial Adviser, thought it unwise to press Egyptian delegates 
on this issue. FO.lUl/626. 223/7/30, 223/9/30, 223/13/30; 
FO.lUl/771, U05/6/31. U05/7/31.
93. FO.lUl/771, U05/6/31.
9U. FO.lUl/6262, 223/^0/30/
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paragraph A  of a Note attached to the Egyptian counter-draft
clearly stated the responsibility of the Egyptian government
95for its own minorities.
Even after the 1930 negotiations ended in failure, 
missionaries continued to argue that Egyptian responsibility 
was contingent on the assumption that the Egyptian government 
adequately protected religious liberty. Because it had never
done so, the missionaries wanted the issue raised at future
96 ^negotiations. During the 1936 negotiations, the Egypt Inter-
Mission Council insisted that the treaty recognize the protection
of minorities as a' legitimate British concern. The Council
claimed, possibly with some accuracy, that Egyptian Christians
who had been happy with the Egyptian Note in 1930 were not happy 
97with it now. The Foreign Office was reluctant to raise the
issue after it had already dropped it and so tried to placate
the missionaries by suggesting an Egyptian guarantee to the 
98League of Nations. After the treaty, which made no mention
of minorities, was signed in 1936 and Egypt applied for League
membership, missionaries began lobbying for an Egyptian promise 
99to the league. The British government pressed the Egyptian
government to make a voluntary statement concerning minority 
rights to the League, but al-Nahhas declined to make any statement
95. FO. 371/1^612. J1H32A/16:
96. F0.lHl/626, 223A2/30/
97- FO.1U1/613, 376/1/36.
98. FO.lUl/6l3, 376A/36. The idea of a guarantee to the League was
discussed as early as 1931. FO.Al/7719 ^05/6 , 7/31.
99* The missionaries, who had the support of the Archbishop of
Canterbury, were thinking along the lines of a similar Iraqi
promise made to the League.
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which he saw as admitting the right of other bodies to intervene
in Egypt’s domestic affairs c Ubaid was said to be adamantly
opposed to any statement because he feared the Copts would be
accused of seeking foreign protection.
The Copts were not unanimous in rejecting a need for
protection. In 19355 Murqus Sergius suggested that the Copts
would be better off if the British remained in Egypt. He
claimed that the British had filled a necessary function in
protecting minorities, and he remarked on the hypocrisy of
Egyptian Muslims supporting those Indian Muslims who objected
101to rule by the Hindu majority. Increasingly, Copts came
to share his view. In the period after World War II, they were
alarmed by growing hostility in the Muslim community. Misr
demanded that the new treaty being contemplated in 19^6 include
102a clause protecting equal rights for minorities. Misr also
proposed that a new constitution separating religion and state
be drafted in tandem with a new treaty. The paper added that
the Copts had to be certain that British evacuation would not be
103at their expense before they could support it. The Embassy
noted that it had received a number of petitions from Copts 
expressing anxiety about the consequences of British withdrawal;
100. F0.371/23365 3 12869/13^2/16.
101. Al-Manara al-Misriyya, 18 February 1935, pp.3-5. Prior to 
this, in 1933 during an anti-missionary campaign, Sergius said
he feared that the Copts who had supported British withdrawal had 
done so only to find that the Muslims wished to rule Egype alone. 
Al-Siyasa condemned Sergius for this comment which it said suggested 
that the Copts ought to prefer a continuing British presence in 
Egypt. See al-Siyasa, 10 July 1933, p.H.
102. Misr1s reason was that the constitution named Islam the religion 
of*state. Misr, 29 November 19^6, p.l.
103- Misr, 15 April*19^ +6, p.l.
many Copts appear to have held the unspoken hope that the 19^ +6
negotiations would break down.^^ In 19^ -7 Misr criticized 
£
Ubaid for trying to arrange independence for Egypt. The paper
said that it was wrong to discuss the deliverance of Egyptians
from British until they had secured the deliverance of
105
Egyptians from Egyptians.
Coptic fears raise the question of how much protection the
British actually afforded the community. The Copts, as
previously noted, frequently called on British help to resolve
internal communal problems and also problems vis-a-vis the
government. The British, although annoyed by Coptic importuning,
acted when the government planned to strengthen the hand of the
clerical party or increase its own power over the Copts.
British actions were often decisive in persuading the government
to abandon such plans. In 1933, the British government even
discussed whether their obligation to protect minorities
compelled them to intervene to secure religious instruction
for Christian students in government schools.
There was little the British could do to prevent sporadic
107violence against the Copts, although they sometimes tried.
After the 1936 treaty, the Embassy showed less interest in 
defending the Copts. In 19^ +7 one Foreign Office official minuted 
that, as far as they were concerned, Egypt’s responsibility to
10U. FO.371/53331, J2368/57/16. F0.371/5330U, J2076/39/16.
105. Misr, 15 April 19^7, P-3.
106. FO!371/17032, Jl6HT/l6^7/l6. See Chapter Six for further 
discussion of this topic.
107. In one early example, the British pressed the Egyptian government 
in 1853 to stop the Cairene culama’ from fanning fanaticism.
Samir Seikaly, The Copts under British Control, p.20.
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the Copts was set only "by her duties as a member of the UN,
by the freedom accorded under her own constitution and by the
108
conscience of her Ministers. Some Britons felt that
the Copts were better off without foreign guarantees and that
it was unwise of the Copts to lean too heavily on British support
in arguments with the government. The Embassy continued to
report on inter-communal relations, a sign of at least nominal
concern. In 1950 there was some Anglican church pressure on
the Foreign Office to safeguard religious liberties In a new
109Anglo-Egyptian treaty. However, the Foreign Office could
hardly demand new powers when the purpose of a new treaty was
to reduce the old ones. Ironically, British inaction came at
a time when the Copts were increasingly eager for British action.
As early as 1938, one Embassy official on a visit to Upper Egypt
recorded Coptic anger at the British for failing to represent
their interests. He reported a year later that the Copts were
110still anxious about the future; it was an anxiety that grew
throughout the following decade.
2. The Politics of Treaty Negotiations
No better marker of the assumptions Muslims made about the 
attitude of the Copts to the British exists than the public 
discussion of treaty negotiations. Because of this, all 
negotiating teams were careful to balance Muslim and Copt members.
108. F0.371/63029. J802/152/16.
109* Misr, 9 October 1950, p.l.
110. F0iU07/22U, Enclosure in No.2. A Report on a Visit to Upper
Egypt by Mr. Hamilton, December 1939-
111. The British could explain the presence of Uthman Muharram on the
1930 negotiating team only by saying that he was needed to prevent
the Coptic members from being in the majority. The delegation was 
later expanded. F0.371/A607 s J635A/16.
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Popular assumptions had either receded or simply were not played
upon until the 1929 negotiations. Then the Liberal
Constitutionalists, fearing that the Wafd would sabotage their
treaty, made the supposed reliance of the Copts on the British
an issue. They tried to pin opposition to the treaty on the
Copts and specifically on the Copts in the Wafd. This new
charge was simply an extension of one made frequently in the
112past by al-Siyasa, as the paper itself admitted. Muslims,
in al-Siyasa1s view, had no influence in the party and al-Nahhas
was "nothing but a zero on the left side or an instrument in
C Ubaid*s hand".113
Al-Siyasa suggested that the Copts were as concerned as
foreign communities in Egypt with what special promises would be
llUmade to them in the treaty. The Copts, concluded the paper,
did not want a treaty because a British evacuation would leave
115them at the mercy of Muslims. Such statements apparently
played on British fears as much as public ones. Every time the 
Wafd negotiated with the British, the Residency suspected that 
the Copts in the party would sabotage the talks.
Al-Siyasa, charging the Copts with monopolizing power in the 
administration, reminded its readers that the Copts had recently
116held two portfolios and the presidency of the Senate. It
117also complained of other prominent jobs m  Coptic hands and
112. Al-Siyasa, 8 September 19295 Palace Press Files.
113. Al-Siyasa, quoted in Mustafa al-Fekki, "Makram Ubayd: A Coptic
Leader in the Egyptian National Movement", unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of London 1977, p.111.
114. Al-Siyasa, 8 September 1929, Palace Press Files 
115- Al-Siyasa, 29 and 30 May 1929, Palace Press Files.
Il6. Al-Siyasa, 11 September 1929, Palace Press Files.
117* Al-Siyasa, 17 September 1929, Palace Press Files.
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contended that some high positions should he reserved for Muslims. 
To forestall doubts, al-Siyasa assured its readers that it was not 
prejudiced against the Copts, and incorrectly claimed that the 
Liberal Constitutionalist party had more Coptic members than the
1 n O
Wafd.
Al-Siyasa1s attacks soon grew ugly. The paper invented a
story about Upper Egyptian tax collectors, almost all Copts,
making propaganda against the treaty. It reported that these
collectors were terrifying the peasantry with talk that a treaty
would spark first widespread Egyptian military conscription and
119then war in Ethiopia on behalf of the British. The peasants,
remembering their treatment at the hands of the British during
World War I, were not eager to repeat the experience. The
collectors were also accused of claiming that the British planned
to deprive Egypt of much of her water by irrigating the Sudan.
Water was a delicate issue and one which easily aroused peasant 
120
fears. Apparently the government, to maximize its political
gains, ordered al-Siyasa1s articles against the Copts to be
121
printed in a brochure and distributed.
The fact that the Liberals could think of no other weapon 
against Wafdist opposition to the treaty indicates a bankruptcy 
of policy, if not support. No doubt Wafdist agents were working 
against the treaty, but It is unlikely that the Wafd would have
118. Al-Fekki, "Makram Ubayd....", op.cit., p.111.
119- The fighting was supposed to take place because of an argument over 
the headwaters of the Nile. Misr, 8 September, p.2, • W -
120. Al-Siyasa, 6 September 19i$, Palace Press Files.
121. Journal du Caire, 18 September 1929, Palace Press Files.
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relied on men who were bitterly hated by the peasantry. Even
if a majority of Coptic tax collectors were Wafdists, it is just
as unlikely that they would have risked their precious jobs by
spreading anti-government propaganda. The British, surprisingly,
gave some credence to the Liberals' tale, although they had no
more proof than al-Siyasa. Sir Percy Loraine thought the Copts
in the Wafd might wreck the treaty because the British had
122relinquished their insistence on protecting minorities.
Makram CUbaid was blamed for the Wafd's refusal to announce
123its opinion on the draft treaty. He was singled out by al-
Siyasa, not only because he was a Copt and Secretary-General of 
the Wafd, but because he had just returned from an anti-treaty
12Upropaganda mission to London. Upon his return, a leaflet was
distributed in Alexandria claiming that the Copts, wishing to
12 Sdestroy the treaty, had contributed E£10,000 to his mission.
Every issue of al-Siyasa in mid-September criticized cUbaid, and
126the latter felt compelled to deny publicly al-Siyasa's charges.
Al-Siyasa accused the Copts of secretly plotting to use the
127nationalist movement to gain power over Muslims. The newspaper
Al-Tiiaghr, in repeating such stories, warned that the majority
128would not submit to Coptic domination. Other papers, including
Al-1 Akhbar and Avenir, joined the anti-Coptic outburst. Curiously,
122. F0.371/138Vf, J2615/5/16.
123. Al-Siyasa, 11 September 1929s Palace Press Files.
12U. See al-Siyasa, 6 September 1929, Palace Press Files.
125. Al-Fekki, "Makram Ubayd..,.", op.cit., p.110.
126. Misr, 17 September 1929, P«3*
127. Of‘course, only fanatical Copts joined the Wafd. Al-Siyasa.,
17 September 1929, Palace Press Files.
128. Egyptian Gazette, 1^ September 1929, P-2; F0.U07/209, Enclosure in 
No.33, Memorandum respecting the Egyptian Press, 7-13 September 1929-
i
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al-Siyasa was at the same time claiming that the Wafd, no doubt
meaning the Muslim Wafd as distinct from the Coptic Wafd, was
129actually pleased with the treaty.
Misr, al-Muqattam and al-Balagh responded with particular
sharpness to these charges. The latter commented that the
great nationalist, Zaghlul, had united Muslims and Copts and it
accused al-Siyasa of serving British policy in trying to divide 
130
the two. Al-Muqattam also harked back to the glorious days
of solidarity and warned those who dragged religion into the
131treaty debate that it could lead to civil strife (fitna).
Misr, as befitted a Coptic and Wafdist newspaper, made the most
vigorous defence of the Copts and the strongest attack on the
Ministry for fostering a communal policy. The paper condemned
al-Siyasa's attempt to destroy national unity. Like al-Balagfr,
Misr suggested that the Liberals were not so much protecting
Islam and Muslims, as they were advancing their own political 
132interests.
In 1930, the Wafd came to power and Wisa Wasif, the new
President of the Chamber, portrayed his election as a repudiation
133of the Liberals' anti-Coptic campaign. However, al-Siyasa
continued this campaign and in March was pointlessly accusing
Coptic tax collectors of working against the Wafd's treaty 
13hnegotiations. Understandably, the charge was subdued. It
129. Misr, 17 September 1929, p.3.
130. Al-Balagh. 30 May 1929, Palace Press Files. •
131. Al-Mutattam, 11 September 1929, Palace Press Files.
132. Misr, 13 September '1929, p.l.
133. Misr, 15 January 1930, p.l. Al-Siyasa complained that only Coptic 
societies had been given notice of the celebrations scheduled for 
the opening of Parliament.
13U. Misr, 7 March 1930, p.l.
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made little sense to accuse Copts of blocking a treaty which 
the Wafd, supposedly dominated by Copts, was doing its best to 
secure. Al-Siyasa even charged that Copts had too great a
135role in trying to secure the treaty that Copts at home opposed. 
Religion did not colour all of al-Siyasa1s remarks about the 
negotiations', most of them were, in fact, directed at Wafdist 
recalcitrance.
The Residency was even more suspicious than al-Siyasa. Sir
Samuel Hoare in the Foreign Office minuted that nobody believed
that the Copts wanted a change: "Makram will simply hold out for
an unobtainable maximum in order that he and his brethren may
continue to be patriots and heroes..." It is possible that
cUbaid did feel obliged to maintain a more extreme position than
his fellow Muslim delegates because his loyalty could more easily
be questioned. His position on the treaty was, however, consonant
with his reputation for extreme nationalism; there is no evidence
to suggest that he or any other Copts who negotiated with the
British sabotaged any treaty because they desired a continuing
137
British presence in Egypt.
E. Conclusion
Paradoxically, then, the British presence in Egypt was both a 
restraint on and an encouragement of Muslim hostility to Copts. It 
was inevitable that some Muslims would identify the Copts with their 
British overlords because of the shared religion of the two. The
135* Al-Siyasa, 6 April 1930, p.l. See also 9 February.
136. F0.371/1^611, J1308/U/16.
137. In fact, Makram was helpful in advancing the 1936 negotiations to their
successful conclusion.
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British expectation that Copts and Muslims would have different 
interests and would respond differently to the Occupation did not 
help the Copts secure good relations with their compatriots. The 
presence of British troops in the country probably was reassuring to 
many Copts; but the British disinclination to act after 1936, at a 
time when the community was Increasingly threatened, left the British 
presence only as a provocation and aggravation of Muslim feeling without 
doing anything to secure Coptic safety and equality.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE LIMITS OF THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY 
AHD EGYPT'S NATIONAL IDENTITY
A. Religion and the Political System
Perhaps the most fundamental effect of Western influence was to
call into question the very foundation of Egyptian society and
politics. Egyptian intellectuals were confronted with the problem
of why their society and, in fact, others ruled by Muslims had failed
to keep pace with those technological advances which had allowed the
West to establish hegemony over the East. If Muslim society were
innately inferior, as Europeans liked to think, what then did this
say about Islam, at the heart of Egyptian and Arab civilization?
Europeans often blamed Islam for the backwardness of the Muslim
world. Some Egyptians accepted this interpretation and were ready
to condemn the religion in its entirety; others preferred to cast
their stone at the role Islam had ideally and historically played in
politics. Religious opinion, of whatever shade, was naturally
concerned to prevent both this denigration and any corresponding
praise, however implicit, of Christianity as responsible for European 
1success.
To identify the causes of the weakness was at the same time to 
suggest remedies. There was no consensus on either, except perhaps 
that some change was necessary. Remedies centred around what should 
be adopted from the West and what indigenous traditions could be
1. Al-CUrwa al-Wuthqa k (3 April 1887); reprinted in a volume of the 
same title (Cairo 1957)s pp.23-6. The Firm Tie was the short­
lived journal of Shaikhs al-'Afghani and ^Abduh.
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profitably retained. Secularists, for example, constructed an entirely
new foundation, based on reason and common interests, for politics and
society. In their ideal society, religion was removed from the
public sphere and restricted to the private. Traditional Muslims,
on the other hand, upheld the older belief that Islam was inseparable
from politics. The clear fact that the two were not then inseparable
2
was blamed for the Islamic world's loss of independence; Muslims
had failed to follow the principles of their religion and were
suffering the consequences. The ideal was a society organized around
Islam and for the fundamental purpose of practising Islam. The
boundaries of the political community were set by adherence to Islam
and therefore could include only Muslims.
Those on the Islamic side of the fence differed among themselves
3
on the amount of borrowing permissible. However, there was some
consensus that the kind of borrowing advocated by the secularists
would create a poor Egyptian copy of Europe and would give the West
a greater hold over the East. They would not abandon religious feeling
k
as society's main bond, and many saw only a purified and revitalized 
Islam as capable of defeating Western control and protecting the 
territorial and cultural integrity of the Muslim peoples.
2. To Shaikh al-'Afghani, one significant failure was that Muslims had 
not maintained unity, which he termed a religious obligation.
Ibid., 9 (22 May 188U); reprinted on p.70 and ibid., 5 (10 April 
188U); reprinted on pp.30-2.
3. Al-CUrwa al-Wuk&qa in noting that Western nations frequently
borrowed from one another to their mutual benefit, criticized
Eastern rulers for hindering that process. Ibid., 9 (22 May 
188U); reprinted on p.71*
H. Al-'Afghani scorned nationalism, which he saw as divisive, and he
promoted religious solidarity as the only way to bring together the
strength of the East and pit it successfully against the might of 
the West. Ibid., 2 (20 March 188U); reprinted on pp.9-H; ibid. , 
9 (22 May 188U); reprinted on pp.67-72.
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One religious thinker who had some influence in this century was 
Rashid Rida. His journal, al-Manar, consistently called for a return 
to the simplicity of an earlier Islam, and a society in which the 
connection between religion and government was closer than it was in 
twentieth-century Egypt.^ Rida was concerned to give practical 
reasons for the Muslim world's backwardness; one article in al-Manar 
saw an explanation in moral depravity and the ignorance of science.^
For Rida, religion was the root of political and social cohesion. As 
a Syrian and devout Muslim, he wanted to rid the Middle East of non- 
Muslim rule, but not by means of separate nationalism. For example, 
al-Manar criticized the Liberal Constitutionalist al-Siyasa for calling 
"a Muslim and an Arab....a foreigner if he does not belong to the same 
country as themselves". Although Rida’s journal failed to survive 
his death in 1935 5 his views found new champions, most notably in the 
Muslim Brethren.
The more conservative Egyptian religious establishment also argued
8
for Islam to be given more power over people's lives. For them, this 
was a "bread and butter" issue; and they tended, like Rida, to see 
nationality as determined by religion. Such thinking was interpreted, 
not without justice, by the Copts and even by the British, as saying 
that there was no real and meaningful place for non-Muslims in a 
Muslim country.
5. E.I.J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern Rational State (Cambridge 1965), 
p.82. Al-Manar contained more articles on current affairs than the 
more strictly religious periodicals like Majallat al-'Azhar.
6. Al-Manar 31 (22 October 1930: 13U9 AH): UU9-65•
7. Quoted by Charles Adams in Islam and Modernism in Egypt (Cairo
1933), P.19U.
8. They believed that there could be no struggle between religious and
civil authorities as there had been in Europe because in Islam there 
was no division between the two. Muhammad Farid Wajdi, "The Office of 
Caliph and Democarcy", Maj allat al~1Azhar 10 (1939: 1358 AH), 36-8.
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A number of organizations, whose political strength was based
partly on their religious commitment, advocated a greater say for
religion in politics and criticized the more secular political parties
for a lack of devotion to Islam. Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt), renamed
the National Islamic Party in 19U0, was one group that was vocal
in its support of Islamic principles. It demanded, like the Shabab
Muhammad (Young Men of Muhammad) that Islamic religious law serve as
the basis for legislative life. The latter, a splinter group of the
Muslim Brethren, also advocated the replacement of Parliament by
Islam's Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council), the boycott of
anything made or delivered by non-Muslims and the restitution of the 
9
jizya tax.
The Shabab were a fringe group, but the Muslim Brethren were not;
and this latter organization, with its large following became the most
powerful exponent of an Islamic order. In their eyes, any division
between religious and political life was artificial,^ and they blamed
11the West for denying Islam its right to rule. Because the state
12existed only to serve religion, the Brethren were critical of the
9. Misr, 26 April 19^ -6, p.l. When Salama Musa complained about the
Shabab the following year, they accused him of trying to spark
rebellion (Fitna) , Misr, 3 May 19^ -7» p.l.
10. Five Tracts of Hassan al-Banna1., trans. Charles Wendell (Berkeley
I978)j p.6. The Brethren objected to mixing an alien system of
government with Islam because it would ruin the natural ability of 
Islam to operate to the best advantage of mankind. See Sayed Kotb, 
Social Justice in Islam, trans. John Hardie (New York 1970) (first 
Arabic edition I9U5), p.91* Another Brethren ideologue was moved 
by Islam's modernity to call its system of government "a free
democracy" and "a tempered socialism". Muhammad al-G-hazzali, Our
Beginning in Wisdom, trans. Ismacil al-Faruqi (Washington DC 1953) 
(first Arabic edition 1951)5 P P * 6 ,  13.
11. Al-Banna' argued, as did Rashid Rida, that a contributing factor was
the transfer of power to non-Arabs who did not understand Islam.
This is an argument several pan-Arabists made to account for the 
decline of the Arab world. Five Tracts of Hassan al-Banna', p.19*
12. Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (London 1969), p.2^7-
Ill
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political elite for failing to protect Islam. Much of their 
activity was directed against Western hegemony, and they made a 
strong claim at a time when the Wafd. was losing credibility, to be 
considered the only genuine nationalists. It was a nationalism, 
however, that rested more on religious feeling than any sense of 
territorial identity.
The ideal of Islamic unity exerted a strong pull on some Muslims, 
for whom the wholly imaginary simplicity of an earlier time when the 
Muslim world was united was a compelling vision. One symbol of that 
unity was the Caliphate, the supreme Islamic religious office, 
abolished by the Turks in 192^ 4. Many Muslims seemed eager to re­
establish the position, and potential political gains as well as 
religious duty figured in their attempts. However, Egyptian public 
interest may have been due mainly to Egyptian royal pressure. The 
Caliph, had, after all, sat far away in Istanbul. As it was, public 
feeling was strong mainly In the few years following Turkey’s 
unilateral action, although there was some renewal of sentiment when 
the young and seemingly pious Faruq ascended the throne in 1936.
lUMany of the ulama were sincere in their desire for a Caliph, even
Al-NaQhlr l (No.12: 1938/1357 AH): 2-3. In 19k 1, Prime Minister 
Husain Sirri was so annoyed by al-Banna1’s criticism of his 
government that he banished the latter to Qina. FO.lUl/838, 305/37/^2.
Ik. Not even they, however, agreed on the need for a Caliph. In 1925
Shaikh ^Ali ^Abd al-Raziq claimed in a book that neither the Qur1 an nor 
the Hadith made the office incumbant upon Muslims. Religious circles 
reacted so vehemently to this that public and government attention was 
focused on the unfortunate Shaikh. Al-Manar and many others particularly 
objected to his claim that the establishment of a state was not a part 
of the Prophet’s divine mission; this, of course, implied that a 
division between religion and politics was not only acceptable but 
ordained. Al-Manar noted indignantly that Muslims would have to give 
up one-half of their religion if they were to adopt al-Raziq's under­
standing of Islam. Feeling was so strong that few of those who 
approved of al-Raziq’s words dared to defend them; most rather weakly 
argued for the right of free expression. Wisely, this is all the 
Coptic press attempted to do. See al~Watan, 20 August 1925, p.l;
5 September 1925s P-l- See also cAli *-Abd al-Raziq, al-' Islam wa 
’Usui al-Hukm (Cairo 1925), pp.119-29* Adams, Islam and Modernism 
inlEgypt * p.267.
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if their activity was conveniently tied to King Fu'ad and later Faruq.’s
15
ambition to be named Caliph.
Neither the Wafd nor the Liberal party wanted an Egyptian Caliph.
Both understood that no political party could compete with a Caliph- 
King whose political authority derived from religious rather than 
constitutional sources. It was not easy, however, to oppose the 
Caliphate and maintain a reputation for religiosity, particularly when 
each party was trying to denigrate the other’s commitment to Islam.
The Copts were wary of the Caliphate and indeed all Islamic unity 
schemes. They also understood that Egypt could not survive as a semi­
secular democratic system were its monarch named Supreme Commander of all 
Muslims. The Coptic press was justifiably cautious in its comments 
in the 1920s, when enthusiasm and hope for a revival were strongest. 
Later, the Coptic press, if not frank, was at least more open in its 
concern; this mirrored the freedom the Wafd then felt to voice its 
convictions.^"
All elements of the press wrote about Islamic issues such as this, 
and many devoted increasing space to them from the late 1930s. The 
party press could not afford to be left behind some of the more vigorous 
Islamic groups. Even the Wafdist press fell prey to this need; witness 
the name chosen for one of the later Wafdist newspapers, al-Jihad (The 
Holy War). In 19^7, another Wafdist paper, al-Misrj, termed India's 
declaration of war against Pakistan a war against Islam. At the same 
moment, the Wafdist al-Balagh. whose editor cAbd al-Qadir Hamza, was
15. See the description of 'Azhari activity in Fakhr al-Din al-Zawahiri, 
al-Siyasa w-al-'Azhar (Cairo 19^5), pp.209-17-
16. Both al-Watan and Misr restricted themselves to bland reporting on 
revival activities. * See al-Watan, 5 March 1925, p-lj 13 March 
1925, P-1.
17. Misr, 2 February 1938, p.l; al-Jihad, 23 January 1938, Palace
Press Files.
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for some years involved in Islamic-Aral affairs, was listing the
advantages of Islamic unity. Salama Musa was perhaps understandably
moved to comment that it was no longer easy to distinguish between the
18Wafdist and Muslim Brethren press. Several of the literati mirrored
this press interest and, in the late 1930s, took up writing about 
traditional Islamic themes and heroes: some of these, like Muhammad Husain 
Haikal and Taha Husain, had promoted secular ideas in the past. It 
seems clear that this heightened interest in Islamic themes both 
responded to and encouraged the renewal of religious sentiment in Egypt.
Copts could have only a peripheral role in this debate about the 
nature of Egyptian society and politics, and therefore were partly 
excluded from an argument that had some effect on their position.
Those with an interest in national affairs did tend to help Muslim 
secularists advance their cause. It was not that there were not 
important creative thinkers among them; there were, but it was 
simply that their right to a say was not accepted by the other side in 
the debate.
The traditional tie between Islam and government had precluded a 
non-Muslim role in defining the society or polity and had made the 
Copts marginal. Only by excluding religion from government or by the 
more personal act of conversion to Islam could the Copts escape their 
marginality. Secularism promised to broaden the political community and 
reduce the political and social importance of the division between 
Muslims and Christians. The Copts naturally saw the confusion of
19Islam and politics as something directly harmful to their interests;
18. He was no doubt worried about Brethren-Wafd contacts. Misr,
26 November 19^7, p.l.
19- See Mikha’il Fanus' speech at The Coptic Conference Held at Assiout, 
6 , 7 and 8 March 1911, no place, n.d., pp.6-12.
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it threatened both liberty and tolerance. Misr insisted that
theocracy was anachronistic and that only secular democratic
20 _ _ _
government was akin to the spirit of the age. Salama Musa, one
21of the most important Coptic secularists, adhered to the Western 
concept of religion: both Islam and Christianity were meant to be
religions of private faith and not government supervision. Both 
Misr and al-Watan consistently promoted the separation of religion and 
politics:
The world knows....that the source of grief 
and war to humanity in phases of history
has been the appeal of religion to politics
and the refuge politics has found in 
religion. Peace and prosperity were 
established in a country only when politics 
and religion were kept apart.
Of course, Christian advocacy of a Western orientation drew
suspicion because the Copts, after all, shared a religion with the
hated British. One contemporary scholar insists that the Copts should
have recognized that Islam was "the chief safeguard of man’s identity
in that part of the world, the champion par excellence in the long
conflict between East and West...," but they could not share his
23
conclusion that doing so would lead to a common victory.
There were, of course, many Muslims who also rejected the idea 
that Islam was a suitable basis for political life. They hoped that 
a Western democratic government would do for Egypt what others believed 
Islam could do: free Egypt and establish a more just and egalitarian
20. Misr, 22 January 1938, p.l.
21. Syrian Christians, because of their disproportionate press influence, 
played a perhaps larger role than the Copts in promoting secular 
ideas in Egypt.
22. Al-Watan, 21 September 1922, p.l.
23. Jacques Berque , Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution, trans. Jean 
Stewart (London 1972), p.26l.
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society. Lutfi al-Sayyid was one of the first to help lay a
foundation for a polity in which Muslims and Copts could participate 
2kon an equal basis. He rejected pan-Islamic unity as far-fetched,
and believed that only common interests, which were determined largely 
by shared geographic space, could unite men. Among those 
intellectuals who shared his bent were Haikal, Taha Husain, Tawfiq al- 
Hakim, Mahmud fAzmi and Khalid Muhammad Khalid. Their society was 
one In which reason would guide action and religion fill spiritual
s 25needs.
It was the secularists who dominated politics in the 1920s. The
British example and presence no doubt gave them a powerful boost. The
two major political groups of this decade, and perhaps the era, the
Wafd and Liberal Constitutionalist parties, were founded as secular
organizations aimed at obtaining power within the framework of a
democratic system. Neither, however, was able to resist the
occasional temptation to make improper political use of religious
2 6issues; they were not so unlike the royalist parties in this. Two
later political groups, the Sa^dist party and the Wafdist Bloc were 
both splinter groups of the Wafd and adhered to its secular ideas.
Almost all parties, however, capitulated to the strong religious feelings 
evident in the 19^ -Os. It is interesting to speculate whether the 
Coptic politician Makram ^ Ubaid became at this time a peculiarly rabid 
anti-British nationalist precisely because he could not use Islam and
2U. Salama Musa commented that it was Lutfi's work which allowed him to 
be a nationalist in Egypt, The Education of Salama Musa, trans. by 
L.O. Schuman (Leiden 196l), p.^U.
25. Al-Siyasa, 2^ July 1926, p.5; Ibrahim Ibrahim, "The Egyptian 
Intellectuals between Tradition and Modernity" (unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Oxford 1967)5 PP-95, I0U-5.
26. This subject will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 
Six and Seven.
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needed something to equal its intensity. It was the manifest 
strength of these feelings that forced the Copts out of the political 
arena and left few Muslim secularists with the courage both to defend 
and encourage Coptic participation. It was not that the religious 
thinkers had finally defeated the secularists, but the balance seemed 
definitely to have shifted.
B. Theories of History and National Unity
History has always had a role in defining a people and making them
proud of their character. Rarely has it been a simple rendering of a
factual past; rather it is usually a part of the present and is moulded
by present needs. Many Egyptian intellectuals of this era were
absorbed by the question of who the Egyptians were and, how they defined
their heritage. Egyptian history was long and splendid, but not all
parts of it were equally appealing to all readers. Some rejected
27segments of that history for political or religious reasons, others
neglected parts through sheer ignorance. Some described the
inhabitants of the Nile Valley as Arabs and others as Egyptians, Muslims
or Europeans. As Mirrit Ghali has suggested, this inability to agree
on an identity is partly due to a tendency to see Egypt's historical
28periods as self-contained and mutually exclusive.
This problem of competing definitions was not a negligible one. 
Membership in the Egyptian nation could be made exclusive, and the 
excluded could eventually lose their right to participate in politics. 
Egypt had been defined, and still was by many, as a Muslim country.
The Copts could not belong to a culture or polity defined by Islam.
27. Lecture by Mirrit Ghali at 1'Tnstitut d'Egypte, 7 November 1977-
28. Mirrit Ghali, "Essay: The Egyptian National Consciousness",
Middle East Journal 32 (1978) 59-60.
28a. Wendell and Walter Freeman (eds.), ‘Ethnicity'and'^atiOrtlMilding (Reverlv 
Hills 197*0, P.2G5,     ’ ""
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Coptic and Muslim secularists tried, partly through their use of 
history, to base the Egyptian identity on something other than 
religion. Coptic efforts contributed toward the development of a 
theory of Egyptian character which included Muslims and Copts and 
ignored the one source of division between the two, religion.
1. Egyptianism
There were several important Egyptian nationalists, Lutfi al-Sayyid
and Zaghlul among them who sought to build a nationalism based on
Egypt as a territorial entity and to impose this modern allegiance on
the older one. In pursuit of this objective, they proposed that the
Egyptian character was unique; sharing some traits with other peoples,
but still possessing a particular identity based on a particular
historical experience. Some nationalist thinkers began with
Pharaonic Egypt and tried to reconcile this civilization with subsequent
periods. Others concentrated solely on the Pharaonic heritage and
neglected 1,300 years of Egypt’s Arab and Islamic history. Whatever
the emphasis and however great the recognition of historical continuity,
ancient Egypt was an age in which most Egyptians could take pride.
A polity which was sovereign and powerful and a civilization which was
advanced gave some promise of the heights to which Egypt could
29legitimately aspire.
Sparked by excavations beginning in the last century and fuelled
by the discovery of Tut Ankh Amun's tomb in 1922, interest in the
30Pharaonic past became an intellectual infatuation in the 1920s. Many 
Muslims were ready to praise Pharaonic civilization and its attainments. 
With the exception of Salama Musa, they were, in fact, the chief
29. Charles Wendell, The Evolution of Egypt's National Image 
(Los Angeles 1972), p.123.
30. See Misr, 20 and 27 February 19275 p.l.
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exponents of Pharaonism or the idea that the Egyptian character was
inextricably bound to the Pharaonic spirit. Lutfi al-Sayyid was
perhaps the first to suggest that the Egyptian character was built
around a Pharaonic core. The Copts, however, were among the first
to show an interest in and an identification with Egypt's ancient
heritage; and the Coptic press was an important vehicle for conveying
information about the Pharaonic period. Certain European Egyptologists
like Gaston Maspero, seem partly, if not wholly, responsible for
persuading the Copts that they were direct descendants of this
31impressive civilization. Maspero suggested that Egyptian Muslims
were largely Christians who had converted to Islam, but who also lacked
32
the racial purity of the Copts. Egyptian Muslims, then, were a kind
of substandard Copt, a notion which would not have pleased the country's 
majority. The Assyriologist A.H. Sayce went even further with his 
extravagant insistence, apparently shared by Flinders Petrie, that the
33Copts, because of their glorious past, held Egypt's future in their hands.
These ideas were discussed with great excitement by the Copts.
Ramzi Tadrus stated in his biographical dictionary that the Copts were
3b
a nation covered in glory. A heritage of power and high culture was 
naturally more exciting than one of bondage and subservience, and was to
31. An interview with Maspero in a Coptic periodical and a lecture he 
gave at the Ramses Club in 1908 were both seminal in conveying to 
the Copts the idea that the blood line had remained pure from the 
time of the Pharaohs, Samir Seikaly, "Coptic Communal Reform 
l860-19lb", Middle Eastern Studies 6 (1970), 269* Before this 
time, the Copts, like the Muslims, were not interested in ancient 
Egypt. See Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London 19*+5), P-9*+«
32. Seikaly, "Coptic Communal Reform...", op.cit., p.269-
33. Ibid., 269; Samir Seikaly, "The Copts under British Rule, 1882- 
191*+" (unpublished PhD thesis, University of London 1967), p-9*+-
3*+. Muhammad Sayyid Kailani, al-'Adab al-Qibjl Qadiman wa Hadibhan
(Cairo 1962) , p.*+3.
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be preferred. It was difficult for many Muslims to accept that this
weak community had once been great, and some liked to comment that the
Copts were not the sons of the Pharaohs, but rather the descendants of
35captive slaves of the Pharaohs. Perhaps the Copts also had trouble
accepting this past: some of their self-congratulatory writing may
have been as much designed to convince themselves as Muslims and
foreigners of their true worth.
The discovery of the ancient past sparked a parallel Coptic interest
in the Christian period. A Coptic Museum was founded and societies
were formed to encourage the study of Coptic history and the Coptic
language. The latter had been used only for liturgical purposes for
centuries; few priests, let alone laymen, could claim fluency. In
1916, al-Watan suggested that the Copts reject Arabic as a foreign
37tongue and return to their native one. A later Coptic proposal was
that all Egyptians study Coptic because of its connection to 
hieroglyphics. Echoing Maspero, some Copts deduced from the notion 
that all Egyptians had a Pharaonic core, the theory that all Egyptians 
had a Coptic one as well. As Murqus Simaika commented, all Egyptians 
were Copts; some Copts just happened to be Muslim and others happened
3^
to be Christian. Here he reduced the importance of religious belief
to the merest historical accident, but it was not a reduction that was 
likely to win Muslim acceptance. Attempts to revive Coptic were 
unsuccessful: communal history, however, proved more accessible. In
the early 1950s, the Society of the Coptic Nation, al-’Umma al-Qibtiyya,
35* Misr, 13 March 1939., p.l.
36. The Committee of Coptic History was one such society. It was 
formed in 1919 to promote the teaching of Coptic history in 
Coptic schools.
37. Al-Watan, 13 January 1916, quoted in Kailani, al-*Adab al-Qibli, p.51.
38. Al-1Ahram, 3 February 1926, p.l.
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sparked a new interest, particularly among the young, in the community's
past. This came at a time when the Copts felt their identity as
Egyptians threatened.
The point Pharaonism's fo rmul at or s were trying to make was that
Egyptians had a remarkable history and were a distinct nationality. They
were most successful as well as most numerous and active in the 1920s
and early 1930s; after that Pharaonism's popularity faded. The Copts
did retain a strong interest in the movement, although it was primarily
the preoccupation of the well-educated. It can have had little
meaning or attraction for the masses.
Two of its more intelligent proponents were Haikal and Taha Husain,
although the latter was more Interested in the notion of a regional
Mediterranean culture. Husain argued that most Egyptians were descended
in a direct line from the Pharaonic Egyptians and were untainted by Arab
blood. He insisted that Arab civilization, when compared with the older
one, had had a meagre impact on Egypt. Accordingly, he maintained both
39that Egypt had little in common with her Arab neighbours, and that 
neither language nor religion could provide an adequate foundation for
.. Hounity.
Haikal shared these sentiments and publicized them in al-Siyasa, the
Liberal paper under his editorship. He too saw a strong link to the 
Hi
Pharaonic past; throughout the 1920s he wrote articles extolling this
U‘
ancient civilization and calling for a revival of its literature and art.
39* Interview in al-Makhshuf. quoted in al-Majalla al„Jadida,
December 1938, pp.75-6.
Ho. Taha Husain, Mustaqbil al-Thaqafa fi Misr (Cairo 1938), pp.21-3.
Hi. Muhammad Husain Haikal, Tbawrat al-'Adah (Cairo 1965), p.138.
H2. Muhammad Darwasah, al-Wahda al-^Arabiyya (Beirut 1957), P.3HH.
Haikal even believed that early Islamic literature had been influenced 
by Pharaonic culture. Al-Siyasa al-'Usbuiuyya, 20 October 1928, 
quoted in Samira Bahr, "al-'Aqbat fi al-Hayat al-Siyasiyya fi Mi$r" 
(unpublished PhD thesis, Cairo University 1977), pp.291-2.
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He hoped that Pharaonism would inspire the creation of a national 
b3
literature; but, by the 1930s, he was, at least publicly, showing 
more interest in Islam. In 1933 he admitted in Thawrat al-*Adab 
that Egyptian culture was the product of her entire history and that
HU
the Islamic period was also worthy of study. His interest in the
latter period later increased.
Another important writer, Tawfiq al-Hakim, believed, like Husain, 
that environment determined national character. In noting the obvious 
differences in the geography of the Arabian Peninsula and that of the 
Nile Valley, he proposed that the Egyptians reject Arab culture in 
favour of their indigenous one. He too described the chain between
1*5
the Egyptian peasant and his Pharaonic forbears as unbroken and strong. 
Foreign conquerors might have introduced, in his eyes, an element of 
moral corruption into Egypt; but they have not succeeded in compromising
U6the ancient spirit of the people.
To Salama Musa, the Pharaonic era was not only relevant to Egypt, 
but was to be treated with awe, as something almost sacred. He too
believed that the Egyptians were superior to the Arabs because of
H8their Pharaonic blood. Musa tried to encourage the erection of
Pharaonic statues and memorials, believing that such solid evidence
U3« Haikal, Thawrat al-1Adab, p.138.
bb. Smith feels that at this point the Islamic past was still
subordinate to the ancient one. Charles Smith, "Muhammad Husayn 
Haykal: An Intellectual and Political Biography", unpublished
PhD thesis (University of Michigan 1968), pp.291-6.
1+5* Hilary Kilpatrick, The Modern Egyptian Novel (London 197*0 > pp.*+2-3.
*46, Tawfiq al-Hakim, 'Awdat al-Ruh (Cairo 1973, first edition 1933), 
pp.53-6H.
*+7* Ibrahim, Egyptian Intellectuals, p.177*
H8. Salama Musa, al-Yaum w-al-Ghad (Cairo 1927)s p.235.
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l+Qwould reinforce the Egyptians' sense of continuity. Musa's ambition,
evident in so much of his writing, was to gain recognition for the
existence of a specific Egyptian culture.
The Coptic press maintained a steady enthusiasm for the Pharaonic
period; and portrayed ancient Egypt, in sometimes vivid stretches of
the imagination, as the source of science, civilization and even
50
constitutional government. Misr repeatedly chided those who
51concentrated on Egypt's Islamic period and ignored the older heritage.
The paper encouraged the study of Pharaonic history and may have
devoted more space to the discovery of antiquities than any other 
52
newspaper. It was disturbed that the Egyptian government declined
to support excavations and that the majority of Egyptologists were
53foreigners writing in foreign languages.
To establish an inheritance in which Islam and Arab culture played 
no part is akin to both Lebanese Christians claiming direct descent 
from the Phoenicians and Syrian Christians, like Farah 'Antun, insisting 
on the precedence of their pre-Islamic Syrian rather than Islamic 
inheritance. Motives, of course, may have differed. Lebanese 
Christians, like some Copts before World War I, emphasized the ancient 
heritage to make clear their separation from their Muslim compatriots and, 
in the Lebanese case, from Syria. 'Antun and later Copts focused on
U9. Ibrahim, Egyptian Intellectuals, p.223. One of the less happy 
results of this enthusiasm for ancient Egypt was the spawning of 
a neo-Pharaonic school of architecture and sculpture: witness that
memorial to Egyptian independence, the "Egypt Awakes" formed of a 
sphinx and a woman throwing off her veil.
50. Misr , 12 April 1919* p.l.
51. Misr, 18 September 1933, p.l.
52. 'Anls Sayigh believes that the Coptic press paid more attention to 
discoveries than what he calls "the Islamic Press". 'Anis Sayigh 
al-Fikra al-^Arabiyya fi Misr (Beirut 1959), p.211.
53. Misr, 3 November 19^7S p.l.’
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pre-Islamic culture as a common ground on which they felt both Muslims 
and Christians could stand. Neither wished to be reminded of an 
historical period in which they had existed on the extreme fringes of 
society. The Copts, therefore, made this collective possession of a
51*national history the chief element in national feeling. They had
little choice; they could not turn to language or religion.
Arabic was often emphasized as critical in establishing the Arab
identity; nevertheless, it was not entirely ruled out by those wishing
to establish an Egyptian national identity. The Egyptians had a
distinctive colloquial dialect, and some Copts and Muslims were
interested in using it to Egyptianize literary Arabic. This was not
only from a desire to write the living language but "a wish to realize
55
our national character by using our tongue". Among those who
argued for the literary use of the colloquial were Lutfi al-Sayyid5 Mohammad
Haikal^ Qasim 'Amin, 'Ahmad 'Amin, cAbd al-eAz!z Fahmi, Yusuf 'Idris, and 
d 56Louis Awad. The latter, who took the trouble to formulate a theory
of colloquial usage, now wished, because of the considerable fire that
57this drew, that he had used the colloquial m  his writings quietly.
Salama Musa, too, wished the Egyptians to write as they spoke. Such a
development would have increased literacy, but Musa and his colleagues
were after something else. Musa saw classical Arabic as fossilized;
5 8
man could not progress unless his language kept pace. Classical
5^ . Donald Reid, The Odyssey of Farah Antun (Minneapolis 1975), p.101.
55. Al-Majalla al-Jadida, May 1931, p.789.
56. See Awad's discussion of his use of the colloquial in his poetry 
in the introduction to Flutoland. He argues that the precedence 
local European languages gained over Latin weakened the power of 
the religious hierarchy but not the essence of Christianity, and 
he implied that it would be no bad thing were this to happen in 
Egypt. See his Blutuland (Cairo 19^7), pp.11-13. cAwad now admits 
that he advocated the use of the colloquial to undermine religion and 
help establish a secular society. Interview, 29 February 1980.
57. Interview, Louis cAwad, 29 February 1980.
58. Salama Musa, al-Balagha al-'Asriyya w-al-Lugfya al-^Arabiyya 
(Cairo 19^5), pp.53, 71-
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5Q
Arabic had suppressed Egyptian nationalism, and he and others argued
for an Egyptian literary language that would help isolate Egypt from
the Arab world.^
The Pharaonic strain of thought was not without its critics, who
were proud of their Islamic heritage and saw its influence as paramount
in contemporary Egypt. They were, of course, Muslims who might not
have resisted the notion that Pharaonic civilization had genuine merit
but would not credit any theory which reduced 1,300 years of Arabo-
Islamic history to triviality. In addition, the closer blood connection
of the Copts to the Pharaonic Egyptians made the Copts, in an Egypt of
primarily Pharaonic character, a kind of natural aristocracy, and this
was a distasteful idea.
The Syrian Rashid Rida's al-Manar criticized the Pharaonic movement
62and attacked its Coptic advocates as tools of British policy. The
journal al-Risala expressed similar views and insisted that Egypt's only
past of note was her Islamic one; all traces of the spirit and culture
6 3of Pharaonic Egypt had disappeared. Both the Muslim Brethren and 
the Syrian-Christian owned al-Hilal rejected the Pharaonic movement, 
albeit for different reasons. Hassan al-Banna wrote that the Brethren 
welcomed "ancient Egypt as a history in which there is glory, pride, 
science and knowledge", but emphatically rejected any sugtestion that 
Egypt return to the ways prevalent before "God granted her the teaching
59- Ibrahim, The Egyptian Intellectuals, p.220.
60. Datfwazah, al-Wahda al-^rabiyya, p. 3^ +9-
61. Wendell, The Evolution, p.163.
62. Al-Manar 31 (20 December 1930/13^9 AH), p.^5.
63. Al-Pisala, 11 October 1933, pp. 3-^ +- According to Sylvia Haim, 
the journal's editor, 'Ahmad Hassan al-Zayat, saw Arab unity as 
a prelude to Islamic unity. ‘See her Arab Nationalism:
An Anthology (Berkeley 1962), p.53.
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6kof Islam". Several proponents were lost by the Pharaonic cause in
the 1930s, including al-cAqqad' Haikal and *Ahmad Husain; Taha Husain, 
with his long religious training, had never ignored entirely the 
importance of Islamic culture. Except among the Copts, the movement 
seemed to be dead by 19^0; and those like ^Abd al-Rahman ^Azzam and 
Satl al-Husri, who continued to criticize it through the 1950s and 
1960s were only shadow boxing. Of course, their real target was not 
Pharaonism specifically but rather the concept that the Egyptians 
constituted a distinct nationl with a unique history, spirit and 
character. Not all of those who believed in Egypt ’ s uniqueness , 
however, were devoted to the Pharaonic period.
Wafdists and Liberal Constitutionalists were among those who were
65sympathetic to the Pharaonic movement, but neither were so committed 
to secularism or Pharaonism that they avoided using religious feeling 
for political gain. The Liberals, for example, created an issue 
out of Zaghlul's final resting place in 1930. Zaghlul1s family and 
the Wafd Government wanted to bury him in a Pharaonic-style tomb. 
Al-Siyasa seized the opportunity this presented and ran a series of 
articles criticizing the design as heretical,^ In words more 
suitable to the Muslim Brethren press, the paper proclaimed the 
Pharaohs infidels and, in another statement bordering on the criminal, 
called on pious Muslims to wipe out all traces of this civilization.
6k. Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers, p.266. Some opponents 
labelled the Pharaonic movement as yet another attempt by the 
British to divide and rule. See Sayigh, al-Fikra al-^Arabiyya, 
p.101; 'Ahmad Tarabain, al-Wahda al-^Arabiyya Bain 1916 wa 19^6, 
(Cairo 1957), pi189.
65. 'Ibrahim Faraj Maslha, a retired Wafdist politician, insists that the 
Egyptians have Pharaonic blood running through their veins and that 
they absorbed their Arab conquerors. Interview, 13 June 1979*
66. Al-Siyasa, 23 January, 6 February, 20 April 1930, quoted in Smith, 
Muhammad Hussin Haikal, p.238. Al-Siyasa, 13 February 1930, quoted 
in the Egyptian Gazette, ik February 1930, p.U. Unfortunately, this 
volume of al-Siyasa is missing from Dar al-Kutub so these sources 
could not be confirmed.
Misr, 10 January 1930, p.U.
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Misr attacked this as an attempt to replace patriotic with religious
feelings,^ and added drily that expressions of religious fervour from
al-Siyasa could only be regarded as suspect in light of the cAli ^Abd 
69 -
al-Raziq affair. Al-Balagh also attacked the Liberals for false piety.
Moreover, it defended Pharaonic art as worthy of imitation because it
was Egyptian art and made a point of trying to illustrate Wafdist
TOsensitivity to Islam.
The Liberals, of course, hoped to weaken the Wafd by proving a
shallow commitment to religion. Al-Siyasa recommended that a religious
71opinion (fatwa) on the acceptability of a Pharaonic tomb be solicited.
For good measure, this campaign was coupled with anti-Coptic remarks. 
^Ubaid was blamed for the tomb design and was accused of having over­
ridden the natural inclination of Mme. Zaghlul and Nahhas for an
72
Islamic-style tomb. The Copts were again accused of having excessive
73influence in both Wafdist Councils and the diplomatic corps.
An unattractive pseudo-Pharaonic mausoleum was finally built. The 
Liberals were clever to see the symbolic importance of the tomb, but 
their efforts to rouse public ire over the idolatrous resting place of 
their beloved leader failed. The Sidql government solved any lingering 
difficulties by making the tomb a national pantheon, Zaghlul co-habiting
68. Misr, 13 February 1930, p.3.
69. Misr, 15 February 1930, p.U.
70. The paper noted that all mosques built by the Wafd government 
were in the Arab style, but that in any case, this style had 
nothing to do with Islam. Al~Balagfy. 6 February 1930.p.2.
71. The article continued "...the present Cabinet must understand 
that it is the first....to look with contempt on the religious 
feelings of Muslims". Al-Siyasa, 13 February 1930, quoted in 
the Egyptian Gazette, lU February 1930. p.U.
72. Al-Siyasa, 22 April 1930, p.5*
73. Misr, 13 February 1930, p.l.
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•with a few distinguished Pharaonic mummies. Predictably, the Wafd
7l+was unhappy with this desecration, but perhaps conservative Muslims
found it even more distasteful'.
2. Mediterraneanism
Those who formulated and publicized the notion that Egypt was a
part of a general Mediterranean civilization were not necessarily
opposed to Pharaonism; two of the most active publicists, Taha Husain
and Salama Musa, were, in fact, enthusiastic Pharaonists. Pharaonism
was, of course, designed to give Egypt a cultural "edge" by pointing
to a glorious and unequalled heritage. Mediterraneanism, on the other
hand, was meant to fix that "edge" by establishing an identity with
at least a part of Europe. This theory tying Egypt to European
civilization through the Mediterranean created less public interest
than Pharaonism and was even more distinctly the plaything of the
intelligentsia. As Edward Said has noted, any suggestion that Egypt
was European marked only the cultural identity of the suggester and
75not that of the vast majority of Egyptians. At heart here, as
another scholar has suggested, was not only a desire to prove that 
Egypt was unique but that her culture and mind were rational and
t y / r
intrinsically modern. The proponents of the existence of a distinct
Mediterranean culture tried to establish that the Egyptians were the 
cultural and .intellectual equals of Europeans and perhaps were therefore 
prepared for a Western-modelled government. While it was not
7^. See cAbbas al-^Aqqad’s article in Misr, 1 December 1931, p.l. In 
1937 the mummies were moved out of tlie tomb, and Zaghlul was left 
in peaceful solitude.
75* Edward Said, Orientalism (New York 1978), p.323.
76. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism (Urbana 1973), p.l88.
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necessarily wrong to suggest that Egypt shared elements of her culture
with Greece, Spain and Italy, the tendency to overlook cultural and
historical differences was as mistaken as failing to note any
similarities would have been.
Taha Husain, who remarked on Egyptian admiration for European
civilization, progress and education, wrote that the Egyptians thought
and felt as Europeans and strove to emulate a European political 
77system. As noted previously, many wealthy Copts had adopted
European culture in place of their own, which had made them marginal.
Wasif Ghali, who was most comfortable expressing himself in French,
78
was one such Copt. Unfortunately, this new allegiance estranged
them from the majority of their compatriots and brought suspicion on
the whole Coptic community.
Salama Musa, seeing Pharaonic Egypt as the source of the ancient 
79world’s civilization, believed that Egypt's links, through the Greeks
and Romans, to the West were stronger than those,through the Arabs, to 
80the East. Egypt's ties to the East were religious and therefore, by
definition, anachronistic. Musa wanted Egypt to emulate the "advanced"
West *, the East constituted a drag on Egypt and could keep her from
8lthe progress of which she was capable. To prove Egypt’s ability 
to emulate the West, he confused what appeared to be previously a clear 
division of East and West by positing a middle ground, Mediterranean 
civilization. Christianity, Judaism and Islam had all originated in
77* Taha Husain, Mir'at al-!Islam, quoted in Ibrahim, Egyptian 
Intellectuals, p.UU.
78. He was often criticized for this by the opposition press. See 
al-Siyasa al-'Usbu ciyya, 11 June 1927, pp*3-^*
79* Salama Musa, al-Yaum w-al-Ghad. p.236.
80. Ibid. , p.2*48.
81. Ibid., p.2Ul.
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the Middle East, therefore Egyptians and Europeans shared elements of 
82 „ -culture. Musa, at one point, rather extravagantly suggested that
there was no difference between the Arab and the ancient Egyptian
. , 83cultures.
Taha Husain also liked to suggest that Egypt and Europe were
culturally one, and he tried to demonstrate the influence of ancient
81+Egypt on Greece and later of Greek thought on Egypt. He, too,
pointed to Christianity's Eastern origin; and he argued that Islam, 
born in the same region, could not make Egypt Eastern if Christianity 
had not had the same effect on Europe. He added that Islam had not 
only benefited from Greek thought but had at one time made this thought 
available to Europe.^ Taha's East is the Far East,^ and few would 
disagree with him by arguing that Egypt had more in common with China 
than with Europe. Like Musa, he tried to establish a foundation for 
emulating Western ways: he insisted that the Egyptians had long
realized that a religion and a political system were two separate 
things and that a constitution and state must rest on a practical
Qij
foundation.
Mirrit Ghali promoted a vision of an Egypt which included Western 
and Eastern influences. He described Egypt as the meeting ground of
82. Salama Musa wrote several articles in al-Hilal on this theme. 
See al-Hilal, July 1927, pp.l072-U and 1 December 1928,
pp.177-81, for examples.
83. Musa, al-Yawm, p.236.
8U. Husain, Mustaqbil, pp,12-lU.
85. Ibid. , pp.21-3.
86. Taha Hussain, The Future of Culture in Egypt, translation by 
Sidney Glazer (Washington DC 195^), pp.U-5-
87. Ibid., p.6 .
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two civilizations. Few saw as clearly as he that Egyptian culture
was the product of her entire history and that no era could he
89excluded without robbing that culture of some of its wealth.
3. Arabism
Those who defined Egypt as an Arab country had a blind spot as 
well, but their interpretation at least had some chronological merit.
They concentrated on the years following the Arab conquest and ignored 
those that preceded it. Egypt's obvious cultural and religious 
affinities to her Arab neighbours were in their favour but to assume 
that Arab civilization had obliterated all traces of Egypt's pre- 
Islamic culture was as perverse as crediting that civilization with no 
influence.
There were two sorts of theorists here: those who saw Egypt as Arab
because she was Muslim and for whom, therefore, religion and national identity
were inextricably entwined and those who wished to build a foundation for
including Egypt in a secular pan-Arab union. The first were not
necessarily opposed to the goal of the second but rather tended to see
Arab unity as a step toward the ultimate aim of Islamic unity. The
Tc
latter were secularists and some, like Sati al-Husri, went to
90great lengths to keep religion out of their theory. Religion was
incidental, a fact which was witnessed by the important contributions 
Syrian Christiansmade to pan-Arab thinking.
Shared history and language together produced the Arab nation.
Al-Husri distinguished between Arab and Islamic history and promoted
88. Mirrit Ghali, The Policy of Tomorrow, trans. Ismail al-Faruq 
(Washington DC 1953) (first Arabic edition 1933), pp.108-9-
89. At times, Salama Musa also suggested that Egypt look to both her 
Arab and Pharaonic eras for inspiration. See al-Ma.ialla al- 
Jadida, May 1932, p.791> al-Yawm w-al-Ghad, pp.235-6.
90. Satic al-Husri, "Muslim Unity and Arab Unity", in Haim,
Arab Nationalism, pp.1^7-53.
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the existence of a highly civilised pre-Islamic Arab nation in the 
peninsula. Language was a more important ingredient than history;
and he argued, in a similar vein, that Arabic had flowered before the
91divine revelation of the Qur1 an. By the importance he gave
linguistic unity in his writings, he made Islamic unity impossible; 
the Muslim countries spoke many different languages. Language was 
problematic enough for Arab unity. The various colloquial dialects 
of Arabic presented difficulties in communication, and al-Husri 
condemned them as divisive.
The work of al-Husri and other secular pan-Arabists not with­
standing, the common man did not find it easy to disentangle pan- 
Arabism from Islam. The Arabs, after all, only had a common history 
because of Islam; and the connection between the language and the 
religion could only be ignored by the most obtuse. It was precisely 
because of this latter connection that the Copts were barred from study
at the Dar al-dUlum, which in part trained language instructors, and
92from teaching Arabic In schools. In 1951 the Ministry of Education,
noting the connection between language teaching and the Qur1 an and
Hadith, voiced its disturbance and ordered an investigation into rumours
93that private schools were employing non-Muslim teachers of Arabic.
To insist, as the Copts did, that Arabic was their native tongue and 
that there were Christians who had spoken it before the advent of 
Islam, served them nought; this explains the desire of some Copts to 
Egyptianize literary Arabic.
91. William Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist (Princeton 
1971), pp.121-3.
92. This ban was only made official by Ministerial decree in 19^0. 
Misr, 12 April 19^6, p.l.
93. Misr, 12 February 1951, p.l.
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For years, the most enthusiastic proponents of Egypt’s Arab
character were non-Egyptians like SatI . They saw Egypt's wealth
and large population as critical to establishing a successful Arab 
oil
nation. Their initial efforts were frustrated by an official and
popular lack of interest in pan-Arabism. Many politicians and
intellectuals were promoting the idea of a particular Egyptian identity.
As has been demonstrated, they had some success; the people had a
sense of being Egyptian rather than Arab. "Arab" had, in fact, long
been a pejorative word in Egypt. The only ground for the pan-Arabists
to build on was the one provided by some Egyptian nationalists, like
Taha Husain who, although opposed to unity, were not averse to
95co-operation with their Arab neighbours. This, at least, was a
start, but it was a slow one. Only when the states in the region 
gained or were approaching independence and became active in inter-Arab
96
affairs did Egypt come to see an Arab role as in her interest.
Palestine was an important catalyst, and the situation there made 
Increasing claims on Egyptian attention from the late 1930s.
Like many other Egyptians, Wafdists were until this time preoccupied 
with Egyptian concerns and did not take any real notice of the pan- 
Arabists. In a remark characteristic of Wafd policy, Zaghlul in 
1921 answered a proposal that the Egyptians and Arabs join forces to 
secure their mutual independence negatively, noting that zero plus zero
9^. Satlc al-Husri, al-^Uruba 'Awwalan (Beirut 1965).
95* Anwar Chejne, "Egyptian Attitudes to Pan-Arabism", Middle East 
Journal XI (1957), p.258.
96. Leonard Binder, "Ideological foundations of Egyptian-Arab 
nationalism", in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter 
(New York I96H) , p.136.
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97was still zero. In a speech to the Senate in 19375 al-Nahhas
made the first official party statement supporting the Arabs in 
98Palestine. From this time, statements backing Palestinian Arab
demands and condemning British policy became frequent. Palestine did
not then appear to be a high-risk Issue, and parties other than the Wafd
99 i iwere also vocal on the subject. By 19ta Wafdist concern with pan-Arab
issues prompted Leon Castro, a Jewish lawyer and old Wafdist, to
accuse al-Nahhas of abandoning the policy of Zaghlul who had feared
that Arab unity would lead to religious fanaticism. It seemed a clear
sign of the times that al-Balagh hotly defended Zaghlul from this
imagined attack by insisting that the man had never said that Egypt
was not an Arab country. The newspaper construed Castro's comment
as an attack on both Islam and Egypt.
Only a short time after this, al-Nahhas signed the Arab League
protocol. King Faruq, having finally abandoned his caliphal ambitions
in favour of pan-Arab ones, helped set a pan-Arab course for Egypt,
without necessarily bothering to inform or obtain the consent of his 
101
government. A political role in Arab affairs was, however, one '
thing and unity another. When the Syrian Prime Minister proposed 
immediate unification in 1951» the reaction of some Egyptians was still 
chilly. The influential journalist Mustafa 'Amin likened the Prime
97• The Wafd in 1921 was hoping for the support of the French against 
the British so they could not back the Syrians against the French.
98. Sayigh, al-Fikra al-‘A.rabiyya, p.2Ul.
99. ibid., p.l9U. F0.371/23361+, J1973/77^/H.
100. Egyptian Gazette, 1^ September 19^ 5 p-3.
101. Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern 
Studies (London 1970), pp.215-6.
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Minister’s Idea to the situation of a farmer who, having failed to
cultivate one half a feddan (Palestine), was proposing to take on the
102.cultivation of 1,000 feddans.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Liberals sometimes advocated co­
operation with Arab countries, but they always stopped short of political 
103unity. Al-Siyasa, its judgment obscured by enthusiasm for the
struggle against the British, even suggested in 1931 that Muslims and
10UJews in Palestine unite to gain their independence. Pushed by the
same considerations as the Wafd, the Liberals began to show greater
interest in pan-Arabism at roughly the same time as their political
opponents. Increasingly, for all parties, the supposed lack of proper
brotherly feelings for Arab neighbours became yet one more stick with
105which to beat an incumbent government.
The Copts, without a great leap of the imagination, could not see 
themselves as Arabs and in this they differed from Syrian Christians.
One of the better-known Egyptian pan-Arabists, ^Abd al-Rahman ^Azzam, 
made just such a leap in an effort to persuade the Copts. He promoted 
the rather odd idea that Egypt had been an Arab country before the 
birth of Jesus. This, of course, made the Copts Arab; not only 
did it make them Arab, argued <“Azzam with a final flourish, but it made
xo6some of them more Arab than the inhabitants of Mecca and Medina.
The Copts, however, were not convinced; they saw Arabism as a 
doctrine which even in its secular guise could be used to exclude them
102. ’Akbbar al-Yawm, 2*1 January 1951, quoted in Chejne, Egyptian 
Attitudes to Pan-Arabism, pp.26l-2.
103. Al-Siyasa, lH June 1933, p.l.
10^. Egyptian Gazette, 19 November 1931, p.U.
105. For example, in 1932 al-Siyasa accused the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of trying to isolate Egypt from her Arab neighbours. In another 
article the paper criticised the Ministry of Education because it had 
in\/ited foreign scholars to speak on subjects other than "Eastern, 
Islamic and Arab" topics. Al-Siyasa, 5 August 1932, p.U; 
al-'Ittihad, 3 April 1933, 0.1.
106. Al-Hilal*, September-October 19^3, pp.H62-3, quoted in Haim, Arab 
Nationalism, p.51.
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107from national life. Being a minority in Egypt was uncomfortable
enough; the prospect of being an even smaller minority in a greater 
Arab state did not bear contemplation.
Salama Musa, echoing Lutfi al-Sayyid, pointed to the differences 
between the various Middle Eastern peoplesand sceptically asked what 
the Westernized Lebanese had in common with the more backward Sacudis
10 8and Sudanese. As the 19^ +0s progressed, the Copts became
increasingly worried about pan-Arab sentiment. They saw themselves
as potential if not actual victims of this dangerous idea. Some tried
to discredit it by calling it a plot to distract Egypt from her real 
109interests: the British were responsible for both the mess in
110Palestine and the creation of the Arab League, an organization which
the Copts found at best suspect. Salama Musa was one who tried to
. . Illuse British support for the League against it. He called it an
Islamic League and insisted that it would finally accomplish, by
increasing religious fanaticism, what the British had been trying to do
112 cfor years: the division of Muslims and Copts. Louis Awad also
113objected to the League; and others, writing in Misr also described 
the League as a religious organization. Their emphasis was always on 
the fact that the people of the Nile Valley were Egyptian and not
A -U 1 1 ^Arab.
One rather unlikely supporter of pan-Arabism was the Copt Makram 
^Ubaid. Never much interested in the traditions of his community, he
107. They did not oppose a degree of co-operation, al-Watan, 
18 August 1926, p.l.
108. Misr, 6 August 1937, p.l.
109. The Cry of Egypt's Copts (New York 1951), P-3-
110. Misr, 25 May 19U8 , p.l.
111. Misr, 17 April 19^ +6, p.l.
112. Misr, 6 July 19^6, p.l.
113- Interview, Louis ^Awad, 29 February 1980.
llH. Misr, 30 November 19^ -6, p.H;  ^December 19^6, p.l.
136
n,av well have been the only Copt to deride Pharaonism publicly,J 
and to claim that the Egyptians were Arabs.
He went even further and applauded Arab unity because it had the
117capacity to make Muslims and Copts indistinguishable. This, of
course, was exactly what his co-religionists feared. They were well
aware of whose distinguishing characteristics would be obliterated.
Of course, public pronouncements, particularly those of politicians,
do not signify personal commitment; and Makram's support for pan-
Arabism, especially in the latter part of the constitutional monarchy,
may have been a tactic to overcome the handicap of his Christian back- 
ll8ground. He was never an important theorist of pan-Arabism, and
his early statements on the subject have probably had too much
attention paid to them. In fact, in one place what he called unity
was really only a kind of solidarity to help fight imperialism and
develop economic resources; he did not suggest that the Arabs give
119up their separate nationalisms. His definition of unity was no
doubt deliberately fuzzy, but it seems clear that he did not want
questioned his support for the concept of unity. One of the planks in
his party’s platform called for the encouragement of pan-Arab co-
120operation as a step toward unity. His support for the pan-Arab
cause Increased as the fortunes of his party declined and as other 
parties made greater use of religious propaganda. Pan-Arabism and 
anti-British zeal were Makram’s secular replacements.
115. He said this on a visit to Syria, and he promised to use his 
influence to bring about closer ties with Egypt. Egyptian 
Gazette, 19 September 1931, PP-^, 8.
116. Makram cUbaid, "al-Misriyyun ^Arab", al-Hilal (April 1939), p.33.
117. Sayigh, al-Fikra al-^Arabiyya, p.173.
118 . He may even have opposed Arabism at one point. ^'Azzam suggests that 
it was Makram's enthusiastic reception in Syria in 1931 that made him 
into a friend if not an actual partisan of Arab unity. FQ.1U1/7HU 83^/1/33
119. c Ubaid, "al-Misriyyun 11 Arab", pp.32-3.
120. Bahr, al-'Aqbat, p.7^5- In October 19^, Makram claimed that all true 
Egyptians, Muslim and Copt, believed in the pan-Arab plan, and he 
condemned al-Nahhas for his past opposition to unity. Egyptian 
Gazette, 11 October 19^, p.3.
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Those organizations which did the most to promote the Palestinian
cause, until the late 19^0s, like the Muslim Brethren, Misr al-Fatal,
Shabab Muhammad and the Young Men’s Muslim Association, were moved more
121
by religious than pan-Arab sentiment. At a Brethren meeting in
1936, the Supreme Guide invited both Copts and Muslims to defend 
Palestine. When the audience voiced its objections to Coptic 
participation, he pointed out that fairness demanded this since Muslims 
had helped defend Abyssinia against the Italians: "If the Copts
respond to the call, good; if they do not, we will see that they 
suffer for it".
123ho doubt many Copts hoped to avoid a Palestinian entanglement. 
Events in Palestine had so aggravated Egyptian Muslim sentiment that 
attacks on Egyptian Jews and foreign Christians were becoming common, 
and these did not inspire confidence. The Copts feared, with some 
cause, that Muslims would suspect them of having more in common with 
Palestinian Jews than Muslim compatriots. For example, the 1938 
election campaign saw a group of ’Azharl demonstrators rather wildly
12Udemand that the Copts be expelled and sent to Palestine. As a
conservative Christian community, the Copts had little sympathy for 
the Jews in any case.
121. J.W.D. Gray, "Arab Nationalism: ^ Abdin against the Wafd", The 
Middle East Forum 38 (1962), p.l8. Sayigh concedes that there is 
some truth in this in al-Fikra al-cArabiyya, pp.2U0-l. As Misr 
noted, all Brethren and Shabab propaganda on Palestine had a 
religious colour. It charged that they had made religion into a 
"call to blood, killing, hostility and hatred". Misr, 17 May 19^7, 
p.l. See also Misr, 6 September 1951, p.2j for a similar complaint 
about Misr al-Fata&, Kedourie believes that it was the Brethren's 
championship that alerted the Egyptian masses to the problem, and this 
no doubt helps explain Coptic wariness. Elie Kedourie, "Religion 
and secular nationalism in the Arab world", in The Middle East:
Oil, Conflict and Hope, ed. A.L. Udovitch (Lexington 1976), p.l85-
122. FO.lUl/536, U03/12/36.
123. Al-Manara al-Misriyya, 2 April 1951, quoted in The Cry of Egypt’s 
Copts, pp.18-19*
12*1. Kedourie, The Chatham House Version, p.200.
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When Murqus Sergius, then the Patriarch's Deputy, was invited to
a major anti-partition rally in 19^7» he declined to attend. He told
a visiting delegation that he would not take a hand in fighting the
Jews, a fellow minority, at a time when the Copts were facing increasing
discrimination at home. He added that those Copts who had supported
125his appearances at al-'Azhar in 1919 would not countenance them now.
Cooler or more cowardly heads prevailed because the Patriarch attended
the meeting in Sergius' p l a c e . C o p t i c  religious dignitaries appear
127to have attended other partition ralles as well.
Few Copts in 19^7 were as vocal as Sergius, and only a fool would
have opposed Egyptian policy once the war began. The church, of
course, never differed publicly with the government in foreign policy
matters; and it had, in any case, a real concern about the fate of its
wealthy Jerusalem endowments. The church preferred that the endowments
128not be under the jurisdiction of a country with whom Egypt was at war.
It is not altogether surprising that the war sparked some 
enthusiasm among Copts. Christian Palestinians were, after all, 
fighting alongside Muslim Palestinians. Misr praised the Egyptian 
war effort and condemned Zionist plans. Article after article hammered
away at the need for Copt-Muslim unity and reminded readers that,
- - 129although al-Banna' called the war a "jihad", Copts too were fighting.
Even Salama Musa, in a burst of patriotic fervour, called on all
125- French Embassy Archives, Box lUU, File 31/2. Revue des Periodiques 
Arabes, 31 December 19^7* This is from al-Manara al-Misriyya,
13 December 19^7*
126. Ibid., Situation de la Communaute Copte en Egypte, 2k January 19^8.
127. FO.371/62993, J6319/13/16.
128. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch declared that, in the absence of an 
international mandatory or Arab state as guardian of the Holy Places, 
he preferred that custody remain in Muslim hands. FO.371/63021, 
J5123/79/16.
129- Misr, 21 May 19^8, p.l.
130Egyptians to do their duty. Despite these efforts, the Copts
remained suspect and by 1951 were being insultingly compared to the
Jews. Some Copts wondered whether Israel would welcome them if they
were banished from Egypt, and Sergius glumly remarked that they might
131eventually be forced to seek such a refuge. He complained that
the Copts had become foreigners in their own country at a time when
132every foreign Muslim was considered a citizen. This, to the Copts,
was the manifest danger of Arabism.
U. Marxi sm
The Marxist movement in Egypt, formed by several disparate and
schismatic groups rather than one disciplined party with strong
Comintern links, provided an alternate focus of loyalty and placed the
political community in an international context. It was a context
which dissolved religious, ethnic and national distinctions
Until the Second World War, the communist movement in Egypt was
small, uninfluential and dominated, perhaps even monopolized, by
foreigners. Jews, Armenians, Syrians, Lebanese, Russians and other
133Europeans were involved, but few Egyptian Muslims and Copts. The
various nationalities tended to stick together and their audience was
13Uvery limited, given the miniscule size of the proletariat. In
1925, the Residency noted that there were two main Marxist groups:
one run by a Syrian with members from several ethnic and national groups
135amd a second composed of Russians and Europeans. These men were
130. Misr, 27 May 19^8, p.l.
131. AllManara al-Misriyya, 19 February 1951s reprinted in The Gry of 
Egypt's Copts, pp.20-1.
132. Al-Manara al-Misriyya, 5 March 1951, p.l.
133. In those days it was much safer to be a communist if you held a 
foreign passport. Mohammed Heikal, Sphinx and Commissar: The
Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World (London 1978)* P«39- 
13b. Ibid., p.39-
135. FO.371/10909, J1932/1153/16/
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outsiders. If they were not themselves European, they were European 
educated and influenced. They had few ties to Egypt and no roots in 
the country. They could not and generally did not wish to be Egyptian. 
Accordingly, a movement which held out the promise of membership in a 
larger society was bound to have a certain attraction for them.
One Copt who did show an early interest in socialism as Salama
Musa, but he usually was considerably in advance of even the
intellectual vanguard of his own community. In 1920, in the wake of
the Russian revolution, he was associated in the founding of an
Egyptian socialist party, the first organization of its kind in the 
136country. Musa, however, was much taken up with Fabian ideas;
Marxist-Leninist doctrine seems not to have appealed to him. The 
party soon collapsed, and while Musa continued to promote theories of 
economic and social reform, evolution (a subject which he regarded 
with almost religious fervour) and progress, he remained apart from 
later and more orthodox manifestations of Marxism in Egypt. He was 
perhaps too much of an Egyptian nationalist to be attracted by an 
international perspective.
Other than Musa, the Copts were not greatly interested in the 
early movement but were content to explore their community's destiny 
within the framework of the political order they had helped to 
establish. This behaviour, perhaps atypical of a minority, shows 
the extent to which they felt themselves to be citizens of Egypt.
As an indigenous minority, they did not have to look beyond the 
borders of their own country. Religious ties were strong, and many
136. Salama Musa, The Education of Salama Musa, p.137*
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Copts were reluctant to involve themselves in a movement known to he
godless. There was little incentive, at this time at any rate, for
them to work for the overthrow of the new and largely untried political
system; a system which not only promised equality but gave them an
opportunity to wield such power as their talents fitted them to
exercise. The chief political desideratum of Copts and Muslims in
that period was the acquisition of genuine independence. While Salama
Musa's Socialist Party had shared this desire, its successors were
137preoccupied primarily with class conflict. This was not a concern
of many Egyptians at that time, and it can only be counted as a 
tactical error if the Marxists were interested in increasing their 
support among the Egyptian population. Some of them may not have been 
very interested in this; even as late as the early 19^-Os, the 
organization Iskra resisted suggestions that it Egyptianize its 
membership from a fear that this would erode its political 
sophistication.
From the Second World War, there was a marked increase in 
139Marxist activity. Study circles developed into more formal groups,
which split and formed themselves into new groups; journals were 
published, many of them short-lived; and the movement began to grow 
in influence. It began to acquire support among Egyptians, Muslims 
and Copts, and was particularly influential among students, labour and 
the left wing of the Wafd. In the early 19^0s, membership still was 
dominated by foreigners and Jews. Even as late as 19^8, the British
137- Walter Laqueur,Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New
York 1956), p.37. See also M.S. Agwami, Communism in the Arab
East (London 19&9), p •5•
138. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism. . . , p . k-2.
139* Russia's entry into the war meant that British vigilance against
the communists relaxed. Heikal, Sphinx..., p.^7-
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Embassy noted that Jews were still among the leading communists in
1U0Egypt. Ibrahim Ibrahim has suggested that Coptic support for
lUlthe movement also was strong, but this is difficult to substantiate. 
There does not seem to have been a disproportionate degree of Coptic 
participation in the Marxist movement at any time, not even when the 
movement was stronger and had, to an extent, Egyptianized. By 1952 
Walter Laqueur noted that the leadership of the communist movement was
lU2almost entirely Muslim.
Still, there were Copts connected with various Marxist groups, and
some occupied positions of importance in them. Perhaps Coptic
participation can be linked with the increasing hostility shown to the
Copts by the Muslim population of this period. These groups, no doubt,
showed a firmer commitment to secularism than did the legitimate
political parties. They were uninterested in religious affiliation.
Of course, many politicians claimed a similar lack of interest, but
few showed it. The Marxist periodical al-Tatawwur, begun In 19^0,
published a number of articles in its short life insisting on a
lU3separation between religion and state. It promoted secularism,
defended freedom of religion and criticized those who confused
Ibb
politics with religion. These are not positions from which many
in the Coptic community would have dissented. Still, it may be more 
fruitful to explore general reasons for Muslim and Copt participation 
In the movement. The legitimate political system had bankrupted 
itself; parties were Interested only in power and not in the welfare 
of the Egyptian people. They had neither succeeded in getting rid of
lhO. FO.371/69259, J3911+/2Ll0/l6.
lUl. Ibrahim, Egyptian Intellectuals, p.285.
lk2. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism..., p.51.
1U3. Rifcat al-Sa^xd, al-gihafa al-Yasariyya fi Misr, 1925-19^+8 
(Cairo 1977), p.106. *
lUU. Ibid., pp.105, 107-
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the British nor in creating an honest and just government. The 
standard of living of ordinary Egyptians had declined, and many who 
joined the Marxist movement had a fierce concern for economic justice 
and equality. It should he said that these groups were not concerned 
only with class struggle, but that they also seemed to draw individuals 
possessing a variety of advanced or radical views; for example, some 
were very concerned with the liberation of women.
George Hinain, son of the early Wafdist Sadiq Hinain, may have
1U5
been the most important Marxist Copt in this later period. He
came from a wealthier background than most Egyptian Marxists and, 
after flirting with several groups, seems to have ended up a Trotskyite. 
The orthodoxy of his attachment to this Marxist heresy is not known.
In 1939 he belonged to the Society for Art and Freedom (Jamacat al-Fann 
wa al-Hurriyya) which had, as its name suggests, primarily literary and 
artistic interests. The group started a magazine, the first three 
issues of which Hinain financed. He withdrew his support when his 
friend ’Anwar Kamil, broke away to form Bread and Freedom (al-Kbubz wa 
al-Hurriyya). Hinain became responsible for the financial side of 
Kamil’s periodical Development (al-Tatawwur), and he later was 
connected with the founding of the journal The New Dawn (al-Fajr al~
Jadid). He wrote occasional articles for these journals and, of course,
1L7provided money and financial advice.
Two other Copts connected with al-Tatawwur were Tawfiq Hanna
lA8'Allah and Ramses Yunan. Yunan, an artist, seems to have been
175. ’Ahmad Sadiq Sacd, Safahat min al-Yasar al-Mlsri 19^5-6 
(Cairo i976), pp.39-^5•’ 1
176. Sa^Id, al-Sihafa, p.83.
1^7- Hinain was a Francophile. He wrote in French by preference and had a 
keen interest in Impressionism. He was eventually ejected from the 
movement, perhaps for bourgeois tastes, and retired to Paris. 
Interview, 'Ibrahim 'Amin Ghali, 19 March 1979 
lU8. Sa^d, al-Sihafa, pp.96, 102.
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one of the more radical members of al-Khubz. He was, at any rate, an
1U9 _ cardent feminist. ’Anwar Abd al-Malik, the well-known critic and
h i s t o r i a n L u t f l  'Allah Suliman; and ^Assad Halim, a Coptic
152convert to Islam, also had connections with the Marxist movement.
None of these groups was interested in Egypt's sectarian problems.
Their myopia was perhaps engendered by the class model they used to
examine society. Al-Tatawwur did, however, show some concern with
religious fanaticism-, and it criticized those political parties which
153resorted to religious tactics.
The Marxist movement's vision of a secular and just society had much 
to recommend it. One factor which may have militated against Coptic
15Usupport was that some groups, like the New Dawn, supported Arab unity.
In addition, the composition of the movement encouraged the public,
egged on at times by the government, to make a connection between
minorities and communism. Sidql in 19^6 claimed that the communists
were in collusion with the Zionists, and in 19^8 Parliament voted to
declare war against Israel "in defence of Arab rights and against
155communist atheism". The Copts were already being likened to the
Jews; to court Marxism must have been seen by those in the community 
as courting disaster. A further consideration was that some Marxist 
groups were collaborating with and had even won some members from the 
Muslim Brethren and 'Ahmad Husain's Socialist Party. These new Marxists 
were likely to have retained their old attitude toward the Copts.
IU9. Ibid., p.85.
150. FO.lUl/1158, 66/109A7.
151. Suliman presented himself as a Copt but may have been of Syrian 
extraction. His masquerade may have been the result of attempts to 
Egyptianize the movement. Interview, ’Ibrahim 'Amin Ghali, 19 March 1979-
152. From the early 19^0s, he was connected with various Marxist groups and 
in 1950 was a member of the Central Committee of the Egyptian 
Communist Party. FO.371/803A 5 E101l/6/l6.
153. Sacid, al-Sihafa, p.107*
15^. Ibid., pp.136-7*
155* Heikal, Sphinx, p.52.
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C. An Historiography of Copt-Muslim Relations
Many Egyptian writers, summing up the long centuries of Copt-
Muslim co-habitation, interpreted history in the light of their
reaction to communal relations in their own time and their goals for
the future. Muslims naturally stressed Muslim tolerance; many
nationalists, eager to establish an independent and democratic state,
suggested an historical background of communal solidarity and brotherhood.
For example, Mustafa Kamil declared in an 1895 speech that Copts and
Muslims had co-existed peacefully for 13 centuries, and that their
religious differences had never had any political import.1^
Despite this, Egyptian writers in the period before World War One,
when communal relations were tense, often seemed to suppress examples of
peaceful Inter-ethnic co-operation and concentrate on episodes of
conflict in Egyptian history. The Copts tended to portray the Arabs
as usurpers; in a happier period, they would praise the latter for lifting
the Byzantine yoke. Some Copts, echoing Maspero, tried to establish
a clear separation from Muslims by arguing that their descent from the
157Pharaonic Egyptians made them racially different. Much later, this
claim was repeated by Muslims who were prejudiced against the Coptic 
community. In 1937» Shaikh al-Maraghi, tc drive home his 
denunciation of Coptic influence, stated that the Copts were a racial
as well as a religious minority.
156. Saikaly; The Copts under British Rule, p.138-'
157* Some Copts before the war did countenance a common descent, but 
Muslims were not at that time interested in claiming Pharaonic 
ancestors. See the speeches of Mikha’il Fanus, 1Akhnukh Fanus and 
Murqus Hanna at Coptic Conference Held at Assiout, 6-8 March 1911, 
no place, n.d., pp.6-l8, 33-9*
158. F0.U07/221, No.27, D.V. Kelly to Mr. Eden, 2 September 1937-
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The 1919 revolution-which deserves most of the credit for
persuading Muslims to regard Copts as genuine Egyptians, gave birth
to an article of faith which was frequently repeated. According to
this conviction, Copts and Muslims have lived in harmony since the
159Arab conquest and are one and not two peoples. Once, when Copts
were accused of presenting special demands as the price of their
participation in the revolution, Misr indignantly denied the charge
and said that the Coptic experience of Muslim rule had not led the Copts
to fear that they would be excluded from a share in government A
month later, Misr wrote of the love and ties which had bound Muslims
1and Copts from the time of the Arab conquest. Peaceful co-existence
in past and present were stressed and the former was used to buttress
the latter. It became almost treasonous to suggest that there were any
disagreements between the two communities.
Some Copts, accepting that the British presence contributed to
their security, described the period immediately after the 1882
162Occupation as a golden age in Coptic history. However, even with
all the intercommunal problems in the period before the First World 
War, the Copts were willing to blame some of their problems on the 
British. The need for an outside scapegoat increased after the 1919 
revolution, although some writers preferred to pretend that no inter­
communal tensions which demanded the presence of an agent provocateur 
in fact existed. Even in the troubled 1950s, some Copts continued to 
maintain that Christians and Muslims had been equal until the time of
159* See, for example, Misr, 23 April 1919, quoted in FO.371/3717, 
78^59/2^930/16.
2.60. Misr, 25 April 1919, quoted in FO. 371/3717, 78^59/2^930/16.
161. Misr, 21 May 1919, p.l.
162. Ramzi Tadrus, the Coptic biographer, is one who did. Seikaly, 
The Copts under British Rule, p.172.
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the Occupation. The pre-Occupation Egyptian government was said
to have treated all of its subjects equally:
....the different Islamic governments which 
successively ruled over Egypt, and which you 
[the British] count as despotic and tyrannic, 
did not treat their members in such a way as you 
have treated them. History is before you and 
it tells you that when the Muslims occupied Egypt 
In the early part of the seventh century they 
contented themselves with supervising the principal 
affairs of the country and left the administration 
of all its affairs in the hands of its owners, 
the Copts, who continued to conduct all admini­
strative and financial affairs, century after 
century....It is true that the Copts were 
responsible for many events in those dark ages 
which harmed them, but it was the rabble and the 
ignorant which cause problems while the princes 
and the governors denied them....When the English 
occupied Egypt in 1882 the Copts filled all the 
principal offices in the government...,(and the 
English deprived them of them). 1-6^
As the Egyptians moved away from the revolution in time, they 
felt less compelled to see the whole past as rosy. Copt-Muslim 
relations before 1919 were portrayed accurately as black. This was 
done not in the interest of historical truth but to glorify the
*i q
revolution and Zaghlul, the man who brought Copts and Muslims together.
From the late 1930s, there is little concern with a mythology of
Copt-Muslim brotherhood, beyond some rather feeble assertions that
they were one people because ethnic problems were again on the rise.
Present disunity made past unity seem unlikely. The Copts longed for
the golden days of the revolution and were disappointed with the failure
166of the polity to live up to its theoretical underpinnings. This
163. Zaghlul Mikhatll, Farriq Tasud: al~Wafrda al-Wafraniyya wa-al-1Akhlaq
al-Qawmiyya (Cairo n.d.), p.10. One contemporary writer, Muhammad 
KailanI, suggests that problems were due partly to the British and 
partly to some misguided Copts. See his al-'Adab al-Qibt1, p.70. 
l6H . Misr, 11 November 1921, p.l.
Misr, 25 July 1931, p.l.
166. Misr, 27 and 28 August 19513 p.l.
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perhaps is mainly indicative of a human tendency to see past eras as
untroubled and placid. One Copt proposed in 1951 the formation of a
Committee of Historical Studies which could remind people of the good
16?
old days and the role the Copts had played in the national movement.
Certainly the Copts became more sceptical of any Muslim insistence
l68
on the historical tolerance of Islam in theory and practice. The
Society of the Coptic Nation helped disillusion any remaining romantics 
by exploring all eras of Coptic history, including the more sorry ones. 
Copts today describe the 1918-52 period as a golden age In communal 
relations and often react sharply to any suggestion that there were
169problems. The Nasser era is remembered at least by well-off Copts,
170most unpleasantly; these people have good reasons for preferring
the constitutional monarchy. At least until late 1979> Sadat's rule
was portrayed favourably and was described by one Copt as a silver 
171period. Since then the increase m  communal tensions has altered
Coptic perceptions, and even the Nasser era may now appear in a more 
favourable light.
167. Misr, 13 August 1951, p.l.
168. Two books on the subject of Muslim-Copt relations, Mikha'Il's 
Farriq Tasud, and Jak Tajir's al-'Aqbat w-al-Muslimun (Cairo 1951) 
were banned by the government when they were published in the early 
1950s. The government was not eager to have these relations 
scrutinized. D.W., cAbdin Palace Archives, Tawa'if Diniyya 1.
169. Interview, Kamal al-Malakh, the Coptic Assistant Chief Editor of 
al-T Ahram, 9 November 1978.
170. Nasser's pronounced pan-Arab policy led some Copts to recall 
Maspero’s 1908 lecture and to regard Egypt's Pharaonic heritage as 
once again their unique possession. See the speech by a Ministry 
of Education official, Kamil Mikha'il al-Sa^Id on 27 January 1955
at a church in Shubra, Al-'Aqbat 'Ibna1 al-Fara^ina (Cairo 1956), p. 37*
171. Interview, Kamal al-Malakh, 9 November 1978.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS
A. The Legal Framework: The Egyptian Constituion
At the 'Asyut Conference in 1911s Mikha’il Fanus voiced the 
sentiment of many Copts when he asked people to set aside the idea
1
that the Copts constituted a group apart from the rest of the nation.
The law had long recognized and even reinforced religious difference^ 
and when there was talk of drafting a constitution in 1908, at the 
height of communal hostilities, many Copts feared that a constitution 
would perpetuate their inferior status. Their concern was premature 
because a constitution was not, in fact, drawn up until 1922.
The constitution is important not only because it set the 
framework for political activity in this period, but because the debate 
surrounding It illuminates different attitudes toward minorities and 
their place in the political system. Was the constitution, once in 
effect, able to fulfil Fanus’ hope and establish the ascendancy of one 
view of minorities over all others?
1. Civil Rights
Copts had long argued that although they shouldered an equal burden 
of the responsibilities of a citizen, they did not enjoy equality in the 
exercise of rights. Their freedom of worship was circumscribed by 
various regulations and was often hampered by the illegal interference 
of Muslims with religious processions. They suffered from discrimination 
in many areas of Egyptian life and hoped to cure it with a political system 
that granted them adequate representation. They expected the constitution
1. The Coptic Congress Held at Assiout on March 6, 7 and 8, 1911: 
The Speeches {no place, n.d.), pp.6-12.
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to recognize that civil and political equality so lavishly praised
during the revolution.
The Constitutional Commission began meeting in April 1922 and was
as representative as an appointed body opposed by the Wafd then could
be. Wafdists had demanded the election of a constituent assembly
which might have brought younger men of more radical views and diverse
backgrounds into the deliberations. The Palace instead chose a small
2
commission of notables, including four Copts. The Wafd's boycott 
left both the political composition of the Commission and the 
deliberations of that body conservative. The Wafd, however, did 
interrupt its blanket opposition to the proceedings to take an 
influential stand at least on the subject of minority representation.
When Husain Rushdl, Chairman of the Commission, raised the issue 
of constitutional protection for minorities, he did so partly to banish 
the incubus of British intervention. He suggested several safeguards 
including freedom of worship and equality in political and civil rights. 
His proposal was neither irregVlar nor unexpected. The Commission had 
studied several European constitutions, most of which made provisions 
of this kind, and had chosen the Belgian constitution as a model.
Belgium had sectarian problems, and its constitution took communal fears 
and desires into account.
Rushdl told a subcommittee charged with the actual drafting that 
he wanted Egypt's minorities so well protected by the constitution that 
the British would have no grounds for maintaining the third Reserved 
Point. There was substantial agreement on both this and his suggested
2. The four Copts were Tawfiq Dus, Qalini Fahmij. 'Ilyas cAwad and 
Bishop Yu'annis.
3. Mafoaglir al-Lajna Li-Wad*" al~Mabadi' al-cAxnma, thirteenth session,
T May 1922 (Cairo 192U).
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guarantees. Three articles were drafted and the subcommittee1s report 
to the whole committee made clear that these were not a new departure 
hut a recognition of historical fact. As the report stated, the 
Egyptians had always been equal under the law.'* Despite a fair degree 
of religious tolerance, this claim was not precisely true-, it was 
simply another example of making modernity acceptable by proving its 
coincidence with tradition. The Commission, meeting in August, approved 
these three articles and they appeared in the Constitution as Articles 3, 
12 and 13. The first guarantees that the Egyptians were equal before
the law and in right and duties; no distinction was to be made on the
basis of origin, language or religion. Article 12 promised freedom 
of belief, and Article 13 freedom of worship as long as it did not 
infringe upon public order or morals.
None of these clauses officially recognized minorities; in a 
political sense, they did not exist. The principle of freedom of 
conscience could perhaps fairly be regarded as the modern equivalent 
of the old communal autonomy, although the Copts expected the new 
provision to be more far-reaching than the old. The guarantee of equal 
rights and duties was a radical departure and went well beyond what the 
old system had afforded non-Muslims. The question that occurred to 
few Copts in 1922 but to many in later years was the ability of a piece
of paper, reflecting the opinions of a portion of the elite, to change
popular attitudes. The government often found that it was unable to 
enforce those very guarantees of equality which the constitution provided.
The Commission’s anticipation of British expectations was an 
important element in the acceptance of the idea of equality. Not only
U. Madabit Lajnat al-Mabadi1 al-^Amma, thirteenth session, 7 May 1922.
5 • Taqrir al-Latjna Li~Wadg al-MabadiT al-cAmma, Appendix I , Cairo 1927.
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British hut European expectations were a concern; such protections
were an integral part of any modern, democratic constitution. These
were simply safeguards which were, in this era, considered constitutional
good form. Coptic participation in the revolution was fresh in the
public mind; such guarantees could be portrayed, and sometimes were,
as the "price" of this participation. There seems to have been no
objection to the three articles, not even by those ‘uilamaT on the
Commission. Shaikh Muhammad Shakir, former Vice-Hector of al-’Azhar
and a member of the 1913-1^ Legislative Assembly, wrote to Rushdl that
it was reasonable to guarantee every man the right to practise his
faith.^ Indeed, it was reasonable, but in the final reckoning
Articles 3, 12 and 13 were over-shadowed, and to an extent even negated,
by the provision making Islam the religion of state.
2. Catch 22: Islam, the Religion of the State
As noted, many Egyptians argued for a separation between religion
and politics. The incorporation of an article naming Islam the
religion of state made this impossible from the outset. The Commission,
without demur from its non-Muslim members and with no discussion,
7
agreed to its inclusion. This article, as Subhi points out, did not
Q
create a new situation, but rather confirmed an old one. Of course, 
a number of European constitutions named a religion of state, but 
the dynamic between religion and government in these countries was not 
what it was in the Islamic world. The Commission’s members either
6. This letter is included in Mahadir al-Lajna al-^Amma Li-Wad^ 
al-Dustur, Cairo, 1927*
7. When Shaikh Bakhit proposed naming Islam the religion of state, the 
president said that he had previously solicited opinions on this 
subject and that all members unanimously agreed on its inclusion in 
the constitution. Ibid., p.51 (seventeenth session, 19 May 1922).
8. Muhammad Khalil Subhi, Ta*rifcb al-Hayat suh-Niyabiyya fi Misr, vol. 5 
(Cairo 1939K  p. +^89.
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failed to see or ignored the contradiction inherent in the special
obligations this article imposed on the government and the promise of
9
equality to all Egyptians, regardless of their religion.
The 1911 Heliopolis Conference had insisted, despite it hilling 
as a non-sectarian meeting, that Islam must he the official religion of 
Egypt. Wot many Muslims would have dissented publicly in 1922; only 
the Wafd had the popular support to do so but it is unlikely that they 
would have been willing to run the risk. Zaghlul knew, in 192U, that 
it taxed his popularity just to keep two Copts in his Cabinet, a much 
less drastic step. Few, if any, members of the Constitutional 
Commission were radical in their political ideas. Nor did the Palace 
subscribe to the time’s most modern views, except those contributing to 
royal power; and it was conscious of its strong ties to the Islamic 
religious establishment. The ruler traditionally had a duty to protect 
and promote the worship of Islam; this became a task of the 
constitutional monarchy as well.
Curiously Copts both inside and outside the Commission do not 
seem to have objected strenuously to this clause, although some supporting suecial
minority representation hoped in doing so to balance the naming of a 
state religion. The Copts seemed to feel that the Constitution 
adequately protected their interests, and they counted on the continuance 
of Muslim good will. After all, religious qualifications were given 
no formal political significance in the constitution; that document 
might even initially have been a spur to equality and unity. Copts 
frequently expressed a desire for a separation of Islam and politics; 
this general sentiment is not, however, equivalent to a clear statement
9. Muscad Sadiq, a journalist, was only one of several Copts to note
this contradiction in later years. See Misr, 15 February 1951j p.l.
^a' '^lr~_WatapL would have preferred to omit the latter. See 2S Sentember
lq22, p.2 .
15 4
that there should be no state religion. In fact, in 1930 Salama
Musa rather curiously declared that he, as an Egyptian, was obliged
to defend Islam because it was the religion of his country. Makram
£
Ubaid, in a similar but typically more glib statement, announced on 
several occasions that he was "a Muslim in country and a Christian in 
religion".
Copts only clearly began to voice their concern about being "Muslim
in country" in later years when the protections and promised equality
of the constitution were demonstrably inadequate. As Misr observed in
1951s the article naming a state religion had turned out to be the most 
11Important one. By then it was less likely than ever that a formal
separation between Islam and politics could be made. From the mid- 
19^0s, Salama Musa and others writing in the pages of Misr called for
12a constitutional amendment disestablishing Islam as the state religion.
In 19^ +8 Murqus Sergius circulated a petition for signature among Copts
calling for the separation of religion and state and for complete 
13equality. Misr criticized those Egyptians who called Israel a
lUreligious state when their own country was not exempt from the charge,
and Salama Musa commented that religion ought not to be used to serve
15the interests of the state.
10. Colombe, who quotes this, does not mention the context. There is 
nothing similar to be found in Musa’s Tarbiyyat Salama Musa. Marcel 
Colombe, "L'Islam dans la vie sociale et politiuque de l1Egypte 
Contemporaine", Cahiers de I1Orient Contemporain XXI (1950), 19*
11. Mi gr, 15 February 1951 s p.l.
12. F0.371/53297, J2253/39/16; F0.371/3331, J2268/57/16; FO.371/53300,
J2253/39/16; Migr, U April 19^7» P-l; Migr, 18 January 1952, p.l.
13. He apparently drew up a petition, addressed to the Egyptian government, 
after receiving a number of petitions from individual Copts. His 
petition defended its demands by claiming that the Copts represented 
one-seventh (lU.3 per cent) of the population and two-fifths of the 
tax payers. F0.lHl/1296, 506/3 A8.
A .  Migr, 5 October 1950, p.l.
15. In Misr, June 19^ +8, quoted in Zaghlb Mikha’ II, Farriq TasudI
Al-Wahda al-Wataniyya w-al-'Akhlaq al-Qawmiyya (no place, n.d.), p.311.
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By this time, the Copts had lived for several years with
Article ll+9* It did not make Egypt a theocracy but it did oblige
the government to build mosques, teach religion, train Imams, celebrate
Muslim holidays and adhere, at least in part, to religious law. In
addition, the king was charged in the constitution with various religious
responsibilities; he was, for example, the head of religious institutions.
Public funds collected from Muslims and Copts, were distributed
inequitably, and certain benefits accrued to one sector of the population 
l6alone. Walter Smart, the Oriental Secretary, noted that enormous
sums were spent on Islamic institutions while no similar or even
17
proportional sum was allocated for Coptic institutions. The Income
from Muslim endowments grew increasingly inadequate for funding Muslim
institutions, and the government was obliged to fill the gap out of
tax revenues. By 19^ -6, almost 90 per cent of al-'Azhar's budget
lQ
came directly from the government. When that institution's budget
was discussed In the Senate in 1939 s 11brahim Bayumi Madkur pleaded
with his colleagues not to argue to over sums: Islam was the religion
of state; it must be protected and religious education provided to
19coming generations. Generally, neither the Senate nor the Chamber
quibbledover al-’Azhar’s budget, which between 1923 and 1937, increased
20by more than six times. The government spent more per student on
21
Islamic theological training than It did on secular education.
16. The Copts were not slow to note this, particularly since they felt
they paid a disproportionate share of the taxes. See Murqus
Fahml's speech at the ’Asyut Conference in 1911. The Coptic 
Congress Held at Assiout, pp.UU-U9; F0.lUl/1296, 506/3A8; Misr,
5 December 19H6, p.l.
17. FO.1U1/7U9, 20/26/33; Misr, 5 December 19U6 , p.l.
18. Chamber Debates, second session, 23 July 19^6.
19. Senate Debates, fourteenth session, 13 June 1939-
20. Budget of the Egyptian State, Cairo, 1923-27.
21. Russell Galt, The Effects of Centralization on Education in Modern 
Egypt (Cairo 1936), p.19*
* PT. Tessler, "The identity of religiotts minorities In non-secular
states - Jews in Tunisia and Morocco and Arabs in Israel”, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 20 (1978), p.36o.
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Copts seem never to have asked for an end to all religious
allocations; they simply desired that the principle of equality or
22proportionality he recognized. For example, it turned out to he
impossible, despite Coptic importuning, for the Egyptian government to
fund a proportional amount of Christian education for its Christian
students. The government could not participate in training teachers
of Christianity; nor could it pay their salaries and allocate hoth
time and space in a public institution. In a general sense, then.
Article 1^9 meant that some of the state’s goals, when not harmful to 
23Coptic interests, were at least irrelevant to them.
The more serious problem was not the naming of a religion of 
state, but the fact that the much vaunted guarantees of freedom of worship 
and equality were not inviolable and were not really taken seriously.
When a Coptic convert to Islam wished to return to Christianity, the 
court denied him permission on the grounds that the state’s religion 
did not recognize the right of apostacy. Ramsis Jabrawi very properly 
noted that this contradicted the constitution's promise of freedom of
2Ubelief.
Ultimately, Article 1^9's reinforcement of the traditional 
relationship between Islam and government prevented the full political 
integration of the Copts and made a secular polity legally impossible.
How could the Copts be part of a national community which undertook as 
one of its tenets the necessity of defending and promoting Islam?
22. See Murqus Fahmi's speech, The Coptic Congress Held at Assiout, 
pp.HH-H9.
23. Included In this would be, for example, support for Muslim 
missionary enterprises.
2U. Al-Manara al-Misgriyya, 5 March 1951, quoted in The Cry of Egypt’s 
Copts (New York 1951), pp.12-13.
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3. The Representation of Minorities in Parliament
Even before the Constitutional Commission met, the question of
granting minorities proportional representation in parliament was
25raised and a heated public discussion ensued. The idea was not
unprecedented. 1Akhnukh Fanus’ short-lived political party had
hinted at the desirability of guaranteed representation in its 1908
platform. At the 1911 ’Asyut conference, Murqus Hanna pointed to the
Belgian system of proportional representation and implied that Egypt
would do well to emulate this arrangement.^^ When no Copts were
elected to the 1913-1^ Legislative Assembly, four were appointed,
recognizing at least informally the need to make some arrangement for 
27a minority voice.
When the subject came up in 1922, it divided partly along Wafd - 
28non~Wafd lines. Those Muslims supporting minority representation
tended to be hostile to the Wafd and included the followers of ^Adli 
and Tharwat. The same generalization cannot comfortably be made 
about the Copts. Some who advocated proportional representation were 
bound by the horizon of the community. The Wafd and the National 
Party opposed minority representation; they kept the debate on this
25. The Residency noted that in May minority representation was the 
burning issue. However, this issue in general did not have
the emotional impact of the Sudan question. FO ..371/77^2, E555^/6l/6/
26. Hanna first says that he objects to the idea of allowing the Copts 
a certain number of seats in elected bodies but later he proposed 
a scheme which would, in operation, be the equivalent of this.
The Coptic Conference Held at Assiout, pp.36-8.
27. The four were Q alinl Fahmi Pasha, Murqus Simaika Bek, Sinut Hanna 
Bek, Kamil Sidql Bek. That no objections were voiced to these 
appointments may be an indication of the extent to which Kitchener 
was able to calm troubled communal waters. Severianus, ”Les 
Coptes de l'Egypte Musulmane”, Etudes Mediterraneennes 6 (1959)a p.80.
28. Tariq al-Bishri, al-Katib 119 (l97l)i p.126.
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subject within the framework of the nationalist struggle against the 
29Occupation.
There were two main arguments. The first was one of necessity.
As Tawfxq Dus pointed out, few Copts had won seats on Egypt's 
representative bodies; what guarantee had they that now they would be 
elected? Their guarantee, answered his opponents, was to be found in 
the events of the revolution and its aftermath. A new pattern had 
been set: Copts would be elected because of the interests they
represented and the skills they possessed or defeated because of the 
lack therefore, and not because they were Copts.
The second point of discussion was whether minority representation 
would encourage or discourage British intervention to protect minorities. 
Those who took the latter view predicted that, because there would be 
no arrangement which would permit minorities to vent complaints, the 
British would be called upon to interfere on their behalf. Opponents 
claimed that guaranteed representation would encourage intervention 
because the scheme was a British plot to divide the Egyptian people; 
an unjust allegation since the British were content merely to record 
this debate.
In a subcommittee meeting in May, Tawfxq Dus recommended fixed
30minority representation. He pointed to the 19lH Legislative Assembly
and suggested that minorities must have a voice in any body deciding 
on laws which would affect them as well as Muslim Egyptians. He 
proposed the following plan: elections would be held and, if an
29. Ibid., p.127. Newspapers divided according to their political 
allegiance. Among those opposed to minority representation were 
al-'Afkar, al-'Akhbar. Wadx al-Nil, al-Liwa*, al-Basxr and Misr. 
Al-Watan, al-Istiqlal, Revue Egyptienne and La Liberte supported it, 
AI-Muqaftam and al-!Ahram, after publicizing both sides, remained 
non-committal.
30. Mahadir al-Lajna Li-Wad^ al-Mabadi* al- cAmma, thirteenth session,
7 May 1922, Cairo 192U.
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inadequate number of minorities were elected, either a second general 
election, with Muslims and Copts voting, could be held to make up the 
Coptic quota or the Chamber could elect the number needed from among 
those minority candidates who had lost.
C- ^Abd al-Hamid Badawi, chief legal adviser to the subcommittee, 
objected and pointed out that the British were not insisting on special 
representation for minorities. He presented as evidence those post- 
World War I treaties which only promised Eastern European minorities 
the protection of their civil rights. Dus, like earlier Copts, had 
quoted from the Belgian constitution, but Badawi insisted that the 
Flemish and Walloon communities were political and not religious groups.
He added that the Egyptian Chamber was designed as a political body 
with deputies representing the whole country, and not merely a 
religious sect. Badawi believed that minority representation would 
fix the importance of a religious division which otherwise would diminish.
In a later meeting, Badawi suggested that it was political heresy
(bid^a) to incorporate religious or racial minorities in Western
representative institutions. He added that if the Copts were granted
a fixed number of seats, It would be difficult to deny seats to the
other minorities, including foreign ones, in Egypt. Cromer's plan
would then be realized and Egypt would be a "stage for religious
31and racial discord". Badawi insisted that they did not have the
competence to draw up this kind of a constitution.
Dus commented that however equal all Egyptians were made in the 
constitution, differences would continue to exist; the monarch, for
31. Subcommittee Minutes, 11 May 1922.
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example, would always lie a Muslim. The subcommittee's discussion
made no progress and, after rejecting a suggestion that Coptic 
notables be invited to express their views, members decided to hold 
the matter for the full committee.
It is interesting to speculate on Dus' motives. He was not
known for his interest in the welfare of his community, but it is
possible that he thought that minority representation would fix his
own star in the political firmament. He was reasonably close to the
Patriarch and may have been acting at his behest. Dus spent part of
33May on a propaganda tour of 'Asyut and, ignoring a subcommittee ban,
3I4.
published his views in al-'Ahram. He felt compelled to disagree
publicly with the many newspapers calling minority representation a
British plot to divide Egypt; he insisted he was concerned not with
the welfare of the Copts but with the danger Egypt faced without
minority representation. Dus was criticized by the press and was
accused of representing himself and not the Copts; otherwise, wrote
one paper, he would not have joined the cAdli Government when all his
35 -co-religionists were opposing it. Salama Mikha'il wrote in the
pages of al-1Akhbar:
Let Tawflq Dus know that the Copts prefer to 
sustain all the sufferings he fears to come 
from their compatriots rather than record in 
the constitution..,.that which makes them 
look like foreigners.... and impute to their 
compatriots the charge of fanaticism and 
ungratefulness. It is far better for them
32. The Constitution did not specify that the King had to be a Muslim.
Article 30, however, stipulated that only a member of the family
of Muhammad ^Ali could sit on the throne.
33. Al-Watan, 19 May 1922, PPF.
3U. Al-'Ahram, 15 May 1922, p.l. See also 26 May 1922, PPF.
35* Al-'Afkar, 15 May 1922, PPF. Wadi al-Nil made a similar comment,
suggesting that his position became clear when it was realized 
that he was an ^Adlist and a friend of the English. Wadi al-Nil, 
1? May 1922, PPF.
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to lose everything than to see the 
constitution.... contain a clause on which 
the foreigner can rely in accusing the 
Egyptians of backwardness and mistrust of 
each other and of still clinging to old 
religious differences....thereby finding a 
way of intervention in the.... internal 
affairs of their country.36
Perhaps the most sophisticated debate to appear in the press was
07
the one which occurred between Mahmud '“Azmi and cAzIz Mlrhum. The
first was a Muslim and the second a Copt, and both were committed 
secularists and charter members of the short-lived Democratic Party. 
Mlrhum opposed minority representation while cAzmi supported it.
The latter, chief editor of al-lstiqlal, published a series of articles
which one Egyptian scholar claims were inspired by the British in an
38attempt to divide Muslims and Copts. cAzmi, claiming that national
solidarity demanded minority representation, backed Dus’ proposal
without reserve. The Egyptians, he wrote, were still motivated by
religion and, it was only fair, when a state religion had been fixed,
to regard religious groups as political groups and to have those groups
39represented in Parliament. His paper claimed that most Copts were
afraid to express their approval of fixed representation, and therefore 
was pleased when 'Ilyas cAwad announced that the Patriarch supported 
the idea 3^
Very early in the debate Mlrhum warned of the danger of dividing 
the country into a majority and minorities. He said that if the 
Christian members of the Commission presented themselves as
36. Al-fAkhbar. 18 May 1922, p.3.
37. Al-Bishri, al-Katib 119 (1971), p.117.
38. Muhammad Sayyid Kailani, al-TAdab al-Qibti Qadiman-wa-gadithan 
(Cairo 1962), p.l68. Here he is merely echoing what many Wafdists 
believed. The belief seems an illogical one unless Wafdists 
assumed that Egyptian minorities were inherently less loyal to Egypt.
39* Al-BishrT, al-Katib 119 (1971), pp.117-8.
^0. Al-1Istiqlal, 22 June 1922, p.l.
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representative of Coptic opinion, they lied. Mlrhum insisted that
such divisions were anachronisms; political and economic groups would
grow out of them, and the constitution should aid this process and not
1+2 r hinder it. In his eyes, uVzmi was denying those secular and
democratic ideas in which he claimed to believe, and he attacked cAzmi
for mingling religious, social and political questions. He believed
that granting the minorities special seats meant that they would never
be absorbed into the body politic; religion would always be tied to
government. ^
cAzmI also wished to eliminate the importance religious expressions
had in social and political life. Until this could be done across the
board, there would still be a majority and a minority; nationalism was
not enough to unite the two as long as family, education, the court
system and other factors prevented a full blending of the different
ethnic groups. He insisted that as long as the constitution did not
abolish outmoded special principles and institutions, the minorities
1+3needed special representation.
Salama Musa felt that minority representation was pointless since
the Muslim majority would have enough votes to pass any law it wanted
1+ 1+and could also defeat any minority bill it opposed. If, he wrote,
communal representatives were able to reach their goals through alliances 
and agreements with other parties, then they would have exceeded their 
specific minority role.
1+1. Al-1Ahram, 11 May 1922, p.l.
U2. Al-Bishrl, al-Katib 119 (1971), p.ll8.
1+3. Ibid. , pp.119-20. Both these men were active in lecturing and 
organizing support for their views.
1+1+. Kailani, al-1Adab al-Qibti, p.l68.
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In May Taha Husain was moved to pick up his pen. He too blamed 
the British for this disagreement; once again, they were trying to 
foment discord between moderates and extremists and between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. He wrote that Egypt had begun to follow European ways 
and accordingly the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims were 
disappearing little by little:
Our new government, he continued inaptly, would have no tie to religion.
The king would receive his power, through the constitution, from all the
Egyptian people and not from Islam.
The Coptic community had mixed reactions to proportional
representation. The Orthodox were split, whereas the Council of the
1+6Evangelical Church supported it. Monseigneur Sidfawi, Head of the 
Coptic Catholic community, commented in an interview that those Coptic 
Catholics to whom he had talked feared that minority representation 
would harm national unity; the Monseigneur cautiously refrained from 
offering his own opinion.
The Orthodox Majlis Mill! sent a message supporting minority
1+7representation to the Constitutional Commission. Misr invited
the Lay Council to a meeting in an attempt to persuade them to reverse
1+5* Al-'Ahram, 23 May 1922, p.l. Doris Behrens Abu Saif suggests that 
Taha Husain believed that proportional representation would give 
the Copts the means to create a state within a state. Die Kopten i; 
der Agyptischen Gesellschaft von der Mitte 19 Jahrhundert bis 1923,
(Freiburg 1972), p.9^. •
^6. Al-Istiqlal, 17 June 1922, p.l.
1+7. The Vice-Presidents of the Copt Councils in Tanta, Banha and other 
towns also supported minority representation.
Every equality exists between Muslims and 
non-Muslims, but some want to keep the 
minority separate and give it a special 
existence it has not got now. They want 
Christians equal before the law but 
separate from Muslims with special 
representation. They w r o b o t h  the 
majority and the minority.
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their decision hut failed. The Orthodox Bishops of 'Isna, Bair al-
Muharraq, al-Minya and Sanbu also made known their support. The
Patriarch initially kept a low profile; this equivocation, which al-
1+8Bishn suggests was intentional, led each side to claim his support.
Al-'Anba Yu'annis, as his representative on the Constitutional Commission,
took no stand on this issue in the Subcommittee discussion. However,
it appears that the Patriarch supported minority representation; the
church, as the most well-organized and articulate of the community's
institutions, could only gain by it. The church had no serious communal
rival at that time, and it could easily have influenced or dominated
the communal members of parliament. Finally, in June, the Patriarch
came out in an interview in favour of the idea. Wafdist Copts formed
a deputation to plead their case before the Patriarch but he refused
to see them. Curiously, he gave two interviews after this and
i+9
managed in both to obscure his position.
The conservative Coptic newspaper, al-Watan, may have been the
first to advocate proportional representation. In an article
published in March, the paper, after going to lyrical lengths to
demonstrate Coptic loyalty to Egypt, reminded its audience that the
Copts were still a minority. They wanted to serve their country and
share in the work of the legislature, yet they feared that they might
50not be represented in that body. The following day, al-Watan
suggested that it was in Egypt's interest to protect her minorities in
51order to deprive Britain of the right to meddle. The denial of
U8. Al-Bishri, al-Katib 119 (1971), p.123.
U9* FO.i+07/19^, Enclosure in No.12. Situation Report, 20-30 June 1922.
50. Al-Watan, 8 March 1922, p.l.
51. Al-Watan, 9 March 1922, p.2.
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parliamentary representation -would lead the minorities to complain, and
52their complaints ‘would result in foreign intervention. Al-Watan
claimed that, except for Badawi, the only ones opposed to communal
representation were Wafdists; even the Beduin wanted special rights
53
written into the constitution.
5UThere were many Coptic critics of proportional representation,
but the most vehement ones were Wafdists, many of whom resisted the
55
idea on the grounds of nationalism or secularism. Zaghlul was an
old opponent, believing that Parliament should divide on issue or party
lines and not ethnic ones.^ Characteristically, both the Wafd and Misr
denied that there were minorities in Egypt; all Egyptians were of one
race and no Egyptian Copt had an identity separate from his Muslim 
57brother. Misr was very concerned that minority representation would
5 Gconstitute a legal separation between Muslims and non-Muslims. The
paper argued that, although Egypt was still officially a religious state,
religion would not be relied upon for political ideology. Misr
published letters and telegrams from many Copts who were opposed to
guaranteed representation*
On 12 May the Wafd announced its official belief that minority
representation would be a prop for the British; division had been the
policy of Milner, Curzon and all of Egypt’s enemies, and it was
59
incompatible with the welfare of the nation. Most important Coptic
52. Al-Wa^an, 17 May 1922, quoted in al-Bishrl, al-Katib 119 (1971), p.122.
53. Al-Watan, 13 May 1922, PPF.
5*1. Al-’Ahram, 27 May 1922, p.It.
55. Al-Bishri, al-Katib 119 (1971), p.126.
5 *^ Al-Nizam, 8 October 1920, p.2.
57. Migr, ‘l*+ May 1922, p. 3.
58. Misr, 17 May 1922, p.l.
59. This statement was signed by what were probably the eight most important 
Wafdists then in Egypt. Their number included four Copts: George 
Khayyat, Murqus Hanna, Wasif Ghali and Wisa Wasif. ^Abd al-Rahman 
Fahmi also thought that minority representation would be divisive and 
would buttress the British to protect minorities. DW. Mahfaza Raqm 1, 
Makhtut 19, Memoirs of ^bd al-Rahman Fahmi, 12 May 1922, p. 1953.
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Wafdists wrote in the press on this issue, including, as already noted, 
Salama Mikha'Il. Wisa Wasif published an article in La Bourse Egyptienne 
insisting that only political parties be represented in parliament;
go
Copts who won seats would be present as deputies and not Copts.
Raghib 'Iskandar warned of rebellion (fitna) if Parliament were divided 
along ethnic lines. Parliament, he added, was not meant to act as a 
religious council. To supplement this writing, Fakhri CAbd al-Nur
propaganized in Jirja, and Najib ’Iskandar at the Ramsis Club and in 
Cairo,^
Coptic Wafdists called for a community meeting to be held on
6319 May 1922 at St. Peter's Church in Cairo. Between 100 and 500
6U —
Copts turned up and they applauded Zaghlul, his exiled comrades and 
Salama Mikha’Il. Salama gave two speeches in which he attacked minority 
representation as heretical (bidca), He gave the crowd examples of the 
important role Copts played in the Wafd, and said that it would be 
unfortunate to exchange a representation based on feelings for a 
representation based on law. Wisa Wasif, ’Antun Jirjis 'Antun, Shaikh 
Mustafa al-Qayatl and others also spoke. A final report was issued 
attacking minority representation as heretical and dangerous to national
• +. 65unity.
In July al-’Azhar advertized its views. In a letter to the Head 
of the Royal Diwan, the '"ulama' complained about an article written by
60. La Bourse Egyptienne, 13 May 1922; quoted in al-Bishrl, 
al-Katib 119 (1971), pp.127-8.
61. Ibid., p.128.
62. F0.U07/193, E5709/61/16.
63. This meeting apparently was organized by Salama Mikha'Il, Jirjis 
'Antun, Najib 'Iskandar and Talcat Sacat. F0.1+07/193,
Enclosure in No.62, Situation Report, 18-2U May 19221.
6U. The Residency recorded attendance of 120 (ibid.), and al-Bishri 
the higher figure, al-Katib 119 (1971), p.129.
65. Ibid., p.129.
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Mahmud cAzmI. This article had advocated both secularism and
minority representation, and the Silema' asked for an injunction to
prevent ^Azml from publishing articles against Islam. They probably
were more upset by his advocacy of secularism than by his support for
minority representation. Their letter only pointed to the danger of
raising the latter subject when the country had achieved unity.
It does seem that the opponents of minority representation were
in the majority. The King, for once in agreement with the Wafd, does
not seem to have approved of the idea.^ This must have been clear
in the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission when they
68
took up the matter in August. Dus began by noting that the press
debate had been acrimonious, and he pointed in particular to an article 
al-1 Ahram by the Watanist, 'Ibrahim Desuql 'Abaza, who claimed that 
the Copts desired minority representation because they had no faith in 
Muslims or in the new political arrangements. The Copts, claimed Dus, 
were intimidated by the such statements and felt unable to present 
their real views. Dus, after repeating his personal opinion, stated 
that the Patriarch favoured minority representation. Presumably, he 
had some authority to make this claim.
'Ibrahim al-Hilbawi and cAbd al-^Aziz Fahmi countered Dus' views, 
and the latter suggested that Dus proposed making elections a struggle 
between religions rather than between political parties and ideas.
Dus here suggested a weighting of the electorate which would give 20 
per cent of the seats to minorities. A proportional scheme, based
66. DW ^Abdin Palace Archives, Royal Diwan, al-'Azhar Qisr 1.
67. Pierre Rondot, "L'Evolution historique des Coptes d' Egypt e11,
Cahiers de 1'Orient Contemporain 22 (1950), p.138. Unfortunately, 
Rondot does not offer any support for his claim other than that, to 
him, it is coramonsense.
68. Mahadir al-Lajna al-^Amma Li-Wadf7 al-Dustur, 27th session,
25’August 1922, Cairo 1927.
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on the 1917 census, would have given the minorities a much smaller 
number. Yusuf Qattawl, representing the Jewish community, and 
Metropolitan Yu'annis agreed with Dus' views. The Metropolitan 
claimed that minority representation would help preserve unity.
Badawi, the most articulate member of the opposition on the Commission, 
unaccountably was absent, but CA1I Mahir upheld his views. Qalinl 
Eahmi, here serving his master the King rather than the Patriarch, 
joined the opposition. A vote was taken and Dus’ proposal was 
defeated by a vote of fifteen to seven.
Tariq al-Bishrl calls the defeat of proportional representation
69
a victory for those supporting nationalism and secularism. The
victors did not wish to deprive the Copts of parliamentary seats.
They genuinely believed that the voters would not choose candidates 
according to an ethnic criterion but because they represented an 
important interest or had useful campaigning skills. They did not see 
the Copts as a minority in the Eastern European or even Belgian sense, 
and believed that Dus1 reminder of the failure of any Copts to be 
elected to the 191^ Legislative Assembly was irrelevant. Coptic 
Wafdists perhaps feared to lose their influence in party councils if 
they suddenly became the representatives of a small and insignificant 
community. If Copts were awarded seats because they were Copts, they 
could not claim to represent the nation; any political role they 
wished to play would be circumscribed by their ethnic origin.
The quarrel was not cast in ethnic or religious terms, if only 
because so many Copts vigorously opposed the idea. Muslim intimidation 
does not seem to have been a factor in this Coptic position. Since
69. Al-Bishrl, al-Katib 119 '1971), p.129*
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most people then seemed to be backing the Wafd, most people supported 
the Wafd's objection to the scheme. Although the issue perhaps would 
not have arisen in a Wafdist-dominated constituent assembly, the Wafd 
probably was less annoyed with the idea of proportional representation 
than it was with the appointment of a commission by its opponents. It 
was the latter who were developing the political framework within which 
the Wafd would have to operate. The party was then in an awkward 
position with most of its important leaders in exile or under arrest, 
and minority representation was a good issue for rallying the faithful. 
Political "moderates'' were at least willing to consider the question, 
and those on the Commission might have backed Dus had it been clear 
that this community was behind him, and also had there been less Wafd 
and Royal opposition and more British support. Even had the Commission 
agreed to guaranteed seats, the minorities would not thereby have 
acquired any substantial power.
B. Coptic Political Representation, 192^-1952
1. The Chamber of Representatives
Elections for the Lower House were held more frequently than for 
the Senate. Eligibility, with no property or status restrictions, 
was relatively open, and some members were accused of illiteracy by 
their political opponents. Due to changes in the election law, some 
elections were direct and others indirect. Election boycotts were 
not uncommon and doubtless eased the task of those who chose to compete. 
Sometimes a coalition of parties was formed and constituencies divided 
before an election. Both factors help explain the surprising number 
of candidates returned unopposed. The voters in approximately one- 
half of the constituencies which elected Copts in this period had no
17 0
choice. Occasionally, of course, a party failed to nominate a
candidate because it realized that the opposing party’s candidate
was likely to win. In addition, only the Wafd seemed to have the
support and financial ability necessary to field a candidate in almost
every constituency.
Copts were adequately represented in the Chamber. The position
of the opponents of minority representation was vindicated by the first
election in 192*+ when more Copts won seats than would have been allocated
TO
to them using the 1917 census. The percentage of seats occupied
by Copts often topped their official proportion of the population;
however, it never equalled or exceeded the more probable estimate of
10 per cent. In some Chambers, Coptic representation was surprisingly
low.
71
Year Humber of Copts Humber of Seats Percentage of Coptic Seats
192k 16 2lU 7.5
1925 13 21k 6.1
1926 16 21k 7.5
1929 20 235 8.5
1931 k 150 2,6
1936 20 232 8.8
1938 6 26U 2.3
19^2 23 2 6k 8.7
19U5 12 26k ^.5
1950 8 320 2-5
What is immediately apparent to someone familiar with this period 
is that the Copts won more seats whenever the Wafd won an election; 
that is, in 192U, 1929» 1936 and 19^2. Coptic representation was
70. This election was indirect and Jacques Berque thinks that 15 to 25
per cent of the major electors were Copts. Jacques Berque, Egypt:
Imperialism and Revolution, transl. Jean Stewart (London 1972), p.365,
71. Tariq al-Bishri has done similar computations (al-Katib 121 (1971),
p.165), but has arrived at slightly different figures for some years.
The above statistics are based on Muhammad Subhifs Tahikh al-Hayat 
al-Niyabiyya fl Misr, and were cross-checked with The Egyptian 
Directory. Professors cAbd al-Halim and Megalli, of The School
of Oriental and African Studies and the Central London Polytechnic 
respectively, helped in distinguishing indeterminate names.
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adequate in two Chambers with strong Wafdist representation: the short-
72lived 1925 Chamber which was less than half Wafdist, and the coalition
assembly of 1926. Most of the Copts who won seats in these last two
elections were Wafdists. The 1931 elections, overseen by the Sidqi
Government, were not an accurate expression of popular feeling; and
73few Copts were nominated or returned. The 1938 elections were
exceptionally corrupt and its victors made heavy use' of religious and
anti-Coptic propaganda. It is not surprising to find that the winning
parties nominated few Copts and that few of those who did run were
elected. Although the 19^5 Chamber was dominated by a non-Wafdlst
coalition, more Copts were elected to seats because of the participation of
the al-Kutla party. The latter, organized by Makram cUbaid, nominated
two-thirds of the successful Coptic candidates in this election.
Given this pattern which suggests both that the Wafd had more
Coptic support and that the Copts were more influential within this
party than within other parties, the 1950 election constitutes an
anomaly. The 1950 election was a dramatic victory for the Wafd, at
last come in from six years in the political wilderness. The party
7t
presented only seven Copts to the electorate and the Copts consequently 
won fewer seats than they had in the 1931 elections. This low figure 
indicates that Coptic support for the Wafd had declined and/or that the 
Wafd was unwilling or unable to replace those Copts who had walked out 
with Makram cUbaid in 19^2. Most of al-Kutla’s Coptic candidates
72. The pressure of the Administration was used against Wafdist 
candidates in this election. However, many Independents turned 
Wafdist when it came time to elect the Chamber’s President.
73. The Wafd and the Liberal Constitutionalists boycotted this election. 
7I+. Three Copts, one of whom was Mirrit Bey Ghali, ran as Independents,
but as Misr.noted, it was very difficult for Independents to get 
elected. Misr, 26 November 19^9, p.l. Al-Kutla nominated seven 
Copts. See al-Balagh for all nominations, 30 December, 31 December 
and U January 1950, p.6. The Wafd’s seven Coptic nominees plus 
Mirrit were the eight who won seats in the Chamber.
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were ex-Wafdists, and the party failed to secure any seats in the 1950
election. Between Copts forfeited to al-Kutla and the Grim Reaper, the
Wafd lost most of its important Coptic members, including men who had
been in the party since 1919 and had impeccable revolutionary credentials.
These were politicians who commanded considerable popular support, at
least in association with the Wafd, and it was hard for the party to
find adequate substitutes. This task was made even more difficult by
the increase in communal tensions in the late 19^-Os. At one time,
the mass of Muslim Egyptians, who were mainly Wafdist in sympathy,
probably were more willing to countenance the election of a Coptic
Wafdist than a Coptic Liberal Constitutionalist or Ittihadist. By
1950, the Muslim population may have been less willing to vote for
any Copt, whatever his party affiliation. The low number of Copts
nominated in 1950 perhaps also supports the contention that the Copts
had largely withdrawn from the political arena in response to what
they saw as their worsening position. They believed that the Wafd had
forsaken them. Misr complained that the party had seen fit to nominate 
75so few Copts; that Misr did not do so on earlier occasions indicates
that it did not have the same expectations of non-Wafdist governments.
Few Copts were elected officers of the Chamber. The Wafd
attempted to have Wisa Wasif elected one of the two Vice-Presidents
in I92U and failed. It had better luck the following two years and
in 1928 was able to secure his election to the Presidency of the
77Chamber. Wisa’s role in leading Parliament in passing a vote of
75. Migr, 7 July 1950, p.l.
76. An 'Asyuti Muslim was elected instead and the British commented that, 
while this was supposed to have been a revolt against Wafdist 
autocratic methods by Upper Egyptian deputies, Wisa’s religion was 
probably against him. F0.U07/198, No.109* Field-Marshal 
Viscount Allenby to Mr. MacDonald, 22 March 192U.
77- The 1928 election had its opponents. Both the Liberal al-Kashkul 
and the National Party’s al-*Akhbar wrote that the President of the 
Chamber should profess the religion of state. FO.U7O/206, No.73 
(Enclosure 7)> Memorandum on the Egyptian Press, 22 March-U April 1928.
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no confidence in the government which had just illegally dissolved it 
in 1928 helped ensure his re-election in the Wafd-domlnated Chamber of 
1930. In 1936 Kamil Sidqi, another Wafdist, was elected Chamber Vice- 
President .
Copts were returned from a wide range of constituencies, with
Coptic populations which varied in size. Setting aside urban
constituencies in Cairo and Alexandria, about two-thirds of the districts
which returned Copts were in Upper Egypt and one-third in the Delta.
The only delta province never to elect any Copts was al-Sharqiyya,
but one scholar has noted that generally Delta constituencies sent
*78Copts to Parliament only when the Wafd won an election. Copts were
returned from every Upper Egyptian province except from al-Faiyum and 
the predominantly Nubian ’Aswan. Both had fewer Copts than any other 
Upper Egyptian province, and one of the ’Aswan seats was usually reserved 
for a member of the Jewish community. That Copts often were elected 
from constituencies with a very small percentage of Coptic inhabitants 
indicates a certain acceptance of their political role by Muslims, 
although election often had less to do with the number of Copts in a 
district than the number of feddans owned by Copts or the party 
affiliation of the Coptic candidates. It also says something about 
the strength of the Wafd, which was, for example, the only party that 
could get a Coptic candidate elected in a Delta constituency. Copts 
were returned from several Cairene constituencies, including the 
heavily Coptic Shubra and Ezbekia and from two Alexandrian districts 
where many Copts lived, al-Labban and al-^ttarin.
No district seems to have been automatically allocated to Coptic 
candidates. Even Christian Ezbekia, which included the Patriarchate,
78. Al-Bishrl, al-Katib 121 (1971), p.165.
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was sometimes consigned to and won by a Muslim candidate. There were 
constituencies, however, in which it Is difficult to imagine a Copt 
running and, while they were theoretically open to Christian candidates, 
no Copts were nominated to stand in them. Examples of such districts 
are the exclusively Muslim Darb al-’Ahmar in Cairo and Tanta, a city 
of some religious significance in the Delta.
Wafdists occasionally ran in two constituencies in the same 
elections, although Makram ^Ubaid seems to have been the only Wafdist 
Copt to have done so. In 1926 he ran in his home constituency of 
Qina town and in Matubis, al-Gharbiyya, a district with few Copts.
He won both seats and relinquished the latter to a Muslim replacement.
In 1929 he ran again in Qina and also in alrMuski, Cairo, an almost 
exclusively Muslim constituency. Again, he won both seats. This 
perhaps was meant to prove that one of the Wafd's important Copts had 
as much Muslim support as Christian. It may also have been done to 
preserve the seat for a Wafdist or to indicate that Wafdists could be 
elected outside those constituencies where their families had land and 
influence. Unfortunately, these conclusions seem a little forced 
given that Makram was the only candidate running in Matubis and al- 
Muski in these elections. In 1938 he ran in Shubra and Qina but he, 
along with most other Wafdists, failed to win a seat.
Coptic representatives in the Chamber did not differ in background
from their Muslim colleagues. Many were wealthy landowners and others
were middle-class professionals. The latter were mainly lawyers, with
79a sprinkling of medical doctors. Coptic ecclesiastics were not
elected, although Muslim shaikhs sometimes were.
79. In the 192U Chamber, proportionately more Coptic Wafdists had 
urban occupations than, did Muslim Wafdists.
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2. The Senate
The requirements for election or appointment to the Senate were
more rigorous than those for election to the Chamber. Essentially
service was restricted to the well-to-do of at least Uo years of age.
Candidates who did not meet certain professional requirements were
80obliged to pay an annual land tax of £E150, or show proof of an
8lannual income of £E1,500.
Three-fifths of the Senate were elected in three-stage elections
and two-fifths appointed. This ratio was reversed in the Sidqi
constitution of 1930 and the total number of seats decreased.
Appointments were made by the government in power, with the consent of 
82the King. Terms were for ten years with replacement of half the
seats every five years. Replacements were selected in 1930, 19^1-2, 
19^ +6 and 1950. In addition, several governments cynically invalidated 
the appointments and elections of their predecessors and made new ones. 
The entire Senate was replaced in 1931 and 1936. Senators were also 
unseated In 19^2, 19^H and 1950; those who were dislodged in 19^2 
were restored In 19^, and the 19^2 candidates ousted.
80. As the land tax was approximately £E1 per feddan, those who met this 
prerequisite owned 150 feddans. Cromer saw 50 feddans as the 
dividing line between big and small landowners. Ra'uf cAbbas Hamid 
accepts his distinction, although somewhat reluctantly, and applies 
it in his own work on landownership. See al-Nizam al-'Ijtima^i f 1 
Migr, 1837-191U (Cairo 1973), pp.2U-6, 189.
81. cAbd al-Rahman al-RaficI, FI cAqab al-T^awra al-Misriyya, vol.l, 
(Cairo 19U7), p.HT*
82. This was always an issue when the Wafd was in power, since each 
claimed the right to appoint its own creatures; witness the 
quarrel over the appointment of Fakhrl ^Abd al-Nur, al-Nahhas1 
second choice, to the Senate in 1937- The King refused to 
countenance it, and the matter was only settled when the Ministry 
was dismissed. Al-Dustur, 8 March 1938, PPF; Muhammad Husain 
Haikal, Mudhakkirat fi al-Siyasa al-Misriyya, Vol.II, pp. 54-5.
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Copts were well represented in the Senate. Until the mid-l^Os, 
the percentage of seats they held was higher than their probable 
proportion of the population and, until 19515 was higher than their 
recorded proportion of the population. They were better represented, 
at least in numbers, in the Upper Chamber than in the Lower, as can 
be inferred from the chart below.
Year Number of Copts Number of Seats Percentage of
192*4 11 122 ?.!
1930 1£83 130 4.3
1931 15 100 15.0
1936 lU 132 10.6
1939 19 1U7 13. 0
19*42 16 IU7 10.9
19*4*4 158*1 1*17 10.2
19*46 13d 1*47 8.8
1950 1385 1U7 8.8
1952 12 17286 7.0
With two exceptions, no Coptic Senators were returned from the 
8*^
Delta. Copts were elected from heavily Coptic constituences in 
Cairo, Alexandria and Upper Egypt. More Copts were appointed to the 
Senate than elected; 57.1 per cent of the total number of Coptic 
Senators were appointed. Appointments were used to ensure that Copts 
from all three sects had a voice. The government also used its power 
to appoint Senators to balance the number of elected Coptic Senators. 
For example, when five Copts were elected to the 1931 Senate, ten 
Copts were appointed to ensure adequate representation. Even more
83. Bishop Lukas, who is counted here, died in 1930. He was appointed
in 192U, and in’1930 drew a ballot to remain in the Senate.
Curiously, he was not replaced.
8*4. This excludes Senator Zakariya Mihran who could be either Copt or Muslim.
85. Of the 30 Senators unseated by the Wafd in 1950, four were Copts.
Since four of the party’s new appointees were also Copts, the 
Coptic percentage was maintained. Al-Migri, 18 June 1950, p.l.
86. The opposition boycotted the August 1950 election designed’to fill
new Senate seats which were created to compensate for the increase
in population.
87. The two^exceptions were Minya al—Qamh in al—Sharqiyya and Tukh in 
al-Qalyubiyya. Both districts had few Coptic"""inhabitants .
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useful was the government’s ability to use its appointment power to
improve overall parliamentary representation. Opponents of minority
representation had suggested in 1922 that any weakness in Chamber
88representation could be made up through Senate appointments. When
no Jew was elected to the 192*4 Chamber, the government appointed a
representative of that community to a seat in the Senate. In 1931,
when Coptic representation in the Chamber fell to 2.6 per cent, the
Sidqi Cabinet was able to placate Coptic fears, at least to an extent,
by boosting Coptic representation in the Senate to 15 per cent. When
few Copts were elected to the 1950 Chamber and only three were later
elected to the Senate, the Wafd government increased their total number
by appointing Copts to Senate seats. However, Coptic representation
still fell to its lowest point in the life of the Senate.
The Senate, for most of its life, had a Wafdist majority.
Exceptions to this were the 1931-1935 Senate and the 19*46-50 Senate
89when non-Wafdists had a majority. Unlike the Chamber, Coptic
representation was not necessarily highest when the Wafd was in power.
Coptic representation in Wafd-dominated Chambers generally was adequate
and Senate seats were not needed to redress the balance. Coptic
representation in the Senate reached peaks in 1931 and 1939, both years
with non-Wafdist governments. After 19*46 and in accordance with
increasing communal tensions, Coptic representation declined.
Comparing the first and last parliaments in 192*4 and 1952, both houses
indicate that the Wafd grew less interested in maintaining a high level
of Coptic representation. Before the 1952 Senate election, Misr
90complained that the Wafd had only seen fit to nominate one Copt; 
subsequent to this criticism, the Wafd presented three for election.
88. See al-1Ahram, 26 May 1922, PPF.
89. In 19*46 most Copts in the Senate were non-Wafdists.
90. Misr, 23 March 1951, p.l.
i?8
Although the appointment power was used to give all native ethnic
groups and some sectional interests like the army a voice, seats were
not formally or informally allocated to one or another. When the
Syrian Senator Yusuf Saha died, a Muslim colleague suggested that his
seat he given to a member of his community, but this was defeated and
91Taha Husain was appointed to the seat. Often when a Copt died or
resigned, his seat was consigned to a Muslim. Just as often, when a
Muslim resigned his seat early, it was offered to a Copt. Coptic
senators came from the same backgrounds as their Muslim counterparts;
large landowners, including several who owned more than a thousand
feddans, were well represented, as were ex-Cabinet Ministers and high
government officials.
The 1923 constitution permitted religious dignitaries to sit in
the Senate, and consequently that body had representatives from both
the Muslim ^ ulama* and the Coptic clergy. Two Coptic ecclesiastics,
one Orthodox and the other Catholic, were appointed to the first
Senate. Then in 1931, Sidqi, to the considerable displeasure of Misr
92and the Lay Council, appointed Patriarch Yu’annis to the Senate.
Misr argued that the Patriarch’s position and religious function required
93him to remain above the political fray; but it really objected out
of a fear that his appointment would increase his power. The Patriarch,
perhaps due to this pressure, seems to have considered declining the 
9*4appointment, but ended by accepting it. Senate representation of
91. Egyptian Gazette, *4 April 192*4, p.*4.
92. EO.1*41/758, 92/15/31. There was a precedent for this. Patriarch 
Cyril had served in both the Legislative Council and the General 
Assembly in the 1890s.
93. Misr, 9 June 1931, p.5; 1*4 June 1931, p.l.
9*4. Ibid.
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Muslim culama came to a temporary end and of Coptic clergy to a final
end in 1936, when the Wafd refused to name representatives of either
to the Senate. While no Coptic complaints seem to have heen voiced
at the time, Salama Musa proposed in 1950 that a Coptic Metropolitan
he appointed to the Senate to he the official representative of the 
95Coptic Church. The Wafd, again m  power, did not heed his
suggestion. However, the election to that last Senate of al-Minyawi
Pasha, the lay Vice-President of the Majlis Milli, gave some
96satisfaction to the community.
3. Local Councils
Coptic representation in some local bodies was adequate or more than 
adequate; in others, it was weak or non-existent. This generally, 
hut not invariably, bore some relation to the number of Coptic 
inhabitants in an area. Even the predominantly Coptic population of 
Naqada, Qina did not always elect a Copt to their four-man town 
council. However, even a persistent failure to elect Copts to a 
given council probably had little effect on the community's welfare 
given the high degree of government centralization. Little power 
was delegated and most important decisions were made in Cairo.
Provincial and municipal councils had more prerogatives than town and 
village councils, as might be expected, but even the provincial councils 
had only executive powers. Town and village councils were transferred 
at one point from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Public
95- Migr, 5 January 1950, p.l.
96. Curiously, Migr objected when al-Minyawi tried to run for election 
to the Chamber in 19^9 and expressed the fear that this would give 
the Majlis Milli a political colouring. Due to communal pressure, 
al-Minyawi withdrew his candidature. He had been nominated by al- 
Kutla, as he had been in 19^6 when he failed to secure a seat in 
the Senate. In 1951 Misr was pleased with his election. See Misr, 
6 December 19^9 5 p.l. *
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Health, indicating the limited range of their interests. It is 
difficult to draw any correlation between the number of Copts elected 
to a council and the party affiliation of the government conducting the
97election. Coptic representation does not seem to have been
significantly better in Wafd-dominated councils. Often a Copt served
on a council for a number of years or kept the seat within his family.
For example, Jirjis Bey cAbd al-Shahid eventually relinquished his seat
on the Biba, Bani Suwaif town council to his son, Habib, who in turn
passed it on to his brother Munir.
Copts generally were well represented on the 'Asyut and Jirja
provincial councils; these were the only two which always included at
least one Copt. Both provinces, of course, had large Coptic populations.
'Asyut officials in 1922 even unseated one of the four Muslims elected to
98their town council in order that one Copt should be represented.
Copts won election to provincial councils in other Upper Egyptian
provinces, but with less frequency. Copts never served on the ’Aswan
provincial council and seldom did so on the Bani Suwaif and al-Faiyum
councils. More Copts managed to secure election to the Qina and al-
Minya councils. The only Lower Egyptian provincial councils to include
Copts were those of Bahaira, al-Gharblyya and al-Minufiyya in 1939 and
19^3. Their election may be the result of Wafd-conducted provincial 
99council elections. Few town and village councils in the Delta included
97- Attempts to do so are complicated by the fact that, depending 
on the law then prevailing, only one-half of the members came 
up for election at any one time. In addition, the provincial 
council law was changed frequently. Among those items altered 
were the method of election, the term of office, the qualifications 
of candidates and the powers exercised.
98. The Coptic community voiced its dismay when it learnt that it had 
failed to return a Copt. To preserve civil harmony, one of the 
victors, a Wafdist, stepped down. Tawfiq Dus raised this example 
in the Constitutional Commission to support his demand for minority 
representation. Al-Watan, 27 February 1922, p.3; F0 .lUl/U52,
1U5UU/2/22/
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Copts, but more in Upper Egypt did s o . ^  Copts often did secure 
election to municipal councils in both regions; these councils, 
however, were unique in including foreign representation as well. 
h. The Quality of Coptic Representation
Because Copts were elected to Parliament to represent not only 
their constituents, a majority of whom usually were Muslim, but, in a 
more general sense, the entire country, it is not surprising to find that 
the level of formal representation on matters of concern to the Coptic 
community was low. This was particularly true of issues which also 
interested Muslims and was less so of those specific to the Coptic 
community, like the Majlis Milli reform of 1927. The latter, despite 
Palace concern, was not a matter of interest to Muslim voters or most 
Muslim members of Parliament; therefore, Coptic Senators and Deputies 
felt free to use this new forum to prosecute an old quarrel. Few Coptic 
members, however, would have had the courage or foolhardiness to 
contribute to the annual debate on al-'Azhar's budget. The prudence of 
Coptic politicians on such points is well illustrated by Taha Hussain’s 
remark that al-*Azhar was never as pampered as when Makram^Ubaid was 
Finance Minister.
99* Deeb suggests that the Wafd was stronger in the Delta and won
proportionately more seats on Lower Egyptian than Upper Egyptian 
provincial councils. However, this does not help explain why 
Wafd-dominated Delta provincial councils in previous years contained 
no Copts. The Wafd would seem to have controlled provincial 
councils except for a time in the early 1930s and another in the 
later 19^0s. See Marius Deeb, Party Politics in Egypt; the Wafd 
and its Rivals, 1919-39 (London 1979)> p.159*
100. Sometimes Copts were included in these councils by virtue of their 
occupation; for example, the local sanitation inspector, who was 
sometimes a Copt, belonged by right.
101. Interview with Louis cAwad, 29 February 1980. When cUbaid was 
Finance Minister in 1936, he apparently spent so much money on 
translating the Qur'an into other languages, building mosques and 
paying preachers, that a delegation of ^ulama came personally to thank 
him. This gave ^Ubaid the opportunity to reiterate that he was a 
Christian in religion and a Muslim in country.
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One example of the poor quality of representation can he seen
in the issue of Christian religious instruction in state schools,
discussed in greater detail later. This was a subject close to the
heart of the Coptic community because Islamic religious instruction
formed part of the school curriculum. When the Chamber debated in
1933 the compulsory primary education bill, which provided for extensive
Islamic religious studies, no Coptic Deputy suggested that Christian
education also be provided. One Senator, Dr. cAbd Allah Simaika,
showed more courage, and at least raised the subject during the Senate
102debate on the bill. In the Chamber, a motion to provide Christian
education was made in the following session but found little Coptic or
Muslim support. When a motion was made to increase the amount of
Islamic education provided in state schools, no Copts demurred or spoke
103in favour of an equal amount of Christian education. Often, when
Coptic representatives did choose to speak out in defence of their 
community, they made their argument on technical or legal grounds and 
not on the actual merits or demerits of the case. For example, in 
the 19*0 Chamber debate on a draft inheritance law and the 19*0 Senate 
debate on personal status jurisdiction, Coptic representatives argued
that both bills should be returned to Committee on minor grounds; they
10 Usaid nothing directly against the provisions of either bill.
Coptic senators may have been slightly more willing to represent 
the Community than Coptic Deputies, as is Indicated by Oibd Allah
Simaika's 1933 attempt in the Senate, and the 1926 proposal of
Senator Suryal to change the Lay Council Charter. Some appointed 
senators may have seen themselves as communal representatives. It is
102. Misr, 3 June 1933, p.3.
103. Chamber Debates, thirty-third session, 7 March 1933. See also 
Alfred Yallouz, "Chronique legislative, 1932-3", L'Egypte 
Contemporaine 152 (193*0, p.800.
10*+. Chamber Debates, sixteenth session, 8 March 19*0; Senate Debates, 
twenty-third session, 23 December 19*0.
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certainly difficult to see the ecclesiastical senators as anything else, 
although many Copts would have argued that these men represented the 
clergy and not the community. Bishop Lukas' outspokenness on the 
subject of Majlis Milli reform in 1926-27 is a case in point. Otherwise, 
the clerical senators seemed to keep a low profile and probably were 
busier with church than Senate duties.
Copts seem to have been conscious of this failure to defend their 
interests, if only because the Coptic press periodically mentioned it.
In 1926 Misr took Murqus Hanna, Deputy and Cabinet Minister, to task for 
not persuading the government to act on the matter of church reform and 
monastery endowments. However, the paper did go on to praise him for 
representing the general interests of his constituents.
In 1933 Murqus Simaika complained about Coptic deputies "who 
never open their mouths when bills of vital importance to the Coptic 
community....are discussed or when important grants out of public funds 
are voted in favour of Muslim institutions". He added that it was not 
only Coptic Deputies who failed to show an interest in communal affairs, 
but those in the Senate and Cabinet as well.10^ Although Misr noted 
its pleasure in 19*4-0 when Kamil Be.y 'Ibrahim broke the "jealously- 
guarded silence" of his colleagues and co-religionists to broach the 
subject of non-Muslim personal status courts, it expressed disappointment 
that he so quickly abandoned the topic. The paper asked Coptic 
senators, whom it claimed had said little since their election, to be 
more vigorous representatives of the community
105. Mi?r, 27 September 1926, p.l.
106. FO.lUl/755, 12*1/7/33.
107. Misr, 9 May 19*4-0, p.l.
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Traditionally, the higher clergy had constituted the community's 
political elite, which was entirely dependent on the good will of the 
government. What this new political system did was to consolidate, 
if not actually establish, a new Coptic political elite, which looked 
not to community, church or government for approval, but to the Muslim 
majority. Had the Copts been concentrated in one region or had 
minority representation been approved, then Egypt might have seen the 
rise of communal politicians. Coptic representatives would have been 
obliged to defend better Coptic interests In Parliament, but a better 
defence need not have contributed to the overall welfare of the community. 
The nationalist fear that proportional representation would divide the 
Egyptian people was not far fetched. It would have set the Copts apart 
from the national community and Coptic politicians, in competing with 
one another, could have indulged in verbal extremism, making more and 
more extravagant and hopeless demands on behalf of their constituents.
This would probably have led to physical violence, if only in the form 
of a Muslim backlash against a community which had forgotten its place. 
Violence was something the Copts had to contend with anyway, but it 
probably came later and on a smaller scale than it might have otherwise. 
Formal parliamentary representation, while not unimportant, was nothing 
compared to informal influence exercised In party and government 
circles, particularly when Parliament was not a strong institution and 
was subject to summary dismissal. This kind of Influence Coptic 
politicians certainly had and it was sometimes used on behalf of their 
community. Any kind of proportional scheme would have allocated so 
few seats that their role would have been restricted to the less 
important formal one. There remained the possibility, too, that 
percentage of the population could have become a criterion in other
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areas; for example, the civil service and state education. This 
would not have been in the interest of the Copts. Of course, with the 
great increase in the number of political groups competing in elections 
toward the end of the monarchy, proportional representation could have 
given the Copts more power than that provided by the same number of seats 
in a stable two-party system.
5. Coptic Expectations and Demands
Muhammad Husain Haikal tells the story of a young Coptic lawyer 
who tried to persuade him of the virtues of minority representation in
10Q
the wake of the 1927 election. Haikal pointed out to him that
under proportional representation, the Copts would have had fewer seats
109than they had just won. The lawyer declared that he was willing
to sacrifice those seats in return for a guarantee of future seats.
He believed, with some prescience, that national solidarity would weaken, 
intercommunal tensions mount and the Copts end up unrepresented in 
Parliament. While this situation did not specifically come to pass 
under the monarchy, the Copts, by the mid-1970s, felt that they no 
longer had an adequate number of representatives. Salama Musa 
complained repeatedly that the 'Abazas, a large and powerful Delta
110family, had more representatives in Parliament than did the Copts.
This concern about the number of representatives was occasioned by a 
recognition that their constitutionally guaranteed religious freedom
108. Haikal, Mudhakkirat, vol.l, pp.l60-l.
109. Because of this, in 1930, when the Copts were well represented
in Parliament, al-Siyasa claimed that proportional representation 
was needed to protect the interests of the majority and not the 
minority. Al-Siyasa, 12 February 1930, quoted in al-Bishri
al-Katib 121 (1971), pp.155-6.
110. Misr, 20 April 1976, p.l; 15 April 1976, p.l.
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was not safe from the government or the mob. Mounting hostility
toward the Copts persuaded several Copts to call for the disestablishment
of Islam as the state religion. At the same time, Copts and Misr
began to call for the institutionalization of proportional representation 
112for minorities. Misr was clearly concerned that the Muslim
113Brethren and others were working toward a theocratic state; as
the paper noted, religion had already been introduced into foreign and 
litdomestic policy. With the prospect of a British withdrawal in
the near future and the problem of an increasingly discredited and 
fragmented political system, the Copts perhaps saw minority 
representation as something which would safeguard the community. The 
irony is that they did not need protection from those who were willing 
to operate inside the bounds of the political system, but from those 
who denied its legitimacy and wished to overthrow it.
111. Misr, March and April 19^7, particularly b April 19^7, p.l.
112. See Mi^r, k April 19^7, p.l. Curiously, in the next breath, 
this article demanded that government employment be equally open 
to all and not be restricted to a community's proportion of the 
population. Misr, 11 January 1950, P-l; 12 January 1950, p.l; 
18 January 1952, p.l.
113. F0.371/53297, J2253/39/16; Migr 17 April 19^8, p.l.
llU. Mi^r objected in part to Egyptian participation in an Islamic 
conference held in Pakistan. Misr, 11 January 1950, p.l.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE COPTS AND PARTY POLITICS
A. The Wafd
The Wafd party placed more Copts in visible positions of
influence than did any other party, with the possible exception 
£
of Makram Ubaid's 19^3 splinter group, al~Kutla. The party's 
concern to promote Coptic political participation derived partly 
from its self-image as the representative of the entire nation.
The Wafd saw itself not as a party representing sectional interests, 
but as a movement whose wide-ranging support in all sectors of 
Egyptian society most fitted it to obtain genuine independence and 
exercise political power. In addition, the egalitarian and secular 
political beliefs of the party, borrowed from Western thought, could 
be both demonstrated and reinforced by according a share of that power 
to minorities. On a more practical level, many Coptic nationalists 
rose in party circles due to the 1918-23 arrests and exiles, which 
created a turnover in leadership. Their success in proving their 
loyalty, ability and courage gained them the respect of their Muslim 
comrades and attracted a popular following. This, in turn, drew 
still more Coptic supporters into the Wafdist fold.
In 1923 the Wafd, in preparing for a more orderly political life, 
appointed a new party Executive Committee of eight Muslims and six 
Copts. In order of seniority, the latter were Sinut Hanna, George 
Khayyat, Wasif Ghall, Wisa Wasif, Makram cUbaid and Murqus Hanna. A 
second group of eleven Muslims and three Copts, Salama MIkha’Il,
Fakhri cAbd al-Wur and Raghib 'Iskandar, was designated to join the
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first in plenary sessions."*" Only Wlsa Wasif, Murqus Hanna and 
Sinut stayed with the Wafd until their deaths in the 1930s. The 
three in the second group left the party in 1932 and later returned. 
Khayyat resigned at roughly the same time. Wasif Ghali, seemingly 
more interested in cultural than political affairs, was inactive 
between 1932-6 and retired from party life in the late 1930s, The 
last of the nine, Makram, parted company with the Wafd in 19^2. New 
Copts, however, were periodically appointed to the Executive Committee 
in an attempt to preserve the special character of the party.
The Wafd was perhaps the only party to devote much attention to 
local organization. Local notables were useful campaigners; and, 
in heavily Coptic areas like ’Asyut and Qina, many Copts served on 
Wafdist provincial, district and constituency committees. Sinut
2Hanna, who made many a fund-raising tour in the party’s early days,
was in charge of party organization in ’Asyut. His colleague,
Fakhri ‘Abd al-Nur, held the same job in his home province of Jirja.
Fakhri was also, for a time, reponsible for organizing Wafdist 
3
provincial tours. Both were two of the most active Wafdist
hpropagandists in the early period.
Several Wafdists had influence in labour affairs. Raghib 
'Iskandar was the only Coptic member of the Chamber’s Labour Committee 
in 192b$ and he ran as a workers' candidate in 1925- Along with
1. The British were surprised at the omission of Sadiq Hina in, who 
probably played an important role in keeping the party going the 
first six months of 1923. He was frequently received by King 
Fu’ad who was then paying court to the Zaghlulists and who gave 
Hinain £E3,000 to help start the Wafdist paper al-Balagh.
F0.371/8959, E1031/10/16.
2. Marius Deeb, "The Wafd and its Rivals: The Rise and Development of
Political Parties in Egypt 1919-39", unpublished PhD thesis,
University of Oxford 1971, p.120.
3. This was after Zaghlul’s return from Paris. Interview with Sa^d 
Fakhri ^Abd al-Nur, 17 May 1979*
See Chapter Two; Egyptian Gazette, 6 July 1923, p.^i
F0.371/12361, J3215/8/16.
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Makram, -who also professed a special interest in workers, he was
defeated in this election; hut this probably had more to do with
government interferance than with any inability in the proletariat
to identity their interests with those of Makram and Raghib. Makram
and the Copt, ^Azlz Mirhum, served as legal advisers to several unions;
and the former, even after breaking with the Wafd, retained some
influence with workers. Mirhum, in conjunction with a Muslim
colleague, ran the Egyptian General Union of Workers' Syndicates, a
federation of twelve unions with U,800 members.'’ He was the most
active Coptic labour leader in the 1930s and eventually became President
of the Wafdist Council Union of Syndicates, founded in 1935, after
ousting cAbbas Halim. Dr. Najib 'Iskandar, who represented a
working-class district in the Chamber and who was arrested at one
point for feeding funds to workers suspected of perpetrating anti-
7
government bombings also had some influence.
cUbaid was very popular with students and youth, an increasingly 
important political force in the 1930s. He was intimately connected
g
with the paramilitary youth organization, the Blue Shirts. Kamil
Sidqi also had ties with this unruly group, which gave the King an
9
excuse to dismiss the Wafd government in 1937*
Wafdist Copts had even more influence among lawyers. A very 
large proportion of lawyers were Copts, so it is not surprising that
5. This federation was practically moribund by April 1931.
FO.lUl/763, 506/1/31. 506/2A/31.
6. Marius Deeb, Party Politics in Egypt: The Wafd and its Rivals,
1919-39 (London 1979), pp.26U-5.
7. F0.371/15U07, J3309/26/16.
8. The British and even al-Nahhas looked on Makram as "Director" of 
the Blue Shirts. In 1936 a Committee of Direction, formed of 
Kamil Sidqi and two others, was set up with the hope of strengthening 
al-Nahhas/&Ubaid control of the organization for the coming anti­
cipated challenge from Mahir and al-Nuqrashi. FO.l4l/5^3, 19/18/36; 
F0.371/2012U, J9095/2/16; FO.371/20098, J10U8/2/16.
9. F0.1U1M3, 19/58/36.
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the Copts played an important role in the Egyptian Bar Association, 
which was often controlled by the Wafd. Murqus Hanna, who was the 
first Copt to serve as this professional organization's president, was 
elected five years in a row. Makram, Kamil Sidqi and a fourth Wafdist 
Copt, Kamil Yusuf Salib, also served as Bar Association presidents. ^
Because Egypt's fate lay with those outside Egypt, propaganda 
missions abroad were an important political weapon. Those Wafdists 
who were assigned to work on European and American opinion included 
Wasif Ghali, Wisa Wasif, Makram, Sadiq Hinain and Louis Fanus. Their 
knowledge of Europe and perhaps even their Christianity was a help in 
dealing with Westerners. These men, particularly in the 1920s, made 
numerous trips to Europe to promote the Wafdist cause. Later, their 
religion was less of an advantage in dealing with the West because 
it made them suspect in Egyptian eyes.
To the British, many Wafdist Copts were "extremists", a term 
which denotes mainly the degree of intransigence displayed toward 
themselves. Ho doubt Coptic nationalists seemed more extreme in 
their political views than some of their Muslim colleagues because the 
British expected to have their support. The British division between 
"moderates" and "extremists" is retained here not for what it says 
about the views of Wafdist politicians, but for its usefulness in 
suggesting alliances within the party. Personal loyalties and 
enmities often had more to do with political position than devotion 
to a particular set of aims. Some of those the British labelled 
"extremist" in 1923 had materialized into "moderates" by 1932.
10. Salib Sami was the only non-Wafdist Copt to play a prominent 
role. Don Reid, "The National Bar Association and Egyptian 
Politics, 1912-5^", The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies VII (197*0, pp.6o8-^6.
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The British deplored the influence the early extremists, among
them Sinut, Makram, the 'Iskandar brothers, Wisa Wasif, Murqus Hanna
11 -  and Salama MIkha'iil, had with Zaghlul. Sinut was devoted to the
latter and was very influential in the party's early days; his zeal
was such that the British described him as "unbalanced" rather than
"extremist11. Makram, whom one party luminary called the most
12influential of the younger Wafdists, did not meet Zaghlul until 1921.
He quickly became a protege and was known publicly as "the faithful son
of Sacd"; this relationship was yet another symbol of Muslim-Copt
unity. One scholar has suggested that Murqus Hanna was, until
Zaghlul's death, one of the five most powerful men in the party. He
acquired a considerable reputation for anglophobia as Minister of
Public Works in 192U; in consequence, Lord Lloyd, the British High
Commissioner, was very unhappy with Hanna's appointment to the 1926 
13Cabinet.
There were Copts in the party who were credited with moderate 
views by the British. This designation was relative since in British 
terms the true moderates were the cAdlists and later the Liberal 
Constitutionalists. Two such Wafdists were Wasif Ghall and George 
Khayyat. Wasif s familiarity with Western culture may have done more 
to endear him to the British than his political views. Wasif had a 
powerful voice in the party and in 192U successfully persuaded Zaghlul
11. Salama was a close friend of ^Abd al-Ratunan Fahmi, the head of the 
Wafdist secret terrorist apparatus. When the latter fell out with 
Zaghlul, Salama pleaded his case. Mustafa ’Amin, al-Kitab al-Mamnuf  
’Asrar Thawrat 1919■» vol.l (Cairo 1976), p.263.
12. Interview with Raghib 'Iskander, 'Akhir Saca , 2 June 1976, p.l6 .
13. Curiously, Hanna's views were moderate enough to enable him to be 
considered for a portfolio in the 1922 Tharwat Cabinet. In 1926, 
al-’Ittihad, the Palace newspaper, suggested, possibly for reasons 
of its own, that Hanna sometimes sided with the moderate non- 
Wafdists. Quoted by the Egyptian Gazette, 27 July 1926, p.U.
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against the advice of al-Nahhas and others , not to resign in his quarrel
lUwith the Palace over whose right it was to make Senate appointments.
In contrast with this, Khayyat had little influence in the party; his
standing may have been critically injured by his brief defection in 1921.
In the first Wafd Cabinet of 192U, Murqus Hanna and Wasif Ghali
were given portfolios. Ghali* s appointment to Foreign Affairs was
15perhaps obvious given his familiarity with Europe and the Palace.
His advice, according to al-*Ahram's political editor, was generally
taken by the Wafd on diplomatic affairs, but was not routinely sought
l6on domestic matters. Murqus' elevation offers some proof of his
influence with Zaghlul. One contemporary opponent suggested that
17Murqus was then known only among lawyers, but another source regarded
l8him as "universally respected" and greatly liked by Muslims.
Sinut had seniority and should have had a portfolio, but his zeal
probably damned him in both British and Palace eyes. Murqus was a
more palatable candidate; he had earned the confidence of his party
19and appears to have been routinely consulted by Zaghlul. His
influence did not do the career of his new son-in-law, Makram ^ Ubaid,
20any harm, although the latter was not elevated to Cabinet rank until 
1928. In another important appointment, Sadiq Hinain was named Under­
secretary in the Ministry of Finance. Unfortunately accusations of 
favouritism hampered his usefulness to the party. In 1925, he was
lU. Wasif described the contemplated resignation as a "revolt against
the King". Abd al-Khaliq Lashin, Sacd Zaghlul wa Dawrahu.fi al-
Siyasa al-Misriyya (Cairo 1975), pp.363-5.
15. He had once worked in the Khedival household, an experience relevant 
to running a Ministry over which the Palace had considerable control.
16. FO.U07/199, Wo.2 (Enclosure 2), Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to 
Mr.MacDonald, 18 July I92U.
17. 'Ahmad Shafiq Pasha, Hawliyyat Misr al-Siyasiyya, Vol.l (192U),
(Cairo 1926), pAU.
18. F0.H07/199, Wo.2 (Enclosure 2), op.cit.
19. Ibid.
20. Zaghlul helped arrange Makram's 1923 marriage to Murqus' daughter, 
for which Makram had to convert to Orthodoxy.
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posted to the Egyptian Legation in Madrid as part of an effort to 
rid the administration of Wafdists, and this effectively ended his 
political career.
The 192U Cabinet came to grief over the Sudan and the assassination
of the Sirdar. Makram was among those arrested on suspicion of
complicity in the assassination. He was not directly implicated, but
had delivered several incendiary speeches which had helped establish a
21climate for murder. He was soon released and his influence, along
with that of other party extremists, may have grown at the expense of
22
more moderate Wafdists. By 1927, they were able to make Prime
Minister ^Adli's position so untenable that he resigned. Zaghlul was 
not in good health and was perhaps losing control of his more unruly 
disciples. King Fu'ad, believing that the Wafd could successfully
insist on the appointment of a Wafdist Prime Minister, idly mentioned
_ „ 23
Wasif Ghali as a candidate. The previous year, the king had seen
Murqus Hanna as the most acceptable Wafdist for the post on the grounds 
that a Copt would be more amenable to royal pleasure because he would be
2hboth more disliked and more timid than a Muslim. However, all
Wafdists, whatever their differences, agreed that Zaghlul was the only
candidate for Prime Minister. The British did not concur, and so
Zaghlul was forced to accept the appointment of Tharwat.
Zaghlul's death in August 1927 threw the Wafd into a succession
crisis which was aggravated by the absence of several Wafdists, including
25four Copts, from Egypt. Sentimentalists in the party considered
21. FO. 11*1/501, 13592/57/28.
22. Deeb, The Wafd and its Rivals, p.190.
23. F0.U07/20U, No.17, Lord Lloyd to Mr. Chamberlain, 21 April 1927-
2k. F0.371/H58U, J2218/25/16.
25* The four were Ghali, Sinut, Wisa Wasif and Salama Mikha'il. The 
absentees do not seem to have returned to Egypt in time, but may 
have voted by proxy or cable. 'Ibrahim 'Amin Ghali believes that 
they were able to vote from Europe. Interview, H June 1980.
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leaving Zaghlul's position vacant in memoriam or appointing Mme.
Zaghlul as a figurehead with real power in the hands of al-Nahhas,
26Fath Allah Barakat and Wisa Wasif. Both were fanciful solutions,
and it is unlikely that al-Nahhas and Barakat would have comprised an
amiable partnership. These two, the one as Secretary-General of the
party and the other as Zaghlul1s nephew, were the main rivals for
Zaghlul's mantle.
An election was held with surprising speed in September, and al-
Nahhas was its victor. Haikal maliciously credits Copts with a special
role in the election by pointing to the presence of Makram and Fakhri 
c 27Abd al-Nur in a group which engineered the victory. Sa d, Fakhri's
son, confirms his father's crucial role, contending that Fakhri
switched his vote from Barakat to al-Nahhas and persuaded others to do 
28likewise. The British, who, unlike Sacd but like Haikal, were
hoping to discredit the Wafd, also suggested that the Copts played a
29
role in the election.
Fakhri may or may not have been able to carry the votes of other
Wafdists; there were certainly not enough Copts in the Wafd to elect
30al-Nahhas single-handed. They may well have chosen to support al-
Nahhas on his own merits. The latter was from an important Christian 
centre in the Delta and had been helped early in his career by a 
Christian notable; he was tolerant and unpredjudiced. In addition
26. FO.U07/2O5, No.21, Mr. Henderson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,
2k September 1927•
27. Muhammad Husain Haikal, Mudhakkirat fi al-Siyasa al-Misriyya, 
vol.l (Cairo 1951), p.279.
28. Sacd suggests that his father betrayed Barakat only after receiving 
assurances that al-Nahhas was not prejudiced against Copts. The 
Residency, however, speculated that al-Nuqrashi had frightened 
Fakhri into voting for al-Nahhas. Interview, Sacd Fakhri cAbd al- 
Nur, 17 May 1979; F0.U07/205'No .21, op.cit.
29- F0.371/12359 * J2730/8/16. Leland Bowie accepts Haikal's interpretation
that a group of Copts helped tip the balance in favour of al-Nahhas. 
Leland Bowie, "The Copts, The Wafd and religious issues in Egyptian 
politics", Muslim World 67 (1977)* p.llH.
30. Eight out of the 20 voters wer.e;Copt.s and four of these were in Europe.
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Wafdist Copts may have known or suspected that Makram, as a very
close friend of al-Nahhas, would he made party Secretary-General.
Al-Nuqrashi, suspected of complicity in several political crimes,
and Mme. Zaghlul probably had more to do with al-Nahhas1 victory than
either Fakhri or Makram. The former organized a demonstration in
front of the polling place and earnestly reminded voters to cast their
ballots for al-Nahhas. His words may have been innocent, but his
31past political record gave them a threatening ring, which may well
have unnerved voters. Mme. Zaghlul probably played a more important
role. Al-Nahhas won her support by his readiness to allow her a say
in party matters; a say that Barakat was unwilling to concede.
32
Both men had the advantage of rural backgrounds; al-Nahhas, 
however, was much better educated and had better moral credentials. 
Barakat had caused a scandal in 192U when he had used his position as 
Minister of Agriculture to get a large part of his large land-holdings 
worked without cost to him.
The royalist press played a mischievous and not insignificant 
role by advocating the election of Barakat. Not even the most 
respectable Wafdist could have survived branding as a Palace favourite. 
The Palace here seems to have hoped that al-Nahhas, as party head,
3U
would destroy the Wafd more quickly than Barakat. Afaf Marsot
suggests another reason for Nahhas '■ election: she feels he was nominated 
by the extremist faction because he was malleable and would do their
31. FO.371/12359 > J2730/8/16.
32. Deeb, The Wafd and its Rivals, p.173.
33* Interview, 'Ibrahim !ftmin Chilli, U June 1980. He had also lost
prestige when he referred the Secretary-General of his Ministry 
to the Council of Discipline, whose members unanimously 
acquitted the man. FO.U07/206, J615A / 16.
3U. FO.371/12359, J2715/8/16.
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35bidding. However, as the second most important party official
after Zaghlul, he was an obvious candidate. It is true that he was 
close to a number of the more radical members of the Wafd, but the 
fact that he sought their advice does not mean that he was dominated 
by them.
It Is equally true, however, that al-Nahhas was less well equipped
than Zaghlul to balance those of moderate and radical views and bind
all to him in personal loyalty. He was also perhaps less interested
in doing this. None of the more moderate Wafdists who sat in the
Tharwat Cabinet had any influence in the new Wafd. Murqus Hanna was
past his prime, as was Sinut. Wasif Ghali remained Influential,
perhaps because he avoided factional squabbles. He replaced the
moderate Hamid al-Basil as head of the Foreign Affairs Committee in
the Chamber and he was also offered a portfolio in the 1928 Wafd Cabinet.
Real power in the party became concentrated in the hands of al-
37Nahhas, Makram,'Ahmad Mahir and al-Nuqrashi; by 1930, the Residency
3 3was convinced of their predominance. Other Wafdists who had backed
35- Afaf Marsot, relying on Barakat's Memoirs, gives a very different
picture of the election when she suggests that Mma Zaghlul quarrelled 
with Barakat over some petty personal matter, and then was cajoled 
into supporting al-Nahhas by flattery. Marsot's bias in favour of 
Barakat is strong; neither the British nor Fatima al-Yusuf share 
her prejudice. The British thought his character unsavoury and his 
unpopularity deserved, but they were resigned to his usefulness as a 
moderating force in the Wafd. Fatima, in addition, suggested that 
many Wafdists feared his tyrannical nature. See Afaf Marsot,
Egypt's Liberal Experiment 1922-36 (Los Angeles 1977)*. P*105i 
FO. 1+07/206, No.10, Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 6 January 
1928; Fatima al-Yusuf, Dhikrayat (Cairo 1976), p.l2U.
36. Murqus was so inept as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1926 that he 
was thought to be suffering from ’’some form of mental collapse”.
The British were not surprised when he was excluded from the 1928 
Cabinet. FO. 1+07/213, J395/395/16.
37- Al-Nuqrashi seems to have been added to the party executive at the 
suggestion of Makram. FO.1+07/205, J2715/8/16/
38. The Residency saw Makram and al-Nuqrashi as the presiding evil 
geniuses. FO. 1+07/210, Nos.10 and 22, Sir P. Loraine to Mr. A. 
Henderson, 1+ and 19 January 1930.
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al-Nahhas in the succession struggle improved their standing in the
- 39party; Fakhri Abd al-Nur, Salama Mikha’il and Raghib 'Iskandar 
were, like Mahir and al-Nuqrashi, added to the Executive in late 1927*
The moderates grew restive at their loss of influence. In 1928 
they quarrelled with al-Nahhas over the enactment of a law ensuring 
freedom of assembly. They wished to drop the plan, fearing that 
British disapproval would result in a costly ultimatum. The British, 
in a fine piece of wishful thinking, predicted that the Cabinet would 
split on this issue and that a new one under Wasif Ghali, who sided 
with the moderates, would be formed. Fu'ad, however, had his heart 
set on a more tractable Cabinet and therefore insisted to Lord Lloyd 
that Ghali was more of an extremist than Makram and was not a
. . hosatisfactory candidate for Prime Minister.
The al-Nahhas coterie became increasingly Impatient with moderate 
thinking. At the end of 1931, when the exactions of the Sidqi regime 
forced the Wafd to consider Wafdist-Liberal collaboration, the moderate 
Barakat faction urged the acceptance of a Liberal plan for a coalition 
Cabinet. This Cabinet would conduct elections and its non-Wafdist 
Prime Minister would remain in office even in the event of a sweeping 
Wafdist victory. Their opponents found this plan naive; they would 
have little incentive to share power after their inevitable election 
victory.
Most members of the Executive, including some who had helped al- 
Nahhas triumph over Barakat, favoured collaboration with the Liberals. 
They included Fakhri cAbd al-Nur, George Khayyat, Raghib ’Iskandar and
39* Neither Henderson, Grafftey-Smith nor Keown-Boyd had a very high 
opinion of Fakhri. The latter had gained a reputation for his 
"venal exploitation" of appointments. See, for example, FO.HO7/206, 
No.6l (enclosure). Notes on a visit to Sohag, 11-lH February 1928 
by L.G. Grafftey-Smith; FO.lUl/770, 358/5/31*
HO. FO.371/13117, J1378A/16.
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Salama Mikha'll, They may well have felt that co-operation with the
moderate Literals would strengthen their own position in a party whose
leadership had grown less collective. Ranged against them were a
_ 1+1
group including al-Nahhas, Makram and Sinut. Barakat had a majority
on the Executive Committee hut since his opponents controlled the party 
treasury and the local Wafdist organizations, he was the one forced to 
make concessions. Working out the details together, he and Makram 
abandoned the Liberal plan for a post-election Cabinet and agreed that 
majority decisions would henceforth be respected by all members of the 
Executive Committee. Barakat’s faction should have put their money 
on a better horse; only British insistence could have put a coalition 
cabinet into office and it soon became clear that the British were not 
going to co-operate. The moderates had offended al-Nahhas needlessly, 
and they must have realized that swallowing their pride was less
,, 1+2traumatic than trying to survive in opposition to the Wafd and Sidqi.
George Khayyat, who had been relatively inactive for years, 
resigned in early 1932 from the Executive. No doubt he disliked the 
moderate faction's loss of face, but he may have had a more cogent 
reason for breaking his long association with the party. He was 
rumoured to be in financial difficulties, and if he hoped for assistance
1+3from the Bank of Agricultural Credit, it was unwise to oppose Sidqi. 
Khayyat was only the first to go; later in 1932, al-Nahhas, perhaps 
feeling the advantages of a more homogeneous Executive, expelled the 
moderate majority from the party. A quarrel between the moderate
1+1. Wasif Ghali, perenniallyin Europe, was asked by both sides to return 
home to mediate. He seems to have stayed put, sensibly avoiding a 
job which would have earned him the resentment on one side or the 
other.
1+2. FO.3Tl/l60l8, Jl+5l/ll+/l6.
^3* Ibid. Interview, 'Ibrahim 'Amin Ghali, 1+ June 1980.
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Najib al-Gharabli and Makram over a legal ease they were jointly
defending gave al-Nahhas the opportunity.
Makram, in the middle of his legal presentation, was obliged to
absent himself from court for a few days. Wien he returned, the court
refused to allow him to interrupt the lawyer then speaking in order to
complete his case. In a fit of pique, he called upon his colleagues
to withdraw from the defence with him. Al-Gharabli, believing such
an action damaging to the accused, refused to withdraw and chastised
Makram for his precipitous behaviour. Al-Nahhas eventually sided
with Makram, a decision that was as much due to al-Gharabli1s lack
of tact as to Makram's greater persuasive talents, and al-Gharabli was
1+5
expelled from the Wafd. Al-Nahhas next excluded all the moderates,
including Raghib 'Iskandar, Fakhri cAbd al-Nur and Salama Mikhafil.
Najib 'Iskandar, who had too handsomely praised al-Gharabli1s work
1+6
for the defence, lost his place on the Cairo Central Committee.
Salama promptly published blistering attacks on Makram in al-Siyasa, 
calling him a viper and a shameless liar. Makram responded in a
Ij.y
similar vein in Kawkab al-Sharq.
Wasif Ghali, alarmed by events but maintaining a safe distance from
the maelstrom, wrote to both sides in an attempt to repair the damage
1+8and to arrange a reconciliation. One note of his survives; it
IpQ
condemns al-Nahhas* unilateral action as a "coup d'etat". The
50
British expected Ghali to join the expelled, but one cousin believes
1+1+. FO.lUl/71^ , 1167/1 ?- 2/33; FO.371/16109, J2552/l*+/l6.
1+5. FO. 1+07/216, No.22, R.I. Campbell to Sir J.Simon, 28 October 1932.
U6. Ibid.
1+7* FO. 1+07/216, No.39 (enclosure). Memorandum Respecting the Egyptian 
Press, 25 November to 1 December 1932.
1+8. Interview, 'Ibrahim 'Amin Ghali, 19 March 1979.
1+9. CAS, File W/22. This note may be the draft of a letter, but it
is undated and is not addressed to anyone.
50. FO. 1+07/216, No.36. Sir P. Loraine to Sir J. Simon, 26 November 1932.
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that Ghali disapproved equally of both sides in the dispute. Afaf
Marsot suggests that Ghali remained with the Wafd from a misguided 
52sentimentality. A more plausible explanation, and one which gives
him credit for some intelligence, is that he realized how little hope
the dissidents had of creating a viable political organization, Ghali,
obviously, was less than delighted with the outcome, and he announced
that he was retiring from politics until such a time as the situation
should clear. He did not attend party Executive meetings, and in
1935 he ceased to be a member of the Executive. He did, however, resume
political activity with the formation of the United Front the following
53year, and he accepted a portfolio in the 1936 Cabinet.
Eventually, several of the moderates drifted back to the Wafd.
The ’Iskandar brothers, Salama Mikha'il and Fakhri cAbd al-Nur stood 
for election in 1936 and were not opposed by their old party. Najlb 
’Iskandar and Fakhri won election; the former again left the Wafd in 
1937 and the latter, although never again a member of the Executive, 
remained a Wafdist until his death. Salama and Raghib lost the 
election. Salama ran again and lost in 1938; he was appointed to 
the Senate by a non-Wafdist government in 1939 and died a few months 
later. Raghib was compensated for his defeat when the Wafd appointed 
him to the Senate in 1937.
In the wake of the 1932 schism, twelve Wafdists were added to the 
Executive Committee. Kamil Sidqi, a lawyer, ex-Senator and prominent 
member of the Bar, was the only Copt in this group. He was of little 
consequence in the party until Makram cUbaid’s ignominious exit in
51. Interview, 'Ibrahim 'Amin Ghali, k June 1980.
52. Marsot, Egypt's Liberal Experiment, p.1^9.
53. FO.371/20916, J1989/815/16.
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19U2. Due to expulsions and deaths, the Wafd Executive in the
1930s included far fewer Copts than it had in the 1920s. However, 
Makram’s considerable influence and popularity*^ compensated in quality 
for any deficiency in quantity.
At least partly because of the reduction of the number of Copts 
at high levels in the party, Makram's influence began to stand out and 
by 1935 "was causing problems. Al-Nahhas would hold no important 
meetings without Makram, and his calendar was increasingly controlled 
by the latter.^ Whether Makram attempted to limit the access of 
certain Wafdists to al-Nahhas or not, it is clear that al-Nuqrashi and 
’Ahmad Mahir, came to resent al-Nahhas’ reliance on Makram. As early 
as 1930, the Residency reported that Makram and al-Nuqrashi were on
57terms of armed neutrality while awaiting a future struggle for power.
Makram's influence was not the only sore point. There were policy
differences as well. One of these occurred in 1935 over the insistence
of Mahir and al-Nuqrashi that the Wafd demand the immediate restitution
of the 1923 constitution. Al-Nahhas and Makram, for once on the
cautious side of the fence, thought this too risky but feared to 
58appear irresolute. Makram was further annoyed and blamed the unseen
hands of Mahir and al-Nuqrashi when the party newspaper, al-Jihad, lost
two of its best writers to the staff of the journal Ruz al-Yusuf.
The latter's owner had made plans to publish a daily newspaper, and
59Makram feared that his two rivals would control it. He accordingly
5 .^ Curiously, Sidqi appears, for some unknown reason, to have been
dropped from the Executive in the mid-1950s. He was reappointed
to the Committee in 19^2.
55. F0.371/15^0^, JlllO/26/16.
56. Al-Yusuf, Dhikrayat, pp.131, l6H.
57- F0.407/210, J317/3/l6.
58. F0.371/19076, J5782/110.16. It is intrusting to note that by 1935
the Residency is calling the al-Nahhas faction moderate and al-
Nuqrashi’s supporters left-wing.
59. Fatima al-Yusuf claims that Makram's fear was misplaced. Al-Yusuf, 
phikrayat. p.l68.
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convinced al-Nahhas that the new enterprise would harm al-Jihad, and 
al-Nahhas compliantly refused to sanction the paper. In retaliation,
Ruz al-Yusuf began attacking the Wafdist-supported Prime Minister,
Nasim Pasha, Both the journal and al-Nuqrashi appear to have been 
connected with scurrilous pamphlets attacking Makram and al-Nahhas.^
The Wafd, pushed too far, renounced its link to Ruz al-Yusuf; and the journal 
avenged itself by mounting a vitriolic attack on Makram. In both 
articles and cartoons, the journal suggested that al-Nahhas listened
61only to Makram and Makram listened only to the English.
The rivalry between al-Nuqrashi and Makram grew increasingly
acrimonious and friction soon developed between the latter and al-
Nuqrashi 's friend, 'Ahmad Mahir. Al-Nahhas was no doubt cognizant
of the problem and was reported, probably inaccurately, by the British,
62to be trying to free himself from Makram's "domination". The
British, of course, liked to suggest that Makram had some kind of
malign hold over al-Nahhas.
Makram had certain advantages in this struggle. He had
 ^3considerable Influence with the Wafdist press. He was even able
to force 'Ahmad Mahir to relinquish his job as political editor of 
Kawkab al-Sharq in 1936 as a condition for joining the treaty 
negotiations. Mahir and al-Nuqrashi moved to get control of the 
party treasury and the local Wafdist committees, both of which were
60. One pamphlet called al-Nahhas a camel and Makram his driver. It also 
suggested that Makram had persuaded al-Nahhas to frequent low dancing 
places. PO.371/19076, J5699/H0/16. It‘should be noted that al- 
Nuqrashi was close to ‘Abbas al-cAqqad, one of the two writers who 
left al-Jihad for Ruz al-Yusuf, and he pleaded on behalf of ‘Abbas 
with al-NahhSs. Ruz' later attacks on Makram suggest that al- 
Nuqrashi maintained his link with the journal.
61. Ruz al-Yusuf, lU October 1935, PP*9, 13, 32; J October 1935, P*7*
62. This was in November 1936, FO.lUl/535, 1/183/36.
63. For example, when Makram suspected 'Ahmad Mahir of collaborating 
secretly with his brother, Prime Minister cAli Mahir in 1936, he was 
able to presuade Kawkab al-Sharq to treat both brothers hostilely.
FO.371/20105, J3533/2/16T
6U. This is from a Cairo Police report. FO.371/20105, J.3533/1/16.
in Markam’s competent hands, hut the latter out-manoeuvred them.
That July, they lost control of the party’s propaganda apparatus*, and 
in 1937 Makram seduced the staff of the new Wafdist daily, al-Misrl 
By 1937 the British Embassy believed that al-Nahhas took counsel only 
with Makram and it predicted, or perhaps merely hoped, that his reliance 
on a Copt would harm him in the long run.^
Makram and al-Nuqrashi finally quarrelled over a scheme to
~r
electrify the Aswan dam; and this was the straw that persuaded al-
Nahhas to drop al-Nuqrashi and three supporters from the Cabinet in
68August 1937- At least two attempts at reconciliation failed, and 
on lU September 1937, al-Nuqrashi was ejected from the Wafd. Although 
it is difficult to determine when other Wafdists chose sides, it is 
known that the practical Wasif Ghali maintained strict neutrality all 
that summer.
In this way, the third major split in the party occurred.
Several members left the Wafd; the only important Copt to do so was 
Najib 'Iskandar. To compensate for the loss, the Wafd added new 
members to its Executive, among them two wealthy Coptic landowners, 
Fahmi WIsa Bey and Bushra Hanna Bey. Aside from Makram, they were 
the only Copts on the Executive, and they could not hope to rival his 
influence. Bushra, as the late Sinut's brother, was greatly respected
69
but was blind and past the prime of life. Fahmi was a nonentity.
The characters of both men suggest that they were added because 
they would unquestioningly follow al-Nahhas' lead, would not upset
65. His favours annoyed the previously loyal al-Jihad so much that the
paper moved into opposition, even though only for a month.
FO.371/22006, J2805/2/16.
66. FO.*107/221, No.51, Mr. David Kelly to Mr. Eden, 28 October 1937*
67. Makram refused to submit the contract to competitive bidding.
Haikal, Mudhakkirat voli2,p.35*
68. FO.371/20885, J3778/20/16.
69. FO.371/20886, jU060/20/l6 .
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Muslim opinion by seeking public exposure and would not threaten 
Makram's position, either nationally or within the party. There was, 
in fact, no one in the party at that point who was capable of leaping 
into the shoes of Mahir and al-Nuqrashi.
It has been suggested that Makram, believing that al-Nahhas and
the Wafd saw his political role as one of communal representation,
70
sought to block the advance of other ambitious Wafdist Copts.
Certainly, Makram would not have put such an interpretation on his 
role in the party. He was always careful to present himself as an 
Egyptian, rather than a Christian, nationalist; and he must be 
credited with some success in persuading at least Wafdists, if not 
his political opponents,of that fact. Certainly he was In no position 
in the early days of the party to counteract the influence of men like 
Sinut, Wisa Wasif, Wasif Ghali and Murqus Hanna. The prestige and 
weight these Copts carried within and without the party proves that, 
at least in the 1920s, there was room for more than one Copt at the 
top. Most of these men had disappeared from the scene by the early 
1930s and, even without a deliberate policy of obstruction on Makram's 
part, few Copts had the seniority or talent to rival his influence.
The latter's main concern seems always to have been with Muslim and 
not Coptic competition; Muslim rivals were the most capable of 
weakening his position by playing on his religious background. It is 
true, however, that with the exception of Wasif Ghali, there were no 
additional Copts in the party who rose to prominence until after Makram's 
exit.
70. cAbd al-^Azim Ramadan, Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wafaniya fl Misr, 
vol.2,(Cairo i960), p.259*
2 0 5
It was a favourite taetic of anti-Wafdists, both British and
- 71Egyptian, to claim that Makram dominated al-Nahhas, and this is a
72claim accepted by some scholars. The two men were very close: they
were the same generation, they were both lawyers, they had shared exile 
and they held similar political views. To note a strong bond between 
the two is not the same thing as suggesting that one had achieved 
mastery over the other. The characters of the two men complemented 
one another and made for a powerful political combination. Rumours of 
al-Nahhas1 weakness probably originated in his flashes of temper,
73which suggested instability, and his unfortunate physical appearance.
It is likely that Makram's religion also had something to do with the 
rumour. Claiming that al-Nahhas, a Muslim, was the slave of Makram, 
a Copt, was a far more telling blow than the later charge that al- 
Nahhas was dominated by the Muslim Fu'ad Siraj al-Din. It seems 
unlikely that al-Nahhas could have been held in such high regard and 
affection by Zaghlul and risen so high in the party had he been nothing 
more than the stooge and ninny his political opponents claimed. At 
least three times, he succeeded in persuading a fickle public that he 
was the real Wafd, while the other, dissenting Wafdists were only 
schismatics.
By degrees, others emerged to counter Makram's influence. Their 
work was. not co-ordinated and, even as late as a few months before the 
final denouement, Makram's power does not seem to have been substantially
diminished. Al-Nahhas had begun to consult others in the party:
-  c 7 ^'Amin Uthman, Fu'ad Siraj al-Din, Najib al-Hilali and Sabri 'Abu Alam.
71. This allegation was particularly favoured by the Liberal press and 
Haikal repeats it in Mudhakkirat, vol.2, p.263.
72. Afaf Marsot, Egypt's Liberal Experiment, p.203*
73. Al-Nahhas' eyes looked in different directions.
7^. Muhammad al-Tabi^I, Misr min QabI al-THawra (Cairo 1978)) pp.2U0-l.
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These men were of a younger generation and they were eager for
political success. They were too new to leadership to rival Makram’s
power in the late 1930s, hut, by the early 19^-Os, their position was
more solid. Perhaps a greater threat to Makram came from al-Nahhas1
wife. She may have been jealous of Makram’s influence with her
husband; Makram certainly suspected her of trying to counter it.
It has been argued by more than one individual that al-Nahhas
consciously tried to balance power in the Wafd to prevent a future 
75schism. This is not an unreasonable analysis, and yet al-Nahhas
did little to prevent major defections in 1932 and 1937s in fact, he 
seemed to encourage them in the interests of party peace and unity. 
Still, the Wafd in the 19U0s was a weaker organization than it had been 
in the previous two decades, and al-Nahhas may have realized that the 
party could not afford another schism. In addition, Makram was too 
crafty a politician to have made or responded to overtures from the 
Palace without cause, particularly at a time when the Wafd had just 
returned to power. Only concern about his political future could 
have driven him into the arms of such an old and untrustworthy enemy.
The only serious policy dispute between Makram and al-Nahhas on 
record before 19^ -2 was one which surfaced in the previous year. The
Wafd had, for some time, been waiting for the British to find an excuse 
to force the King to invite al-Nahhas to form a Cabinet. The British 
were prepared to take such action in 19^0 but were outsmarted by the 
Palace and hampered by al-Nahhas’ contraction of cold feet. By the
75. Salah al-Shahid, Dhikravati fi ^Ahdain (Cairo 1976), p.^0. Fu’ad
Siraj al-Din is quoted as holding a similar opinion, which Ramadan
accepts, in Ramadan, Tatawwur, vol.2, pp.272-3. Mustafa al-Feki 
also accepts this interpretation in his "Makram Ubayd: A Coptic
Leader in the Egyptian National Movement", unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of London 1977» p.159*
76. Siraj al-Din believed that the Palace was the initiator. Ramadan, 
Tatawwur, vol.2, p.265.
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summer of 19^1, al-Nahhas had grown restive; he asked Lampson to
intervene hut it was the latter's turn to be unco-operative. Al-
Nahhas, in retaliation, flirted with the Palace and made a few sharp
anti-British speeches just in case Lampson had overlooked the
possibility of a Palace-Wafd alliance. Security reports suggest
that al-Nahhas was actually considering such an alliance in the hope
that the Palace would act more quickly than the British in allowing
the formation of a Wafd government. In contrast, Makram seems to
have advocated keeping faith with the more reliable British. He
feared that an anti-British campaign, at such a sensitive juncture,
77would only harm the Wafd; and he knew how much he personally was 
disliked by the King. On his own authority, Makram may even have 
ordered Wafdist papers to reduce the number of references they made
nr O
to the King. Their quarrel lasted into the new year. In January,
Makram was so angry that he refused to attend a holiday speech given
79by al-Nahhas at Zaghlul1s tomb. Kamil Sidqi tried to mediate; few 
others were displeased to see Makram and al-Nahhas at odds.
Baikal incorrectly claims that Makram had contacts with the
8 o
Embassy to arrange the British-Wafdist coup of U February 19^2.
It was too dangerous for senior politicians to be seen frequently at 
the Embassy; and it eventually cost ’Amin ’Hlthman, the real emissary 
in this case, his life. The warrant for which Lampson had been 
waiting came with the resignation of the Prime Minister, an act which
77. GCEH, F7/D7, Cards 757* 760. Security Reports (Palace) on 
Meetings of the Wafd, 8 October and 15 October 19^1.
78. Two Security Reports confirm,this. CCEH, F7/D7, Card 76^, Security 
Reports (Cairo Police), 2 November 19^1 and Card 765, Security 
Reports (Palace) *+ November 19^1- However, a third report claims 
that at least al-Migri had received no orders about reducing the 
news It published about the King. Card 765* Security Reports 
(Cairo Police) 5 November 19^1.
79. CCEH, F7/D7, Cards 826-829. Public Security Reports, 21 January 19^2.
80. Haikal, Mudfrakkirat, vol.2, p.263.
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followed a crisis generated by the Palace over the government's break 
in relations with Vichy France; and a Wafdist government was imposed 
on the King.
Despite the fact that Makram's acquisition of two critical port­
folios, Finance and Supplies, would seem to indicate a resolution of
differences, two Wafdist contemporaries suggest that serious problems
8lbegan with the first day of the Ministry. 'Amin *~Uthman, who had
gained the confidence of al-Nahhas, almost immediately succeeded, 
with the latter's support, in blocking an attempt by Makram to fire 
Hassan Rifacat, Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior. The 
Embassy suspected that 'Amin, who had turned down a portfolio for the 
possibly more useful post of Secretary-General of the Cabinet, was
f 82using Rifa at to increase his power in the party. Less than two
months later, Makram lost another round when he was unable to prevent
the appointment of 'Amin as Auditor-General. This was an office
Makram preferred to keep vacant because it undercut his own authority
as Minister of Finance.
Differences between al-Nahhas and Makram soon became public
knowledge. Al-Nahhas suspected Makram of intriguing with the Palace.
The latter was known to be having direct contacts with Palace officials 
83
in March; and, when Makram accepted an invitation to a Royal Audience,
84al-Nahhas was reported to be uneasy. He was also annoyed since he 
was having some trouble getting the King to receive him. Makram then 
infuriated al-Nahhas by publicly praising the King without seeking prior
81. Jalal al-Din al-Hamamsi, a supporter of Makram, and Fu’ad Siraj 
al-Din, an opponent, both think this. Ramadan, Tatawwur, vol.2,
pp.266-7. 
82. FO.371/31567, J6U9/38/16.
83. FO.371/31569, J1252/38/16 and J1319/38/16.
8*+. Salah al-Shahid wrongly claims that al-Nahhas did not know about the 
audience with the King until after it took place. He suggests that 
Makram as Minister, was fulfilling the wishes of the Palace without 
consulting al-Nahhas. Salah al-Shahid, Dhikrayati. pp.38, 41.
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approval; in doing this, he gave sufficient scope to those party
85
members eager to widen the rift. He quarrelled with Mme. al-Nahhas
86who was abusing her husband's position for private gain. Playing
an infuriatingly righteous politician, he also opposed the accepted
practice of promoting Wafdist officials whose loyalty had earned them
87punishment under previous non-Wafdist governments. Makram made
both these issues, as petty as they were, the basis of his campaign
against corruption in the party. His ad hominem attacks gave al-
Nahhas so little room to manoeuvre that it seems unlikely that Makram
was still jockeying for position within the party. He probably had
resolved upon leaving and hoped to take as many party members with
him as possible. Al-Nahhas, on the other hand, could not have been
eager to get rid of Makram; he knew only too well that the latter was
88as formidable an opponent as he was capable an ally.
With the Palace behind him, Makram pushed the dispute to its
logical conclusion. Like the Sacdists before him, he could not hope
for political survival alone; only an alliance with the Palace was
likely to guarantee his political longevity. In May al-Nahhas
deprived Makram of the Ministry of Supplies which the latter was
using as a base from which to mount his campaign against corruption.
Makram had already forfeited any support he had in the Cabinet, and
89some influential Copts pressed him to be more conciliatory.
Finally, on 26 May, the Cabinet was reshuffled and Makram was 
left out. Kamil Sidqi Pasha, who had been Minister of Commerce, 
became Finance Minister. Censorship was ordered to prohibit references
85. Al-Feki, "Makram Ubayd", p.l62.
86. Apparently, Mme. al-Nahhas and Mme. ^Ubayd were not on good terms and
this affected their husbands' relationship. FO.371/31570. Jl6l9/38/l6.
87. One of these officials was the Copt, Ibrahim Faraj Masiha.
88. The British commented that, after the exit of al-Nuqrashi, Makram was
the only efficient organizer left in the party. FO.371/31571> JI885/38/I6.
89. FO.371/31572* d2Ul5/38/l6. Kamil Sidql was probably one of those
Copts urging moderation.
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to Makram as Secretary-General of the Wafd, although he nominally
90retained this position. He was still, of course, a Deputy in the
Chamber. Makram took advantage of an ensuing lull to muster support
91among Wafdists and members of parliament.
Unfortunately for his political future, Makram had picked his
time badly. Under martial law, the government was able to prevent any
92publicity unfavourable to it and the party. It was difficult for
Makram to attract attention, let alone popular support. His work in
parliament was easier. There he had a legitimate and not unsympathetic
forum in which to prosecute his case against al-Nahhas. Makram had
had charge of the selection of most of the Wafdist Deputies and 
93Senators. Some of these men no doubt owed their political career
to Makram’s patronage, and many Upper Egyptians, Muslim and Copt, ' 
were reputed to be well-wishers. Makram, in fact, persuaded the 
Senate to pass a resolution praising him for past services, although 
he failed in a similar attempt in the more heavily Wafdist Chamber.
There seems to be little doubt that "the faithful son of Sa^d" hoped 
to establish his title to the name of Wafd by besmirching al-Nahhas’ 
good name. In popularity, he was second, to al-Nahhas, and even if 
the assessments made of their talents are only partly correct, he was 
a good deal more clever.
Makram, eager to carry on the war against concessions and favours, 
planned to make an interpellation in the Chamber on the subject of
90. CCEH, F7/D7, Cards 9^0-2, Security Reports, 30 May 19^2.
91. CCEH, F7/D7, Cards 9^0-9, Security Reports 30 and 31 May 19^2.
Among those, including several journalists, reported to be helping 
Makram were Mustafa 'Amin, Muhammad al-TabacI , Qasim Judah, Jalal 
al-Din al-Hamamsi and FikrI ’Abaza.
92. In 19^3 Makram’s followers were still complaining about how difficult
it was for them to publish or give speeches. Security Report 2250,
12 October 19^ +3, quoted in Jamal Salim, al-Bulis al-Siyasi Yahkum 
Misr (Cairo 1975) p.169.
93. FOI371/31572, J256H/38/16/
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supplies, but strong pressure appears to have prevented him doing so.
He also failed in an attempt to take his brother’s place on the
Chamber's Finance Committee, a position which would have enabled him to
gk
direct further attacks against the Wafd. In June, there was a full-
dress debate on supplies, during which al-Nahhas refrained from attacking
Makram. He may have feared not only Makram’s eloquent tongue, but the
evidence that the latter had acquired against his wife and in-laws.
- 95Curiously, Makram did not use the opportunity to attack al-Nahhas;
the restraint of both men may suggest that attempts at reconciliation
were being made.^
It has been suggested that Makram was seduced by the Palace with
the promise that he could be Prime Minister if he succeeded in damaging
97the Wafd sufficiently. It is curious that such an asute politician
would have not only believed a promise from such an unreliable source, 
but accepted that a King, who had relied heavily on religious and anti- 
Coptic propaganda in the past, could appoint, with impugnity, a Coptic 
Prime Minister. There had been many Prime Ministers without even a 
trace of Makram’s popularity, but they had all been Muslims. There had 
even been two Coptic Prime Ministers; but the greater amount of power 
exercised by the British at that time helped make the appointments 
possible. Once the Prime Minister had represented the Khedive, and 
it was acceptable for a Christian to execute the orders of a Muslim 
superior. After 1923, the office became more powerful. The Prime 
Minister represented the will of the people and had independent
9U. CCEH, F7/D7, Cards 9^3-9, Security Reports, 31 May 19^2.
95. FO.371/32573, J2885/38/16.
96. CCEH, F7/D7, Cards 9^0-9, Security Reports, 30 and 31 May 19^2.
97- Both Ramadan and al-Feki think that Makram genuinely thought
that he could be Prime Minister. Ramadan, Tatawwur, vol.2, 
p.272; al-Feki, "Makram Ubayd", p.163.
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executive authority; it was less acceptable for a Christian to 
exercise such direct power over Muslims. Even had the Palace retained 
a sterling reputation, it would have had trouble with the appointment 
of a Coptic Prime Minister. Perhaps Makram, in thinking it feasible, 
fell prey to the political ideas upon which his party and the Egyptian 
political system were based.
In June Makram was dismissed as Secretary-General of the party.
He and 20 supporters requested a meeting of the Executive to discuss
the action, but al-Nahhas refused. Perhaps Makram felt that he could
command a majority in the party Executive. In July Makram and a 
- Oft
supporter, Raghib Hanna were ejected from the party. Twenty 
deputies and senators, about half of whom were Copts, left the Wafd
on
■with them.
In attracting ten Copts, Makram succeeded in obtaining the support 
of only one-quarter of the total number in parliament, most of whom were 
Wafdists. Some members were probably reluctant to find themselves so 
soon in opposition, particularly after several years out of power.
Those Copts who backed Makram may have done so out of some combination 
of familial, regional, personal, political and religious ties. Although
98. Raghib was his closest ally but was not, as is sometimes reported, 
is brother-in-law. Raghib was the brother of Bushra and Sinut 
Joanna: Makram married into a different Hanna family.
99- ama^an lists 17 names, as does al-Feki. Misr lists 19 names
missing one of the names on al-Feki's list. The British records 
suggest that 21 were^expelled with Makram and this probably 
included Rag|ib^Hanna. The Copts were Charles Bushra Hanna, 
the nephew of Raghib; George Makram ^ Ubaid, the brother of 
Makram; Mihana al-Qummu?; Zaki and NajTb Mikha’il Bishara;
Michel Rizq; Dr. Fahmi SulimAn Sidhum, Alfred Qasls and Labib 
Gris. None were members of the Wafd Executive. See RamadSn,
J3228/If/16° P*25?; Mfr, 13 July 19^2, p.2; FO.371/3i573,
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Makram's supporters were disproportionately Christian, he attracted
many Muslims as well. This fact alone suggests that the schism had
nothing to do with religion.
Given strict press censorship, an underground publication was
the only way that Makram could be sure of reaching the public. With 
101Palace collusion, Makram had the Black Book, a catalogue of Wafdist
corruption, illegally printed and distributed. The book insisted
that the quarrel between al-Nahhas and Makram was due to the latter's
refusal to tolerate corruption and not, as al-Nahhas insisted, an
102attempt to trim Makram's power. The censorship forbade any
mention of the Black Book in the press; in any case, Ruz al-Yusuf was
103the only journal to take Makram's part openly.
King Faruq and Makram hoped that the British would be unable to 
ignore the volume and seriousness of the charges and would allow the
10U
al-Nahhas Cabinet to be dismissed. However, Lampson, who had
gone to so much trouble to put the Wafd in power, was unaccommodating. 
The charges in the Black Book were dealt with in Parliament, but 
through an interpellation, which did not permit discussion, rather 
than a full-dress debate. Makram took three days to present his
100. It is possible, however, that the heavy use of ethnic propaganda in 
1937-38 had an effect on a segment of the Wafd leadership. Some 
may have been concerned to reduce Makram's visibility not so much 
out of personal rivalry as a desire to leave the party less open
to charges of Coptic domination.
101. Lampson speculated that the Palace, at a minimum encouraged Makram 
in the enterprise. Al-Hamamsi claims that Hassanain suggested the 
Idea of a petition while Makram recommended its publication. It 
would seem that the preliminaries were arranged by 'Isma'il Sidqi 
and Murad Muhsin, head of the Royal Daira. Once the King agreed 
to the project, Hassanain seems to have taken charge of it. See 
Evans (ed.), The Killearn Diaries, 193U-U6 (London 1972), p.250; 
Jalal al-Din al-Hamam§i, Hiwar Wara' al-'Avar (Cairo 1976), PP*31-6; 
F0.371/35525, J2855/2/16.’
102. F0.371/35532, J1781/2/16.
103. F0.371/35533, J1951/2/16.
10l+. F0.371/35536, J2855/2/16.
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interpellation and stormed out of the Chamber when he was not allowed 
to continue. Al-Nahhas answered the charges and won a vote of 
confidence from the Chamber in May."*"^ Two months later, Makram was 
deprived of his seat; his supporters in Parliament shared his fate.
The following year, Makram was arrested and only released in October 
19HU when the Wafd government fell.
Some Copts feared that Makram’s behaviour would cause a Wafdist 
backlash against the community. In 19^3 Habib al-Masri publicly asked 
al-Nahhas not to confuse the views of a people with those of one 
i n d i v i d u a l . A l - M a s r i  need not have worried. The Wafd was eager 
to retain its traditional Coptic support. As early as July 19^2, 
notice was sent to provincial Wafd committees that the problem was not 
a sectarian one; the party would keep its faith with the principles
107of Zaghlul and would not begin making distinctions on religious grounds.
Two Copts, ’Ibrahim Faraj Masiha and Kamil Sidql, joined Fahmi Wisa on
the Wafd’s Executive Committee. Since Bushra Hanna, Fahmi’s colleague,
had died, this action put three Copts on the Executive and gave notice
that the party was still a union of Muslims and Copts. In addition,
’Ibrahim Faraj, son of the man who had helped al-Nahhas get a
professional start, was portrayed as a protege of al-Nahhas. Al-Nahhas
called on the Coptic bishop in Makram’s home town of Qina in January
10 819^3 and later made a speech reaffirming Copt-Muslim solidarity.
Al-Nahhas lost the good will of some Copts when Makram was defeated 
in a fixed election for the Presidency of the Bar Association. There were
105* FO.371/35536, J2855/2/16 .
106. Misr, 9 September 1950, p.l.
107. FO.371/31573, J3228/38/16.
108. At the same time, the Palace began competing for a share of this 
now uncertain Coptic support. Brotherhood and unity were praised, 
and even Shaikh al-Maraghi made friendly public references to the 
Copts. F0.371A1317, J A 95/1U/16 . FO.371/35529, J665/2/16.
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many Coptic lawyers and a majority of them, as well as of their Muslim
109colleagues, seem to have supported Makram. The day of Makram's
defeat, the Minister of the Interior made a conciliatory hut hardly
110satisfactory speech about the patriotic unity of Muslims and Copts.
A few days later, in a speech celebrating the Islamic New Year, al-
Nahhas spoke at great length about the need for religious tolerance
111and he reminded his audience of Muhammad's example.
When the British demanded the replacement of the incompetent Kamil 
Sidqi as Finance Minister, al-Nahhas demurred. Sidql was the only 
Copt in the Cabinet, and al-Nahhas feared that some Copts, and maybe 
even Sidqi himself, would take offence and desert the Wafd. Not until 
May did al-Nahhas bow to British pressure and move Sidqi to the less 
consequential State Audit Department.
To compensate for the demotion of one Copt, Fahmi Wisa was made 
Minister of Civil Defence, a portfolio which had been abolished in 
19^ +2. Neither Fahmi nor Kamil exercised much influence in the party;
their colleague, 'Ibrahim Faraj, seems to have played a more important
n 112 role.
From the mid-l9U0s, ideological concerns seemed partly to occupy 
the party. Leftist members co-operated with Marxists and trade 
unionists to form in 19^ -6 the Committee of Workers and Students. This
body, which played a disruptive role and helped bring the Wafd to
109- To secure the election of Makram's opponent, the Wafd government 
postponed the elections until the day after Christmas making it 
impossible for Coptic lawyers who had joined their families in the 
provinces for the holiday to return in time to vote. The following 
year the Wafd nominated Kamil Sidqi to run against Makram. Sidqi 
won by a considerable majority, but many Copts felt that this election 
had also been fixed. FO.371/^-6315, J15l/lU/l6 and J223/ A / 16.
110. This was at a meeting he attended of the Coptic Benevolent Society. 
F0.317A1316. J223/1U/16.
111. US Department of State Archives, No.883A0^/ll6. Alexander Kirk 
to the Secretary of State, 31 December 19^3.
112. Interview, ’Ibrahim ’Amin Ghali, h June 1980.
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113power in 1950, seems to have involved few Copts. Some Copts were,
however, associated with another organization of the party's left wing,
the Wafdist Vanguard (al-Talica al-Wafdiyya), and among them were
Dr. Riyad Shams and CAzIz Mirhum. Louis ^Awad, another Copt, was
a sympathizer. As a poet and critic, he was particularly influential as
someone around whom leftist students in the university could gather.
At the other end of the spectrum, the powerful Fu’ad Siraj al-Din
was cultivating the Palace. He probably numbered at least one Copt,
Stafan Basil!, a relative newcomer to the Wafd, among his supporters.
It is more difficult to tell where 'Ibrahim Faraj and Kamil Sidqi stood;
their first loyalty was probably to al-Nahhas who was trying to hold
115
the party together but was by 1950 ailing. The only important
Copt to join the party in the post-Makram period was Jeffrey Najib 
Ghali who abandoned the Sacdists in 19^ -6 to become a member of the Wafd 
Executive.
There is no instrument so fine as to allow an accurate and easy 
assessment of shifts in support for the Wafd. Consequently it is 
difficult to determine if there was an immediate and disproportionate 
decline of Coptic support after Makram's exit. There was, of course, 
a genuine and steady deterioration in the Wafd's reputation from 19^2; 
the event’s of U February and the Black Book showed al-Nahhas and his 
cohorts to be flawed characters, and they badly tarnished al-Nahhas1 
personal aura of incorruptibility. This growing disenchantment with 
the party which had most strongly backed Coptic participation in 
politics was bound to affect the community.
113. Louis cAwad believes that few Copts generally were to be found 
in the party's left wing. Interview, 29 February 1980.
llH. Ibid.
115. FO.371/803^8 , EIOI6/36/16.
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A more serious problem for the Copts was the Wafd's diminished 
commitment, statements of party leaders to the contrary notwithstanding, 
to unity and equality. This was on symbolic and practical levels.
The sundering of the al-Nahhas-Makram alliance destroyed a symbol of 
national unity as potent and meaningful as that of the 1919 crescent 
and cross flag. No new symbol, or partnership, emerged to take its 
place. There were fewer Copts in the party, and they had less influence 
as individuals and as a group after the split. In effect, the Coptic 
voice in the Wafd was neutralized; and, while the Wafd never formally 
abandoned its secular principles, Wafdist Copts were unable to counter 
their party's greater reliance on Muslim religious feeling in the late 
19U0s.
Possibly no party could have borne the burden of being the party 
of national unity after 19^6. Even had the Wafd not split in 19^2, 
it might have succumbed to the temptation to play with religious 
sentiment. There certainly was less pressure to resist this temptation
after 19^2. The Wafd expended so much of its energy on the pursuit of
independence and power that it never had the time, or perhaps the 
inclination, to devote to internal reform and to building solid political 
institutions. Only this latter focus could ultimately have secured the 
political integration of the Coptic community, as well as a stable 
political system which was responsive to the needs of ordinary Egyptians.
From the mid-19^0s, a feeling grew that the Copts deserved the
111attacks made against them. The Wafd, as the organization most
capable of calming sectarian hostility, did as little to combat the 
problem as did the Palace. In 19^8, the French Embassy, in noting that
no party defended the Copts, added that the Wafd appeared to have
111. Misr, 17 January 1951, P*l*
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forsaken its supraconfessional stand for one of Arabism and "the Islamic
IIP
idea". Misr repeatedly complained in the early 1950s that the Wafd
113Cabinet completely ignored the problem of religions fanaticism. The
paper made a clear distinction between the Wafd of the 1950s and the Wafd
of Zaghlul; in reporting how few Copts had been nominated by the party
in 19^9, Misr commented savagely on this "new policy".11  ^ Many Copts
felt that they had been abandoned along with the principles of Sa^d
Zaghlul;11  ^ Misr criticized the Wafd for confusing religion and nation.
Co-operation with the Muslim Brethren did not improve the Wafd's image.
Misr repeatedly returned to the days of Zaghlul as a paradigm for
national unity and equality.11^ In 1952 the paper brought up the
subject of the Black Book and accused al-Nahhas of disliking all Copts
117
because he hated Makram.
Misr was now quick to point out the disadvantage of relying on
parties which continually acted to erode the political position of the
community, in part by decreasing the number of its political 
ll8representatives. At the same time, those same parties were eroding
the political system on which Coptic participation and communal safety 
depended. The only solution was perhaps to withdraw from a political 
world in which the principles of Zaghlul seemed to be increasingly 
irrelevant.
112. French Embassy Archives, Box lUU, File 21/2. Situation de la 
Communaute Copte en Egypte, 2k January 19^ -8.
11.3- Migr, 23 October 1951, p.l.
llH. Migr, 26 November 19^9, p.l.
115. Migr did not only criticize the Wafd for introducing Islam into 
secular matters, but this particular article clearly indicates a 
new perception of what the Wafd was and what it stood for. Migr,
11 January 1950, p.l. See also, Misr, 9 September 1950, p.l.
116. When al-Nappas abrogated the treaty and appealed for unity between 
parties, Migr chided him for not also calling for unity between the 
ethnic groups. Migr, 12 November 1951, p.l, and 10 October 1951, p.l.
117. Migr, 28 March 1952, p.l, and 1 April 1951, p.l.
118. Migr, 26 November 19^9, p.l.
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B, The Liberal Constitutional Party
This party3 with less organization and appeal than the Wafd, was,
119
in the words of one wit, "A General Staff without an army". The
Liberals began with certain convictions but were rather half-hearted
120about expressing them in public; they eventually grew half-hearted
about the convictions as well.
The party grew out of the 1921 ^Adli-Zaghlul split; its founders 
backed the former and saw themselves as sensible moderates combating 
the alarming extremism of the Zaghlulists. Four Copts were elected to 
the party’s Executive Committee at its founding in 1922: ’Ilyas ^Awad; 
Tawfiq Dus, who brought his two brothers into the party; Salib Sami; 
and 'Amin Khayyat, a relative of George. ’Abadir Hakim, a landowner, 
and Qalini Fahmi also joined the party at its inception but were never 
members of the Executive, The latter was a Liberal for only a very 
short time. Kamil Bulus, an ^umdah, landowner and former member of 
both the Wafd Central Committee and the Union Party, was elected to the 
Liberal Executive in 1926, perhaps as a replacement for Tawfiq Dus. By 
1935, all these men had left the party. The only Copt to play an 
important role after this date was Shafiq Bey SIdum ’Ilyas, a former member 
of the Shacb party, who was a Senator and a member of the Liberal 
Parliamentary Committee from 1938-U6. By the latter year, even he had 
defected to the Wafd.
Although the Copts had good reason for their lack of interest in 
the party, the main point illustrated by these defections is the 
weakness of party loyalty. Opportunism explains many shifts in party 
membership. It certainly accounts for the resignation of Tawfiq Dus in 
1925. Dus, a Minister in the Liberal-Unionist Government of 1925, came
119. Cab.2U/20U, CP,181 (1929). Memorandum on Egypt.
120. FO.U07/198, Enclosure in N0 .H8. General Situation Report, 
9-22 January 192H.
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increasingly under Palace influence and was unhappy when his party
insisted he resign, with other Liberal Ministers, over the Shaikh
121cAli ^Abd al-Raziq affair. This coalition had never been an easy
one and, once before, Dus had managed to preserve it when the other
three Liberal Ministers threatened to resign over the Unionist abuse
of government machinery for party ends. He persuaded his colleagues
that the Liberals would lose the next election if they had to compete
122against the Wafd without government help. His arguments in
September were less convincing than they had been the previous July;
and he, with other Liberals, was obliged to resign from the Cabinet.
Not long after this, Dus submitted a conditional resignation from 
123the party. His act was at least partly motivated by growing ties
with the Palace. Given the Liberals' general lack of success at the
polls, Dus may have felt that his political future could best be secured
with royal backing. However, he seems to have maintained contacts
with Liberals, perhaps out of a reluctance to burn his bridges too soon.
Both he and Salih Sami were reported in 1926 to be opposing Liberal
co-operation with the Wafd. Dus finally broke with the Liberals when
a Wafd-Liberal coalition was established and Zaghlul adamantly refused
12t
to grant Dus a constituency for the upcoming Chamber election. Dus
ran as an Independent but with Palace and government backing. He
C c v' «*•121. Abd al- Aziz Fahmi, the Liberal Minister of Justice, had been dismissed 
because he did not want to expel the Shaikh, who had Liberal connections,
from the Judiciary when the latter published his controversial book on
the Caliphate. Sidqi followed Fahmi out of the Cabinet, and the party 
voted in favour of the resignation of the two remaining Liberal 
Ministers. The British did not want the coalition to collapse, and
Dus had actually been in touch with them over the matter. F0.U07/201, 
No.33, Mr. Henderson to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, 12 September 1925;
Haikal, Mudhakkirat, vol.l, pp.235-6, 2^1.
122. F0.H07/202, No.17, Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 9 April 1926.
123. The reason he gave was al-Siyasa1s hostility to the 'Ittihadists.
FO.^07/201, No.35. Henderson to Chamber, 19 September 1925; Migr 
21 September 1925, p.2 ; Haikal, Mudhakirrat, vol.l, p.2U2.
12U. F0.1|07/202, No.17. Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 9 April 1926.
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won but was almost immediately obliged to resign his seat due to 
striking election irregularities.
In a similar case, Salib Sami, a gifted lawyer, resigned from the 
party in 1933 because he wished to accept a portfolio in the Sidqi 
Cabinet, which his party was opposing. Sami, who was rumoured to owe 
his career to Liberal leader Muhammad Mahmud's patronage, had been an 
important party member.
Other Coptic notables drifted away from the party at different times
and for different reasons. The Liberals’ persistent use of anti-Coptic
propaganda could not have encouraged old Coptic members to stay and new
ones to join. In the wake of al-Siyasa's 1929 assault on the Copts for
their alleged opposition to the treaty, Misr asked how any Copts could
consider themselves members of such a despicable party. At least one
Copt agreed with Misr; 'Abadir Hakim resigned from the party in
February 1930 because of al-Siyasa1s anti-Coptic bias. Predictably,
al-Siyasa seems to have accused him of putting minority interests before
national ones. Hakim may have been putting personal interests first as
127well; he went over to the the then reigning Wafd.
The Liberal party began its political career with good and 
honourable intentions toward Egyptian minorities, as the number of Copts 
and even the one Jew who became party "Generals" indicates. However, 
few Christians hastened to fill out the ranks; Wafdist ideas and 
political behaviour were better known and more attractive. In addition, 
the Liberal press indulged in anti-Coptic statements as early as 1923. 
This may have caused many Copts to think twice, as did the punishing
125. FO.371/20916, JI989/815/I6 .
126. Misr, 13 September 1929, p.l. This is discussed in Chapter Two.
127. See Hakim's articles in Misr, 10 March 1930, p.l, and 
20 February 1930, p.U.
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Liberal defeat at the polls in 1923- Very few Copts stood for election
on the Liberal ticket in 1925 > tut perhaps the Liberals by then resented
the fact that they had so little Coptic support. The 1923 defection
of Qalini Fahmi and the 1925-26 loss of the Dus brothers meant that
within the party there were fewer influential Copts who could argue
against the tactic of linking the Copts with the Wafd in order to
discredit the latter. Kamil Bulus Bey may have been the last Coptic
member of the Executive. He still sat on the committee in 1931 but
died shortly thereafter. By the mid-1930s, no Copts were represented
on the Executive. In the 1938 and 19^5 elections, not one victorious
Liberal was a Copt. This does not mean that no Copts stood as 
128
Liberals but this is a likely conclusion since the coalitions winning 
the elections apportioned constituencies to reduce competition before 
the election. It may, of course, mean that no Coptic Liberal had a 
high enough standing within the party to demand a safe seat. In the 
1950 election however, there were no Coptic Liberal candidates. The 
party of Liberalism and constitutionalism had become the party of 
Muslims.
C. The Palace
The Palace played such a critical and indeed even damaging role in 
Egyptian politics that it merits inclusion in a section devoted to party 
politics. The royal family, proud of its Turkish ancestry, disdained, if 
not despised their Egyptian subjects. The inner circle of royal
advisers were mainly Turkic in origin; few Christians worked in the
128. Curiously, al-Siyasa in these two years published a list of all the 
candidates without denoting Liberal candidates.
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Palace with the one exception of the European Administration, where
129Christian language skills were useful.
There were Coptic politicans who sought their political fortune
in conjunction with the Palace. This was less out of a belief in the
institution of monarchy than it was out of devotion to personal
interests. While the Wafd and the Liberals can at least claim to have
had certain principles , it is difficult to find any principles to which
the Palace and its allies were attached, beyond the advancement of their
own power. Those Coptic politicians who sheltered under the wing of
the Palace had little popular appeal; few seem to have been involved in
the nationalist movement between 1918 and 1922. They came from
different family circumstances; some were descended from great landowning
families and others, who came to politics via a professional education,
were from more modest backgrounds. In 1925 a number of Copts, mainly
wealthy landowners like Amin Ghali, brother of the late Prime Minister
Butrus; Bulus Hanna Pasha, an elected Senator who probably had just
130resigned from the Wafd Parliamentary Committee; Kamil Bulus Bey, who
in the space of a few short years belonged to the Wafd, 'Ittihad and 
Liberal parties; and Sarufim Mina ^Ubaid, an ex-Wafdist, joined the 
Palace-sponsored al-'Ittihad party.
129. One Copt who did gain influence with King Faruq, particularly at the 
end of his reign, was the businessman, ’Ilyas Pasha 'Andrawus. A 
member of the boards of directors of several companies, he had an 
unsavoury reputation and was well placed to advise the Palace on its 
own unsavoury financial dealings. 'Ilyas’ influence seem to have 
extended beyond business matters to other more critical areas.
Hassan Pasha Yusuf, head of the Royal Diwan just before the end of the 
monarchy, suggests that ’Ilyas interfered in practically all Palace 
concerns. Yusuf believes that Ilyas' reputation for corruption was 
richly deserved. Interview, Hassan Yusuf, 8 November 1978. Another 
Copt who had influence with the Palace was cAdli 'Andrawus Bishara, 
the son of a wealthy landowner.
130. In early 1925, a number of members of the Wafd Parliamentary Committee 
resigned on the grounds that the Wafd was insufficiently loyal to the 
throne. Many then joined al-'Ittibad. 'Ahmad Shafiq accused the 
British press and some English papers of trying to create a rift between 
the Wafd and the Palace. See his Hawliyyat, vol.2(l925), pp.2-20.
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'Ibrahim Ghali suggests that his father, 'Amin, and other landowners
joined the party because they were in financial difficulties and they
thought membership in a Palace-backed organization would help. 'Amin
and Bulus Hanna were members of the party Executive. Kamil Bey Bulus
was a member of the Qina Committee, of which Bulus Hanna was President.
131Sarufim belonged to the Minya Markaz (District) Committee. A few
Coptic ^umdahs and merchants joined the party as well. Nakhla al-Mutl^I,
whom the British respected, belonged to the party and was occasionally
offered a Cabinet post as well.
More Copts leapt on the bandwagon and joined a Palace-approved, if
not sponsored, venture in 1930. This was Prime Minister 'Isma^il
Sidqi's misnamed al~Shacb , or People's Party. Some who joined, like two
members of the Wisa family, were landowners and relatively inactive
politically; again, they probably joined because they hoped for financial
benefit. Other members, like the three Dus brothers and Qalini Fahmi,
were both more active and influential with the Palace. The lawyer Salib
Sami joined al-Sha^b when he was offered a portfolio in the Sidqi Cabinet. 
132Cabinet. At the local level, there were Copts on the provincial
committees of the more heavily Christian provinces; for example, one-half 
of the members of the 'Asyut Committee were Copts.
The party outlived the Sidqi regime but after the Prime Minister's 
fall in 1933, it was scarcely a credible political force. Sidqi lost 
control of the party and eventually it was merged with al-'Ittihad. At 
no point did al-Shacb have any popular support. It was an artificial 
creation designed to brighten the democratic image of a basically 
repressive regime.
131. See al-'Ittifrad, 29 January 1925, p.^> and U October 1925, p.5.
132. Sami remained a party member when he served in the Cabinet of Sidqi's 
successor, ^Abd al-Fatah Yahya Pasha. Sami was reported to be the 
only Minister who had the confidence of Yahya. FO.371/20916, 
1989/815/16.
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There were two Copts in particular who were close to the Palace:
Qalini Fahml and Tawfiq Dus. The influence of the former, once
considerable, began to decline before Fu’ad's death, in part due to
133
Fahml's advanced age and deteriorating mental ability. In addition,
Patriarch Yu'annis had come to rely on Tawfiq Dus. Fahmi had once been
his closest lay adviser and had served as an intermediary between
Patriarch and Palace; by 1930, Dus had usurped his role.
Dus had a more chequered career and was perhaps most influential between
1925 and 1933. He was close to Sidqi and, during the latter's years as
Prime Minister in the 1930s, he may also have been closer to the King
I3I4.
than any other member of the Cabinet. He was also Sidqi's main support
135in the Cabinet. By 1933, however, the Palace was so embarrassed by
charges of corruption against Dus and saw these as so threatening to an
already weak government, that it pressed Sidqi to drop Dus from the 
136Cabinet. Relations between Dus and Sidqi remained good despite
this and, after the latter's eclipse, Dus left Palace-sponsored attacks
- 137on Sidqi to his brother, Wahib.
133. By 1929, the British reported that he no longer enjoyed great 
political influence. FO.lUl/686, 8609/55/29*
13U. FO. 1*07/213, J395/395/16.
135* F0.H07/216, J3362/1U/16.
136. In 1932 there were charges of corruption made against Sidqi and Dus. 
Partly because of the frequency of these charges, two other members 
of the Cabinet were on such bad terms with both men that they were 
threatening to resign (F0.U07/216, J3392/lU/l6; FO.lUl/650, 392/7/30). 
Sidqi suggested Dus for the US Legation, but given the likelihood of 
an unenthusiastic welcome by the Americans, Dus decided to remain a 
Deputy (F0.371/20916, J1989/815/16). In any case, Dus' primary 
interest seems to have been in making money; politics was just 
another means of acquisition.
137. In this way, Dus managed to satisfy royal pleasure without 
sacrificing Sidqi's friendship. F0.371/20916, JI989/815/I6.
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King Faruq's reliance on religious feeling and his poSe as a devout
monarch, probably made him more unwilling than Fu’ad to be seen working
in close collaboration with certain Coptic politicians. He was, in
any case, not terribly open to outside influence at the beginning of
his reign due to the ascendance of ‘‘All Mahir and Shaikh al-Maraghi.
Dus was persona non grata for some time, but was sufficiently returned
138to favour in 19^ -2 to be named to the Senate. He may later have lost
139that favour with the Palace because his appointment was cancelled 
in igkh.
Dus’ brother, Wahib, was also close to the Palace but was without 
Tawfiq*s influence. He was a great friend of CA1I Mahir and was even
_ 1U0persuaded by the latter to make contributions to Misr al-Fatat. He
ll+l
was also to be found lecturing to the Young Men’s Muslim Association.
These were connections that few Copts would have found appropriate.
There were other Copts who were associated at times with the Palace.
-  ^lU2Unlike the Dus brothers, these tended, like Salib Sami, Nakhla al- 
MuticI and possibly Saba Habashi^^ to be conscientious and respected 
functionaries who were useful as token Copts in Palace-dominated Cabinets.
138. The Prime Minister al-Nalj]jas did not want to repeat his 1937 battle
with the Palace over Senate appointments. He objected to some of the 
names proposed by the Palace but settled on a compromise list which 
included Dus. FO.371/31571, J1926/38/16.
139* Interview, Hassan Pasha Yusuf, 8 November 1978.
1^0. WO.208/1560. Middle East Information Centre Summary. Report ^31,
6 February 19^1.
lUl. DW. HBM(QM): Security Report ^ 9 1 s 20 November 19^ -0.
1^2. His 1925 campaign experience was so shattering that he never ran
for election again. He had a good reputation as a jurist although 
Mack in the Foreign Office did not think much of his ability.
Salib Sami, Dhikrayyat Siyasiyya 1891-1952 (Cairo 1952), pp.lU2-H;
FO.371/17009, J1851/25/16.
1^3. The British may have used him as an intermediary with ‘-All Mahir in 
19^1. CCEH, F7/D7, Card 801, Public Security Report, 22 December
19*+1. Once a Sacdist, he became, at some point, an "Independent".
He served in the Sidqi Cabinet in 19^6 and was, during that time, 
appointed to the Senate. He resigned his portfolio in October 19^6 
because he did not want to be connected with the unsavoury Sidqi any 
more. FO.371/53313, JIU78/39/I6.
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D. The Sa°dist Party
Only one important Copt, Najib 'Iskandar, left the Wafd with Mahir 
and al-Nuqrashi to form this party named after Sacd Zaghlul; none the 
less, Copts were well represented in the party. This is somewhat 
surprising given the party's predilection for anti-Coptic propaganda, 
as demonstrated particularly in the 1938 election campaign, but it may 
be related to the Sa^dists* primarily urban base. 'Iskandar may have 
joined because he had finally realized that, after his 1932 defection, 
he was unlikely to be trusted with any important position in the Wafd.
He was able to play an influential role in the new party and sat in
various Cabinets which included Sacdist participation. Another defector
t 1^4-Uto the Sacdists was Azir Jibran, Deputy for Baqur, 'Asyut. vYziz
Mishriql, a young lawyer related by marriage to Najib, was more
influential; he was considered but rejected for a portfolio in 19^ +6
and finally became Vice-President of the Chamber. Saba HabashI also
7 ) cr
joined, and was elected in 1938 to represent Heliopolis in the Chamber, 
Jeffrey Ghali, who was a personal friend of al-Nuqrashi, also belonged to 
the party and gave generously to its treasury. He resigned in 19^6 over 
the draft Anglo-Egyptian treaty which he believed demeaned Egypt. His 
His second cousin suggests that he felt his political ambitions would be
lk6better served by the Wafd.
It is interesting that most of those Copts who won election to 
the Chamber in 1938 stood as Saedists. The party improved its record 
in 19^5 and 1950 elections by nominating more Copts than in 1938. At
l4^. Migr, 12 January 1938, p.l. 
li+5. See footnote 1^3.
1k6. 'Ibrahim 'Amin Ghali thinks that Jeffrey resigned because he wanted 
to be made a Cabinet Minister. Interview, k June 1980.
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least half those Copts represented urban constituences. Had the party- 
preached what it practised, it might have won the support of many more 
Copts; but this probably would not have been an advantage to a splinter 
group struggling to establish itself as a credible political force.
E, The Wafdist Bloc (al-Kutla al-Wafdiyya)
Soon after breaking with al-Nahhas, Makram founded his own political 
vehicle, the Wafdist Bloc. Its better known members seemed mainly to 
come from middle-class families in Upper Egypt; many were fairly young 
and none had strong links with the Wafd in the formative 1918-22 period. 
Most were relatively unknown, although some of al-Kutla’s Copts were 
familiar to the community through their participation in various communal 
organizations. Unlike the other parties, al-Kutla was blessed with an 
absence of internal dissension, partly because of Makram’s strength and 
partly because, as the American Ambassador pointed out, there were not
ti ii 1^7enough members to work up a good fight .
Al-Kutla was not an overnight or even an eventual success. Until 
late 19^ +U, the Wafd Ministry was able to neutralize its activity.
With both censorship and martial law in effect, there was little 
political freedom for those not backing the Wafd. The new party found 
it very difficult to place its rival claim to the Zaghlulist legacy 
before the public’s eye. Perhaps Makram miscalculated and saw his 
popularity as something that grew out of public perceptions of his 
talents and character rather than something that was due, at least in 
part, to his connection with Zaghlul, the Wafd and even al-Nahhas.
1U7. US Department of State Archives, No.883.00. Ambassador Jefferson 
Caffery to the Secretary of State, 10 November 19^9*
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Particularly in the party’s early years, Makram was the most
lU8ferociously anti-Wafdist of any politician. That a party whose
platform was largely restricted to complaints about Wafdist misdeeds 
could survive two-and-a-half years of Wafd government is something
1U9of a tribute to the talents of Makram. Al-Kutla was only briefly
a credible political force and that was due to the events of I9H2-UU
as well as to strong Palace backing. In the long run, however, the
150
party’s tie to the King only reflected discredit upon it. A party
newspaper was not published until 19^  and its collapse in 19^9
signalled the virtual end of the party.
In an attempt to attract public attention, Makram adopted a more
151exaggerated anti-British stance than he had for some years. The
American Ambassador suggested that his views were more nationalist and
152anti-British than even those of the Wafd. These views gave him
something in common with the Muslim Brethren and he, like other
politicians, courted them in particular and the religious sentiment
which made them popular in general. He complained that the Wafd
maltreated al-'Azhar and the Brethren; he mentioned in the Black Book,
for example, that the Wafdist government had closed some of the Muslim
153
Brethren’s branches. The Black Book was also careful to record the
special favours the government had granted to certain Coptic officials.
lU8. Haikal, Mudhakkirat, vol.2, p.2 7 6; FO.371/^1328, J1731/31/16; 
F0.371A137. JI69H/1U/16; Evans (ed.), The Killearn Diaries.
193^-U6, p.255.
1^9. Lampson felt that Makram was "too passionate and vindictive for wise 
leadership", and apparently many opposition elements felt Makram1s 
violent tactics were not helping their cause. FO.371/35529> J812/2/16.
150. As Louis cAwad commented, it was one thing to attack the Wafd but 
quite another to become a "stooge" at the Palace. Interview.
19 February 1980.
151. This was evident as early as July 19U2. FO.371/31573, J3301/28/16.
152. US Department of State Archives, No.883.00. Ambassador Jefferson 
Caffrey to the Secretary of State, 10 November 19^9■
153. Al-Feki, "Makram Ubayd", p.216.
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In the autumn of 19^2, it was rumoured that Makram was meeting 
with Eassan al-Banna', the Brethren's Supreme Guide. Upon learning 
that al-Nahhas planned to ban Brethren meetings in Cairo in
retaliation, al-Banna' publicly denied that any meetings with Makram
15k 1had taken place. With the publication of the Black Book in 19^3,
the Wafd government, needing another ally, eased its pressure on the
Brethren, and may have considered using the Brethren to intimidate
155Makram's Coptic supporters. In later years, the Brethren would not
need any encouragement to intimidate Copts. It is not clear that 
Makram's conciliatory attitude toward the Brethren was ever productive.
When he tried to use the Brethren to ensure a good reception on a visit
-  156 to Tanta in 19 A , it backfired and he was loudly booed. In 19 A s
Makram was again meeting with al-Banna'. The following year, he was
the only politician to condemn the dissolution of the Brethren 
157organization; similarly, he was the only one to defy a government
order and attend the funeral when al-Banna' was assassinated.
However much Makram may have disliked the fact, his religion and 
the number of Copts in the party at its founding gave al-Kutla an 
immediate claim on the attention of the Coptic community. He did not 
attempt to fix that claim by representing communal interests both because 
he considered himself a national politician and because he realized that 
Muslim support was vital to his success. If anything, Makram paid less 
attention to sectarian problems than many of his colleagues. He may,
15l}. FO.lHl/838, 305/27A2.
155* F0.371A1329, J1880/31/16.
156. It is not clear who was doing the booing. FO.37lAl335, Al6U/3l/l6. 
157- 'Akhir Saca wrote that al-Banna' must think that Makram had become 
the last Muslim Brother. Quoted in Richard Mitchell, The Society 
of Muslim Brothers (London 1969)5 p.66.
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however, have worked both sides of the street and ordered Coptic party
workers to explain to Copts that it was in their interest to hack al~
158Kutla. In 19bh it was rumoured that Coptic party workers were
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using communal and religious tensions to attract followers.
The fall of the Wafd government in I9A  and the organization of 
a coalition government, including four Ministers from al-Kutla, gave 
the party its first real freedom to organize. In October, the party 
gained the support of ten Deputies and Senators who defected from the 
Wafd when they realized that their party was due for a long stretch in 
the political cold."^^
In the summer of 19^ -2, Makram had begun talks with the Liberals 
and Sa^dists; both, like him,were opposed to the Wafd and in some measure 
dependent on the Palace. They were not natural allies and only
l6lconsiderable pressure from the Palace forced their co-operation.
The personal antipathy between Makram and al-Nuqrashi would soon have
destroyed the I9A  coalition government without this countervailing
pressure. Some Copts feared that December that this enmity and
Makram1s troublesomeness could have unpleasant repercussions for the 
162
community. Makram was not only being unnecessarily critical of the
Wafd but he was creating many problems for his Prime Minister, 'Ahmad 
Mahir. Prince Muhammad CA1I and Embassy personnel speculated that 
Makram and the Palace would, after thoroughly discrediting the Wafd, 
sabotage the present government and install a more subservient Palace
158. CCEH, F7/D7, Cards 95^— 7* Security Report, 15 August I9U2.
159. FO.371/^1331, J3065/31/16.
160. This list included at least three Copts: Albert George Khayyat, 
Dr. Ramzl Jirjis and Dr. 'Iskandar Fahmi Jirjawi. The three 
were Deputies.
161. One first fruit of their co-operation was an attack on al-Nahhas 
delivered in a joint letter to King Faruq that November. CCEH, 
F7/D7, Cards 95^-7* Security Report, 18 August 19^2.
162. F0.371A5916, J76/3/16.
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l6 3Ministry. Perhaps Makram saw this as his chance to he Prime
Minister.
The coalition quarrelled over the distribution of constituencies 
for the 19 A  election. Makram wanted fewer seats left to open 
competition because he correctly calculated that, with Sa^dists as 
Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Sacdists would win free 
constituencies. The Palace pressed 'Ahmad Mahir to agree to Makram's 
demand because it did not want the Sacdists so strong that it reduced 
their dependency on the Palace. However, when 'Ahmad Mahir threatened 
to resign if he could not have his way, the Palace relented. Makram 
then threatened to resign unless the Sacdist party disowned all Sacdist 
candidates standing in constituencies earmarked for al-Kutla and stopped 
appointing Sacdist village chiefs in al-Kutla constituencies. Mahir was 
tempted to let Makram resign, but his supporters dissuaded him because 
they were worried about Makram's considerable support among workers."^^ 
The Sacdists were popular primarily in urban areas so it was important 
that the coalition not lose that support. While Makram was working 
out the details of a compromise, workers demonstrated in front of 
cAbdin Palace and threatened a general strike if Makram resigned.
King Faruq was moved to send Hassan Pasha Yusuf, a Palace lackey, to
165urge Makram to settle his differences with the Prime Minister.
Makram was right to be concerned for al-Kutla did even less well
in the elections than he expected. The party was allocated 55 safe
seats by the coalition, but it presented a total of 83 candidates.
166Fourteen of these, or 17 per cent, were Copts. The party won only
163. F0.371A1335, JU013/31/16; J^052/31/l6; JU15U/31/16. 
16k. F0.371A1335, JU516/31/16.
3.65. Ibid.
166. Al-Kutla, U December 19A , p.3.
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20 seats, due to government interference on behalf of Sa'-dist candidates 
and because many so-called "Independents" standing in al-Kutla 
constituencies were actually Sa^dists. There was talk of excluding al- 
Kutla from the Cabinet and Makram tried to resign, but the Palace refused 
to allow it. Al-Nuqrashi became Prime Minister in February 19^5 when 
'Ahmad Mahir was assassinated, and relations between him and Makram 
steadily deteriorated throughout 19^5* At one point, the Palace patched 
things over but, by autumn, Makram was complicating the Anglo-Egyptian 
treaty revision for al-Nuqrashi by insisting on formal negotiations rather 
than the useful prelude of informal talks. Makram seems to have feared 
being left out of informal discussions. When Raghib Hanna, a passive 
politician loyal to M a k r a m , d i e d  in November, Makram feared that al- 
Nuqrashi would give Hanna's portfolio to a Sa^dist. However, it turned 
out that Raghib, a Minister of State, was not replaced. This weakened 
Makram, without giving him too much cause to complain. Finally, in 
February 19^6, Makram resigned on the grounds that al-Nuqrashi was 
not sharing information about the progress being made toward a revision 
of the treaty. He also outspokenly objected to the severe treatment 
the government had meted out to student demonstrators. This brought 
down the Cabinet and tIsmacil Sidqi became Prime Minister.
Although Makram would never again occupy a Cabinet position, he was 
invited to join Sidqi1s team to negotiate a new treaty. Acting in 
character, he was reported to be the most intransigent and difficult 
member of the team.~*~^ Although the British remarked on his hostility,
167. He had been in poor health and virtual retirement from the time he 
joined the Mahir Cabinet in October 19A. US Department of State 
Archives, No.883.002, Mr. Lyon to the Secretary of State,
28 November 19^ +5 •
168, For example, while Sidqi was willing to leave the matter of the Sudan 
until after the treaty had been signed, Makram insisted that it be 
settled in the treaty. FO.371/53312, Al38/39/l6; FO.371/62993*
A 516/3/I6; FO.371/53313, JUl6l/39/l6.
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it was not really noteworthy; Makram was playing to an audience that 
had itself become increasingly anti-British. One rather concise 
description suggests that Makram1s political tactics of the time 
involved "flattery of the Palace, resounding patriotic speeches, 
bitter attacks on the Wafd, appeals to the Coptic minority for 
support....and declarations of friendship toward the reactionary
169Muslim Brethren". This is an odd combination, and must have
seemed so to the public. While Makram continued to attack the Wafd,
from the summer of 19^6 , his blows were aimed increasingly at the
1705oxrernment and negotiations with the British. He was very
171argumentative in the Chamber and was complaining indiscriminately.
hi January 19^ -7 he engaged in fisticuffs in the Chamber with a government
leputy. By that autumn, he had turned on his former sponsor, the
Palace. The latter was eager to obtain a treaty and had probably come
172“o find Makram an obstacle in obtaining one.
In 19^6, perhaps sensing that he had antagonized many potential
allies, Makram made a curious approach to the Wafd. Both parties
were in opposition to the government and their newspapers , for a time,
stopped attacking one another. It was rumoured that Fu'ad Siraj
173al-Dm was trying to work out the details of a reconciliation. This
failed and Makram made another approach in 19^7j when the post of party 
Secretary-General fell vacant. Understandably, al-Nahhas was not
17 k
willing to overlook the years of betrayal. Makram again tried to
169. This summary was given at the conference of communist parties of the 
British Empire in 19U7. FO.371/62993, JU516/I3/I6 .
170. Ibid.
171. FO.371/62990, J722/13/16.
172. FO.371/16302, J5178/79/16.
173. It seems unlikely that Siraj al-Din was behind the contacts.
FO.371/53332, J5U30/57/16.
17^. FO,371/63020, J1952/79/16.
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improve his relations with the Wafd in 19*+9» His brother, Hilmi,
was a Wafdist and probably was used as a channel for communication.
By this point, however, there was no incentive for the Wafd to 
collaborate with a party which commanded so little public support.
Makram tried very hard to persuade al-Nahhas to boycott the elections
“I rj/T
because he feared that his party would do badly in them. At the
same time, he tried to come to an arrangement with the Liberals and
v ,. 177Sa dists but they wanted nothing to do with him. He had earlier
been invited to join the coalition cabinet of SirrI Pasha but his
n r r Q
conditions were so extravagant that he was left out. The best he
could hope for was some sort of coalition government formed after the
elections and he appears to have suggested to the British Embassy that
179they intervene to produce such a result. How he intended to deal
with the public reaction to such interference is not recorded. For
someone who tried to build political support on the strength of his 
anti-British credentials, this was an astonishing volte face.
Makram soon gave up the idea of an election boycott and an attempted 
rapprochement with either al-Nahhas or the British. He and al-Nahhas 
attacked one another freely during the election campaign. As the 
British Embassy noted, Makram was "Fighting a losing battle and {had] 
made the fact all the more obvious by canvassing the support and 
collaboration of some of the more extreme elements of the dissolved
175- FO. 371/7*+36U, J5696/1015/16.
176. Ibid.
177. FO.371/73*+6o, J5658/1015/16.
178. He demanded a second portfolio for his weak party and the 
abolition of martial law. FO. 371/73*+65 , J6035/l015/l6.
179. F0.371/73U6H, JU279/1015/16.
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180Muslim Brethren...” Al-Kutla failed to win any seats in the new
Wafdist-dominated Chamber and this effectively finished Makram's career.
The reaction of the Coptic community to Makram was an ambivalent
one. His father had converted to Protestantism, a religion Makram
at least nominally shared until he returned to Orthodoxy in 1923.
Many orthodox resented those who fractured the unity of the Holy Church;
they may also have disliked Makram's convenient conversion to Orthodoxy.
Makram1s lack of interest in the community and its welfare only
reinforced the sense of estrangement. For example, Misr suggested
that Makram*s first name, William, which he never used, was somehow
l81illustrative of his isolation from the community. However, he was
still a Christian and a Copt, only conversion to Islam could change 
this; and, as one who had overcome the handicap of religion to achieve 
great political success, he was an object of pride and a symbol of the 
new equality. He was both praised and criticized, paraded as a great 
patriot and branded as the betrayer of his community. Copts disliked 
his familiarity with and political use of Islam, not simply because it 
sounded hypocritical on the tongue of a non-Muslim, but because a Copt, 
of all Egyptians, ought to have had the sense to leave religion out of 
political debate. Misr criticized Makram for repeatedly referring to 
Christ as "Jesus, the son of Miriam", thereby implying a denial of 
Christ's divinity. The paper suggested that Makram would do well to 
seek instruction in Christianity and to alter his stock political phrase
to "I am an Egyptian [instead of "a Muslim"] in country and a Christian
... „ 182 m  religion .
180. FO.371/803^7» E1016/1/16.
181. Migr, 23 April 1936, p.l.
182. Misr, 15 April 1936, p.l.
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From the mid-19U0s, Makram became something of a liability and 
an embarrassment to the community. Even if he had shown an interest 
in lessening sectarian tensions, the weakness of al-Kutla would have 
given him little power to do so. His party's interest in the problem 
of Muslim hostility to Copts was limited to praising itself as an 
example of Copt-Muslim unity. As the party paper pointed out, al- 
Kutla's leader was a Copt and his followers mostly Muslims. From
1 9 3 7 s  there was always fear in the community that Makram's extravagant
18Hbehaviour threatened them. Misr blamed ^ Ubaid in part for the bad
pass to which the community had come by 1951. He had ignored, wrote
the paper, his responsibility to the Copts. At a time when many were
giving primacy to their religious beliefs, Makram was wearing a
185"patriotic cloak" over his. To Misr, Makram seemed hardly to be
« 4. 186a Copt.
The Copts were not unaware that Makram had separated himself from 
them for political reasons. He was not the only Coptic politician to 
do this; he was simply the most successful. Without this separation, 
he would not have reached the position he did. Perhaps this is what 
many Copts came to resent the most: that one could not be devoutly
Christian and show public concern for the community and be a noteworthy 
success in politics. To Muslims, Makram was a symbol of equality and 
unity, but he was also evidence that non-Muslims could rise above 
parochial concerns and make their first interests national ones.
Despite Makram's clear evidence of this, his very success: made him the 
object, as Misr realized, of more anti-Coptic propaganda than any other
183. Al-Kutla, 2 0  December 19^6, P - 2 .
l8i+. See FO.371/^5930, J399/10/16, for an expression of just this fear 
before the 19^ -5 election.
185. Migr, 27 August 1951, p.l.
186. Migr, 7 April 19^7, p.3
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Christian politician. It was not, however, the propaganda which ruined 
his political career hut his own miscalculations; including, it would 
seem, a mistake as to what was and was not possible for a Copt. Had he 
remained within the Wafdist fold, he might have withstood the political 
storm of the late 19^0s and would surely have strengthened his old party
2 3 9
CHAPTER SIX 
THE COPTS AHD THE STATE
The state hoped to see the Copts exchange their anachronistic 
communal identity for a modern, national one hut still was doubtful 
of both their ability and desire to do so. Consequently, it tried to 
bind the Copts more tightly to it at the same time that it hindered 
this work by protecting the Muslim hold on state institutions. Copts 
increasingly saw the state apparatus as biased against them; their 
access to it was restricted and its interference in their cultural 
and religious affairs was intolerable. By the late 19^0s, the Copts 
could feel the state's chains tightening and there was little to 
compensate for it. There were more theoretical objections to 
equality than there had been in the 1920s; if anything, Egypt seemed 
to be moving farther and farther away from her ideal. Most Muslims 
probably did not care whether the state infringed upon or respected 
traditional millet autonomy; but they did care that the Copts, In 
their practice of Christianity and their demands on the state remain 
relatively invisible. The state could offer the Copts protection and 
a degree of religious tolerance (although even this traditional 
obligation seemed to be questioned by the 19^0s); anything more than 
this could and would be construed as catering to them.
A. The Issue•pf Inequality
1. Economic Behaviour
The division between Copts and Muslims in this century was not 
complicated by a class division. Economic power was not in the 
hands of one community, while political power remained in the hands of
24 0
the other; nor did Muslims completely monopolize both. They
assuredly held the balance of political power and their sheer
numerical majority gave them vast economic resources on which to
draw. Each community did complain about the economic behaviour of
the other; however, grievances were based not on a serious inequity
in the division of wealth but on a fundamental suspicion of those who
were different. There was no sense in either community that they were
completely shut out from all the economic goods life could afford;
the Copts, however, were not entirely unjustified in thinking that
they had a special problem of access to the goods the state could
provide. Although Copts were sometimes Inclined to attribute
"scarcity" to discrimination, they were, In this period, marginally
better educated and marginally wealthier as a group than Muslims.^
Education has always been a route of escape from minority status.
This is not to suggest that there were not many poor, illiterate Copts;
about one-half of the Coptic population earned its living from 
2
agriculture, and most of those were engaged m  subsistence farming.
As far as can be determined, Copts and Muslims acquired land in
much the same way in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Influential and loyal Coptic officials were granted land by a grateful
government or were given the first chance to buy choice state land,
3
and wealthy merchants chose to invest their profits in land. Most,
1. In 1917) 12.3 per cent of Muslim Egyptians and 30.7 per cent of
Copts were literate. See also Gorst's Report on the Affairs of
Egypt, 1911 (Accounts and Papers, Clll), Cd.5633.
2. Gabriel Baer, Population and Society in the Arab East (London I96U), p.97
3. Ra'uf ^bbas Hamid, al-Nizam al-'Ijtima^ fl misr, 1837-191^ (Cairo
1973), pp.96-100. Gabriel Baer, A History of Land Ownership in 
Modern Egypt, 1800-1950 (London 1962), pp.63-137* Baer notes that the 
Copts did not stand out as an important group of landowners until the 
l880s, but this emergence seems to have had nothing to do with the 
British Occupation. It is possible, however, that the Copts believed 
that the British presence would protect their investment in land and so 
were more willing to purchase property. Cromer's establishment of 
credit in the 1890s did make it easier to buy big estates.
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"but not all, of the big Coptic estates were in Upper Egypt; several
exceeded 1,000 feddans, including those of the Ghali, Dus, Khayyat,
<1 _ \Wisa, Fanu§ 'Abskharun, Hanna, Ubaid, Bishara and Jrais families.
By the end of the last century, the Copts were paying 16 per cent of
the taxes on agricultural land, although they were officially counted
at around 6 per cent of the population.^ Even allowing for the fact
that they were undercounted, these figures suggest that they owned
marginally more farm land than their proportion of the population would
have suggested. Perhaps curiously and certainly fortunately, this
does not seem to have roused Muslim ire. It was the large landowning
families, Muslim and Copt, who carried disproportionate weight in the
political system; and their economic interests gave them a powerful
incentive to co-operate against pressure from below and from the outside.
Unlike other, smaller minorities in Egypt, the Copts preferred 
to invest in farm land and real estate and not in the development of 
industry. The strong participation of foreign minorities in large-scale 
commercial and industrial ventures perhaps created problems for both Copts and 
Muslims. The only Copt on the Board of Bank Misr, an enterprise aimed at 
Egyptianizing the economy, at its foundation was 'Iskandar Maslha.
Kamil ’Ibrahim eventually succeeded him. Copts did serve on the 
Boards of Directors of Bank Misr subsidiaries and of other companies, 
but‘in 1951 only U per cent of all company directors were Copts.^
U. CCEH, cAbdin Palace Archives, Biographical Card Index; ^Ali Barakat,
Tatawwur al-Malakiyya al-Zira^yya fi Misr, appendix 6 (Cairo 1977) 1 
Hamid, al-Nizam al-’ I/jtima0-! , pp.96-100.
5* Charles Issawi, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis (Oxford 19^7)»
p.3^. Another source contradicts this and suggests that the Copts 
paid 16 per cent of all property taxes. See "al-iAqbat fi al-Duwal 
al-’Islamiyya”, al-Hilal 19 (1910-11), pp.l0U-5.
6. Charles Issawi, Egypt in Revolution: An Economic Analysis (London 1963),
p.90. Tawfiq Dus, who was a member of the boards of directors of ten 
companies, and Sadiq Wahbah of eleven in 19^1 were the most active in 
this sphere. Others appointed to various boards included Wahib Dus, 
Hakhla al-Mutici, Charles Bushra Hanna, Raghib Hanna, £?adiq 
Kamil gidqi, Wa§if Simaika and Shukri and Fahml Wi§a. See The 
Stock Exchange Yearbook of Egypt (Cairo 19^1).
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Many of these men were wealthy landowners, and some were influential 
politicians. The list of Coptic directors was much longer by 1951;
Many Copts by then held more than two directorships although a 19^7 
law formally prohibited this. No doubt more Copts were nominated to 
directorships because of a second law requiring that one-third of the 
members of the board of any new company be Egyptian.
Muslims could and did sometimes hinder Coptic access to various 
kinds of economic activity, a fact that helps explain the Coptic feeling 
of dependency on the civil service. The Coptic press periodically 
voiced complaints about discrimination in both state-owned and private
7
companies; and it does seem that, by the late 19U0s, there was more
O
government pressure on companies to hire Muslim Egyptians than Copts.
For example, in I9U7 the Egyptian Labour Office denied a certificate
of Egyptian nationality to a Copt who wished to work for an American
9
firm m  Alexandria.
Curiously, there were few attempts at communal commercial ventures. 
There was, however, in the late 19^-Os, when the Copts were meeting with 
increasing discrimination in both the public and private sectors, a push 
to establish specifically Coptic enterprises; a bank and other kinds of 
companies were among those suggested. In 19^7 a Coptic bank, the 
Pharaonic Bank, was established. Salama Musa praised the venture,10 
and Misr.faithfully printed the names of all the subscribers in an 
effort to boost their number. Other newspapers condemned the bank as
7. See the complaints about discrimination in Abbud's companies and 
particularly in the sugar company in Naj Hamadi. Misr, 10 December 
19^7, p.l; 23 December 19^9» p.H.
8. FO.371/63029> J197U/152/16.
9. FO.371/63029, J2860/152/16.
10. Misr, 10 November 19^7 5 p.l.
divisive; and Musa retorted that, in that case, so were the Muslim.
11Brethren’s economic projects which no one thought to criticize. 
Unfortunately, the hank failed to sell enough shares and collapsed. 
Tawfiq HInain, a Coptic journalist, speculated that the Copts had 
been afraid to buy shares In what would appear to Muslims to be a 
chauvinist venture.^
132. The Civil Service
Government employment in this poor country with its relatively
privileged bureaucracy was prized for its security and was the goal of
many ill- and well-educated Egyptians. Fair access was considered
critical by both Muslims and Copts, particularly as the bureaucracy
itgrew and the number of posts held by the British declined. In
addition, the better-educated Copts had long occupied a greater 
proportion of bureaucratic posts than their percentage of the population 
justified. However, by the turn of the century, Muslims were becoming 
better-educated and were beginning to compete for these positions. 
Although the number of Coptic officials increased in this period, their
11. Ibid.
12. Misr, 6 December 19^7» p.l.
13. Information on the civil service is derived largely from The 
Egyptian Directory, an annual publication which listed Ministry 
officials of senior and middle grades. However, by the 1950s, 
the Directory included fewer middle-level positions. In addition, 
pension lists and individual files deposited in the Dar al- 
Ma^fugat were used. The pension index is only in moderately good 
order, and occasionally an individual died or retired before or 
after the year he actually appears in It. One problem in working 
with lists of names must be noted: it is not always possible to 
distinguish between Muslim and Coptic names and between Coptic 
names and those of Syrian origin.
it. The cadre increased from 15,000 in 1915 to t2,000 in 19t0, but in 
1930 there were about 190,000 non-cadre employees. Marius Deeb, 
"The Wafd and its Rivals", unpublished DPhil thesis, Oxford 
University 1971, pp.tt2, tt5.
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share of the civil service declined. The 1937 census recorded a
decline in the Goptic share of 35 per cent in 27 years, to 9-1 per 
15cent. This was not a formal government policy hut rather a tacit
admission that a bureaucracy which was thought to be dominated by a
minority would lose credibility.
The Copts were unable to grasp the necessity of achieving an
ethnic balance. They did not think that their percentage of the
17population should be a factor m  making appointments, but they did 
use percentages when the figures were in their favour. If 50 per cent 
of all Egyptian lawyers were Copts, they argued that 50 per cent of all
judges should be Copts. The British, who regarded the decline in
19the proportion of Coptic officials as fair, were unsympathetic.
Although they believed discrimination to exist and sometimes investigated
Coptic allegations, they seem never to have Intervened except perhaps
20occasionally on a strictly Individual basis.
The highest percentages of Copts between 1922 and 1952 were found 
in the Ministries of Communications and Public Works, Many Copts were 
employed by the post office and railway; there were also many Coptic 
engineers in the irrigation service of the Works Ministry. Coptic 
representation in the Finance Ministry was also good due to the Copts'
15. Baer, Population and Society, p. 97-
16. Cynthia Enlow, "Ethnicity, Bureaucracy and State Building in Africa 
and Latin America", Ethnic and Racial Studies 1 (1978), p.3^0.
17. Tawfiq Dus argued this at the 'Asyut Conference on the curious 
grounds that it might enable the Copts to obtain posts for which 
they were unqualified. The Coptic Congress Held at Assiout on 
March 6 , 7 and 8 , 1911 (no place, n.d.), pp.22-3.
18. Misr, 16 November 1951, p.l.
19. FCL^07/215, no.52. Sir P. Lorraine to Sir J. Simon, 21 May 1932;
F0.U07/221, Part 122, Enclosure in No.5- An Appreciation of the
Situation of the Copts by Mr. Hamilton, 1937-
20. F0.371/16118, J1U75/19U/16.
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21traditional expertise in monetary matters. It was probably in these
three Ministries that the Copts had their test chances of promotion.
A fair number of Copts were employed by the Ministries of Justice,
Public Health and the Interior, while relatively few worked in the
Ministry of Agriculture. Even fewer were employed by the Ministries
of Education, Defence, Social Affairs and Foreign Affairs. The latter
was the preserve of the Palace and there seems to have been considerable
22pressure to keep the diplomatic corps Muslim and Turkic. Those few
Coptic diplomats who managed to overcome the Palace's prejudice were
generally scions of old, prominent Coptic families, like the Wahbahs
and Ghalls, who had considerable European experience. The Copts had
good access to junior and intermediate positions; however, they
complained repeatedly that all important civil service posts were
23reserved for Muslims. There is some truth to this complaint. Not
only were few Copts employed in some Ministeries and Departments that 
had considerable power over the Copts, like the police and the Ministries 
of Education and Social Affairs, but their access to positions of 
influence in other Ministries was limited. Very rarely was a Copt 
made Under-Secretary; when Sadiq Hinain, a Wafdist Copt, was appointed 
to that post in the Ministry of Finance, the Liberal Constitutionalist
21. The British noted in 1928 that 87 per cent of the officials in the
Direct Taxes Department were Copts. The percentage is not nearly 
this high in the Egyptian Directory so presumably they occupied 
predominantly junior posts. FO. 1+07/206, Enclosure in No.32. 
Complaint by Coptic Officials, February 1928. A list of routine 
transfers in the Department in August 1937 included no Muslim names. 
Found in the pension file of ^Azlz Habashi in Dar al-Mahfuzat,
No. 368/3/3656At073. ’ * *
22. The Wafdist Copt, 'Ibrahim Faraj Masiha, claims that such pressure
was put on him when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the last
Wafdist Cabinet. Interview, 13 June 1979*
23. See Migr, 21 June 1935, p.l; 15 January 1938, p.l; Zaghib Mikha’il, 
Farriq Tasud! al-Wafoda al-Wataniyya w-al-'Afcblaq al-Qawmiyya 
(Cairo, n.d.), pp. 11-12, 1+0.
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journal al-Kasbkul objected. Few Copts reached the top posts in
any Ministry. Few directors of departments or sub-departments were
Copts. This is almost as true of the post office, where many Copts
were employed, as it is of the Ministry of Education. There were
perhaps more Copts in senior positions in the Ministry of Finance.
Copts were appointed Financial Secretary to different Ministries, and
there were Copts at high levels in the State Legal Department
(Contentieux d'Etat). In the Ministry of the Interior, there was never
a Coptic Governor or Deputy Governor of a province; nor, in this period,
25
a Coptic District Office (Ma’mur Markaz), As one observer noted,
the Muslim public might be induced to accept an iconoclast as governor, 
but never a Copt.^ There were some Coptic 'Umdas, appointed to head 
predominantly Coptic villages. Copts were represented in good numbers 
at lower levels in the provincial administration, particularly on the 
clerical and financial sides. Most of the provincial chief clerks 
were Copts; this was generally the most senior post they held in a 
province.
In other ministries, Copts were employed mainly in those 
departments concerned with accounting, record keeping, the budget, 
purchasing and stocks, translation and, in some instances, personnel.
It was in such departments that a Copt was most likely to be appointed 
director or assistant director. In addition, they often held technical 
positions; for example, those Copts employed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture were mainly engineers.
Copts charged that Muslims were favoured for the Judiciary, but 
this claim has little merit. Often around 10 per cent of those named
2k. Al-Kaabkul, March 192k, p.lk.
25. One 1911 report recorded that there were a few Coptic District 
Officers. F0.371/HH, 31390A079/16-
26. Ibid.
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judges of Courts of the First Instance and the lesser Summary Courts
•were Copts. Fewer Copts were appointed to the bench of the Appeals
27 28Court and the superior Cour de Cassation, Coptic complaints about
the Parquet were more accurate. Very few Coptic lawyers were able to
secure employment in this elite corps, from which judges were often
drawn. In addition, few Copts seems to have worked at middle levels
in the judicial administration.
The frequently voiced complaint that no Copt had ever served
as director of a state school was, with one exception, correct.
29’Ibrahim Takla headed a secondary school in Cairo in 1929-30. The
less exalted ranks of the Education Inspectorate did include Copts, 
whose numbers jumped from one in 1925 to 19 in 19^3 but without in any 
way improving the Coptic hold on the Inspectorate. Many Copts also 
taught in the University but only 10 per cent held the title of
30professor and none were ever appointed to top administrative posts.
In the Ministry of Defence, there were some Copts in the personnel,
budget and records offices, but few overall in the general administration.
31While there were some Coptic army officers, their influence seems to 
32have been slight. This was as much due to the lack of a tradition
27. In 1925 three out of 3^ judges were Copts but, by 1950, only two 
out of about 50 judges were.
28. There were no Coptic i;conseillersn in 1939 and only one in 19^3 
and 1951.
29. Misr recalled in 19^ +6 that objections had been voiced to his 
appointment. Misr, 12 December 19^ -6, p.l.
30. In addition, periodic complaints were voiced about discrimination 
against Coptic students. Misr was disturbed in 1929 when al~
Siyasa suggested that only a certain percentage of Coptic students be 
allowed to pass the exams. Misr, 16 September 1929s P*3.
31. R.H. Dekmejian suggests that 7 pan cent of the officer corps was
Christian in the late 19^ -Os. Egypt Under Nasser (London 1972), p.21.
However, more officers seem to have been in the Medical Corps than 
any other branch of the service.
32. F0.U07/221, part 122. Enclosure in Wo.5- An Appreciation of the
Situation of the Copts by Mr. Hamilton, 1937- he also noted that 
those who did have influence were gradually being side-tracked.
Only one Copt Mlralai Farid cAbd Allah, conspired with the Free 
Officers.
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of entering the army and making a career of it as to discrimination.
The number of senior posts open to Copts may have decreased over 
time. In 1932 the Financial Adviser,Hugh-Jones,reported that this 
was the case in the Ministries of Agriculture and Finance; in
contrast with past practice, very few heads of sub-departments were
33Copts. By 1951 the numbers of Coptic Inspectors in the Ministry
of Education and judges in Courts of the First Instance had declined.
Misr complained on two occasions that there were too few Copts among
3U
recent appointments to the Judiciary and the Parquet. There were,
in fact, more Copts in the Parquet in 1922 than In later years. In
addition, there were fewer Copts in the provincial agricultural service
and the post office by 1951-2; significantly more Copts were employed
at higher levels in the latter In 1925. Muslims eventually broke into
35the ranks of the provincial chief clerks and, at a lower level, they
3 6finally gained admittance to the tax collectors' school. Both had 
been a Coptic preserve.
There seems to have been no appreciable difference, however, in 
the number of Copts employed by the railway, telegraph and telephone 
administration or by the Finance Ministry. Given the system of
33. It is not clear whether he is comparing 1932 with the 1920s or some 
earlier time. F0.37l/l6ll8, Jl*+75/19*i/l6.
3*1. The paper.also alleged that the Minister of Justice's predecessor
had announced that Coptic appointments to the Parquet and the bench 
must be kept in line with their proportion of the population. Misr, 
6 November 1951, p.6 , and 16 November 1951, p.l. However, more 
Copts sat on the bench of Summary Courts in 1951 than in 19*+9*
35- FO.371/16118, JIU75/I9U/I6.
36. Just before the 1936 election, Mi§r al-Fatat made a point of
contention of Makram's closure of the school, claiming that he 
did so in behalf of the Copts. This was the second time Makram 
had closed the school so perhaps the notion was not far fetched.
The school had originally been opened by cAbd al-Wahab Pasha who 
was not known for his love of his Coptic compatriots. F0.1*+l/5^3,
I9/UU/36.
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client a J. is in, Copts knew that the loss of one job to a Copt often
entailed the loss of others to the community. Civil servants were
expected to favour their co-religionists; accordingly, the Copts saw
the long arm of fanaticism reaching into every Ministry. Misr and
al-Manara al-Misriyya published many articles on this problem; if
the frequency with which these articles appeared is any gauge, it was
a problem which grew worse in the mid-19**0s. The appointment of a
Muslim as Director of the Coptic Museum in 1950 in defiance of the law
was a blow which seemed to symbolize the mounting discrimination Copts
37felt they met with in all walks of Egyptian life.
Misr was most likely to champion the cause of Coptic employment
38when a non-Wafdist government was in power. However, the most serious
campaign mounted by the paper was in 1928 when a Wafd-Liberal coalition 
government under Tharwat was in power. Misr published articles in 
almost every issue criticizing particularly the Ministry of Finance, 
which had transferred several officials in an economy move. The 
campaign seemed designed to embarrass the Cabinet, already in some 
difficulty over the treaty. As al-Ka&hif remarked, it was an 
inopportune moment to raise a matter which could affect Britain's
39willingness to relinquish the third Reserved Point. Misr was Wafdist
in sympathy and It ceased its complaints when al-Nahhas became Prime 
Minister in March. It might seem that Misr was preparing the way for a 
purely Wafdist government; however, the Wafdist press strenuously
37* This contravened Law No.lU (1933) which specified that only a 
Copt who had the approval of the Patriarch could be Director.
38. Several such articles were published in 1935 s 1938 and 19*^ 6.
39* Al-Kashif, 21 January 1928, p.*+; 28 January 1928, p.U.
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attacked Misr1s charges as lies. There is no indication that the Wafd
Uowas trying to break up the coalition by devious means. Wasif Ghali
expressed surprise at MisrT s behaviour and reaffirmed that there was 
no difference between Muslims and Copts in national affairs,^11 The 
answer may lie in the fact that the Wafd, with its own press, had 
ceased to subsidize Misr. Accordingly, Misr was in financial 
difficulties, which served to spur sensationalism. Hugh-Jones noted 
that the paper, normally of "insignificant circulation", sold very well
U2
during its campaign. Another possible explanation was the desire to
secure, through pressure, the newly-vacant Directorship of Direct 
U3
Taxes for a Copt. The Residency reported that Tawfiq Dus was said
UU
to be behind Misr’s campaign; this fits with another report that
the Palace was intriguing for the fall of the Thaarwat Cabinet.^
However, Misr never exhibited any affection for Tawfiq Dus, and it is
unlikely that it would have been amenable to his suggestions, unless
they were accompanied by some kind of financial incentive.
There were areas for legitimate complaint, but Misr’s facts in
this case seem twisted. The paper alleged that an unreasonable number
of those dismissed in the Department of Direct Taxes were Copts.^
If the British Financial Adviser and the Egyptian Minister of Finance
are to be believed, officials were only transferred and not dismissed,
W
and more Muslims were transferred than Copts. 1 Selection of these
Uo. See FO.U07/2 0 6, for December 1927 and January—February 1 928.
Ul. Al-'Ahram, 30 January 1928, p.5; F0.U07/206, J519/18/16.
U2. FO.lUl/685, 8U2U/65/28.
U3. Ibid.
UU. FO.U07/206, No.32 (Enclosure). Complaint by Coptic Officials, 
Feburary 1928.
U5. F0.371/13117, J8U6/U/16.
U6. Ninety-four Copts and thirteen Muslims, Misr, 23 January and 
2 February 1928, p.l.
U7. F0.U07/206, No.32 (Enclosure). Complaint by Coptic Officials,
February 1928; No.32, Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen: .Chamberlain,
23 Feburary 1928.
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officials to be transferred was entrusted to a Committee headed by
18
Holden, a member of the Financial AdviS'er's staff. Holden believed
both that there was some discrimination against the Copts in promotions 
and that neither the Minister nor the Under-Secretary liked Copts. 
Hugh-Jones noted that neither official was likely to victimize Copts 
in any significant way unless the political situation suddenly called
1+9for it. As Copts held most of the positions in this department,
there was no reason, as al-Balagh pointed out, that a majority of those
50transferred should not have been Copts. Al-Balagh asked if the Copts
were going to declare themselves oppressed everytime the government was
51obliged to transfer or discipline a Coptic employee; such was the
Copts' sensitivity that sometimes the complaints were out of proportion
to the misdeeds, Kawkab al-Shara suggested that British officials had
encouraged their Coptic colleagues in an attempt to provoke fanaticism
52and provide an excuse for intervention. Sinut Hanna and Makram ^ Ubaid
also publicly denied Misr's charges and the latter, in an al-'Ahram
53interview, condemned Misr1s communal approach. Misr responded by
5I+
attacking the Wafd in February
U8. FO.lUl/685, 8U2U/65/28.
1+9* Ibid.
50. Al-BalagI). 29 January 1928, PPF.
51. Ibid., 30 January 1928, PPF. See also Chamber Debates, twenty- 
fifth session, 31 January 1928; Misr, IT January 1928, p.2.
52. FO. 1+07/206, J683/18/16.
53. A1-*Ahram, 6 February 1928, p.6 ; al-Balagt}, 7 February 1928, p.l, 
and 13 February 1928, p.l.
5I+. Misr, 2l+ February 1928, p.l; 28 February 1928, p.l. Misr could 
conceivably have wanted to destroy the treaty, but this was also 
the goal of Wafd extremists, like Makram cUbaid, who criticized 
Migr's ethnic campaign.
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At other times, Misr presented evidence of discrimination in
virtually every Ministry. In 1926 it published several articles
recounting the sad fate of Dr. Kamil Hanna, an employee of the Ministry
of Public Health, who committed suicide when he failed to obtain an
55unexpected promotion. Several articles complaining of demotions,
unjust transfers, the promotions of Muslims over the heads of Copts
and a general reluctance to appoint Copts appeared in the summer of
56 /" —1935. Misr mourned the days of Sa^d Zaghlul, when, claimed the paper,
57no distinction was made between Copts and Muslims; and, when the Wafd
58came back into power in 1936, the paper promised a return to equality.
In 1939 Misr complained about discrimination in the Ministries of Justice
and Agriculture,^ and in 19^6 in the Ministry of Education.^ In
the latter year, Misr was convinced that the heads of certain government
departments had issued Instructions not to hire any non-Muslims.^
The Wafd itself was capable of using this weapon to rally the Coptic
faithful; in 19^ -1 it was the source of a rumour which suggested
that the King had ordered all Ministers and senior officials not to
6 2appoint any Copts to government posts.
55. The paper did, however, present at least two dissenting opinions.
Misr, 25 October 1926, p.2; 27 October 1926, p.l; 3 November
1926, p.l; 29 November 1926, p.l; 17 December 1926, p.l. La 
Bourse Egyptienne, 23 October 1926, p.3.
56. All officials, however, were subject to arbitrary treatment by their
Ministries. See Migr, 1 7  June 1 9 3 5 ,  P - 3 ;  1 9  July 1 9 3 5 ,  P*l;
26 July 1935, P*lj 1 August 1935, p.l.
57. Migr, 19 July 1935, p.l. Wafd Ministries, claimed Migr in another 
article, worked to realize equality. Misr, 29 June 1935, p.l.
Migr, 27 May 1936, p.l.
59* Mi?r, U March 1939, p.5; 1^ - March 1939, p.5* Al-Kashkul took up
the subject of Coptic complaints on 10 March and suggested that
Copts believed that the Palace had blessed this policy of 
discrimination. Al-Kashkul. 10 March 1939, pp.3-5*
60. However, the paper was pleased when the new Minister of Education 
announced that there was no reason that Copts could not be head­
masters. Migr, 12 December 19^6, p.l.
61. Misr, l7 May 19^ +6, p.2.
62. CCEH, F7/D7, Card 805, Security Reports: Report on Religious
Discord, December 19^1.
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Although Misr generally refrained from attacking Wafd governments, 
it made clear its dissatisfaction with the 1950 Wafd Cabinet. The 
paper published several articles, as did al-Manara al-Misriyya, on 
discrimination in various government departments.
Non-Wafdists reversed the charges of discrimination and used them 
to prove the Wafd's partiality to Copts. Muslims were equally ready
6U
to suspect the Copts of an ambition to monopolize the civil service 
so the non-Wafdist press had an audience for its allegations. The 
Liberal Constitutionalist papers were particularly vigilant. As early 
as 1923, al-Kashkul pointed out that Coptic judges were biased in 
favour of their co-religionists.*^ During the 1930 Wafd Ministry, 
al-Siyasa published several articles which suggested that the Wafd was 
conspiring to advance the interests of the Copts. First al-Siyasa, 
reporting that the Wafd was considering making Makram ^ Ubaid Minister 
to London, protested, insisting that there were already enough Coptic 
diplomats.^ A few days later, the paper complained that three 
Egyptian ambassadors were Copts, a clear contravention of the interests 
of the Muslim majority. Another article alleged that all the 
important officials the Wafd Ministry had dismissed were Muslims and 
that more than one-half of the Ministry's promotions and appointments
63. Misr, 1 November 1950, p.l; 6 December 1950, p.l; 3 September 
1951, P*lj 6 November 1951, P«6 ; al-Manara al-Misriyya,
12 June 1950, pp.1-2.
6^ 4. Al-Minbar claimed that the Copts1 principal object in life was to 
amass wealth, obtain high ranks and fill government offices.
Quoted in the Egyptian Mail, 1+ November 1920, p.2. See also 
allegations of Coptic trickery in al-Kashkul, 20 May 1923.
65. Al-Kashkul, 31 August 1923, p.H.
66. Al-Siyasa, 9 February 1930, PPF. There is no confirmation in the
Public Record Office archives that the Wafd considered this.
cUbaid was entitled to a p(j?&tfolio and might not have wanted to risk
losing his influence by remaining outside the country when the Wafd 
was in power.
67. Migr asked what was Islamic about the work of representing Egypt in 
Switzerland or Washington. Misr, 13 February 1930, p.l.
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were Copts. For this, Haikal was called before the Public
Prosecutor’s office and he was later able to report, probably with
69
some effect, that the Prosecutor was a Copt. Misr answered the
allegations and printed the names of prominent Coptic officials who 
TOhad been sacked. It also published several articles defending tax
71 -collectors, whose honour al-Siyasa had besmirched. When Sadiq
Hinain, former Wafdist Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, 
was again attacked by al-Siyasa for favouring Copts, Misr observed
that the Copts sometimes hated to see a co-religionist successful for
7 2  t*fear that criticism would follow his appointment. In 1935 al-Sha b
reproached the Wafdist, Kamil Sidqi, for stirring up trouble when no
73Copts were included in a list of judicial appointments.
Just before the 1936 election, the British reported that Misr al-
Fatat planned, as part of its campaign, to accuse Makram of using his
7^influence to obtain government appointments for Copts. The
opposition then criticized the 1936 Wafd government for appointing and
promoting too many Copts and it decried Coptic influence, which was
75slight, in the Ministry of Education.
68. Al-Siyasa, 9 February 1930, PPF.
69. Ibid., 20 April 1930, p.5*
70. Migr, 10 February 1930, p.l.
71. Misr alleged that tax collectors had been subjected to an 
unreasonable number of transfers in the previous government. 
Misr, 12 March 1930, p.5*
72. Ibid., p.5.
73. Makram was reported to be trying to get his brother-in law 
appointed judge. Al-Shacb , 5 March 1935, p.U; 7 March 1935> 
p.l+.
7*+. FO.IU1/5U3, 19A V 36.
75. Misr, 19 October 1936, p.l.
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Similar accusations followed in 1937 and during the 1938 election
campaign. As Hamilton, the Assistant Oriental Secretary, noted, the
opposition was prepared to inflame passions against the Copts for party
purposes. In November the government felt obliged to issue a statement
denying al-Balagh 's report that favouritism had been shown toward Copts in
77recent appointments. Al-Kashkul suggested that Copts formed 73 per
cent of the student body of the College of Medicine, 93 per cent of the 
Railway, Telegraph and Telephone Administration, 70 per cent of the 
Ministry of the Interior, and 80 per cent of the Post Office, and that 
the Copts earned £E8 million out of £E12 million allocated for salaries
rj g
in the top civil service grades. The journal also accused Coptic
79professors of favouring Coptic students.
Complaints by both Copts and Muslims were not always timed for 
political effect. Copts generally were concerned to preserve or 
increase the share of the bureaucracy they had held in the 19th century. 
Muslim complaints usually were characterized by a strong feeling that 
the Copts had risen above themselves; that it was the minority which 
was obliged to make adjustments to satisfy the majority and not vice
8 0versa. Often articles in the non-Wafdist press had a threatening tone.
Shaikh al-Maraghl, complaining about Coptic influence in the Ministry
of the Interior, suggested that religious fanaticism could play a valid
8l
part in reducing that influence. Such charges and counter-charges 
lead to the question of whether some Cabinets did discriminate against
76 . FO. 1+07/221, No.5 (Enclosure). An appreciation of the Situation
of the Copts by Mr. Hamilton, 1937*
77* Henry Ayrout, "Egypt: Interferences de la politique et de la
religion", En Terre dfIslam 13 (1938), p.l9U.
78. Al-ICashkul. 2 5  February 1 9 3 8 ,  pp.1 - 2 .  This was repeated, with minor
alterations in the percentages, on 2 0  March 1 9 3 9 s  pp.3 - 5 *
7 9 *  Al-Kagbkul, 2 5  February 1 9 3 8 ,  p.l+.
80. See al-Kashkul, 10 March 1939, PP*3-5*
8 1 .  F O . U 0 7 / 2 2 1 ,  No.2 7 .  D.V. Kelly to Mr. Eden, 2 September 1 9 3 7 -
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or favour Copts. It is a question which is difficult to answer with any
accuracy given the expansion of the bureaucracy and periodic Ministerial
reorganizations. One authority believes that the first Wafd Ministry
82appointed many Copts to important positions xn the civil service.
Another contemporary scholar suggests that the 1928 and 1938 Muhammad
Mahmud Cabinets deliberately reduced the number of Coptic officials and
that each return of the Wafd to power brought compensation for the Copts.^
The British in both 1928 and 1938 did record strong Christian feelings 
81+of victimization, and they confirmed that there was considerable
85discrimination against Copts in the late 1920s and early 1930s.
86
Mahmud and some of his Cabinet members had anti-Coptic reputations, 
so it is possible that their report is true. It should, however, be 
noted that the British were sometimes as susceptible to political 
rumours as the Egyptian press.
Taking the suggestion about the Wafd first and examining the 1922 
and 192U lists of Ministry of Finance employees, it cannot be said that 
the Wafd brought significantly more Copts into the Ministry. This 
would seem to be true of other Ministries as well. Most Copts appearing 
on the 192^-5 Egyptian Directory lists were also on the 1922 lists, and 
they were not in substantially different positions.
In general, there do not seem to have been significantly more Copts 
employed at senior and middle levels in Wafdist Ministries than in non-
82. Although he notes that it is impossible to prove that the Cabinet
issued a set of instructions to this effect. Interview,
Dr. Zahir Riyad, 1 June 1979.
83. He noted that this was especially true of Finance and Communications, 
but he presents no evidence to support what is probably hearsay, 
Pierre Rondot, "LTEvolution historique des Coptes d’Egypte", Cahiers 
de 1*Orient Contemporain 22 (1950), p.ll+0.
81+. FO.371/219^-8, Jk332/6/16. FO. 1+07/206, No.6l (Enclosure 3). Note on 
a Visit to Asyut, February 1928 by L, Grafftey-Smith,
85. F0.1+07/208, No.27 (Enclosure 1.). Note on a Visit to Mansura,
February 1929. F0.1+07/217, Part 115, No.126, Sir M. L&mpson to Sir
J.Simon, 13 June 193U. F0.371/16118, JII+85/I9V 16; J1719/19U/16.
86. F0.11+1/1+89, 71/5/32.
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Wafdist ones. A surprising number of Coptic employees were left to
87
work in peace regardless of who was m  power. It is possible that
it was at lower levels that the Mahmud Cabinets dismissed most Copts, 
but it seems unlikely that the ubiquitous teamen would be a matter of 
much attention. It does not appear from government pension lists that 
either Mahmud Cabinet placed an unusual number of Copts on pension; 
but, of course, those dismissed might not have been entitled to a 
pension. However, it may be safe to conclude that those officials 
fired by any Ministry had unsatisfactory political ties and since Coptic 
support for the Wafd was strong, many of those dismissed by non-Wafdist 
Cabinets were Copts.^
a. Coptic Cabinet Ministers
It was traditional even for Cabinets in the period before 
independence to Include one Copt. This was both expected and accepted. 
For example, when Lampson insisted in 19^ +3 that Kamil Sidqi be removed 
as Minister of Finance, another Copt was immediately made Minister of 
Civil Defence to maintain Coptic representation. Only the Wafd broke 
with this' custom, and then it did so by appointing two Copts. Haikal 
recalls in his Memoirs that there was considerable surprise when the 
Wafd named Murqus Hanna and Wasif Ghali to its first Cabinet in 192U. 
Haikal praises himself for not exploiting the fact, although he did
89note the departure from tradition in al-Siyasa. Al-Siyasa1s 
Liberal colleague, al-Kashkul, was not as restrained. It featured a 
conversation, purportedly overheard at the Coptic Ramses Club, between
87. This is not true of judicial positions which had a high turnover 
probably because so many politicians were lawyers.
88. On the general subject of dismissals, see Haikal, Mudhakkirat fi al-
Siyasa al-Misriyya, (Cairo 1953), vol.2, pp.93-U; ^Abd al-Rahman al- 
Rafi^i, Fi 'A^ab al-Thawra al-Migriyya, (Cairo 1951), vol.3, pp.69, 
118; and ^Abd al-Azim Ramadan, Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wafaniyya fi 
Misr, p.h-7. *
89. See al-Siyasa, 30 January I92U; Haikal, Mudhakkirat, I, p.l80.
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prominent Wafdist Copts. In it, these Copts quarrelled over Cabinet
posts and how many they could justifiably demand. Finally they agreed
that the Copts should be rewarded with three portfolios, two Under-
90Secretaryships and at least one ambassadorship. Later al-Kashkul
reported that there were to have been three Copts in the Cabinet but
91that opposition was so strong that the proposal was dropped. In
1929 al-Siyasa retroactively criticised the appointment of two Coptic
Cabinet Ministers in 192^ 1 as part of a general anti-Wafd campaign.
In 1928 the Watanist al-*Akhbar wrote that there were so many Copts in
the Wafd Cabinet that the government might as well name Christians as
93Shaikh al-'Azhar and the Mufti of Egypt. Criticism was also levelled
9U
at the 1930 Wafd Cabinet, and in 1937 al-Kashkul incorrectly suggested
95that the party was planning to add a third Copt to the Cabinet.
After Makram left the Wafd in 19^ -2, the Wafd named only one Copt 
to its Cabinets. This does not necessarily suggest that Makram was 
responsible for the earlier policy; the schism simply left fewer Copts 
entitled to Cabinet rank in the party. In addition, the symbolic value 
of having Copts in the Cabinet had declined and in the 19^0s would have 
earned the Wafd little praise from any quarter. Most non-Wafdist 
Cabinets conformed to the older custom and gave only one portfolio to 
a Copt. There were two Copts in the ’Ahmad Mahir and al-Nuqrashi 
Cabinets of I9UU and 19^6; both were coalition governments including 
the heavily Coptic al-Kutla party. The only other exception occurred 
in the November 193^ Nasim Cabinet, which had one Copt holding two portfolios.
90. To cast further suspicion on Coptic allegiances, the dialogue is half 
in Egyptian colloquial and half in French. Al-Kagjikul, 18 January 
192U, pp.7-9, 12.
91. Al-Kashkul, 1 February 192^, p.3.
92. Al-Siyasa, 17 September 1929, PPF.
93. FO.U07/206, No.73 (Enclosure 7)* Memorandum on the Egyptian Prees,
22 March-t April 1928.
9!+* Al-Siyasa, 20 April 1930, p.5*
95* Quoted by Jacques Berque, Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution (London
1972), p.505.
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The Ministries of the Interior, Justice, Education and
9 6Endowments were never entrusted to a Copt. From the April 1919
Rushdl Cabinet until the July 1952 CA1I Mahir Cabinet, the portfolio 
most frequently held by a Copt was Finance, an obvious choice given 
the number of Copts employed in the Ministry. From the 192U Zaghlul 
Cabinet until ^Ubaid's split in 19^ -2, the Wafd alone appointed Copts 
Finance Minister; ^Ubaid was the only Copt to serve as Finance Minister 
in non-Wafdist Cabinets after this. Agriculture and Foreign Affairs 
were the two Ministries most often entrusted to Copts after Finance. 
Foreign Affairs was an unimportant portfolio before 1936 and, even 
after that, the Ministry was hampered by excessive Palace interference 
and the tendency of the British to ignore it. The post did require a 
man who was familiar with Europe, and this partly explains why Copts 
were often appointed. The Wafd again was more willing to appoint 
a Copt to Foreign Affairs than other parties, while all Coptic 
Ministers of Agriculture, a post of little power, served in non-Wafdist 
Cabinets. Trade and Industry, a Ministry created in the 1930s, often 
had a Coptic Minister, again usually in non-Wafdist Cabinets; this 
ministry seems to have had a good number of Coptic employees. The 
Ministry of Communications was held by a Copt in five Cabinets; other 
portfolios held by Copts included Health, Village and Local Affairs, 
Supply, Civil Defence and War. Salib Sami, who had served as Royal 
Adviser to the Ministry, was, to his considerable surprise, appointed 
Minister of War in the 1933 Yahya Cabinet. Sami claims that he was
96. In 1910 when Butrus Ghall was made Prime Minister, it was decided 
that although it was then customary for a Prime Minister to be his 
own Minister of the Interior, he could not do so. Part of the 
reason for this was that al-'Azhar was under the jurisdiction of 
the Interior. Butrus Ghall retained Foreign Affairs instead„
- In 1919 Yusuf Wahbah e>\so WeAj Fmanc.'ej _ .
Interview, 'Ibrahim 'Amin Gha.li, 19 March 1979-
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uneasy with the appointment because he felt that an officer should be
Minister, but it is more likely that he was concerned about the effect
97his religion would have on the high command. A decade later, the
repercussions Sami probably expected in 1933 occurred when Prime 
Minister Husain Sirri tried to move Sami from Foreign Affairs to the 
Ministry of Defence. Senior army officers objected, and Sami was
98transferred back to Foreign Affairs.
Although the number of portfolios expanded from ten in 1925 to
z' 9916 in 1951s Coptic representation did not increase. Obviously the
appointment of two Copts to some Cabinets was an innovation to which
some Egyptians were unable to reconcile themselves in more than two
decades. By the late 19^0s, increasing resentment of any visible
Coptic role in politics may have made it impossible for any willing
party to appoint two Copts to the Cabinet. In addition, from February
19^6, those Copts who were appointed were relegated to uninfluential
Ministries. The accusations of political opponents notwithstanding,
Coptic Cabinet Ministers did not populate their Ministries with Copts
Occasionally, the did employ a Copt as personal secretary, but this was
surely an excusable indulgence. Some Copts, as well as Muslims, viewed
97* Salib Sami, Dhikrayat Siyasi (Cairo 1952), pp.206-8. King Fu'ad
told Sami that he personally desired his appointment, and Sami
appears to have suspected that this was a manoeuvre designed to 
increase royal control over the army because of the intrinsically 
precarious position of any Coptic Minister. See also, ^Abd al- 
dAzim Ramadan, al-Jaigh al-Misri fi al-Siyasa 1882-1936 (Caircr.1977), P.312.
98. This doomed the Cabinet reshuffle to failure and left an impression 
of instability. Sami soon ran into trouble with the King when he 
broke relations with the Vichy government without royal consent.
Faruq's behaviour over this issue resulted in the incident of 
h February 19^2. FO.371/31566, J33U/38/16.
99* This did not escape Coptic notice. See Migr, 6 July 1950, p.l.
100. For example, some Muslim employees in the Ministry of Agriculture
accused their Minister, Nakhla al-Muti^i, of discrimination, and 
this was repeated in the press. Al-'Ahram, 2 August 1919? al- 
Siyasa, 17 September 1929, PPF; al-Kashkul, U September 19^6; and 
al-Siyasa, 19 September 1929, quoted in Pierre Rondot, Cahiers de 
l fOrient Contemporain 22 (1950), p.139*
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Coptic Cabinet Ministers as communal representatives or as men who were 
well placed to ensure that Coptic rights were respected. This was 
less a reflection of reality than a forlorn hope, and some Copts became 
increasingly angry in the 19 -^Os that these representatives did so little 
for the community.
b . Religious Instruction in State Schools
The problem of religious instruction in government schools was
one new to the 20th century; before this, education was largely
private. Copts educated their own children and taught them what they
liked. Religious education only became a point of contention, for
Muslims as well as Copts, when parents began to desire a modern
education for their children and as the state came increasingly to
provide that education. There were many private and church-affiliated
102Christian schools, but they could not educate all Coptic children.
The state had resources the community could never hope to match. Many
parents could not afford a private education, and even some of those
who could wanted their children to have the government school certificates
103which admitted their holders for many years to the civil service.
Education was one way to produce uniformity in the citizenry, and this 
uniformity was more likely to threaten the cultural integrity of the 
minority than the majority.
101. Misr occasionally took a Coptic Minister to task when it felt that 
he was not fulfilling this function. In 19^ -9 it criticized the 
Minister for failing to protect Coptic employees in the civil service, 
and in 1950 for failing to deal with the increase in violence against 
the Copts. In the aftermath of the Suez church burning in January 
1952, many Copts called for their Minister to resign to express 
communal despair. See Misr, 21 December I9U9, p.3., and
9 October 1950, p.l.
102. In 1927 the Copts had U03 schools, including Evangelical 
institutions, with a student body o'f ^0,089. Misr, 29 June 1927, p.l.
103. F0.371/1111, 5672/5672/16.
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The state dictated what Coptic children would he taught, first 
in state-owned schools and later in private Christian schools. In 
the former, Islamic religious instruction formed a larger part of 
the curriculum, particularly for the younger, more impressionable 
children. Not only were the Copts upset at the exposure of their 
children to lectures on Islam, but they were angry at the state's 
failure to use public revenue to provide equal Christian religious 
instruction. They believed that this failure had direct bearing on 
the health and vitality of the community, and they feared their children 
growing up with too little knowledge of their own religion and too much 
temptation to convert to Islam. Ultimately, Christian protests were 
aimed at protecting the community's autonomy and resolving inequities 
in the division of public money.
In this half-century of debate, no one in the Coptic community
_ _ioU
except the socialist Salama Musa criticized the principal of 
offering religious instruction in state schools and urged the complete 
secularization of education. Copts did argue for the use of secular 
materials in Arabic teaching, but mainly they were interested in seeing 
that their children were instructed in Christianity. Few Muslims 
proposed the secularization of public education; even Lutfi al-Sayyid^^ 
and Taha Husain1^  thought that It was in the Egyptian interest for the 
state to provide a firm grounding in Islam. In fact, many Muslims 
clamoured for more and more Islamic education as this period progressed.
The principal of providing Christian education in state schools was 
established early on when Khedive Isma'Il, in endowing land for the
lOU. See Misr, 15 March 1937, p.l.
105. Mounah Khouri, Poetry and the Making of Modern Egypt (Leiden 1977). P.189.
106. He thought that Coptic children should be taught their own religion 
in state schools. The Future of Culture in Egypt, transl. Sidney 
Glazer (Washington, D.C. 195*0, p.lUO.
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expansion of elementary education, stipulated that Christian instruction
107for Christian students he included in the curriculum. In 1907, in
response to Coptic demands, the Ministry decided that Christianity
could he taught in those state schools which had 15 Coptic students
1O0
enrolled, on the condition that the Church pay the teachers. In
some heavily Coptic areas, there were exclusively Coptic kuttabs,
providing the most "basic kind of education, and these were run by
109Provincial Councils. Other Copts attending government kuttabs were
not so lucky; approximately four out of six hours per day were devoted
110to Islamic religious subjects. When Christian instruction was
offered, it was often taught by an ill-trained Coptic teacher or an
equally ill-prepared priest. It annoyed the Copts that the government
allocated funds for the training of Muslim religious teachers but would
111not do so for Christians, but this problem seemed secondary. A more
fundamental problem was that the Provincial Councils seemed to make
so little effort to provide Christian instruction. Copts felt that
this was distinctly unfair given that, in certain areas, they paid a
112high proportion of the tax which supported council education. Some
of the more radical Copts of ’Asyut demanded a rebate of the school
113taxes Copts paid so that they could organize their own education.
llUCopts in Jirja and elsewhere felt likewise. In the late 1920s, some
107. FO.lUl/675, U5/7/37.
108. The Copts believed that the government should pay the teacher. Misr 
22 November 19^9, p.3.
109. In 1911, for example, the 'Asyut Provincial Council administered 79 
kuttabs, nine of which were reserved for Copts.
110. Kyriakos Mikhail, Copts and Muslims under British Control (Port 
Washington, N.Y. 1971), pp.1+6, 53, 79*
111. Interview, Mirrit Ghali, U December 19T8.
112. F0.371/1111, 5672/5672/16.
113. FO.371/1111, 10869/5672/16.
llU. In 1911 a concerted protest by the Copts led Sir William Bull on 
2k February to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 
the House of Commons whether discrimination in the kuttab system 
had received the government’s attention. Ibid.
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Copts were still complaining that their council failed to meet its
115
responsibility to teach religion to Christian students. Given
that one-third of the children in government schools in 1927 were
Copts, the numbers of Copts and the feasibility of providing them with
Christian instruction was not the real problem"?*^ The problem was, as
Eldon Gorst noted in 1907, that there was considerable Muslim
117
opposition to Christian education in schools. In 1911 delegates at
the Heliopolis Conference voted to oppose the teaching of Christianity
H 8in government schools. A more important concern to many Muslims
was the government's failure to provide adequate training in Islam.
In 1923 the Minister of Education expressed a desire to expand
119 cIslamic instruction in state schools. The ulama repeatedly
demanded that a larger share of the curriculum be devoted to Islam 
and, by the 1930s, religion was a large part of the set programme in 
all government schools. At the highest level of pre-university
120training, 20 per cent of class time was devoted to Arabic and Islam.
In 1921 the Ministry of Education agreed to provide Christian
121education in those primary schools enrolling ten Christian students.
115. Particularly in Qina. Migr 16 and 23 February 1928, p.l.
116. These figures excluded kuttabs and madaris, religious schools 
connected to mosques: 58,557 Copts and 102,^35 Muslims. The
statistics are those of the Ministry of Education. Migr, 29 June 1929, p.l.
117. Gorst!s Report on the Affairs of Egypt, 1907 (Accounts and Papers, C), 
Cd 3^52.
118. Mikhail, Copts and Muslims, p.35.
119. Al-Watan, claiming a tie between religion, morals and progress, 
applauded the Idea but asked that Christianity be taught to 
Christian students. 15 November 1923, p.l.
120. Until 1935, students in the fourth year of secondary school were 
exempt from religious classes. James Jankowski, Egypt’s Young 
Rebels (Stanford 1975), p.2.
121. Kuttabs were eventually absorbed by elementary schools, which provided 
basic literacy training. Primary schools had a more elaborate 
curriculum and were intended for students who planned a longer 
education than most Egyptian parents could afford. Secondary 
school was open only to the graduates of primary school.
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Complaints In the communal press suggest that this decision, like the
one in 1907, was executed piecemeal, if at all. In 1925 'Ibrahim
Takla, the highest ranking Copt in the Ministry of Education, was put
in charge of a committee developing a programme of Christian education
for primary and secondary schools. Its writ did not include developing
122
a programme for the more widely attended elementary schools.
In 1927 a memorandum was submitted by the Coptic Orthodox, Coptic
Catholic and Protestant churches to the Minister of Education, asking
that the compulsory education bill, then in preparation, provide
Christian instruction in all schools with ten Christian pupils. It
appealed to the constitutional guarantee of equality and reminded the
123
government that the Copts too paid taxes.
In 1931 the Minister of Education, in announcing plans for 
compulsory elementary education legislation, stated that religious 
education would be mandatory for Muslims. It would not be provided 
for Christian students, but they could make their own arrangements for 
instruction to be given during the periods Islam was taught. Misr 
accused the then Prime Minister SIdqi of so resenting Coptic opposition 
to his regime that he was trying to weaken the community's morals by
12kdenying its children religious instruction.
In 1933 the bill came before Parliament. Those who criticized its
provisions wished to see the curriculum include more Islamic religious
125instruction and less general knowledge. When the Coptic Senator
^Abd Allah Simai'ka bravely asked that Christian education be provided, 
the Minister of Education objected, claiming that it was impossible for
122. Misr, 1 October 1925, p-1.
123. FO.371/17302, JI9U1/I6U7/16.
12U. Misr, 17 December 1931, p.l.
125. Alfred Yallouz, "Chronique legislatif, 1921-311, L'Egypte Contemporaine 
1^6-7 (193*0, pp.126-8. FO.371/17302, JI6U7/16U7/16.
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a state with a constitutionally established religion to teach a 
second religion in its schools. This, of course, overlooked the 
fact that some government schools already offered Christian instruction 
and that there was a precedent for doing so. Coptic Senators planned 
to raise the issue again, but, in compliance with a royal request, did 
not.^^^ Curiously the Majlis Mill! and the Patriarch kept a closely 
guarded silence; that of the latter is almost certainly due to a fear 
of royal displeasure.
The law, when finally passed, did exempt non-Muslims from Islamic 
127Instruction, which was designed to consume one-third of classroom 
hours. Even if Christian children absented themselves from school 
during those hours, they would still have been exposed to Islam in their 
Arabic lessons. In practice, however, social pressure apparently made 
it difficult for Christian parents to withdraw their children from 
Islamic instruction.^^
129The Residency concluded that the law was discriminatory.
Campbell, the Acting High Commissioner, spoke to the Minister of 
Education who agreed to allow Copts, chosen by the community, to teach 
religion in elementary schools. Furthermore, he promised that the
Ministry would pay their salary. The Copts, not trusting the word
of the Minister, asked for a formal Directive. Campbell, who felt that 
the King and not the Cabinet was the real problem, none the less asked
126. FO.371/17302, Jl6*i7/l6U7/l6.
127. See Article 11, Chamber Debates, "Taqrir Lajnat al-Macarif can 
Mashruc Qanun Khas b-il-ta^lim al-'Awwal", 58th session, 22 May 1933.
128. A. Morrison, "Christian Minorities in Egypt", December 19^5, 
unpublished paper, Middle East Centre Library, Oxford University.
129. As a Foreign Office official noted, "The Case for intervention is 
reinforced by the injustice which would be shown by spending on 
Moslem religious education an increased amount of public money 
raised from taxes which are paid to some extent by Christians".
FO.371/17203, JI6U7/I6U7/I6.
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the Acting Prime Minister ahout a Ministerial Decree. Shafxq Pasha,
who had already discussed the matter with a delegation of Coptic
notables, reitereated the government's promise to provide Christian
instruction. He felt that there would be too much Muslim opposition
to a Ministerial Decree, just as there would have been had he tried to
131include it in the compulsory education bill. He promised, however,
to issue a circular to all Ministry offices calling for the
implementation of Christian education in elementary schools.
The Foreign Office was disappointed with his proposal and so were 
132 cthe Copts. Abd Allah Simaika wished to move to amend the bill in
the Senate but he failed to get the ten signatures required to begin 
133the process. The Patriarch still refused to enter the controversy,
but the Majlis Milll was at least preparing to present its views in a 
I3U
petition. In the autumn, the Ministry sent out a circular asking
about the number of Christian students enrolled. The Ministry intended
to make a decision after it obtained the responses, and the British
decided to wait for that decision.
Unfortunately, the anti-missionary campaign that summer and the
Caliphal ambitions of the King made it difficult for the government
135to take concrete action. The first led to demands for a more
130. The Foreign Office told Campbell that he could discuss the matter 
with the King if his Cabinet Ministers proved unhelpful.
131. FO.371/17302, J1727/16U7/16.
132. FO.371/17302, JI9UI/I6U7/I6.
133. There were more than ten Coptic Senators at this time.
13*+. The Majlis submitted the petition on 19 February 193*+ and, in 
it, asked for six periods per week of Christian instruction in 
those schools with at least 15 Christian students enrolled.
Misr, 2  April 19*+6a P * 2 .
135. FO1371/17976, J2067/7/16
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thorough Islamic education in state schools. The following year,
some Muslim Deputies insisted during the debate on the Ministry of
Education's budget that the programme of religious instruction was 
137inadequate. No Coptic Deputy spoke up but Misr, in making clear
its dissatisfaction, commented that parliamentary representatives were
supposed to represent the whole nation and not only its Muslim component.'
The Copts kept up their pressure and, with strong Residency support
which was given at Foreign Office insistence, they made some progress
in 1935* They obtained an exemption for non-Muslim primary students
139from Qur1 an memorization. The Minister of Education, al-Hilali,
was willing to fund Christian education at the elementary level but 
not in school buildings. He was even willing to defray the cost of 
renting sites, should some churches, the logical places for such 
instruction, be too far from schools. Coptic opinion divided on this 
offer: some insisted that the government must supply both premises
and teachers, and others were willing to accept government funds and 
organize the instruction themselves. The former group may have been 
anxious to keep religious instruction out of the hands of the ill- 
educated clergy; otherwise, they ran the risk of increasing the latter's
136. Al-Siyasa, 26 June 1933, p.l. In 1930 the Young Men's Muslim 
Association, concerned about missionary activity, deemed that 
religious instruction should be a part of the general school 
curricula; and it reprimanded the Minister of Education for paying 
too little attention to religious instruction. G. Kampffmeyer, 
"Egypt and Western Asia", in Whither Islam?, ed. H.A.R. Gibb 
(London 1932), pp.130-7, l*+9.
137- Egyptian Gazette, 15 March 193*+, p. 5*
138. Migr, 13 March 193*+, p.l.
139* It is not clear that this was enforced. In December 1936 the
Ministry of Education said that the time was unripe for the
introduction of this change. F0.1*+1/675s *+5/2 & 3/37*
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power. The second, more pragmatic group saw the advantage of the
community, rather than the government, having control of religious
instruction. The Patriarch was not blind to this; al-Hilali claimed
to have obtained his assent. Murqus Simaika, however, noted that the
Patriarch was so timid and fearful of offending the King that the
community could count on him for little help in its battles with the
government. The Majlis Mill! was less amenable to the scheme than
the Patriarch and the Residency was drawn into mediating between the
lUOgovernment and the Copts, a task it never enjoyed. Christian
instruction this time seems to have been sacrificed on the altar of
the Copts' inability to agree among themselves and their reluctance to
compromise with the government.
The tide was, in any case, running the other way; suddenly the
Copts found that the fight for an exemption from Islamic instruction was
more serious than that for the institution of Christian instruction. In
1936 a Qur'anic exam was made mandatory for all students in the first
two years of secondary school. Eventually the Patriarch requested an
exemption for Coptic students; and the Wafd, in power in 1937,
agreed. It was a decision the party may well have regretted because
li+1it raised an unexpected degree of opposition. ’Azharis, others of
similar religious ilk and the Wafd’s political opponents objected to 
the exemption; one petition, from the Central Committee of Young 
Muslim Societies, is typical.
lUo. FO.371/19082, J515/153/16; J15H8/153/16; J3022/153/16.
lUl. Al-Balagh, 8 March 1937, PPF; al-Jihad, 5 February 1937, PPF.
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The Arabic Language is the official language of 
the state and the Qur * an is the noblest 
expression of this language. It is truly 
astonishing that a group of the sons of the 
nation is to be deprived from tasting the 
literature of the official language of the 
country....Unity of teaching is the foundation 
of the unity of the nation. We cannot have 
one set of students taught one thing and 
another set something else.1^2
That same month, a group of law students advocated the introduction of
lU3compulsory religiou instruction at the University. Al-'Azhar was
jubilant, and Shaikh al-Maraghi expressed his approval to senior university
ikkofficials. The Wafdist al-Misri also backed the idea, but then changed
its mind. Muhammad al-^Ashmawi, Under-Secretary at the Ministry of
Education, told the press that students came to the University so well
1^5instructed in Islam that further teaching was unnecessary. Such comments
disrupted class at al-'Azhar and sent student delegations to call on 
university deans.
A few months later, this pressure pushed the Wafd into showing some 
support for Islamic religious instruction. It developed a list of 
recommendations which were supported by the Muslim Brethren and included the 
following: (l) setting a religious exam for students in the final two years
of secondary school; (2) building a mosque in every school and appointing 
one of the teachers to lead prayers; (3) requiring a sermon every day before 
the noon prayer, and (U) establishing a religious library in every school.1^
1^2. Al-Balagh. 8 March 1937, PPF. al-Jihad, 5 February 1937, PPF 
1U3. Al-Misri, 7 March 1937, PPF.
lUU. Al-Ahram, 8 March 1937, PPF.
1U5. Al-Misri, 12 March 1937, PPF. Misr attributed government resistance to 
the fact that the government was then negotiating the abolition of the 
capitulations and wanted to project a secular image . Misr, 15 March 1937 , p .1 •
lU6. AI-Migri, 18 July and 12 August 1937, PPF. At this time pressure was
also being put on parents sending their children to missionary schools. 
After British intervention, the government agreed to allow Muslim children 
to attend such schools if their parents could prove that they were receiving 
private religious instruction. In some places, Coptic parents were fined 
for sending their children to missionary schools instead of state schools. 
FO.371/2091^, J3162/369/16; J2UU7/369/16; J2253/369/16; FO.lUl/675,
U5/5 & 6/37-
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As the Wafd learned, religious education could be a potent
political weapon. In September 1937, the opposition press reported
that the government was developing a programme of Christian religious
IU7
instruction for state primary and secondary schools. The Wafd
ll8was obliged to deny the report, as it was the following year’s 
attack on Makram and al-Nahhas for opposing Islamic religious
1U9instruction in schools.
The pressure for more and more elaborate programmes of Islamic
150religious instruction was maintained throughout the 19^0s. ’Azharis,
151the Muslim Brethren and the Young Men’s Muslim Association were
particularly troublesome on this issue. It became increasingly
difficult for an Incumbent government to reject such demands, let alone
meet those of the Copts. The Ministry eventually acquired extensive
supervisory powers, including approval of curricula and texts, over
foreign and private schools; and It obliged them to teach their Muslim
152students about Islam. Coptic schools accepted Muslim students, and
it was not always easy for them to comply with the new regulations.
Prom 1 9 the Copts were particularly vehement about the need for 
Christian religious education, an unsurprising response to the increased 
degree of Muslim pressure. The Coptic Lay Council was particularly vigorous
1U7. Al-Balagh, 25 September 1937, PPF.
1^8. Al-Migr!, 26 September 1937, PPF.
1^9. Al-Kashkul, 11 February 1938, pp.3^-5•
150. FO.371/31569, J1226/38/16; Egyptian Gazette, 25 February 19^7, p.3.
151. DW, HBM (QM): Security Reports, 1938; Migr, 15 April 19^0, p.l.
152. La Bourse Egyptienne, 23 September 19^3, p.3- In 19^8 the 
Ministry demanded that private schools teach the same subjects with 
the same materials as government schools. Copts complained that 
some of the materials used in state schools were anti-Christian 
and that their authors were discriminated against in making up the 
reading lists. Christian schools were obliged to provide Muslim 
students with a place to pray even if the school met in a church 
and inspectors in some area forced the schools to close on Friday. 
Georgie Hyde, Education in Modern Egypt (London 1978), p.l68; 
Mikha’il, Farriq Tasud, pp.l6 , 23, 2*+; and Misr, 15 April 19^8, p.l.
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in this debate, as were Misr and al-Manara al-Misriyya. Misr sometimes
asked that a proportion of the education budget equal to the Coptic
percentage of the population be devoted to Christian education and, at
other times, only asked the government to help the Copts build their
own schools. From 19^9, the Copts used Law No.10 (19^9), which
guaranteed equal education for all Egyptians regardless of creed, to
support their demand for religious instruction. In 19^9 the Ministry
considered making Christianity an examination subject for Christian 
153students, and both the Majlis Milli and the Patriarch pushed hard 
for it. A committee of Coptic educators was appointed to develop 
a programme, and the Patriarch was asked to submit a report with his 
ideas. The matter went no further because the Cabinet then fell.
The Copts hoped that the new Wafd Cabinet would implement the programme. 
In February 1951, the Patriarch sent the Minister a note of inquiry, 
but not until the end of the year did the Minister of Education
announce that Christian students would be taught the principles of their 
15U
religion. The fall of the monarchy seven months later prevented the
plan's implementation in the next school year; but, if it had not, 
something else surely would have.
No easy generalizations can be made about which government schools 
offered Christian instruction. It was not available in elementary 
schools but seems sometimes to have been taught in primary and secondary 
school. It was an unsystematic arrangement which was made less 
acceptable by the fact that the ease in obtaining exemptions for 
Christian children from Islamic classes probably varied; much depended
153. Misr, 2 July 19^9, p.l.
15^. Misr, 1 December 1951, p.3.
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on local school and Ministry authorities. It was difficult for any 
Ministry, Wafdist or otherwise, to respond positively to Coptic demands 
for equality in the provision of religious education. Although the 
Wafd was accused by its opponents of being "soft" on the issue of 
Christian instruction, with the one exception of the Wafd promise to 
implement Christian instruction in 1 9 5 1 ,  the Copts came closest to their 
goal in 1 9 3 5  and 1 9 ^ 9 ,  both years of non-Wafd government. Even 
Cabinet approval of Christian exemptions from lessons or exams which 
were overtly Islamic was problematic. Part of the difficulty was 
that the Muslims who were inclined to be the most vocal on the issue 
of Islamic religious instruction probably were also the ones who were 
the least inclined to grant Copts true equality. The state could 
hardly fulfil its obligations to Islam by propagating Christianity, 
even among Christians.
B. The Issue of State Control
The state, in this period, was making greater demands on its 
citizens and was increasingly able to affect their lives. Its power 
over Muslims and Copts grew and it extended its authority into those 
areas where clerical competence had prevailed. Muslims found the 
state's tightening grasp less disturbing than did Copts, for they had 
always had a closer relationship with the state. The Copts reacted 
strongly when the government attempted to encroach on their traditional 
autonomy; some who supported integration in the political sphere 
fought the government in this other area. Paradoxically, they wanted 
both political equality and special protection. The road to 
integration was, at best, a long and difficult one; and it was not 
unwise of them to want some protection along the way. As long as
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the constitution and Islam imposed certain duties on the state, many
Copts believed that the community had a right to protect its religion
and culture. Should they relinquish that autonomy, they had no
guarantee that the government would establish an appropriate secular
alternative for both Muslims and Copts. The Copts were particularly
sensitive on two subjects, personal status jurisdiction and government
restrictions on their freedom of worship. If they were to survive as
a community in a Muslim-dominated state, it was vital to protect their
autonomy in the first and their freedom from restrictions in the second.
1. Personal Status Jurisdiction
Non-Muslims traditionally followed the prescriptions of their own
155religion and were bound by Islamic law in only a few cases. There
were separate personal status courts for the fourteen non-Muslim religious 
communities in Egypt. Some, including those of the three Coptic sects, 
were formally recognized by the government; others were unrecognized 
but tolerated. This system of multiple jurisdictions was antiquated,
”1 R
inefficient and lacking in uniformity. The government had no
control over millet court verdicts but was theoretically responsible
for the execution of those verdicts in those communities it had
recognized. As the government sometimes declined to accept this 
157responsibility, the communal courts ultimately were dependent on 
whatever religious sanctions the church could impose on a fractious
155* Such cases involved Muslims, members of different millets,
inheritance, or a non-Muslim’s appeal to a Muslim court in the hope 
of obtaining a favourable verdict. Inheritance traditionally 
followed Islamic law, applied by the millet courts, unless the heirs 
privately agreed to a different division of the property. Most 
Christian churches did not have a special canon law relating to 
inheritance, but sometimes had certain preferences. For example, 
the Coptic Orthodox preferred to award siblings more equal shares 
than did Muslims. See al-Khulaga al-Qanuniyya fi al-'Ahwal al- 
Shakhsiyya Li Kanisa al-’Aqbat al-’Urthudbuksiyya (Cairo 1923), p.327. 
156. FO.371/17976, J2067/7/16/
157* Kosroff Zohrab, "Etude sur les privileges de Patriarcats", L 'Egypte 
Contemporaine 112 (1929), p.155*
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litigant. There were other serious problems. The appointment of 
judges was arbitrary, and they were sometimes unqualified; only the 
Orthodox Copts maintained a high standard in lay appointments.'*"'^ No 
court protected against conflicts of interest, and the Coptic Orthodox 
community was one of the few whose courts followed a rule of procedure. 
The government, in the hope of abolishing inconsistencies within and 
between the millets, wanted one rule of procedure for all the millets; 
it also wished to establish a uniform scale of fees. Both would also 
have made government oversight easier.
Between 1918 and 1958, when the millet courts were abolished, the
government made repeated attempts to reform this system. Every attempt,
however sensible, and however limited, was fought by the Coptic community
on the grounds that reform "represented the thin end of a wedge"
directed at the abolition of the Majlis Millls and their control over 
159communal revenues. Personal status jurisdiction was one of the few
issues able to spark some measure of agreement among the Majlis Mill!, 
the clergy and the Coptic press and, by the 19^0s, it had even brought 
together the normally hostile Christian communities. There were some 
Christians , however, who wanted reform; they realized the judicial system’s 
corruption and inefficiency and were willing to see an increase in 
government power over the community because they had abandoned hope 
that the community would reform itself. When Senator Alfred Shammas 
tabled a motion to make non-Muslim marriage a civil contract, it was to 
overcome evils in the millet s y s t e m . H e  believed that the government
158. Etienne de Szazy, "Le Status Personnel des non-Musulmans en Egypte 
et sa reforme", L1Egypte Contemporaine iQk (1939), p.36l.
159- FO.371/16118, <11719/19^/16.
160. In his plan, the Sharica courts, with a non-Muslim added to the 
bench, had jurisdiction over the validity of marriage. Senate 
Debates, 23 August 1926; Egyptian Gazette, 28 August 1926, p.^.
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would be less arbitrary in its judicial behaviour than the communal 
courts, although on what grounds is not clear. Some Copts supported 
personal status reforms because they wished to see a decrease in the 
Majlis Milli's power and, in some cases possibly, a corresponding 
increase in their own. QalinI Fabmi , for example, suggested to the 
Palace in 1926 that personal status matters be taken over by the 
government, a plan he was still advocating in the 19^0s. He described 
the lay councils as small governments whose existence was not in line 
with the spirit of the constitution.
The British followed the government's attempts at reform closely 
and their help was often solicited by minorities. The Foreign Office 
was more likely to disapprove of draft legislation than the Residency; 
this may have been due to their sensitivity to the infAtence of the 
Anglican church in parliament. At one stage, however, the Foreign 
Office inexplicably reversed its stand and openly pushed for reform.
The first encroachment on the millet courts was made in the 19th 
century with the establishment of the Court of Wards (Majlis al-Hasbi). 
The court was designed to administer the property of minors and the 
incompetent. This was not a religious function, and the Majlis was 
not really a religious court. However, there was no civil code and 
so the court applied Sharica law whenever possible. Many Copts,
including members of the Lay Council, did not approve of the Court of 
Wards or a 1925 law increasing its powers. They were not comforted 
by the fact that the latter law stipulated that a member of the 
appropriate millet join the bench in non-Muslim cases in place of the
l6l. CCEH, ^Abdin Palace Index, Index on the Copts, No.U039-
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- T J 1 6 2usual fena.rT a Judge. The Majlis Milli regarded the Hasbi courts
as Islamic courts and believed that if certain family questions were
secular, they should be under the jurisdiction of the Native Courts.
163Misr and al-Watan also opposed the 1925 law. A few Copts, feeling
that the measure provided more protection to wards than did the
chaotic organization of Majlis Mill! courts, approved it. The
British did not find the 1925 law threatening to Coptic interests ,
although three years earlier M.S. Amos advocated British intervention
l6 kto prevent a similar reform if the minorities opposed it. The
Hasbi Court was again strengthened by royal decree in 1929.
Numerous committees discussed the reform of the entire court 
system but, as ilAli Mahir noted in 1936, their discussions bore little
165fruit. One committee, meeting in 1920-1, conceded that the state
was unable to legislate a personal status code for all Egyptians and 
must find another solution to the contradictions. Acordingly, this 
committee outlined rules of competence to determine jurisdiction. The
committee wanted to create a special court to which cases involving a
', tl
167
conflict of competence or verdict could be r e f e r r e d . H o w e v e r , he
draft law was shelved, as was a similar project drawn up in 1923.
The confusion in judicial prerogatives resulted in many complaints 
from non-Muslims, and the Senate Finance Committee in 1927 asked the
162. 1Ahmad Muhammad Hassan Bey and Isador Feldman, Majmuca al-Qawanin 
w-al-Lawa1ih, II (Cairo 1926), p.1088. Decree Law of 13 October 1925.
163. Al-Watan complained that the government had no right to put into 
effect such a scheme until Parliament was in session . See al-Watan 
15 July 1925, p •2 and 11 August 1925, p.l.
16U. F0.1U1/U51, 1U5UU/1/22.
165. Mahmud cAzmI, al-1Ayyam al-Mi1 a (Cairo 1939)5 p.51*
166. DW, ^Abdin Palace Archives,Tawa1if wa GamcIyat Diniyya 2. Report 
dated 1 May 1921.
167. Egyptian Gazette, 2 March 1923, p.6. Both Committees had a Coptic 
representative in Sidarus Sesostris, later a diplomat.
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Minister of Justice to study the matter. The Ministry, in turn,
asked non-Muslims to present their ideas on the unification of millet 
jurisdiction. The latter responded that, due to variations in canon 
law, it would he impossible to draft one code which would satisfy all 
communities ; many mentioned the difference in divorce laws as 
problematic. Some also insisted that only their clergy could alter
169canon law. Both Misr and al-Watan opposed new legislation.
In 1931 the Minister of Justice, CA11 Mahir, revived the 1923 
170plan. The Copts were annoyed that he chose to take a sounding
of minority opinion in the summer when few communal leaders were
available. Misr and al-Watan voiced their opposition and their
resentment that neither the Patriarch nor the Majlis Mill! had acted
171with speed or firmness. The Majlis finally published in November
172a brochure claiming communal privilege in all matters of personal status.
Because of this opposition, the Cabinet in December appointed a
special advisory committee, including non-Muslims, to help the 
173
Ministry. The Ministry hoped to attach a Christian personal status
court to each native Court of the First Instance. Its bench would be 
drawn partly from the Native Courts and would include two lay members 
who shared the religion of the disputants. A similar Appeals Court 
would be established. The Ministry here was trying to regularize the 
application of the law and not produce a new civil code. If the parties
168. Senate Debates, *+8th Session, 6 June 1927* Misr accused the 
government of tampering with religious freedom.
169. Migr, 25 February 1928, p.3. See also FCf ^07/206, J519/l8/l6 (Jan.).
170. CA1I Mahir had a general interest in reforms which would lead to 
greater efficiency and greater state control. He had a special 
interest in the badly organized Majlis al-Hasbi having been its 
director of administration until 1918.
171. Migr, lU October 1931, p.6 .
172. FO.lUl/755, 12U/9/33.
173. It could only advise and not veto. FO.lUl/566, 78/20/3^.
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were Orthodox and belonged to a community with a recognized code of 
law, they would be justiciable under Coptic Orthodox law, and, if 
Catholic, under Catholic canon law. If the disputants were of 
different sects, then lex contractus or the canon law which validated
17 kthe marriage would apply, except when one party had converted to Islam.
This latter point met an important Coptic demand. Christians desiring
a divorce frequently converted to a different Christian sect so that
they could take their case to an Islamic court.
Many in the Residency, including the High Commissioner, thought
that the proposals, in laicizing non-Muslim jurisdiction only, were 
175unfair. There was no provision for clerical representation on
the bench and, theoretically, Muslims could be appointed judges. A 
more serious problem was that the reform entailed considerable loss of 
power to the Lay Councils and probably foreshadowed their eventual 
demise. Booth, the Judicial Adviser, did see some good in the reform 
and felt that Christian religious sensibilities, given the narrower 
scope of issues considered religious in Christianity would be less
-I
offended by the project than Muslim feeling In a similar instance.
Booth’s reasoning was not shared by Egyptian Christians. Some, 
along with the Protestant Majlis Milli, insisted that the old system 
functioned perfectly well and did not require reform. One delegation 
of Copts told a member of Booth’s staff that matters reserved for the
-| r j r j
Sharica courts must also be set aside for the communal courts.
Those Copts on the government committee showed themselves no more
17U. F0.1U1/U88, 9U/1/32.
175* Of course, the Sharica courts were going to lose jurisdiction in 
cases involving disputants of differing millets.
176. FO.lUlA88, 9h/2/32.
177. FO.1U1/U88, 9^/12/32.
2 8 0
amenable to the reform. They admitted the necessity of uniform
procedure and the desirability of depositing with the Ministry the
code of laws of each community, but they refused to agree to more 
1*70
radical changes. Obviously, their loss of power vis-a-vis the
government disturbed the Copts more than long-time abuses in the system.
The Ministry took these strong feelings into account and drafted
concessionary legislation. Communal courts were not to be amalgamated
or reduced in number, but their competence was to be restricted and
they were to be brought into a closer relationship with the Ministry 
179
of Justice. Judges were to be approved by the Ministry, and their
verdicts pronounced in the name of the King. Although a compromise,
this still increased government power at the expense of the communal
courts. The Copts objected to this scheme, and even Smart feared that
it opened the door to the kind of government conduct witnessed in the
1001928 Patriarchal election. Both he and the Foreign Office concluded
that as long as there were special courts for Muslims, there must be
101parallel courts for non-Muslims.
In discussing the appropriate British response, Sir Charles Dilke
and Sir Maurice Peterson in the Foreign Office believed that intervention
could be justified by the third Reserved Point because, as Dilke noted,
"the liberties of the Copts were being infringed and....the
constitution which we had supposed ensured sufficient protection was 
182being broken..." Peterson instructed an unhappy Loraine to object
if the government persisted with the legislation. Loraine agreed 
with Booth that the government's desire to supervise millet courts was
178. FO.A1A 88, A/8/32.
179. F0.1^1/H88, 9I1/9/3 2.
180. FO.1U1A 88, 9U/8/32.
181. FO.A1A 88, 9^/11/32.
182. F0.371/16117, J1263/171/16.
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not unreasonable, although he saw Smart's point that the government
could approve judges with strong Patriarchal sympathies, thereby
l83strengthening the hand of the clerical party. Booth approved the
legislation because both inheritance and cases involving disputants 
of different religions would go to the Native Courts. Although this
was not quite what the Copts wanted, it was a concession which involved
c 181+some loss of power to the Shari a courts.
Nothing happened until the next year when the Foreign Office,
suddenly and inexplicably, instructed the Residency to see that the
n O c*
reform was not buried forever in the Ministry of Justice, Arthur
Yencken, the Acting High Commissioner, noted his opinion that, due to 
Coptic opposition, it was enough for the British to acquiesce to the
186legislation without actively promoting it. Peterson agreed to a
temporary postponement only. Despite obvious procrastination, 
little pressure was applied to the government before it fell in 
November.
CA1I Mahir returned to the reform when he became Prime Minister in
1936. A new draft was prepared and the Council of Ministers approved 
it in May. Some changes were made to satisfy the British, but these 
did not in any way placate the minorities. Still, having settled 
British, if not Coptic objections, the government declared the project 
law. CA1I Mahir, in fact, enacted a considerable number of laws by 
royal decree during his short interim Ministry. The succeeding Wafdist
183. FO. 1+07/215 No.67, Sir P. Loraine to Sir J. Simon, 10 June 1932.
For a copy of the draft law, see FO.ll+l/1+88, 9^/9/32. 
l8U. The Minister of Justice told Booth that he had received sharp protests 
from Muslims because of this. F0.37l/l6ll8, J1719/19^/l6.
185. FO.lUl/566, 78/2/3U.
186. FO. 11+1/566, 78/1/3!+.
187. FO.ll+l/566, 78/IO/3I+.
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Cabinet declared these enactments the proper business of Parliament 
and abrogated most of them, including the personal status law. The 
British did not protest, either because they had lost interest in the 
reform or because, following the strict letter of the 1936 treaty, it 
was none of their affair.
In 19*+^  the government was once again considering reform. Rumour 
and speculation ran riot. The Copts were already alarmed due to the
enactment of a law formally obliging non-Muslims to follow Islamic 
inheritance laws. When the bill came up for debate in the Chamber, 
three Coptic deputies argued for its postponement until the planned 
personal status law could be drafted. Their tactic failed and the
law passed, seemingly without Coptic opposition to the substance of
.. 188 the bill.
With regard to its personal status legislation, this government
made a greater effort to consult minority opinion than had ^Ali Mahir
in 1936. The Minister of Justice, Sabri 'Abu ^Alam, received many
representations from communal leaders and met with Fahmi Wisa,
Minister of Civil Defence, and Kamil Sidqi, an ex-Minister^^ As a result
of these meetings, minor changes were made in the government's draft.
Minorities still insisted on lex contractus; but the government,
handicapped by a parliament with which All Mahir had not had to
190deal, was not amenable on this point. In mid-September, 'Abu
cAlam met with the press to explain that the government's intention 
was to abolish discrepancies in jurisdiction and procedure and not
188. Chamber Debates, sixteenth session, 8 March 19^.
189. Egyptian Gazette, 6 September 19^» p.3.
190. Sabri 'Abu ^Alam was rumoubed to be seeking the opinion of the
Mufti of Egypt on this idea of lex contractus■ Egyptian Gazette, 
8 September 19^> p. 3.
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191alter canon law. Whatever its purpose, the legislation collapsed
with the fall of the al-Nahhas government.
Both the Patriarch and the Orthodoxy Majlis Mill! made their
objections known to the next Cabinet so the new Minister of Justice,
Hafiz Ramadan, announced that yet another committee would be formed to
examine the subject.
The Committee of Liaison, founded to represent the various
Christian sects and to defend religious liberty, met to co-ordinate non-
192
Muslim opposition to the new draft. Saba Habashi, who was in close
touch with this committee, met with the Ministers of Social and Foreign
Affairs during the summer and emphasized the importance of including
lex contractus. The Committee of Liaison, however, decided that draft
legislation would be unacceptable whatever modifications were made in
it. Wheeling in the big guns, the Coptic Orthodox Patriarch was
persuaded to lead the opposition to the bill, and the Palace was
besieged with petitions claiming that the reform violated the essence
193of the Christian religion. The Senate, without any real discussion,
19U
voted to send the bill back to Committee.
The millets wanted the bill withdrawn altogether and, to this
195purpose, showed a "unity of view and action" never before achieved.
In January the Prime Minister, in a rare meeting with the Coptic
191. F0.371A1318, J3A U / 1U/16.
192. The committee had the backing of the Christian millets and sought 
the support of the two Jewish communities. FO.lUl/11595 73A1/H6.
193* One petition was from 'Ibrahim Luqa. DW, ^Abdin Palace Archives. 
Tawa'if Diniyya-l, No.29, Petition to the head of the Royal Diwan.
19U. Senators Tawfiq and Wahlb Dus played a role in postponing debate
on the bill several times and finally in returning it to committee. 
Senator Saba Habashi, despite his concern, made no visible 
contribution to this discussion. The merits of the legislation were 
not discussed. Senate Debates, 23 December 19 A , twenty-third session.
195- French Embassy Archives, Box lA, File 31/2, letter from Ambassador
Gilbert Arvengas to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georges Bidault, 
N0.2U8, 21 February I9A .
2 8 4
Patriarch, discussed millet demands. The Greek Orthodox and Greek
Catholic Patriarchs and the Grand Rabbi of Alexandria registered formal
complaints. In Cairo, a protest meeting was held and the government's
196action characterized as a coup d'etat. A minor victory was achieved
when a delegation meeting with the King's Secretary was told to prepare
a report which could serve as the basis of new draft legislation.
The British Embassy, whose help was sought by the Greek Orthodox
Patriarch, declined to intervene. Characteristic of British irritation
was the opinion of one official who noted that reform had been
discussed for l6 years and that a new development was always "just
197around the corner". Although the Embassy continued to follow events,
it did not confide any opinion, private or official, to the Egyptian
government after the 1936 treaty. It was not a matter which impinged
on critical British interests.
In June a deputation called on the Prime Minister and the President
of the Senate to present a counterdraft. The Senate Judiciary Committee
issued its plan, which French Embassy officials described as making
substantial concessions at the end of the month. One such gain was
the awarding of competence in cases in which one party had converted
to Islam to the Native Courts. In addition, this draft, unlike its
predecessor in 1932, prohibited Muslims from sitting on the bench
of the non-Muslim appeals courts, and it also provided for clerical 
198representation. None the less, opposition was so strong that the
government was forced to withdraw the bill from parliament. Elections
196. FO.371/63029, J107U/152/16. 
197= FO.lUl/1159, 73/2UA7,
198* In addition, Article 12 legitimized the view of those non-Muslims who 
saw marriage as a religious bond and were opposed to making it a 
civil contract by stipulating that marriages must first be sanctioned 
by the appropriate religious authority and then registered with the 
government. French Embassy Archives, Box ikh, File 31/2, "Coptic 
Catholics", N0.1A 7.
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and a new Wafd Cabinet which sensibly avoided this troublesome issue 
brought the saga to an end.
In conclusion, the Copts, with some British backing as well as 
hindrance, were able to block any major reform in non-Muslim personal 
status jurisdiction. The government, at least in this one area, 
became increasingly willing to make concessions to communal desiderata; 
while the Copts, paradoxically, became increasingly resistant to any 
changes.
No doubt many politicians would have liked to create an entirely
secular court system, under complete government control; but the
system of multiple jurisdictions they inherited, partly Islamic and
partly Western in inspiration, must have seemed frustratingly impervious
to change. The attempt to reform non-Muslim personal status
jurisdiction was not simply a matter of a well-meaning Muslim government
trying to improve a chaotic and sometimes corrupt court system, but nor
was it entirely an attempt by the government to gain power at the
expense of its religious minorities. The government was also interested
199in reforming Muslim family law and its administration. Recognizing
the likelihood of an unfavourable public reaction, its attempts to do 
so were less energetic and radical than attempts to reform non-Muslim 
courts. Government reformers perhaps felt that it was more feasible, 
given the weakness of the millets and the fact that their religions did 
not specify such a detailed family law, to begin a general legal reform 
with their courts. They were wrong and eventually discovered that the 
changes they could effect in this area were hardly more far-reaching
199* In 1926-27 proposals for the revision of Islamic personal status
jurisdiction and the abolition of private endowments were presented 
to the Chamber. Similar suggestions were made from time to time. 
F0.U07/205, No.18. Mr. Henderson to Sir Austen Chamberlain,
8 September 1927*
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than those they could make in the Islamic legal system. The 
government was sometimes lax in consulting minority opinion^*"1 and was 
not entirely unwilling to impose reform by fiat. That it met with 
such stiff opposition was as much due to the minorities' unwillingness 
to lose more power over their communal affairs to a government whose 
secularism was suspect as it was to a desire to hold fast to religion. 
Most Copts, even some of those interested in internal reform, preferred 
to endure the abuses of the old system rather than relinquish communal 
control. No doubt they were also aware that a government-imposed 
reform would not necessarily guarantee efficiency or honesty, but it 
is also true that there was no genuinely strong movement within the 
community to correct the abuses inherent in personal status jurisdiction.
Non-Wafdist governments, which so often manipulated Muslim 
religious sentiment for political gain, were much more willing to 
reform non-Muslim personal status jurisdiction than the Wafd. Non- 
Wafdist parties had, or felt themselves to have, little significant 
Coptic support; the political risks entailed in reform were not that 
great. For the Wafd, however, the political risks were considerable, 
and the social benefits to be derived from any such reform could not 
offset them. The only serious attempt made by a Wafd government to 
deal with the problem was in 19^, after Makram cUbaid and several 
other Copts left the party. This attempt is curious because the Wafd 
then was anxious to retain some of its traditional Coptic support, 
although it does not automatically follow from cUbaid’s break that 
Coptic backing for the Wafd had completely collapsed. However, there 
were fewer Copts In the party to argue against personal status reforms.
200. Non-Muslims were sometimes asked to give an opinion after and not 
before a draft had been prepared.
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2. Government limitations on the freedom of belief
Traditionally, churches could be built only with the permission
of the government; the government, however, was often loth to grant
this permission. The restrictions were manifold: churches could not
be built near a mosque in or in a Muslim area if the inhabitant? objected,
if the government decided that an adequate number of churches already
existed in the area. Although permits fell within the purview of
the Ministry of the Interior, If the church was too near a public
building, a bank of the Nile or an irrigation canal, the appropriate
Ministry had first to approve the proposed construction. One Coptic
society in Kafr al-Shaikh, after waiting four years for permission to
build a church on land the state had sold to it for that purpose, was
told by the government that there were too few Copts in the area to
justify a new church. It was said also that the planned church was
too close to Kafr al-Shaikh town and would somehow threaten public 
201security. This example does not seem atypical; sometimes Copts
202waited as long as ten years only to be denied a permit. What often
seems to have happened was that no sooner was a site chosen and a permit
requested than a mosque was built nearby in order to defeat the 
203
petition. In 19^9 a- Ministry of Social Affairs directive seems to
20thave made permission even more difficult to acquire, and in 1951 
Misr expressed dismay because, at a time when many mosques were being 
built in heavily Coptic Shubra, it was so difficult to build churches
201. Mikha’il, Farriq Tasud, pp.83-A, 87.
202. In 1952, Copts in Suhaj had waited seven years for a permit. The 
Patriarch had even made a fruitless trip to see the Minister of the 
Interior on their behalf. Misr, 29 December 1951, p.l.
203. Migr, 5 August 1950, p.l; Y. Masriya, "A Christian Minority: The 
Copts in Egypt", in Case Studies in Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms IV (The Hague 1976), p.79.
20U. This decision applied to churches built with money collected from the 
public through donations or subscriptions, and its intent seems to 
have been to protect the subscribers. Misr, 28 June 19^9, P*3.
or
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In such quarters. It was a3.so difficult to obtain permits to repair
existing churches.
The Copts correctly construed the difficulty in building churches
as an illegal restriction on the constitutional guarantee of freedom
of worship. Misr frequently complained about the p r o b l e m . I n
1950, 'Ibrahim Luqa wrote an open letter to the Minister of the Interior
asking him to ease restrictions , and the following year the Patriarch
207wrote to the Prime Minister and asked him to abolish them.
Two minor problems which bothered Copts were the functional ban on
ringing church bells and the conscription of Coptic theological students
in the 1950s. A more serious inequity was the impossibility of
broadcasting Coptic religious programmes and services on state radio
when much of the air-time was taken up with Islamic religious broadcasts.
Originally, the Copts were refused permission to broadcast on the grounds
that they would do so In Coptic, and foreign languages were not allowed.
Copts frequently asked for this prohibition to be lifted, but were
u n s u c c e s s f u l . O n l y  once during Coptic Christmas in 1951 were the
209Copts permitted to broadcast a religious service.
C. One Response to Pressure: Conversion
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, due to the pressures 
put on the Copts and the difficulties placed in their way, it was part 
of the state's task to encourage conversion to Islam. In centuries
205. Migr, 10 January 1950, p.3.
206. See Mi^r, 15 May 1936, p.l; k August 1951, p.l.
207. Migr, 10 January 1950, p.3; 18 January 1951, p.l; 28 March 1951, p.l.
208. See Migr, 17 March 1938, p.l; French Embassy Archives, Box lkht 
File 31/2, "Coptic Catholics" no.66l, M. Gilbert Arvengas to M.
Georges Bidault, 29 April 19^8; Mikha'il, Farriq Tasud, p.310.
209. See Migr, 2 January 1951, p.l; 15 January 1951, p.l.
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past, the state may have "been predominantly interested in the jizya
tax but, in this century, homogeneity was increasingly important.
Given the disadvantages of being Christian in this society, surprisingly
few Copts seem to have converted; most estimates range from a few
hundred to less than a thousand per year. These estimates may not,
however, have accurately reflected rural conversions; isolated villagers
may have been subject to a coercion that urban Copts either did not
210encounter or could more easily resist. Judging from the number of
articles published in Misr and al-Manara al-Misriya, concern about the 
conversion rate became more acute in the mid-19*+0s. Salama Musa, 
commenting on the case of a young Copt who had joined the Muslim
211Brethren, accused the Brethren of mounting a campaign to convert Copts.
The French Embassy reported that Brethren zealots were abducting
young Christian girls, marrying them and then forcing them to convert 
212to Islam.
The Islamic religious establishment seems to have overlooked such
abuses. They were required to ensure that the conversion was sincere,
213but this was an empty formality; Copts were not turned away.
Copts, in fact, converted for a variety of practical reasons; among
2ll|
them to find work, escape discrimination and obtain divorce. No
stigma was attached to being an ex-Christian. Some newspapers printed 
articles about converts who had been hired by the government, and 
Muslim societies published figures showing the sums spent to help new
210. One Copt wrote to Migr that he had been forced to convert. Migr, 
23 June 1951, p.l.
211. Migr, 18 April 19*+6, p.l.
212. The Embassy noted that conversions were more numerous. French 
Embassy Archives, Box lUU, File 31/2, Situation de la Communaute 
Copte en Egypte, 2k January 19*+8.
213. Migr, 17 May 19^7, P*3.
21*+. For examples of court cases, see Mikha'il, Farriq Tasud, pp. 150-6*4-.
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215converts. Sometimes a convert later wished to return to the
Christian fold, but the law on apostacy forbade this.^"^ Copts could 
not and did not demand that conversion to Islam be prohibited, but they 
did want to make it more difficult.
D . Summary
Equality was clearly the key in all of this as far as the Copts, and 
to an extent the British, were concerned. The constitution established 
an ideal which they looked to meet in practice but which was impossible 
to realize. If Muslims had separate religious courts, the Copts 
believed that they were entitled to them as well. If mosques could go 
up at will, then the construction of churches ought to be equally easy. 
All citizens ought to have equal access to the civil service and indeed 
to all jobs. The communal press was the most vehement advocate of 
equality in Egypt and was sometimes able to force official Coptic 
representatives to take a stand in defence of sectarian interests. Both 
Coptic clergy and politicians could be woefully unresponsive to communal 
desires. They did little to combat discrimination in employment, but 
this was a fuzzy area in which it was easy to prove discrimination 
overall but difficult to substantiate in the particular. There was, 
in any case, no mechanism for correcting the problem. The constitution 
guaranteed equality, but the apparatus for enforcing it did not really 
exist. There was an almost equal lack of response, at least until the 
19*+0s, on the issue of Christian religious education. This was less
215. Rev. Qummus Sergius, "Why Copts become Moslems?", The Moslem 
World 26 (1936), p.377.
216. Migr, 15 February 1951j p.l.
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a matter of defending an existing preserve than fulfilling a new goal 
engendered by the notion of equality. The issue of reforming personal 
status jurisdiction drew by far the most strenuous protests, although 
Coptic political representatives again were less than stalwart in 
their defence. The Lay Council and the clergy, on the other hand, 
had vested interests at stake and were not about to relinquish them 
without a struggle. Their success in this, the most traditional and 
hallowed preserve of the Copts, was striking. If the number of 
complaints voiced can be used as a measure, the problem of building 
churches became more acute in the 19*+0s. Perhaps the government found 
it more difficult to grant permits in the face of so much Islamic 
religious pressure. It may also be the case that the Coptic press, 
in the early years of the monarchy when chance of obtaining equality 
appeared great, was less interested in this issue; later, when the 
Copts felt threatened on all sides, the problem of building permits 
seemed increasingly relevant to their unfortunate situation. It is 
interesting to note how very much more active the Patriarch became in 
his flock's defence in the late 19*+0s. This may have been less due 
to conviction than the pressures placed on him by the other millets 
and his own community.
It is not entirely clear that the government responded to this 
charged atmosphere by increasing discrimination and by making greater 
attempts to deprive the community of its jurisdiction in certain areas. 
Certainly, Copts felt that the government was treating non-Muslims 
more harshly, although perhaps the government merely struggled to 
maintain traditional relationships. However, its attempts to increase 
its power and strengthen its own machinery meant that there was 
increasingly less room for individual action and responsibility for all.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ETHNICITY AND RELIGION IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
A. The Religious Idiom and Party Politics
The use of religious issues and sentiments became a feature of 
political discourse In this period. There were those who felt that 
this was only right and proper, that Islam required political decisions 
to accord with its dictates. Others were uncomfortable with this 
stance but still made political use of religion because they knew it 
was the easiest way to reach the masses. Still others, secularists 
of a more principled type, saw this as discreditable conduct. Many 
politicians resided, however uncomfortably, in the middle category.
Even when party interests were opposed to a religiously-dictated 
desideratum, like the re-establishment of the Caliphate, party loyalists 
rarely dared to declare their disapproval for fear that their 
obedience to Islam would be questioned. Islamic affairs were discussed 
with lively interest by the party, and sometimes even the Coptic press, 
and attendance at Friday services and other displays of piety helped 
keep a party's devotion to Islam before the public eye. Certain 
Coptic politicians even made a point of attending mosque services, 
although few were able to make such profitable use of Islam as Makram.
All parties, then, used religion to strengthen their support and 
explain their aims, actions and policies. An integral part of this 
strategy sometimes was to make a public issue of the role that the 
Copts played in politics. Some parties claimed to see conspiracies 
at every hand. They also, by questioning the amount of power some 
Muslim politicians placed in the hands of their Coptic colleagues, were 
able to question those politicians' dedication to Islam and
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responsiveness to their constituents. This tactic was used mainly 
against the Wafd by the Liberals, the Sacdists and the Palace and its 
affiliates. The Liberals were among the worst offenders; their 
journal, al-Kashkul. was perhaps the most consistently anti-Coptic 
of any published in Egypt. The record of al-Siyasa was not much 
better. A later offender, and one with the dubious merit of at least 
believing what it said, was the Muslim Brethren organization. Hassan
al-Banna’, the Supreme Guide, believed that Coptic participation in 
politics should be strictly limited; Muhammad Husain Haikal, however 
scurrilous his newspaper al-Siyasa, believed at least theoretically In 
the right of the Copts, as Egyptian citizens, to play a political role. 
The problem for the Liberals, who were perhaps the first to use ethnic 
propaganda in this period, was that the Wafd's credentials were such 
that they had few means of undermining that reputation and enhancing 
their own. The role the Copts played in the Wafd had not only been 
commented on during the revolution, but had actually been praised; 
the Liberals tried to make it into an object of criticism.
Partly because personalities took precedence over policies, 
politicians were frequently criticized for adhering to the wrong 
religion or being insufficiently attentive to the right one. Even 
the mere use of names, which generally marked the holder as Copt or 
Muslim, could serve as a political weapon. Two Wafdist Copts went so 
far as to alter their names, an hypocrisy which displeased many of 
their co-religionists. Early in his political career, Makram cUbaid 
dropped his first name, William. William was a double misfortune; 
not only was it the only part of his name that labelled him a Christian 
but it had foreign and Protestant connections which were capable of 
arousing even Coptic distaste. The anti-Wafdist press was able to
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capitalize on this by almost unfailingly referring to Makram as
"William" or "William Makram". Years later, ’Ibrahim Faraj Maslha did
the same thing when he dropped his last name, which means "Christ".
The Wafdist press, which called Makram "Makram cUbaid" now referred
to Maslha as "'Ibrahim Faraj". Muslims unacquainted with Wafdist
personalities could have been excused for thinking both Muslim.
Copts active in parties other than the Wafd were not above
suspicion. In December 1933 two Ministry of Justice officials were
overheard deploring the Coptic role in the Shacb and al-'Ittihad
parties. The two men were convinced that the Coptic members of both
met secretly to vote on party matters and then persuaded their Muslim
1
colleagues to adopt their view. This was a suspicion that was most
frequently voiced about the Copts in the Wafd. The Wafd was the only
party to defend Coptic political participation and to go on promoting a
Coptic role in defiance of its opponents. It almost never, as a party
policy, used divisive tactics, although there is some evidence to suggest
that it could not resist an occasional ethnic jab at Makram's al-Kutla.
In general, however, the Wafd did not use ethnic appeals because it was
so vulnerable to them itself.
Until 1927, the charge most frequently brought against the Wafd was
that it was a Coptic clique. Once Makram became Secretary-General,
that clique gained a leader; both the party and al-Nahhas were
2
portrayed as puppets in the hands of a sly, evil genius. Both
accusations at least Implied that there was a Coptic conspiracy to rule 
3
Egypt. At times, the charges were more explicit and ugly. In the
1. FO. l*+l/7*+*+. 1167/2/33.
2. There is evidence to suggest that criticism of the role Makram
played in the Wafd dates to 1923* See al-Kashkul. 31 August 1923, p.*+.
3. Al-KasJakul, 20 September 1929, p. 5.
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1930s, the Copts sometimes were likened to the Jews as described by
k
Nazi propaganda. They were also accused of working for a national
5
home in Egypt as were the Jews In Palestine.
Such charges, as absurd as they were, cast aspersion upon and 
ultimately undermined the right of the Copts to participate in politics. 
They suggested that the Copts in politics could only act as Copts; they 
would always think, work and vote as Copts and could not, therefore, 
represent the general interest. These charges perpetuated the 
traditional view of non-Muslims, which was one which could never mesh 
with Western political thought. The Liberals, the Sa'-dists and the 
Palace never publicly came to grips with the kind of place they 
envisioned for the Copts; such an explicit formulation was left to 
tradition and some of the more religiously oriented groups like the 
Muslim Brethren.
The Wafd, to its credit, never allowed its accusers the dignity 
of trying to prove that the Copts did not dominate party councils.
Unless circumstantial evidence and the obvious decline of Copts in the 
Wafd is taken as proof, there are few signs that the Wafd consciously 
tried to reduce Coptic visibility, except in the matter of names, in 
order to render the party less vulnerable to these charges. Generally, 
the Wafd countered by accusing its opponents of trying to divide the 
nation. This was a crime which would have seemed more heinous in the 
1920s when the ideals of the revolution were still fresh, than in the 
1930s. By the end of the latter decade, those ideals had grown somewhat 
stale and the Wafd's response was not adequate to the change. Perhaps 
realizing this, the Wafd defended national unity and the Coptic role in
k. F0.1U1/7UU, 1167/2/33.
5. Al-Siyasa, 9 September 1929, PPF.
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politics less in the 19*+0s than it had in the previous two decades.
Its defence of secularism decreased with its reliance on religion,
hut it had always stressed, as one reply, that Wafdists were good
Muslims and patriots. It also tried to cast doubt on its opponents’
charges of Coptism by discrediting the religiosity of those opponents.
It has, in fact, been suggested by one scholar, Leland Bowie, that
the Wafd, by attacking the Liberals as atheists, provoked anti-Coptic
propaganda in retaliation.^ Both he and Charles Smith, possibly acting
on the suggestion of ’Ahmad Shafiq Pasha, accept 1928-9 as the point at
7
which the Liberals began to describe the Wafd as a Coptic clique.
Bowie, insisting on a Liberal tendency to reside "above the political 
fray" until 1929, believes that the Wafd was the first "to play on
Q
Islamic loyalties for political gain". However, the Liberals grubbed
in political dirt as early as 1923, when they first began to appeal to
sectarian sentiments. There is little indication that the Wafd made
more than the most cursory appeals to religious sentiment that were
seemingly de rigueur until 1925-6 when the books of two men with Liberal
connections, ^Ali cAbd al-Raziq and Taha Husain, gave the party ample
ammunition. In the eyes of many Egyptians, the Wafd then had grounds
9
for calling the Liberals atheists. This charge, of course, was only
6 . Leland Bowie, "The Copts, the Wafd and Religious Issues in Egyptian 
Politics", The Muslim World 67 (1977), p.106.
7. Ibid. , 123. Charles Smith, "The Crisis of Orientation: The Shift
of Egyptian Intellectuals to Islamic Subjects in the 1930s",
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies h (1973), p.399* 
'Ahmad Shafiq believed that national unity was not threatened until 
1929, and that after that date the Egyptians became two peoples, 
Copts and Muslims. See his Hawliyat Misr al-Siyasa, vol.6 .
(1929) (Cairo 1931), pp. 1253-*+.
8. Bowie, Muslim World, p.120-1.
9. In the 1926 election, for example, Haikal's Wafdist opponent accused
him of atheism and of working to destroy Islam. The Wafdist al- 
Balash also accused the Liberals of atheism, in spite of the formal 
collaboration of the two parties. Charles Smith, "Muhammad Husayn 
Hajs a^l: An Intellectual and Political Biography", unpublished PhD
University of Michigan 1968, pp.221-3.
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one of many aimed at the Liberals, but it may have been the most damaging
one. Even in 1930, when the Wafd was arguing with the Liberals over
the design of Zaghlul's tomb, the party press attached the Liberals,
who were promoting an Islamic style, as hypocrites in zealots' clothing.
One article noted that they were among those who were least interested
10in religion and had the least respect for its people.
Bowie is correct in suggesting that the Wafdist charge was damaging
to the political system in that it hampered the development of a secular
state, but anti-Coptic propaganda must be counted at least equally
harmful. The Liberals manufactured it throughout this era and, although
they did rely on communal sentiment more from 1929, the difference was
one of quantity and not type. Liberal and later *Ittihadist and
Sacdist propaganda made the need for the Wafdists to pose as good
Muslims more acute and only refuelled the religious rivalty.
What is perhaps most remarkable is that the British believed many
of the things said about the Copts in the Wafd. Just as they were
convinced that the Copts supported the nationalist movement out of fear,
so they were persuadedthat the Copts were the most influential members
of the Wafd and that al-Nahhas was clay in the hands of Makram. The
Residency used this belief to discredit the Wafd in the eyes of the
Foreign Office. In 1923, for example, the Residency described Zaghlul
11
as being under the influence of "the Coptic and extremist wing". Six
years later, H.M. Anthony disparaged al-Nahhas by claiming that "his 
sole active supporters (....those who pay and not those who shout) are
12the Copts. I need not tell you what that means in a Muslim country".
10. Al-Balagh. 6 February 1930, p.l.
11. F0. *+07/197, No.97 (Enclosure), Situation Report, 19 September- 
2 October 1923; F0.371/20883. Jl*+11/20/16; F0.371/2088*+,
J3105/20/16; Lampson's unpublished Diaries, 10 March 1937, pp.*+8-9; 
30 May 1936, p.l*+*+.
12. FO.371/1381+3, <J17J+1+/5/l6.
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B. Religious Appeals and the Palace
The two reigning monarchs in this period, Fu’ad and Faruq, had
both a traditional and a constitutional responsibility to protect the
religion of the state. Since they were not Egyptian in origin, a
fact which they celebrated, they emphasized religion and the essential
unity of all Muslims to inspire fealty. Both kings bolstered their
political power by relying on their religious authority and their
support in al-'Azhar. With regional ambitions as well as local needs,
the Palace made a great show of its piety and frequently appealed to
religious sentiment. Its pursuit of the Caliphate is only one example.
While the Palace never allowed its name to be directly tied to anti-
Coptic propaganda, it did permit its partisans to produce it in the
pursuit of their mutual interest. The 1938 election campaign, discussed
later, provides the clearest example of this.
As the most serious rival to its power, the Wafd was the party most
feared and hated by the Palace. One way the latter attempted to
discredit the Wafd was by accusing it of disloyalty to the throne.
Because the Wafd was also said to be dominated by Copts, Coptic loyalty
to the throne was placed under suspicion. It was, however, not simply
this connection with the Wafd that damned the Copts in Palace eyes;
the Palace appears to have felt that the Copts, more than any other
13Egyptians, were natural anti-monarchists and republicans. The Coptic
press frequently felt obliged to proclaim its allegiance as well as it
e  1 * +gratitude to the House of Muhammad All.
The Wafd probably was not unduly damaged by accusation of 
disloyalty until Faruq succeeded his father in 1936. In the few years
13. FO.lUl/722, 616/50/36; F0.lUl/6U*+, 158/1U9/37.
1*+. Several such articles appeared in the summer of 1937* See Misr, 
27 July 1937, p.l*
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following this , the Palace was able to draw a clear parallel between 
the devout Muslim monarch and the secular, irreligious and Coptic- 
dominated Wafd party. Palace manipulation of Islamic sentiment 
focused at this time on two issues: (l) Faruq’s stated desire for a
religious rather than a secular coronation ceremony, and (2) his wish 
to receive religious instruction from Shaikh Mustafa al-Maraghi. With 
a Wafd government in power, it was only natural that the Wafd in general 
and Makram in particular would be accused of prohibiting both. It was 
also proposed that the Wafd had sought British backing for these actions 
against Islam.
The coronation issue was energetically discussed by the press in
1937 and was returned to during the 1938 election campaign. The
constitution demanded only that the king swear an oath before Parliament.
The Wafd, on both constitutional and tactical grounds, refused to
contemplate the religious service advocated by the Palace. It feared
that such a ceremony would suggest that royal power emanated not from
the people but from Islam and would accordingly increase Palace power
at Wafdist expense. The Wafdist press, therefore, described the
proposed flamboyant ceremony as almost idolatrous and a contradiction
of Islam’s simplicity."*"^ One Deputy, speaking on behalf of the Palace,
claimed in the Chamber that a religious ceremony would uphold Egypt's
dignity as an Islamic state, and he asked Prime Minister al-Nahhas if he
was aware of the danger of excluding the uluma’from the coronation.
The latter replied that the king's assumption of his constitutional powers
was a national matter and that all Egyptians, Muslim and non-Muslim, had
16a right to participate in the ceremony.
15. Al-Misri, 26 June 1937, PPF.
16. The Deputy was ^Abd al-Raziq Wahbah al-Qadi. Chamber Debates, 
second session, 21 July 1937-
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Shaikh al-Maraghi, perhaps guiding the Palace by playing on its
fears and prejudices, insisted rather curiously that public antagonism
to Coptic influence was behind the controversy over the religious
ceremony. He added that Egyptians wished to re-emphasize, through
17the ceremony, that the government of Egypt was an Islamic one, and
he held up the spectre of a Coptic takeover which would produce a new
Christian aristocracy before which Muslims would be forced to kneel.
Copts clearly were unnerved by the charge that they had a hand in this 
19
religious issue; Misr dared not even mention it. The Patriarch
sent a note to the King deploring rumours which questioned Coptic
20loyalty to the throne. The King reassured the Patriarch, in writing
21and later in person, that he was aware of their fealty. At the same
time, Najib 'Iskandar, now a Palace ally, condemned the
Patriarch's note for implying that the Copts were separate from the
22
rest of the nation. Latif Nakhla, a Coptic notable and probable
23Palace loyalist, voiced a similar objection. The same fracas
occurred over the religious tutorials with al-Maraghi; the King was far 
more interested in using the Wafd's refusal against the party than he 
was in studying Islam with the Shaikh.
17. F0.lUl/U8l, 158/U9/37.
18. FO.371/2091^, J3809/369/16/
19- Two of the Regents, SabrI and^Izzat Pashas, did not think that 
the Copts were behind the objections since al-Nuqrashi and 
and 'Ahmad Mahir were also known to oppose the religious ceremony. 
F0.lkl/6kk, 158A9/37.
20. CCEH. CAbdin Palace Files on the Copts. F2/D2, card 6Ul,
Letter dated 1 December 1937*
21. The Patriarch, in a rather fulsome response, compared the King 
to King Solomon. Al-Muqattain, 2k January 1938, PPF.
22. Al-'Ahram, 30 December 1937 5 PPF.
23. Al-'Ahram, 20 December 19375 PPF.
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Not only did the Palace, through its manipulation of religious 
sentiment, encourage sectarian tensions, but it also failed to try to 
improve relations between the two communities when they began to sour. 
Faruq, whose reputation had suffered by the late 19^0s, was probably 
unwilling to appear overly conciliatory toward the Copts; but it is 
just as likely that he was simply not interested in their problems. 
Faruq_ probably became even less well disposed to the community in 1950 
when his sister, Fathiyya eloped with Riyad Ghali, a Coptic diplomat. 
Islamic law fobade such marriages and the Coptic church was not 
enthusiastic about any mixed marriages, let alone this one. The 
royal mesalliance caused a considerable stir. Riyad Ghali was 
condemned by the press; and the government to forestall violence, put
2hguards on churches the first Sunday after the event was publicized.
In an action Misr reported, the Coptic Patriarch apologized to the King 
for the groom's behaviour. As the paper pointed out, the Coptic 
community was not collectively responsible for the actions of one of 
its members.^
C. Elections
No better examples of the use of anti-Coptic propaganda exist than 
election campaigns. In some campaigns ethnic propaganda was wide­
spread and the result of party decision to exploit religious feeling.
In others, it was either not a general strategy or it was simply less 
apparent. In all elections, however, individual Muslim candidates 
used sectarian tactics against Coptic opponents. It was a temptation
2h . Zaghib Mikha'll Farriq Tasud! al-Wahda al-Wataniyya w-al-'Afcfilaq al-
Qawmiyya (no place, n.d.) pp.122 6
25. Misr, l6 May 1950, p.l. The romance ended unhappily when Ghali
murdered his estranged wife and then shot himself in 1976. Herald 
Tribune, 13 December 1976, p.5*
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to which even Wafdist candidates sometimes succumbed. Given the 
advantages that might have accrued to a Muslim running against a Copt 
in a predominantly Muslim district, it is interesting that Muslims 
were not routinely nominated to run against Copts. Certainly it was 
the pattern in the more heavily Coptic constituencies to run Copts 
against Copts.
Little benefit would be derived from a discussion of every campaign 
because the propaganda differed less in kind than in quantity. Nor is 
there any kind of arithmetic progression in the amount of propaganda. 
Ethnic appeals were more of a problem in 1923 than in 19^2, However, 
the general increase in communal tensions from the mid-19^0s probably 
meant that the population was more receptive to sectarian and Islamic 
propaganda and that it had a more telling effect then than in earlier 
years. The 1923 and 1938 Chamber elections will be the ones focused 
on here, in addition,an interesting by-election in 19^ -3 will be examined. 
Favourite themes in these and other campaigns were that the Copts were 
unscrupulous, that they had joined the nationalist movement to advance 
communal interests, that they had too great a hold on various Egyptian 
institutions, and that the Wafd was the means by which they sought to 
rule.
The 1923 campaign saw the first significant use of anti-Coptic 
propaganda since before the war. The Liberal Constitutionalists 
manufactured it for use against the Wafd; as Tariq al-Bishri has noted, 
their journal al-Kagjjkul consistently Implied that the election was a 
struggle between Copts and Muslims, Wafdists and Liberals.2^
The Liberals, gearing up for the campaign, first objected to the
27number of Copts appointed to Wafdist election committees. Copts were,
26. Tariq al-Bishri, "Mi$r al-ffaditha Bain 'Ahmad w-al-Masih", al-Katib,
121 (1971), p . A 6; al-Kashkul. 2h August 1923, p*3.
27- Ibid.
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in fact, well represented on these committees "but hardly dominated them.
The Literal press blamed Copts for posing as the greatest patriots in
Egypt, for supporting the British presence and for monopolizing the 
28civil service. It also reminded voters of the names of those
29
Coptic candidates who had attended the 1911 Coptic Congress. Makram
was accused of having backed the 1919-20 Milner plan in return for the
30 - - -promise of a provincial governorship, while Wisa Wasif and Wasif Ghali
31were said to have taken control of the Wafd. Fakhri cAbd al-Nur was
so worried by the anti-Coptic statements of his opponent that he feared
that Jirja Muslims were not yet ready to elect a non-Muslim 
32representative.
The Wafd did not let these charges pass unremarked; al-Balagh,
Misr and individual Wafdists all responded. Makram, speaking in
33Shubra, declared that the unity of Copts and Muslims was inviolable.
Zaghlul, upon his return from exile, criticized attempts to divide the
3b
Egyptians and he celebrated the holy unity between cross and crescent.
In a special visit to the Patriarch, Zaghlul again emphasized the need 
35for unity. When the Wafd won the election, its egalitarian attitude
seemed vindicated. Unfortunately, the mauling received by the Liberals 
probably only increased their willingness to rely on discreditable tactics.
28. Al-KagJakul, IT August 1923, p.19; 2H August 1923, p.3; 
al-Bisljri, al-Katib, p. 1^5*
29. Ibid.
30. See al-Kashkul. 31 August 1923, p.*+.
31. Al-Kashkul, 6 July 1923, p.U.
32. Fakhri and TAhmad Mustafa 'Abu Rahab frequently ran against one
another and the latter, according to Sacd Fakhri cAbd al-Nur, 
always raised the ethnic issue. Interview Sa^d Fakhri ^Abd al-Nur, 
17 May 1979.
33. 'Ahmad Qasim Judah (ed.), al-Makramiyyat (Cairo, n.d.), pp.l63-*+.
3^. Egyptian Gazette, 21 September 1923, p*3.
35* Al-Bishri, Al-Katib, p.lH8.
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In 1938 it was the Wafd's turn to he disappointed. Wafdists 
failed to secure a neutral Ministry to conduct the elections and all
the administrative means at the government's disposal were used on behalf
36of its candidates and against the Wafd. Even setting aside blatant
corruption, the innovative scheduling of the election in Upper Egypt, 
where the Prime Minister had considerable influence, first inevitably 
affected voting in the Delta. Government candidates won by 
inconceivable majorities; one even obtained a vote of over 100 per cent.
One French newspaper concluded that the election was a personality
37contest between al-Nahhas and the King. It would have been more 
accurate to describe it as a match between Makram representing Coptic 
participation in politics and King Faruq symbolizing the pious Muslim
ruler. Makram and al-Nahhas were both attacked for their hostility
38to the popular King. Religious and ethnic appeals played a large 
part in the government's campaign and anti-Coptic circulars were 
distributed. Misr al-Fatat, the Liberals and the Sacdists were all 
allied with the Palace, and al-'Azhar was active on behalf of Palace 
candidates.
Young Egypt's leader, 'Ahmad Husain, was released from prison in
January 1938 to enable him to promote the Palace cause. In a favourite
39refrain, he accused al-Nahhas and Makram of worshipping the British, 
and the latter of soliciting British help to prevent Faruq's religious
36, Grafftey-Smith described the process succinctly in 1931: "The Mudir
instructs the Ma'mur Markaz, the Ma'mur Markaz instructs the ^umda 
and possibly sends out a couple of camel corps to each village to 
assist and there goes the electorate, trooping to the polls". 
F0.U71/15^0U, JlllO/26/16.
37* Journal des Debats, 20 April 1938, PPF.
38. One such circular was entitled "al-Kharijan ^lS al-Malik" ("Out­
siders/Rebels Against the King") PHS. American Mission in Egypt
Archives.
39- Egyptian Gazette, 25 January 1938, p.5-
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tutorials with al-Maraghi. Articles in the organization’s newspaper,
claimed that 90 per cent of al-Nahhas' supporters were Copts, and that
Ulthese Copts would back Makram no matter what his crimes. In
addition to discouraging Muslim supporters of the Wafd, Young Egypt 
may have been trying, as Salama Musa charged, to frighten the party's
Ul
Coptic followers. In a country where election procedures were
routinely abused, this could be a useful tactic.
The Sacdist and Liberal press attacked Makram and his puppet al-
Nahhas on every issue. The Sacdists accused the latter of being
"enchanted with the idea of sacred leadership imagined by Makram ^ Ubaid 
U3 rPasha". Sa°dist speeches emphasized the Wafd's insensitivity
to Muslim religious feeling. The religious coronation ceremony and
_ uu
al-Maraghi's tutorials were returned to time and again. Both
Sacdists and Liberals complained that Makram, in his capacity as
U5Finance Minister, had literally shortchanged al-'Azhar. The Copts'
lust for power, although well known, required endless comment. Al- 
Kash-kul noted that too many Copts (30 out of 230) had been nominated 
by the Wafd for Chamber seats, when a more reasonable number would have 
been three.^
Al-Kashkul remarked that Makram and al-Nahhas were hostile to Islam 
and added that trusting them to protect religion was like throwing a lamb
Uy
to the wolves. Al-Nahhas was criticized for shamming piety and Makram
Uo. Misr, 2U March 1938, p.2. This theme was explored in at least one
election handbill. Al-Nahhas was said to have objected to the
religious tutorials in order to please Makram. See handbill 
entitled "Makram". PHS. American Mission in Egypt Archives.
Ul. Misr al-Fatat, 31 January 1938, p.11.
^2. Misr, 3 February 1938, p.l.
U3. Egyptian G-azette, 6 January 1938, p. 5*
UU. Al-Balagh, 20 March 1938, PPF.
U5. Makram was so worried by this criticism that he lodged complaints 
with the Parquet against al-Balagh and al-Siyasa. Al-Balagh,
16 January 1938, PPF.
U6. Al-Kashkul. 25 February 1938, pp.U, 6.
UT. Ibid., 11 February 1938, pp.3U-5.
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for hypocrisy in quoting from the Qur* an. The Wafd Ministry,
according to al-Kashkul, had heen a Coptic Ministry serving Copts; 
twisting Makram’s slogan, the journal wrote that hoth al-Nahhas and 
"William Pasha" were Muslims in religion and Copts in country.
The journal somehow managed to reconcile the fact that Makram was 
leading a Coptic clique with its new charge that he, as a Protestant, 
was not a genuine member of the Coptic community.
The Wafdist press responded vigorously to this propaganda, but 
Misr, as the one remaining Coptic daily, bore the brunt of the work.
Salama Musa reminded readers who were unlikely to need reminding that 
the Copts, feeling their interests to be identical with those of their
Muslim compatriots, had rejected British and League guarantees for
51 . .their safety. He condemned al-Siyasa for writing about the Copts
52as though they were the Untouchables of India.
Musa defended Makram but his real interest was in protecting the 
community. Makram was able to look after himself. In speeches and
C Q
interviews he condemned the Ministry for encouraging religious fanaticism.
He noted that this had long been a tactic used against the Wafd, and he
asserted that he had been so worried by it in 1937 that he had almost
5bresigned from the Cabinet. Throughout the campaign, al-Nahhas
55praised Makram and reaffirmed the brotherhood of Copts and Muslims.
'Azhari activity in the campaign is one sign of both the 
politicization of Egyptian students by the late 1930s and the increased
U8. Ibid.
k9- Al-Kagftkul. 25 February 1938, p.U.
50. Ibid., pp.1-2.
51. Misr, 6 January 1938, p.3; 3 February 1938, p.l.
52. Misr, 15 January 1938, p.l.
53* Al-Misri, 8 March 1938, PPF; al-1Ahram, 9 March 1938, p.9*
5k. He said that al-Nahhas had dissuaded him. Al-Wafd al-Misri,
10 March 1938, PPF!'
55* Al-fAhram, 18 January 1938; al-Manara al-Misriyya, 11 March 1938,
quoted in Samira Baftr, "al-'AqbS't fi al-Hayat al-Siyasiyya fi Misr"
unpublished PhD thesis, Cairo University 1977 > p.703.
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use made of* religion in politics. 'Azhari students travelled the 
country promoting the idea that a vote for al-Nahhas was a vote against 
Islam. They booed Wafdist candidates, caused some violence and
were particularly troublesome in cities where there were religious 
institutes.
CUltxma1 also became involved in the campaign, and sermons in
mosques were used to stir up religious feeling. Shaikh Muhammad CA1I,
of Cairo's al-RifA 1 mosque, expounded at one Sa dist meeting on the
close tie between Islam and politics. He blamed al-Nahhas for
sundering this tie and announced that Muslims would not allow their
57religion to be undermined by a Christian enemy like Makram. Shaikh
al-Maraghi also used his more lavish talents on the government's behalf;
his manipulation of sectarian and religious feeling upset first the
Copts and then the British. Like his allies, he used Islam's supposed
place in the political arena as grounds for attacking the Copts. His
Friday sermons became diatribes against the Copts, Christian
5 8missionaries and secularism, as well as a means of guaranteeing his 
own power by advancing that of Islam. He attacked Makram and, in one 
radio broadcast slandered the Copts as "foxes”. ^  He appears to have 
recommended publicly that Muslims make political choices according to 
a religious criterion.^ He declared in one interview that no Muslim 
who knew anything about Islam could claim to be apolitical, and he 
added that he wished to see Islam rule Egyptian life because the 
country's population was mainly Muslim and because the official religion 
of state was Islam: "Islam is not like other religions which make a
56. F0.371/219^7, J1211/6/16.
57. La Reforme,29 March 1938, PPF.
5^ * Misr, 15 February 1938, p.l,
59. fo:317/219^5, J893/6/16.
60. US Department of State Archives, No.883.00. General Conditions/73• 
Political Summary, March 1938.
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distinction "between religion and politics and, in fact, consider them
as separate matters and entirely different from one another1'.^1 In
a February broadcast, he criticized those missionaries who told their
Muslim disciples that if they wanted to be heroes of civilization and
pioneers of reform they had to announce that their religion was not good 
62for civilization. This attack on Egyptian secularists was part of
his general defence of Islam from the attacks of others. In once 
interview, he claimed that Islam was as appropriate to the present as
63to the past. He noted, rather forbiddingly, that non-Muslims should
be happy to see a strengthened Islam because it was only the fear of
6kJudgment Day that kept Muslims from slaughtering non-Muslims. In an
earlier interview, he insisted that Muslims had always lived on good 
terms with Christians and Jews and had never persecuted them. He 
pointed to the strong and adequate guarantees Islam offered non-Muslims; 
guarantees which consisted of forbidding Muslims "to attack the life,
65honour and worldly goods of Christians and Jews". The welfare of
Islam neatly coincided with the Shaikh’s own interests and ambitions; 
it is not clear to what extent he believed his public statements.
Even as late as 1937? the British were describing him as holding 
"enlightened views'1. ^
Even if the Shaikh and his audience believed implicitly in his 
ideas, there were many candidates who held a more jaundiced view and 
encouraged religious feeling as one of the more effective weapons at 
hand. Hassan Rifacat, who as Under-Secretary at the Interior helped
61. Ibid., No. 383.1163 A 6.
62. Ibid., No.383.1163A?. Despatch dated 21 February 1938.
63. Migr, 7 March 1938, p.l.
6H. US Department of State Archives, No.383.1163/^7, quoting La Bourse 
Egyptienne, 19 March 1938.
65. Ibid., No.383.1163/k6, quoting the Egyptian Mail, 5 March 1938.
66. FO.371/219^71 J1097/6/16.
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fix the elections, told the British that the government was justified
6? £ v 
in using the religious issue to win. Prince Muhammad All shared,
at least in part, this pragmatic view of religion. Lampson recorded
that the Prince was open about "the part played during the elections
by the religious element and made no bones about it that he and his
family had spurred on the 'Azharis throughout the country to link up
religion with the case against al-Nahhas".^  Shaikh al-Maraghi
excused his own activity to Lampson in May when he pointed out that
all parties used religion and, even if they did not, the Copts had
69
grown arrogant and needed to be reminded of their place. This was
a feeling that was shared by the Brethren some ten years later.
However concerned Lampson may have been with anti-Coptic propaganda,
he made no move to do anything about it until March. In the wake of a
conversation the Oriental Secretary had with a very worried S.A. Morrison
of the Egypt Inter-Mission Council, Lampson talked to the Prime Minister 
70
on 8 March. Lampson expressed his dislike of the government's
anti-Christian strategy and noted that Shaikh al-Maraghi's behaviour 
was particularly offensive. Mahmud was conciliatory. He had, in 
fact, made a number of statements extolling unity and brotherhood 
during the campaign but, as Prime Minister, he was bound by more 
constraints than his followers. Mahmud admitted that the propaganda 
was designed for electoral ends only, as though the fact that the 
government had a practical aim and did not actually believe its statements 
made its tactic somehow more acceptable. Mahmud added that he had 
already called a halt to the Shaikh's activities and that all similar
67. F0.371/219^-7 s J1097/6/16.
68. Lampson's unpublished Diaries, 3 April 1938, p.60.
69. FO. 371/219^+7 , J2086/6/16.
70. F0.371/219^+6, J1079/6/16.
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71 -propaganda would cease. Two days later, al-Maraghi insisted to
Smart that his aim was not to increase anti-Coptic feeling. He
pointed out that, at the end of his sermon on Coptic "foxes", he had
72
reminded his audience of their duty to respect the People of the Book,
a palliative that must have appeared inadequate to the Copts.
While the government may have decreased its manufacture of
religious propaganda after Lampson1s conversation with Mahmud, it by
73no means stopped it. The Wafd continued to be accused of working
against Islam and Makram1s objections to the religious tutorials were
still retailed. It would, in any case, have been difficult to prevent
individual candidates from appealing to sectarian sentiment in their
constituencies. With the election only three weeks away, ethnic
propaganda had probably already done all the damage it was going to do.
The British intervention was too late, too little. When reassured
that the campaign would halt with the election, they were satisfied.
Prince Muhammad cAli correctly gauged Lampson^ real interest when he
told him that al-Maraghi1s declarations were anti-Coptic and not anti- 
7U _
missionary. Al-Maraghi had spoken against missionaries and anti-
75missionary tracts were in circulation, and the British feared a 
recurrence of earlier anti-missionary campaigns. Lampson told Shaikh 
al-Maraghi after the election that he had raised the issue of campaign 
tactics only because of Britain1s indirect interest in the welfare of
71. FO.371/219^6, J1079/6/16. After speaking to the Prime Minister, 
Lampson took up the same matter with the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. FO.317/219^6, J1153/6/l6.
72. FO.371/219^6, J1079/6/16.
73. Leland Bowie suggests that after several weeks the Liberals halted
their campaign against the Copts because they feard that events
might get out of hand. This generous verdict seems forced. 
Bowie, The Muslim World, p.125-
7^ -. Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version. . . , p.200.
75- US Department of State Archives, Wo.383.II63A 5> 21 February 1938.
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Egypt and direct interest in the well-being of foreign Christian
communities.^  The Foreign Office seems to have feared that anti-
Christian propaganda would spread to the Sudan or lead to an outburst
TTof feeling against British policy in Palestine, hut felt that the
propaganda was an act "of folly which we must regret hut cannot in post-
*7 3treaty conditions prevent". What this particular official meant
was that British strategic interests were not seriously threatened by 
the government’s policy on this issue.
Understandably, the Coptic community was more concerned with the 
government's methods than the British. Some apparently blamed Makram
79for giving the government a stick with which the beat the whole community. 
Murad Wahbah, son of the ex-prime minister Yusuf Wahbah, even resigned 
his post as Minister of Agriculture because he so disliked his 
colleagues1 anti-Coptic campaign. Unfortunately, he then sacrificed 
his principles to ambition by accepting a portfolio in the post-election 
Cabinet. Other non-Wafdist candidates such as Najib ’Iskandar and 
Tawfiq Dus showed no concern with the government’s methods. The latter 
even had the gall to blame Makram for causing problems between Muslims
0O
and Copts. The Wafd was so troubled that its Parliamentary Committee
commented, in a petition to the King, that the use of religious issues 
in the campaign was undermining the spirit of national unity.
The same day that Lampson mentioned his concern to the Prime 
Minister, the latter learnt of the anxiety of the Copts from a delegation
76. FO.371/219^7» J2086/6/16. One article in al-Kasbkul had resurrected 
all the false reports about missionary activity which had surfaced 
in 1933. FCX. 371/219U6 , J1079/6/16.
77- FO.371/219^6, J1079/6/16.
78. FO.371/219^6, J1211/6/16.
79- FO.371/219^5j J859/6/16,
80. Egyptian Gazette, 19 March 1938, pp.7-8.
81. Translated copies of this petition were sent to England for 
distribution to the British people. FO.371/219^+6, JllOO/6/16.
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consisting of the Patriarch and several notables. Mahmud reassured
them that the government was doing all within its power to discourage 
82factional strife. The Patriarch’s visit, however, may actually
have been made at the behest of the Palace and not the community.
Such visits were not common, and this one certainly gave the government 
an opportunity to placate the community which was perhaps even further 
soothed by the government's timely contribution of £E30,000 toward the 
Coptic quota for repairs to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The 
Patriarch did, at one point, become more directly involved in the campaign. 
cAzIz Mishriqi, standing against Makram in Shubra, paid a call on the 
Patriarch and the latter returned his visit. 'Ahmad Mahir, speaking 
on Mishriqi's behalf, referred to these visits, and so alarmed the
Patriarch that the latter issued a statement deploring the use of his
8 3name in party politics. Of course, by then, the damage was done.
There was some violence, including attacks on churches, but
probably little more occurred than was usual in campaigns. In one
typical incident, the Wafdist Coptic candidate, Louis Fanus, was beaten
up on the steps of the 'Asyut courthouse in full view of placid
8U
authorities. In general, however, Coptic candidates do not seem to
have met with any more violence than Muslim candidates.
After Makram and his followers left the Wafd, the party was relieved 
of many Copts whose influence could be attacked. Ethnic propaganda 
was never again so systematically used by the government, Palace or 
political parties. However, the increase in communal tensions
82. A1-’Ahram, 9 March 1938, p.9.
83. Misr, 2U March 1938, p.3.
8U. The long-suffering Fanus took only 22 votes to his rival's
13)000 in a district which had sent him to Parliament in previous 
elections. Egyptian Gazette, 12 March 1938, pp.7-8.
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inevitably weakened the position of Coptic politicians and made 
campaigning difficult. As Misr noted, ethnic appeals were something
85
all Coptic candidates had to face. As fewer and fewer Copts stood 
for election, the spectre of Coptic conspiracies could not so easily 
be raised. In the declining years of the monarchy, al-Kutla, with 
its many Copts, probably occasioned more ethnic comments than any 
other political party; but not nearly the number it would have faced 
had it been more of a threat. Its weakness offered it considerable 
protection.
Not even the Wafd was able to resist an occasional ethnic jab 
at al-Kutla; only the fact that the latter had inherited so many of 
the Wafd's Copts allowed the Wafd to use a weapon so long available only 
to its opponents. On at least one occasion the Wafd accused al-
Kutla of sparking communal hostilities.^ In a more serious incident, 
partisans of the Muslim Wafdist candidate in the 19^3 Jirja by-election
mounted an anti-Coptic campaign against the chief contender, Maurice
T c 87Fakhri Abd al-Nur, who hoped to inherit his late father’s seat.
Christians were victimized during the campaign and churches were attacked
both before and after the election. The election was, of course,
fixed; Maurice lost despite the backing of his powerful family and
his tie to a great Wafdist and revolutionary figure. His constituency
was also one-third Copt.
One way in which Copts tried to circumvent the problem of their
88religion was to campaign in the company of a Muslim Shaikh. When
85. Misr, 26 March 19^ -6, p.l.
86. Al-Balagh. 20 March 19^ +6, p.2; Migr, 23 March 19^ -6, p.l.
87. FO.371/35529, J880/2/16; FO.371/35530 J1321/2/16; FO.371/35531, 
J1626/2/16.
88. Both ’Ibrahim Faraj and Mirrit Ghali said they did this. Interview,
’Ibrahim Faraj, 13 June 1979; interview Mirrit Ghali, 8 May 1979*
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C. —Fakhri Ahd al-Nur was troubled by anti-Coptic propaganda m  the 1923 
campaign, Zaghlul sent the peerless revolutionary orator, Shaikh 
al-Qayati, to Jirja to help Fakhri. The Shaikh made the rounds of 
town mosques claiming that Fakhri was a better Muslim than those Muslims
-  89who helped the British by opposing Zaghlul. Fakhri, like so many
other Wafdists , went on to win this first Chamber election. Makram,
who relied heavily on his knowledge of Islam in campaigns, was the
only Copt whose knowledge of the Qurf an and the Hadith were adequate
enough to risk quotation; but it was not unheard of for other Coptic
90politicians to help celebrate Muslim holidays. Sometimes Copts were
criticized for exhibiting excessive familiarity with the Prophet 
Muhammad. When Makram compared al-Nahhas to the Prophet in a speech 
in September 1929, the opposition press, with some justice, raised a 
91
furore. Al-Siyasa asked why the Christian Makram did not compare his friend to
Christ, adding that he was duping the Egyptians by quoting from the texts of a
religion in which he did not believe. At the same time, Fakhri was accused
of poking fun at Muslim belief s by praying in mosques alongside Muslims.
At times, Copts were faced not only with the implicit shortcoming
of not being Muslim, but the more direct one that they were not good
Christians. The latter charge probably was meant to deflect Coptic
support from a given candidate and was usually aimed at Makram who was
particularly vulnerable on this score. None the less, other Coptic
politicians were similarly criticized. In 1925, for example, al-Siyasa
89. Interview, Sacd Fakhri cAbd al-Nur, IT May 1979-
90. Fakhri Slbd al-Nur celebrated the holy month of Ramadan by having
the Qur1 an recited in his house in the evenings during the 1929
election campaign. Tariq al-Bishri, al-Katib, p.152.
91* Al-1A&fabar, 10 September 1929, PPF.
92. The Wafdist al-Balagfa only accused al-Siyasa of trying to divide the
nation. Al-Siyasa, 9 September 1929i al-Balagh. 9 September 1929,
PPF.
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insisted that Murqus HannA only went to church to use the pulpit as
93a political platform.
Copts competing in largely Coptic constituencies against other
Copts were less troubled by ethnic propaganda. Except for one
election in which Murqus Sergius was standing, appeals were not made
to specifically Coptic interests. In 19^9, 'Ibrahim Faraj Maslha,
cAziz Mishriqi and Sergius were all competing to represent the same
Shubra constituency in the Chamber. Sergius emphasized his long
9Uchampionship of Coptic rights and church reform. He had the
additional cachet of then being the Patriarch's Wakil or Deputy. He
accused 'Ibrahim Faraj of trying to pass as a Muslim by omitting the
95Mashiha from his name. Those cautious members of the community
who found Makram's behaviour worrisome were probably doubly alarmed
by Sergius' candidacy. Although the pages of Misr had for some
years been filled with complaints about the inequities in Egyptian
society, the paper expressed the fear that Sergius' election would
96give the Chamber a religious colour. The Patriarch, probably under
some government pressure, finally forced Sergius to withdraw from the 
97race. Sergius could not, at this point, have helped calm troubled
communal waters. fIbrahim Faraj, the victor, felt compelled to
98promise his constituents that he would work to achieve greater equality, 
a promise that would never have been made had not the issue been raised 
by Sergius.
93. See al-Watan*s vigorous protest of this on b February 1925, p.l.
SometimesJ however, the Coptic press did indicate some disappointment
with the religiosity of a particular Coptic politician.
9^. See the entire issue of al-Manara al-Misriyya, k January 1950*
95 • Al-Manara al-Misiriyya, 30 November 19^ -9, P • b .
96. Misr, 5 January * 1950, p.l.
97- Misr, 11 January 1950, p.l.
98. Ibid.
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It is very difficult to gauge the effect that ethnic and religious
propaganda had on voting due to election boycotts and political
corruption. It seems to have had little or no effect in 1923-H; the
popularity of the Wafd was able to ensure the election of many of its
Coptic candidates. Perhaps the ethnic issue influenced or confused
voters in later elections. One peasant, only dimly following the
candidates’ charges and counter-charges, believed that the 1936
election was meant to determine whether the Egyptians wanted to be 
99Copts or Muslims. The Wafd had nominated in his district a Copt
lawyer to stand against a local Muslim notable who was trying to take 
advantage of his religion. Ethnic propaganda probably was used to 
more telling effect against al-Kutla than the Wafd, but then al-Kutla 
was both more obviously Coptic and weaker than the Wafd. When used in 
campaigns, such propaganda inevitably resulted in minor incidents of 
violence against Copts. Churches were stoned, priests abused, Copts 
beaten up and occasionally anti-Coptic demonstrations s p a r k e d . I t s  
most serious effect may ultimately have been to make parties reluctant 
to nominate candidates whose position would be tenuous and Copts 
reluctant to stand in an election that might put their person, property 
and community at risk. In addition, by the late 19^0s, the political 
use of Islam by the regular parties had backfired; the public 
recognized it as hypocrisy and was disinclined to credit either parties 
or Palace with a serious concern for Islam, or indeed anything other 
than their own power.
99. FO.lUl/757, U91/10/36.
100. In 19^5, for example, there were anti-Coptic demonstrations in 
Suhaj , 'Asyut and Alexandria. F0.37lA59l8, J777/3/16.
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D. Communal Violence and the Role of the Muslim Brethren
Lawlessness was endemic in the Egyptian countryside; the greater
the economic pressures, the more visible its manifestations. Muslims
as well as Copts were its victims, and it is not always possible to
separate ordinary criminal behaviour from violence motivated solely by
religious feeling. It is particularly difficult to distinguish in
cases of attacks on individual Copts. Misr was always tempted to
101
describe these as attacks on the Copts as Christians. However, a
murder, robbery or beating might well have been the result of a grudge
or plain mischance. The perpetrator might not have known or cared
about his victim’s religion. It is, however, possible to say that a
quarrel between a Muslim and a Copt or their respective families was
102likely to be articulated, at least eventually in communal terms.
An additional problem for the Coptic minority was that public Christian
rituals often roused Muslim ire; Christian processions were attacked
103and sometimes mocked. Funerals and weddings were set upon, prayer
meetings broken up, and priests, so visible in their distinctive garb,
10 babused and beaten. Habit was an important element In this violence.
Communal problems were not necessarily the result of political 
rhetoric; and press incitement probably played a small role in the 
countryside, if a larger one in the cities. The press was, however, 
a potent source of rumour, and it exacerbated those problems which it 
did not actually create. For example, the anti-missionary campaign
103.. Misr, 8 July 1937, p. 5-
102. Urban Egyptians were more likely than the peasantry, who did not 
trust government institutions, to settle such disputes in court. 
103* Following the 1930 election of the Copt Yaqub Bibawi to the town 
council of Samalut in Ban! Suwaif, a mock funeral procession was 
paraded around the town and shouted threats at the houses of those 
Copts and Muslims who had voted to Bibawi. La Bourse Egyptienne,
1 May 1930, p.U.
10U. For examples of unpleasant incidents, see Misr, 18 May 193^, p.2;
2 October 19^55 P * 2 ;  1 December 19515 p.l; ‘al-Manara al^Misriyya, 
5 October 19^+9s P*l*
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waged by the government's opponents in 1932-3 was greatly abetted by 
press incitement. It had unpleasant repercussions for some Coptic 
Individuals and for a time caused grave concern in the community and 
the Residency.
The ever-alert Coptic press recorded relatively little communal 
violence In the 1920s. Misr could perhaps be suspected of turning 
a wilfully blind eye in its nationalist zeal, but other components 
of the Coptic press would not have been so tolerant. If violence 
occurred that could have been interpreted in a communal light, it 
would have been reported. There probably was more communal violence 
in the 1930s and still more in the 19^ -Os, when press reports became 
more frequent and angry. These were both stressful decades; it is 
not surprising that sectarian violence Increased along with the crime 
rate,
Ethnic problems seem to have occurred more often in places with 
a goodly number of Copts, but neither a majority nor so few as to render 
the community almost invisible. Because many Copts lived in urban 
areas, anti-Coptic outbursts occurred in Alexandria, Cairo, Suez,
Tahta, Luxor, Samalut, Suhaj and Zaqaziq. Eruptions were more likely 
in Upper Egypt than in the Delta; they occurred in almost every province 
of Upper Egypt except 'Aswan, a province with few Copts. The 
government probably was unable and may have been unwilling to protect 
Copts because the latter claimed repeatedly that the authorities looked 
the other way when they were v i c t i m i z e d . T h e r e  was some truth to 
this. Government officials understandably were not eager to be seen to
105- See Misr, h December 1930, p.2; 17 May 193U, p.l; 8 July 1937, p.5; 
2 October 19^5, pA; 11 May 19^6, p.3; al-Manara al-Misriyya,
U February 1935, P*7-
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be taking vigorous steps against activities which many Muslims
interpreted as in the best interests of their religion. It would, in
any case, have been difficult to prevent sporadic incidents of
violence against Copts, and the government may even have seen the Copts
as a convenient safety valve for releasing the frustrations of the mob.
From 19^ +6 the Copts focused on the Muslim Brethren and related
religious groups like the Shabab Muhammad and the Young Men's Muslim
Association as the greatest threat to both their safety and the concept
of national unity. There were frequent reports in that year of the
"aggressive attitude" Brethren in the provinces had taken toward the
Copts. Given the tendency to place all postwar outrages on the Brethren,
it probably is too easy to lay the responsibility for all anti-Coptic
incidents at their door. However, their religious and political
beliefs, as well as their zeal in promoting them, played an important
role in exacerbating tensions. Misr and al-Manara al-Misriyya
described the Brethren as fanatics and worried that Brethren incitement
would lead Muslims to despise Egyptian as well as foreign Christians.
Misr saw Brethren activity as aimed at the creation of an Islamic state
and abhorred their encouragement of anti-Coptic f e e l i n g . T h e
Brethren used both mosques and leaflets to spread their anti-Coptic 
107
message. So worried were the Copts by al-Banna's ambitions and
so often did they hear themselves compared to the Jews in Europe, that
10 8
they feared that they would meet a similar fate.
106. Misr, 9 May 19^6, p.l.
107. In May 19^ +6, for three days before the Prophet's birthday, the 
Shabab Muhammad abused the Copts from a Luxor mosque. Predictably, 
this sparked ugly anti-Coptic incidents. Migr, 11 May 19^6, p.3; 
Misr, 18 April 19^7, p.l; 19 April 19^7, p.l.
108. Al-Manara al-Misriyya, 2k April 19^7, PP-lA; Misr, 18 April 19^ -6, 
p.l; 5 April I9U8, p.l.
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The Brethren were not blessed with innovative ideas on the
place of religious minorities in a Muslim society. They adhered to
earlier and more traditional arrangements and beliefs; these confined
non-Muslims to an inferior position, and one which the Copts thought
1 0 9that they had left far behind. A1-Banna' repeatedly denied that
the Brethren were hostile to minorities; Islam did not tolerate 
110
fanaticism. He quoted Qur'anic verses enjoining Muslims to treat
111non-Muslims well and to tolerate the practice of minority religions.
He claimed that Islam taught Muslims to revere Christ and his divine 
112
mission. A1-Banna’, however, was very critical of the Christian
1 1 3religious establishment.
Even Murqus Sergius conceded that the problem was not with Islam
1  i  j ^
but with those adherents who twisted its teachings. One reason
for the Brethren's hostility, despite the tolerance recommended by
their religion, was a belief that the Copts had acquired far more
power than they had a right to have. All authority exercised by
non-Muslims over Muslims was offensive and against the God-given
order. In a Brethren demonstration in Shubra, one speaker called on
1 1 5businesses to fire all their Coptic employees; apparently some
Brethren believed that only Muslims had a right to employment. The 
Shabab Muhammad shared a similar view; they announced that they would 
boycott objects and services provided by Copts. They claimed that
109* Hi$r sometimes portrayed al-Banna’ as a throwback to an earlier age.
Misr, 18 April 19^6, p.l; 1 May 19^6, p.l; 5 April 19^8, p.l.
110. Al-Mu$awwar, 2 2  March 19^ +6, p. 5*
111. Charles Wendell (ed.) Five Tracts of Hassan al-Banna' (Berkeley 1978),
pp.119-21.
1 1 2 .  Egyptian Gazette, 2 7  December 19^6, P * 3 *
1 1 3 .  For al-Banna*, true Christianity was not to be found in the Vatican
or amidst "the luxury of the Patriarchs". DW HBM (QM): Security
Report U 5 1 5 ,  2 1  November 1 9 ^ 0 .
llU. French Embassy Archives, Cairo, Box lHU, File 3 1 / 2 .  Revue des
Periodiques Arabes, 31 December 19^-7j quoting al-Manara al-Misriyya
27 December 19^7*
115. Mikha' ll, Farriq Tasud, p. Ill, quoting Misr, 3 May 19^7-
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they would allow non-Muslims freedom of worship only if they paid
the old jizya tax.^^
The Wafd came in for particular criticism; the Brethren thought
117the party was too attentive to the needs of non-Muslims, and allowed
the Copts to play too great a role in its councils. One Brethren
ideologue, Muhammad al-Ghazzalx, wrote that the Wafd had allocated
150 out of 2lk constituencies to Coptic candidates in the 1923
election, an exaggeration so gross that sensible people would have
dismissed it out of hand had they not been hearing similar charges 
H 8for years. The Brethren attacked the Wafd for displaying hostility
toward Islam and blamed the party's enmity on "William Makram, the
119
Egyptian Englishman and Muslim Christian".
In 19^6 Misr published a series of articles attacking the Brethren
by Salama Musa. For some weeks, the Brethren let them go unanswered
and finally al-Banna' published an open letter, which was addressed
120to the Patriarch, objecting to Misr's campaign. Even if Yusab
had been a strong Patriarch, Musa's articles would have worned him; 
they were useless as information since both the Copts and the 
government were aware of the problems the community faced. Musa’s 
purpose was probably to strengthen the community's resolve to do 
something and to press the government by embarrassing it. The only 
problem with this was that the articles were most likely to anger the 
Brethren who would direct that anger against individual Copts. The
ll6. It is not unreasonable to assume, as did Migr, that the Brethren
supported this as well. Migr, 26 April 19^6, p.l and 1 May 19^6, p.l. 
117* Al-Nadhir, Year I, Wo.12 (26 Jamad Thanin 1357: mid-summer or autumn,
1938), pp.3-7.
118. Muhammad al-Ghazzali, Our Beginning in Wisdom, translated by Ismail 
Faruqi (Washington DC 1953) (first published 1950), p.100.
119* Al-Nadhlr, Year I, No. 11 (12 Jamad Thanin 1357: 1938)_,, pp.U-6.
120. Misr, 13 May 19 -^6, p.l.
I
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Metropolitan of al-Sharqiyya province, 'Anba rAghabiyus, had been
working to ease sectarian tensions; Musa's articles only complicated
121 -  -  his task. The Patriarch, unable to reach Musa, threatened to
cancel Misr's annual subsidy of £E1,U00 if he continued to publish
inflammatory articles. Since the paper’s owners relied heavily on
_  -  122 the subsidy, Musa was obliged to resign as editor.
123
During 19^6, there were attacks on Christian churches in Cairo.
In March 19^7 tensions in Zaqaziq. flared when an angry mob burned a 
Coptic church. Communal relations there had been strained for at
12k
least two years, partly due to Brethren activity. It is not clear,
however, that the Brethren were directly responsible for inciting the
mob that March day. Al-Banna1, in a letter to the Patriarch, denied
Brethren involvement and said that he had sent a letter to branch
125organizations reminding them of their obligations to dhiromis.
He, the Patriarch and the Majlis Mill! all exchanged letters emphasizing
125the importance of national unity. The government, whose officials
had taken no action to stop the mob, sent an apology to the local
Bishop; and the provincial governor organized a festival of unity, to
127which an estimated 10,000 people came. According to the British,
the government was partly responsible for the incident because it was
still employing ethnic propaganda, through elements like the Brethren, 
128against the Wafd. In fact, only a month after the fire a Palace
121. It is not clear whether the Metropolitan was working on his own or 
at the behest of the Patriarch. DW ^Abdin Palace Archives: 
Tawa’if Diniyya 1. Memorandum 15, 8 December19^6.
122. Ibid. These were not, however, the last articles which Musa 
contributed on the subject of the Brethren.
123. Mi?r, 1 April 19^7, p.l.
12 *^ Zbid-, pp.l, k.
125. FO.371/63020, J17H3/79/16.
126. FO.371/63020, J1952/79/16.
127. FO.371/63020, J1630/79/16.
128. Ibid.
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official announced that the government would support the efforts of the 
129Muslim Brethren.
Both the Copts and the British noticed that the church fire
130coincided with the British evacuation of the Delta. Some Copts
were beginning to doubt the wisdom of British withdrawal. The only
official British reaction was a letter to the Prime Minister, expressing
concern about the riot and for the safety of British lives and property 
131in the area. The Brethren blamed the fire on the long-suffering
British, and their 'Ikhwan al-Muslimln accused the British of trying
to divide the Egyptians. When Murqus Sergius held a meeting to discuss
132the arson, he was accused of collaborating with the British. Both
'Akhbar al-Yawm and Buz al-Yusuf speculated that the British provoked
the incident to demonstrate that the Egyptians were incapable of
133governing themselves.
Most Cabinets courted the Brethren in the hope of directing their
prodigious zeal against political opponents. Both al-Manara al-
Misriyya and Misr were angered by the government's failure to control
the Brethren. In October 19U8 Murqus Sergius drew up a petition,
calling for the dissolution of the Brethren and all organizations
which mixed religion and politics and were detrimental to equality,
13Uand then circulated it among Coptic notables. In the wake of a
number of political assassinations and the discovery of the Brethren's 
secret paramilitary apparatus, the government finally acted by
135dissolving the society in December 19^8- The Copts were relieved, 
but the Brethren continued to operate underground and were implicated
129- Mikha'il, Farriq Tasud, p.llU, quoting Misr, 27 April 19^7-
130. FO.371/63020, J1630/79/16.
131. FO.371/62991, J2^06/l3/l6.
132. Al-Manara al-Migriyya, 31 May 19^7, pp.1-3.
133. FO.371/63020, J17^3/79/l6; FO.371/63029, J2kll/13/l6.
13^. Sergius wrote the petition after receiving letters of concern from 
Copts. FO.liH/1296, 506/3/H8.
133. Misr. 10 December 19^8, p.l.
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in the sacking of a Coptic church in 19^9-"^^ They were also
involved in a number of minor incidents, like removing crosses from
137the tops of churches.
The Brethren were not hampered in their activities for long.
The Wafd returned to power, partly through Brethren assistance, in
1950 and felt weak enough to need continued Brethren support.
Despite the fact that its relations with the Brethren were not always
easy, the latter was allowed to operate relatively freely. The
Copts were somewhat disenchanted with the Wafd party by this point;
and, although Misr did claim to be pleased with the formation of a Wafd
Cabinet, it was unhappy with the party’s conciliatory attitude toward 
138
the Brethren. Certainly the paper had good reason to be concerned.
During the campaign, the Wafdist press had praised the principles of
the Brethren, defended them from various criminal charges and called
139the persecution of previous governments unjustified. Misr again
insisted that any society which wanted to divide the Egyptian people
1^0by establishing a religious dictatorship be banned. The paper
lUlcontinued to attack the Brethren and, by the autumn of 1951, was
publishing daily complaints about incidents of religious fanaticism.
There were anti-Coptic demonstrations in Cairo, with marchers shouting
"Christianity is finished in Egypt", "One faith in Egypt - Islam", and
lU2"Today the English, tomorrow the Christians". One activity of the
136. In Giza. F0.371/73U66, J919/1015/16.
137. FO.lUl/1333, 38/58A9G.
138. Misr, h March 1950, p.3.
139- FO!371/803^8, E1016/U2/50; FO.371/80351, E1018/1/16. 
lUo. Misr, 1 November 1950. p.l.
lUl. See Misr, 2 June 1950, p.l and 5 May 1951, p.l.
1^2. See The Times, press clippings on Egypt, 13 November 1951- Even 
the Vatican was concerned.
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Cairene Brethren at this time was to visit heavily Coptic quarters 
and paint crosses on the houses.
To the Copts, the government’s December 1951 decision to restore 
the property of the Brethren was a sign that the Wafd finally had 
renounced its commitment to national unity. The sacking of a Suez 
church less than a month later underlined the fact that the Wafd would 
put its own interests ahead of the safety of those people who had for 
so many years seen the party as their best hope.
On H January 1952, a Coptic church, school and Benevolent Society 
building were destroyed and three Copts murdered by a mob in Suez.
The government did nothing to stop the mob but probably had little 
control in an area that had become a theatre for guerrilla war against 
British troops. There was much fighting and little co-ordination.
The mob, deciding that religion dictated political allegiance, murdered 
the three Copts on the assumption that they must be British spies.
lUUSome blamed the British for the incident, but it was also rumoured
lU5
that the Brethren were responsible. There were certainly many
Brethren fighting in the area. The Patriarch, probably under
1H6considerable political pressure, exonerated the Brethren publicly. 
Makram cUbaid, always ready to befriend the Brethren, visited Hassan
1^3. Interview, Zahir Riyad, Chairman, African Studies Department, Coptic 
Higher Research Institute, 1 June 1979* 
lUU. Suez notables issued a pamphlet calling for inter-communal co­
operation and warning against plots to divide Copts and Muslims.
See Misr, 8 January 1952, p.2. Muhammad 'Anis seems to accept 
this interpretation when he suggests that it was confirmed that one 
of the riot's instigators worked in a British military camp, but it 
is difficult to extrapolate any firm meaning from this. See 'Anls,
Hariq al-Qahira 26 January 1952 (Beirut 1972), pp.23-5.
IU5. Migr, 18 January 1952, p.2.
lU6. Hot only was the Patriarch visited by 'Ibrahim Faraj and al-Wahhas, 
but Makram ^ Ubaid also paid a call.
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al-HadaiVxi, the Supreme Guide; and the two of them, along with other
Brethren officials, chatted about the inviolability of national unity.
Makram then invited al-Hadaibi to visit the Patriarch and the two men
1^7did so on 18 January.
Coptic communities all over Egypt responded quickly. Telegrams
of grief and protest were sent to the government and the Palace.
lU8Copts demanded that the government act promptly. The Patriarch and
the Majlis Milli announced that Christmas would be a time of mourning
and not celebration. The government tried to dissuade the church from
making this very public gesture, but failed. 'Ibrahim Faraj, the
only Copt in the Cabinet, carried the government's apologies to the
Patriarch. Al-Nahhas both telephoned the Patriarch and paid a personal
visit to express his grief and announced a grant of £E5,000 to rebuild 
1^9the church. The Majlis Milli rejected the compensation and demanded
an investigation in its place; as Misr commented, the money could not
replace lives. The paper blamed the government for failing in its duty
to protect all Egyptian citizens.1'50 The government finally agreed to
conduct an investigation.1'51
The Copts were understandably annoyed that the government made
no official <xnnouncement about the incident. Cairene Copts demonstrated
outside the Patriarchate and one group shouted that although the burning
152of the church was a great crime, silence was an even greater crime.
This was perhaps a comment on the inadequate response of both the
lU7- Misr, 18 January 1952, p.l.
ikQ. DW cAbdIn Palace Archives: Tawa'if Diniyya 1.
1^9. Al-Nahhas, to emphasize his generosity, noted that he had increased
'Ibrahim Faraj1s proposed sum of £E2,000. Misr, 8 January 1952, p.l.
150. Misr, 8 January 1952, p.l, and 11 January 1952*, p.l.
151. It was not only important to the Copts to have the blame assessed, 
but they wanted it proved that the three Copts who were murdered 
were not British spies.
152. Misr, lA January 1952, p.l, and 15 January 1952, p.2.
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Patriarch and the government. Al-Nahhas followed Faraj’s footsteps
and made two visits to the Patriarchate in a further attempt to placate
153
angry Copts and finally made a statement deploring the incident.
Messages of "brotherhood were broadcast on the radio, and the Palace
sent two of its people to the Patriarch to express King Faruq's grief.
15U
To many Copts, however, these fine words meant little. Copts
particularly questioned the behaviour of ’Ibrahim Faraj; the editor 
of Misr condemned Faraj for failing to take steps to clear the atmosphere 
which had produced the incident. Many Copts wanted Faraj to resign.
The contemporary Egyptian historian, Muhammad ’Anis, believes that 
the incident was so well handled by the government that it did not lead
157to the threatened withdrawal of the Copts from the nationalist movement.
His conclusion seems unduly optimistic. The Copts did not think that 
the government’s reponse was satisfactory; they would have preferred 
to see the Wafd take more of a stand on communal violence before it 
culminated in the Suez riot. They had unsuccessfully begged the 
government for some time to keep a tighter rein on the Brethren. In 
many ways, Suez was the coup de grace, the blow that destroyed any 
remaining confidence in the goals of the nationalist movement and in 
the ability of Copts and Muslims to co-exist in peace. As Misr’s 
articles continued to prove, the Copts were not conciliated by the 
government’s actions. Without a commitment to equality, the nationalist 
movement could not retain the loyalty of a minority no longer certain of 
its place in a shifting society.
153. Misr, 11 January 1952, p.l, and 17 January 1952, p.2.
15^. Misr, 18 January 1952, p.l.
155* Misr, 11 January 1952, p.l.
156. ’Anis, HarTq al-Qahira, pp. 23-**.
157. tbid., pp.22-5, 1(5-7.
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E. Summary
Ethnic propaganda should not he considered in isolation from the 
more purely religious propaganda, hut was a natural outgrowth and, 
for some, the constant companion of the use of religion in politics. 
Increasing concern with the public role of religion made a reliance on 
sectarian appeals more profitable and eventually drove many Copts out 
of the political arena. The formation of the Society of the Coptic 
Nation in 1952, indicates how disaffected many young Copts had become.
Those legitimate political parties who leant most heavily on
ethnicity and religion tended to be tied to the Palace. Their tactics
were as indicative of their weakness as was the alliance. The Wafd,
perhaps more honourable in its greater strength, represented "as
near as possible.... a lay tendency in Egyptian administration and 
158politics". For many years, the Copts expected that whenever the
Wafd came to power, the state's attitude toward them would change for 
the better. The anti-Wafdist press also promoted this view, but its 
aim was to prove that the Wafd acted to limit Muslim access to the 
institutions of an Islamic state and that it showed insufficient 
sensitivity to the religious feelings of the majority. The Wafd made 
very little use of the ethnic weapon; but as its strength and support 
faded, it did turn increasingly to religion and finally ended by 
pandering to groups like the Muslim Brethren. Its inability to stand 
fast on its secular principles undermined everything for which it had 
originally fought. The most severe censure, however, must be reserved 
for those others, principled or otherwise, whose activities not only 
weakened the new political system, but sometimes made mockery of the old 
one by placing Coptic lives, property and the right to worship in jeopardy.
158. FO.371/2091*+, J3809/369/16.
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CONCLUSION
"RELIGION IS GOD'S AND THE 
HOMELAND THE PEOPLE'S"*
This formulation, which expresses the conviction that there was 
a fundamental separation between religion and state, seems to have been 
coined by Tawfiq Dus in 1911. It was the only statement to come out 
of the Coptic Congress in 'Asyut that was not only accepted by many 
Muslims but was raised by them to the level of political cant. It 
became a favourite slogan of nationalists and politicians.1 Although 
cheapened by frequent repetition and increasingly irrelevant with time, 
it neatly summarized the main political hope of the best educated 
and most vocal segment of the Coptic community; a segment which wanted 
to build a state free from religious bias and a religion free from 
state interference and, at the same time, gain its own freedom from 
ecclesiastical control.
With the creation of a new political system came new opportunities 
to realize that hope. It was to this end, an escape from the 
uncertainty of marginality, that the Copts’ advocacy of democratic 
government, secularism, civil equality and integration in its 
widest sense were aimed. Many worked to develop a new collective 
identity with new ways of interacting for Muslims and Copts. Throughout 
the 1920s, their enthusiasm for this political and social experiment was 
matched by that of many Egyptian Muslims who seemed willing to make 
concessions of power In order to achieve true unity.
* "Al-Din 1-Allah w-al-Watan 1 il-Jami^. "
1. It was quoted from time to time by Makram and al-Nahhas. The latter
still relied on it as late as 1951 when its bearing on reality was
slight. Misr, 17 January 1951, p.l. See also Misr, 3 March 193*+,
p.l, for an early editorial comment on the slogan’s’meaninglessness.
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This experiment was advanced by a number of secondary factors. 
Political energies were largely consumed by the struggle against the 
British who assisted the development of unity by providing an enemy 
against whom Copts and Muslims could join forces. In addition, 
relatively few groups were competing for political power; and the 
main one, the Wafd, helped ensure that Coptic participation in politics 
was not only tolerated but applauded. It was, of course, an advantage 
that the new political ideas were from outside Egypt and were not 
associated with either ethnic group, although eventually Western 
political forms were discredited in the minds of some by their 
association with foreign Christian power. However, early and fairly 
widespread adherence to these ideas and forms permitted the emergence 
of a Coptic elite with political aspirations. In the traditional 
structure, of course, Coptic notables had found their opportunities for 
advancement and power restricted to the civil service and the 
ecclesiastical and economic sectors; and, as noted previously, the 
first and last did not always allow unlimited advancement.
At a time when the British were slowly and reluctantly relinquishing 
power to the Egyptians, some Copts thought it folly to cling to the 
older ways whose safety appeared both illusory and unnecessary when the 
new arrangements offered a heady, if uncertain, reward for victory.
It was clear that Muslims were going to outlast the British, and that 
a partnership with the former held the promise of a security far 
greater than that provided by the latter, whose first priority had 
never been Coptic well-being.
Not all Copts subscribed to this new venture or supported it 
without reservation. Some, and particularly those in the church, 
were reluctant to risk their special governing arrangements and culture
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on what they saw as the far from certain success of this experiment 
in political and social integration. They wished instead to protect 
a system they knew and understood, one which had worked reasonably 
well in the past and which had, perhaps more important, given them 
power. True integration would have completely upset the balance of 
power in the Coptic community, and there were some who had already 
found the struggle with laymen in the Majlis Mill! trying enough. In 
addition, these Copts were suspicious, not necessarily of the intentions 
of Muslims offering equality, but of the durability of the Muslims' 
support and of their ability to deliver genuine equality.
As many of these Copts suspected, Egypt was not a tabula rasa,
and centuries of a particular political tradition could not be so
easily erased. There was little agreement on what was an appropriate
role for religion in this society, and religion inevitably worked its
way into the new arrangements. One scholar has pointed out how
difficult it was for Muslims, who had long seen themselves as the
natural political community, to accept Western political and social
concepts which dictated sharing power with people they had scorned and
2
ruled for centuries. For Christians, of course, the borrowing was 
easier. They had little to lose and much to gain, or so many thought. 
No matter what effect this new system had on the church, it still held 
out the promise of more individual power and greater equality.
Over the course of this period, Egyptians were drawn into a closer 
relationship with their state. The number of government institutions 
with which Egyptians had to deal and the number of statutes which 
regulated their lives increased. Given the clear direction of this
2. Robert Haddad,Syrian Christians in Muslim Society (Princeton 1970),
p . 8 8 .
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new association with the state, It was perhaps not unwise to aim for a 
formal say in running that state. Even had the millet not been weakened 
from within by reformers seeking to eliminate corruption and waste and 
by secularists eager to be free of its restrictions, it would eventually 
have been destroyed from without by a state hungry for more power.
The Egyptian state’s attitude toward the Copts manifested itself
3
in three somewhat contradictory practices. It aided the maintenance 
of Muslim supremacy by countenancing private and practising public 
discrimination. At the same time, it adhered to a political ideology 
which declared all men equal and which tried to replace a communal 
identity with a national one. It also offered, in a practice long 
sanctioned by tradition, the status of the majority to those who 
assimilated. While few Copts followed the path of ultimate assimilation 
and converted to Islam, a number of politicians managed to divest their 
ethnic identity of any significant content. In 1922 the state did 
contemplate a fourth method of dealing with minorities, viz., the 
formal incorporation of communal loyalties into the political system; 
however, the rejection of proportional representation in Parliament 
by the Constitutional Commission ruled out this approach. This was 
not, however, the last time that some Copts would express a preference 
for this method which would have guaranteed their separate political 
existence hut would not, at least initially, have granted them 
appreciably more power. By 19^6, with political activity increasingly 
fragmented, minority representation made more sense. Even Salama Musa 
who had scoffed at the idea in 1922, became an advocate. In a much 
divided Parliament, even a small number of closely aligned delegates 
could have considerable influence.
3. See an interesting article by Milton Esman on state policies toward 
minorities, "The Management of Communal Conflict", Public Policy 21 
(1973), pp.>+9~78.
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During much of the 1920s, hopes invested in the new political 
arrangements seemed to bear some fruit and many Copts were reasonably 
satisfied with the progress made toward equality. What perhaps they 
overlooked was the ease of granting disadvantaged minorities a larger 
slice of the pie when an economy is relatively prosperous. When that 
same economy is static or shrinking, however, any improvement in the 
minority's situation is likely to be interpreted as a comparable and 
unacceptable loss to the majority and can trigger sectarian tensions.
The increasingly desperate economic situation from the 1930s and the 
government's unwillingness to help the poor, had a deleterious effect 
on intercommunal relations by increasing social tensions generally.
Coptic hopes began to evaporate. The failure of Egypt's democratic 
institutions to work as planned and the increasing role played by Islam 
in political mobilization caused great unease in Coptic circles.
Copts came to realize that the price of political acceptance was 
assimilation, the sacrifice of their ways for those of the majority.
Coptic support for the nationalist movement was useful. It brought 
more activists into the struggle and proved Muslim tolerance to sceptical 
outsiders. It was never, however, either essential to the success of 
the movement or vital to governing the country. As the British 
relinquished more and more power, the need for the Copts was less and 
less. Particularly after the 1936 treaty was signed, the usefulness 
of Westernized Copts who could so eloquently present Egyptian views 
to the European powers was diminished. By the 19^ -Os , those marks of 
Westernization, such as Makram1s first name, Ghali's French poetry, 
and the Wisas' Protestantism were increasingly suspect. Unfortunately, 
many of these politically active Copts had no other identity open to 
them; they had long since chosen European over Egyptian culture.
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As it "became clear that the new government was not able to carry 
out the promises made in the Constitution, some Copts, like those whose 
voice Misr was, first pointed out defects In the hope of remedying them 
and later became more and more prepared to promote the special interests 
of their group. This was perhaps less a matter of protecting their 
cultural integrity than of preserving that quantum of power that had 
previously been held by them. They had been willing to make sacrifices 
In some areas in order to achieve what were perceived of as greater 
gains in others. Once the latter turned out to be mainly illusory, 
they felt compelled to fight for all the old protections. Perhaps one 
of the reasons the reformers were still fighting so hard for control of 
the church at the end of the monarchy was that they saw it as a vehicle 
for fighting oppression and protecting the community. If they could 
only reform the institution, then they could make it serve the whole 
range of present-day needs from running schools to lobbying the 
government. The clergy, in general, vitiated this plan not only by 
their near-sightedness and stubbornness but by their quiescent loyalty 
to the monarchy. The Liaison Committee and the church's behaviour 
over the Suez murders and church sacking in 1952 are some of the first 
signs of a break in that quiescence.
The 1938 election campaign was one turning point. It forced upon 
many Copts the realization that they could not act in politics without 
risk to themselves, their party and their community. Some perhaps saw 
that both Palace and government were following the practice of medieval 
rulers who allowed the mob to vent Its frustrations upon a vulnerable 
and disliked minority as a means of defusing resentments having little 
to do with minority behaviour and much generally to do with that of the 
government. A more serious turning point came with the general
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loosening of political restrictions at the end of the war. Intolerance 
of the Coptic right to participate in politics "became widespread among 
Muslims. As Misr dismally concluded in the late 19^0s, there was no 
equality in Egypt, and nor was there ever likely to "be any.
The extent to which Coptic communal demands snowballed in this 
decade is curious but may merely reflect the wide-ranging complaints 
levelled at minority behaviour by Muslims. Complaints about the 
prohibition on ringing church bells and the refusal to admit Copts to 
the Arabic Language Academy were routinely coupled with grimmer accounts 
of communal violence and often received the same weight. These 
grievances seemingly compounded one another and added up to a whole that 
may have seemed far greater than the sum of the parts. Discrimination 
no doubt was more of a problem in the Egypt of 19^7 than the Egypt of 
1927s but the more vigorous and belligerent discussion of the problem 
by both sides certainly added to that problem and increased tensions.
No doubt part of the Copts' belligerence was due to a keenly felt sense 
of betrayal; while discrimination had been an accepted and legitimate 
part of the traditional system, it was a clear moral and legal wrong in 
democratic Egypt. There was a larger gap between the ideal and the 
real, and this perhaps unsettled the Copts. They understood their 
position under the millet sytem; in democratic Egypt, they could not 
be sure where they stood. This last is particularly true given the 
number of groups, operating in the political sphere, who only adhered 
in part or not at all to the constitution.
By this time, Muslims were inclined to see a malign Coptic hand 
in everything. The Copts were thought to be conspiring to monopolize 
the civil service, take over the government and help the British and 
the missionaries in their nefarious designs. Muslims did not, however,
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develop any coherent and well-thought-out conspiracy theories. Not 
a single individual, nor any group or movement, in Egypt, sought to 
build political power on an anti-Coptic foundation alone. In some 
cases, the use of sectarian propaganda was almost offhand; in all 
cases, it was a supplement and not the main diet. This propaganda was 
never very systematic or sophisticated. It most often echoed 
traditional sentiments about the place of the Copts and expressed the 
feeling, sometimes In print and sometimes in violence, that as a people 
the Copts had risen above their proper station. This is a key point; 
as Shaikh al-Maraghi acutely observed, the problem was as much social
kas it was political or religious. A reversal of the natural order 
had occurred, and this demanded an adjustment in the relative positions 
of the two peoples.
Curiously, given Salama Musa’s advanced and sometimes eccentric 
views, his career provides a kind of paradigm for the community. Like 
so many of his co-religionists , he approved of the British role In 
Egypt before the First World War. He became, after the war, a 
committed nationalist and secularist and was, for some time, an ardent 
supporter of the Wafd. These commitments also paralleled those of 
many Copts. As the father of Egyptian socialism, he was not interested 
in church or communal affairs; like many Coptic politicians, he leant 
toward a wider national or even international perspective. In spite 
of this, he had retreated, by the mid-19*+0s, into communalism. He was 
always a forceful advocate, whether of nationalism or Coptic rights, 
but his influence on the Coptic community was probably at its height 
between 19*+5 and 1952 when he was writing for the newspaper Misr. His
U. FO.371/2091*+ s J3809/369/16.
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communalism was less disliked than his earlier social and poltical 
radicalism, but some In the community saw his new views as dangerously 
provocative. They felt that the risks involved in repeated 
confrontation with Muslims on a wide range of issues were too great 
for so weak a community. However, the despair that lay beneath those 
views was shared. Like other Copts, Musa came to realize that the 
experiment had failed and that the Copts, as a community, required 
special protection. The clergy, much compromised by inaction and 
quiet submission, could not be relied upon and no longer seemed to 
have the power, although they did appear to wake to the danger in their 
midst toward the end of the period. Musa, as one remedy, called for 
proportional representation in Parliament and the abolition of Islam 
as the religion of state. His chances of instituting the one were 
about as great as his opportunities for disestablishing the other. He 
also demanded that Muslim religious groups be controlled by the 
government and their political activities prohibited.^ He, who had 
once promoted secular institutions, insisted on the provision of 
Christian religious instruction in government schools and air time for 
Christian religious broadcasts. If the Copts could not be genuinely 
equal, then they would have to work toward a position that would grant 
them safety through separation.
A small segment of the Coptic community did become, along with 
Salama Musa, politicized In the face of this increasing Muslim hostility. 
However, with the sole exception of Murqus Sergius who, like Salama Musa, 
belongs to a special category, not one Coptic politician became a communal 
politician. The policies and thinking of most Coptic politicians so
5. See his mocking suggestion that the Copts should form organizations 
to parallel those of the Muslim Brethren and Shabab Muhammad in 
Misr, 10 May 19*+6, p.l.
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mirrored that of their Muslim counterparts that their presence at all
levels in the government probably did little to ensure Coptic interests
a hearing, let alone acceptance.^ The behaviour of 'Ibrahim Faraj in
the case of the Suez church sacking is evidence of how little such
politicians could do for the community. Some Coptic politicians had
the good fortune to die before political activity became fraught with
difficulties, and they were not replaced. Others gave up politics.
Those who remained active until the bitter end may have worked behind
the scenes to ease sectarian tensions, but they did not defend Coptic
rights publicly. By 1952 they could not have done so without opting
out of the political system and without risking their personal safety.
They had been co-opted into the ruling elite and their community had to
manage as best it could without their talents. At least in the early
period, these politicians had helped to serve as an integrating force;
but, by the 19^0s, there were fewer Coptic politicians who could serve
as a buffer for the community, and the influence of those who were
active was diminished. As the church was no longer the middleman in
government-communal affairs and had been discredited within the
community, a serious gap in representing the community's interests to
the government ultimately resulted. As early as 1 9 3 9 s  Misr stated
baldly that the Copts were thinking of abandoning Egyptian patriotism
because they had failed to build any kind of national consensus with
the Muslims, in the paper's view, Coptic access to public life was
7
and was likely to remain limited. The community began to feel that 
political action was ineffective, if not dangerous, and it withdrew to
6. See a discussion of the phenomenon with relation to other minorities 
in Cynthia Enloe, Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided
Societies (Middlesex 1980), p.226.
7* Misr, 3 March 1939s p.l.
3 3 9
the precarious safety of its ethnic boundaries. Elie Kedourie's 
conclusion about the position of the Jews In the Iraqi state has its 
parallel here: In terms of their civil responsibilities, the Copts
were Egyptians first and Christians second; when it came to 
apportioning rights, their Christianity suddenly became paramount and
g
assigned them to an inferior place.
Although co-operation among Muslim and Coptic elite facilitated 
political unity, a portion of the Muslim elite was partly responsible 
for exaggerating ethnic divisions and manipulating them for political 
gain. However large a share of the responsibility they bear for 
destroying the political hopes of the Copts, they were still less 
frightening than those who were unwilling to work within the 
constitutional limits. It was, after all, the constitution which 
established the Copts' legal equality and their right to participate 
in politics. The Copts, because of their numbers and geographic 
situation, were confined to operating within the bounds of the 
institutional framework. It was not that they opposed the rules, 
although they disliked the constitutional article naming Islam the 
religion of state, but that they objected to the fact that the rules 
had not been followed and that there was so little consensus regarding 
their legitimacy. The Copts had little choice but to play by the 
rules even when others were ignoring them. Many also believed, for 
a very long time, that the rules offered the community its very best 
hope. The only Coptic group to act outside the law was the Society 
of the Coptic Nation, whose purpose was to create a radically different 
society in part by increasing the distance between Muslims and Copts.
8. Elie ICedourie, The Chatham House Version..., p.306.
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Its fate did not recommend its measures to other Copts. Other groups, 
like the Muslim Brethren, Misr al-Fatat, and the Shabab Muhammad also 
wished to create a different kind of society, constructed on a basis 
other than the constitution, and could act more easily outside the law.
The political appeals of such groups were often based on Islam.
By the 1930s , there were a number of competitors for the privilege of 
being the foremost public exponent of Islam. This perhaps forced the 
state and the regular parties into more extreme positions on religion 
than they might otherwise have taken, although from the very beginning 
of the Constitutional Monarchy they had not entirely ignored the appeal 
of religious issues for the masses. Muslims running against other Muslims 
would beg the voters to elect them as the candidates with the greatest 
desire to protect and glorify Islam. Each group hoped to be seen as 
the one, true defender of the faith; in this endeavour, Coptic support 
could only be an embarrassment. Complaints about, discrimination 
disconcerted the government but did not move it to action. On the one 
hand, it was failing to provide what it was legally obliged to provide; 
on the other, its very failure could be commended as Muslim zeal.
There was, of course, no real notion of a loyal opposition. By 
definition, the opposition was disloyal, and one of the clearest ways of 
being disloyal was by a lack of public devotion to Islam. Islam, in 
addition, was not only a weapon against internal political opponents 
but was a powerful one against the West and the British in particular.
It was a great misfortune that the one thing that was probably most 
successful in rallying the Egyptians against imperialism was also 
something that could so easily and almost without effort be turned 
against the Copts.
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Muslims clearly relied on their religious identity to assist 
them in political organization. Religious and ethnic differences 
were manipulated by individuals, organizations and the state to 
advance interests that had little to do with ethnicity or religion. 
Perhaps because it promised at best little pay-off and at worst to 
exacerbate problems, the Copts, by and large, did not use their ethnic 
identity to organize in the political arena. As the need for communal 
defence grew, they began to use community organizations that were 
essentially non-political as platforms from which to make political 
claims and defend minority interests. It was only toward the end of 
this period and immediately thereafter that the Copts turned to their 
ethnicity to organise for political gain. The Society of the Coptic 
Nation is, of course, the most noteworthy example of this phenomenon. 
The Liaison Committee is perhaps an equally interesting development: 
various normally hostile minorities combining forces to lobby for their 
joint interests.
The attempt to achieve equality was not a total fiasco, and it 
would be wrong to stress the Copts' relative failure to become part of 
the political community in the 19^0s at the expense of their success 
in doing so during the revolution and its aftermath. The middle class 
perhaps benefited the most from the limited integration which was all 
that was ultimately achieved. The real situation of the Coptic 
peasantry probably remained largely unimproved although they too may 
have profited from the peaceful relations and good-fellowship that the 
nationalist movement for a time bestowed. Poor Copts may have 
realized, in any case, that their Muslim neighbours had as few 
opportunities as did they. Poverty was a vice more relentless than 
religion. The rich, as always, were exempt from most problems. The
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new system gave them more power, but their money and European tastes
9
gave them the option of leaving any time difficulties arose.
It was, of course, the Copts' success, however modest it might 
have appeared to them, that caused a backlash in the last part of the 
monarchy. Until almost the end, the Copts were generally adequately 
represented, at least numerically, in politics; and opposition to 
their participation, although seemingly widespread, was not unanimous. 
There was some acceptance of the fact that religion ought not to be a 
factor In politics, the bureaucracy or any sector of civil life. What 
discrimination there was was usually unofficial and informal; the 
constitutional article naming Islam the religion of state mandated no 
specific discriminatory practices to be carried out by the government. 
The Copts succeeded in making some kind of place for themselves, even 
if it was not quite the place for which they had hoped. The notion 
of equality had its adherents and at least held a potential for some 
future ascendancy. Statements of brotherly love, often spoken with 
sincerity, are still part of political rhetoric today. The ideological 
groundwork was at least laid. However threatening the situation might
have seemed in the 19^0s, the Copts were not so worried that they chose
to emigrate as they would later in the 1960s. Perhaps this was because
their economic power seemed reasonably secure.
The Copts, of course, had never been completely without honour or 
respect in their own country. Egypt, due to its homogeneity, had 
experienced less ethnic strife than many other parts of the Middle East. 
Some Copts had always reached positions of authority in the society.
New opportunities had been opened to them in this century, and what
9- Wasif Ghali's frequent response to any distress engendered by his 
government or party was to flee to Europe.
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many middle-class and perhaps even upper-class Copts probably resented 
most was what they saw as the gradual restriction or withdrawal of those 
opportunities in the 19^0s. Men who possessed the talent for politics 
or diplomacy were consigned to a career in business. Others who 
entered the professions with ambitions for judgeships or professorships 
of medicine found themselves stuck on the middle rungs of the career 
ladder. Ultimately, the Assistant Oriental Secretary's 1 9 3 7  conclusion 
was perhaps pessimistic but not wrong: as long as the Copts were content
to remain underdogs and not aspire to power, Islam would prove tolerant."*" 
Communal bonds seemed to grow stronger and more relevant as 
pressure on the Copts increased. There is something almost irrational 
about this defiant emphasis on communal ties at a time when Muslim 
hostility appeared increasingly life-threatening and the benefits of 
majority status more than usually clear. Given that the Copts believed 
that all they could win was second place, that the top awards were 
reserved for Muslims and that their lives and property were at risk, it 
Is curious that more Copts did not opt out of the system by conversion 
or emigration. Secularism had not proved to be a very satisfactory 
option. Instead, kinship, communal networks and the church became 
increasingly important to some of those trying to escape the effects 
of discrimination. In the declining years of the monarchy, Misr tried 
to persuade the Copts to act not as individuals pursuing disparate 
goals, but as a group defending common interests. The Copts had 
always had surprising freedom to form a wide variety of communal 
societies, and this privilege gave them a ready-made basis for 
organization. There were, of course, occasional Muslim objections to
10. F0.U07/221, part 122, No.5 (Enclosure). An Appreciation of the
Situation of the Copts under the new regime in Egypt by 
Mr. Hamilton, 1937-
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this prerogative, hut no serious attempt seems to have been made to 
limit it. In addition, by trying to strengthen faith, Copts like 
those who were members of the Society of the Coptic Nation, were trying 
to strengthen both the will to resist and the possibilities for 
collective action. In addition, if they could keep Copts and Muslims 
apart by emphasizing their differences rather than their similarities, 
they might ultimately be able to reduce the number of clashes. Attempts 
such as these were ultimately defeated by the fall of the monarchy and 
the institution of new regime which was less tolerant of all kinds of 
peripheral activity. The Copts no longer had to fear a gradually 
worsening communal situation with its concomitant of violence, but 
equality remained as distant a notion as ever.
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